VZCZCXRO9728
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #0372/01 0531336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221336Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7869
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000372 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E, AF/PDPA, 
IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF, DRL/RSPRING 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC
SUBJECT: PM MELES PUSHES FOR UNITED STATES TO PREVENT 
GENERALIZED CONFLICT IN SUDAN 
 
Classified By: Classified by CDA John Yates for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1.  (C) During a February 1 meeting with U.S. Special Envoy 
to Sudan Gration, Prime Minister Meles emphasized the 
importance of beginning post-2011 negotiations and convincing 
the Government of Sudan to accept the outcome of the 
referendum.  He believed that an unsuccessful referendum 
could spawn generalized conflict across Sudan, and so the 
Darfur peace process must be sped up to reach agreement.  In 
negotiating post-2011 issues, Meles said IGAD would support 
Mbeki's role on behalf of the AU, but that the United States 
must play a key role.  Meles said that the United States had 
uniquely powerful influence in Sudan, but warned that 
internal divisions in the US Administration threatened to 
diminish its stature.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan General J. Scott 
Gration traveled to Addis Ababa from January 27-February 2, 
2010 to attend the AU Summit with the U.S. delegation. 
 
Referendum is More Critical than Elections 
------------------------------------------ 
¶3.  (C) Meles began by prioritizing the referendum over 
elections as the most critical issue for the future of Sudan. 
 He believed the elections, while important, are not the 
definitive act of democratic transformation.  The Government 
of Sudan, Meles said, believes it can win the elections 
fairly, and so they appear to have a stake in making the 
elections fair and transparent.  The Government of Sudan also 
expects "serious dividends" out of the elections, such as 
easing the strains created by the Darfuri rebels and the 
International Criminal Court indictment against Sudanese 
President Omar el-Bashir. 
 
¶4.  (C) Still, Meles argued, the referendum is more critical 
than elections.  Going forward, the post-referendum plan must 
be negotiated and the Government of Sudan must be convinced 
that separation is not only an option, but the most likely 
one.  In the likely event of separation, Meles believed there 
was a 90 percent chance the South would become a failed state. 
 
¶5.  (C) Meles said he raised his concerns during the AU 
Summit with the Government of Sudan and President Bashir, 
saying that the Government should work through post-2011 
issues in advance and allow for the possibility of 
separation.  Meles questioned Basher's sincerity, but 
reported that the Sudanese President stated that he preferred 
unity, but would accept separation. 
 
Referendum Could Spawn Generalized Conflict 
Across Sudan; Speed up Darfur Peace Process 
------------------------------------------- 
¶6.  (C) Meles warned that if the South explodes after the 
referendum, Darfur would follow.  To prevent the referendum 
from spawning "generalized conflict" across Sudan, Meles said 
it is incumbent to address issues in Darfur now.  He believed 
the 15 January 2010 agreement between Chad and Sudan 
represented a fundamental change in attitude, but that the 
agreement may not hold.  Chad, Meles said, may not want to 
"bank on an agreement" and may "hedge its bets", which could 
be interpreted as hesitation in Khartoum, and the agreement 
could fall apart.  To increase the likelihood that the 
agreement will succeed, Meles believed that Chad needed 
reassurances that the United States and others would handle 
whatever "regional consequences they fear" and primarily with 
Libya. 
 
¶7.  (C) On the Darfur peace process, Meles said that 
negotiations were hindered by inefficiencies that made it 
slow to reach agreements.  To increase the efficiency of the 
process, Meles believed that (a) the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) must recognize that the 15 January Chad-Sudan 
agreement as a game changer and (b) "declare Doha a 
tremendous success, close it down, make it a sideshow if 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000372  002 OF 003 
 
 
necessary," relocate talks to Darfur, and assign a deadline. 
Meles believed that moving the Darfur peace process to Darfur 
proper would help "clear the deck" and "get fingers out of 
the pie" by cutting out the meddling of the Qataris, 
Egyptians, and other regional players-meddling which Meles 
believe occurred because the United States was absent.  The 
Government of Sudan, he said, was not enthusiastic about 
holding talks in Qatar in the first place, but allowed them 
because they did not want to offend the Emir and because they 
thought the Qataris could influence JEM to be flexible.  He 
believed the if the United States could get the Europeans on 
board with the idea of relocating talks, then the Africans 
would also be on board, and the peace process could move more 
quickly. 
 
Post-2011 Talks: Mbeki to Lead, IGAD Takes Back Seat 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
¶8.  (C) Though both North and South say they are ready to 
negotiate post-2011 issues such as borders and citizenship 
rights, Meles said that "nobody would call their bluff or 
hold their feet to the fire."  Therefore, he believed it was 
critical to get the parties to sit down and test their will 
to negotiate. 
 
¶9.  (C) On the role of IGAD in negotiating post-2011 
discussions, Meles believed that IGAD needed to be involved, 
but that Mbeki could play the lead role on behalf of the AU 
and IGAD.  He warned that unless the parties in Sudan know 
Mbeki has the backing of the United States, Mbeki would not 
make much headway.  Discussing the background of AU and IGAD 
involvement in post-2011 negotiations, Meles said, was 
looking to have a say in the process and that IGAD, enshrined 
in the CPA, was simultaneously staking its claim.  Despite 
some jockeying between the AU and IGAD, Meles said that "now 
it's no longer a game.  It's serious:  it's about making 
peace."  He concluded that if the AU and Mbeki were present 
in negotiations, IGAD would take a back seat, but that the 
United States could not be absent. 
 
US Holds Key Chips, but Internal USG Divisions 
Could Diminish Influence 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶10.  (C) Meles believed the United States would play a 
critical role in these negotiations.  He said both North and 
South are pragmatic and respect power, which they see in the 
United States and not elsewhere.  For Khartoum, Meles argued, 
"the United States is the party to the conflict; the South is 
a sideshow."  He explained that the real issue for the North 
is not just oil, but the haranguing of the United States 
about the South and Darfur.  Meles concluded that the United 
States holds the &key chips8 with Khartoum, but that it 
cannot successfully negotiate with the Government of Sudan 
without including the possibility of "getting the United 
States off their back," which Khartoum knows will not happen 
unless Darfur is also resolved. 
 
¶11.  (C) Meles said that the United States is being asked to 
step in so that Sudan has a real chance of avoiding 
catastrophe.  He emphasized that while African countries are 
not concerned that the United States will impose solutions, 
it should "back home-grown solutions with full force," 
including the AU High-Level Panel's report on Sudan, and play 
a quiet, but active role behind the scenes. 
 
¶12.  (C) At the conclusion of the meeting, Meles warned that 
internal divisions in Washington threatened to diminish US 
influence, and "the United States would be bit players like 
everyone else."  Africans, he said, do not understand the 
full power of Congress, but worry about the unity of the 
executive branch.  If they see that the Administration is 
behind the strategy and that "both feet of the United States 
are in the same place," they will ignore what advocates and 
some Congressmen are saying against the strategy and the 
United States will be able to assume a greater role. 
 
Participants in Prime Minister Meles Meeting: 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000372  003 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶13.  (U) General J, Scott Gration, U.S. special Envoy to Sudan 
Cameron Hudson, Director of Operations, Office of the U.S. 
Special Envoy to Sudan 
Miriam Estrin, Special Assistant to the Special Envoy, Office 
of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan 
Charge D'Affaires, Ambassador John M. Yates 
Kathryn Pongonis, Deputy Political/Economic Counselor, U.S. 
Embassy Addis Ababa, Control Officer 
 
¶14.  (U) SE Gration's Office has cleared on this cable. 
YATES