VZCZCXRO7636
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #0342/01 0501032
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191032Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7825
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0547
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 8078

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 000342 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AF/RSA, AND IO/UNP, 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
BRUSSELS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MASS MCAP AU
SUBJECT: USAU: SOMALIA MINISTERIAL TURNS HEATED 
 
REF: NAIROBI 191 
 
Classified By: USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle, reasons 1.4 (b, d). 
 
This message is from USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: A regular meeting of AMISOM 
troop-contributing countries (TCCs) is fraught with 
recriminations and increased frustration, particularly on the 
part of the Somali Minister of Defense.  Ethiopia announces 
what appears to be a landmark diplomatic breakthrough that 
would bring Alhus Sunnah wal Jamaah (ASWJ) into the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) fold, integrating 
fighting forces and sharing regional administration. The 
agreement is expected by month's end.  Senior military 
officials warn of al-Shabaab preparations for a USS Cole-type 
attack aimed at shutting down operations in the Port of 
Mogadishu and worry about 9/11-type threats against AMISOM. 
The Force Commander repeated requests for maritime 
interdiction assets, passenger screening technology for the 
Mogadishu Airport, air defense radar, attack helicopters, 
unmanned aerial vehicles, and technical assistance in 
developing and executing a media campaign.  The United 
Nations asks prospective donors to get off the fence and help 
create a "fragile government from a failed state," warning 
the international community that this missed opportunity 
could condemn Somalia to a future that is frighteningly 
similar to its recent past.  End Summary. 
 
Detente 
------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) At the monthly ministerial meeting on the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Ethiopian Vice Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Tekeda Alemu made a rare appearance to 
brief Ministers of Defense from troop-contributing countries, 
the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security, and 
partners on a recent diplomatic breakthrough. Tekeda reported 
that the government of Ethiopia (GOE) had recently 
facilitated a watershed agreement between the TFG and ASWJ in 
which the two parties agreed to coordinate their activities, 
integrate their security forces, and share regional 
administrative duties on the basis of the TFG's charter and 
the Djibouti Process.  TFG and ASWJ negotiators agreed to 
continue reconciliation efforts with all parties seeking 
peace in Somalia in order to broaden the TFG's base. They 
also agreed to establish a National Advisory Council of Ulema 
(Muslim scholars) with the objective of preserving Somali 
religion.  Tekeda added the caveat that while the two parties 
had agreed to cooperate while in Addis Ababa, neither had 
signed the agreement, each having to return to their 
respective constituencies for final approval.  Tekeda 
anticipated formal signature before the end of February, and 
appealed to the international community to support this 
process.  (Comment: While Tekeda probably understated 
Ethiopia's role in brokering the February 13 agreement, not 
everyone is as optimistic about its chances for success.  The 
ASWJ is not monolithic, and its representatives at the Addis 
talks may not represent all ASWJ factions.  End Comment.) 
 
Maritime Insecurity 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) AMISOM Force Commander, Major General Nathan Mugisha, 
reported a looming maritime threat that demands immediate 
international attention.  AMISOM has proof that al-Shabaab is 
preparing at least two small boats with explosives to conduct 
a USS Cole-type attack with the aim of rendering the Port of 
Mogadishu unusable by large resupply vessels.  Mugisha 
reminded the assembly that AMISOM's maritime assets were in 
poor repair and not up to the task of harbor protection, much 
less escorting ships for the final five vulnerable miles to 
port.  Per Mugisha, the Somali Coast Guard also has capable 
mariners, but absolutely no functioning vessels.  Mugisha 
expressed frustration that this shortcoming has been debated 
for a year, with international promises of assistance but no 
fulfillment of the pledges. In response, the United Nations 
Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) representative reminded the 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000342  002 OF 004 
 
 
audience that certain AU member states possess maritime 
surveillance assets and encouraged collective diplomatic 
pressure on these states to make those assets available to 
AMISOM. 
 
Death From Above 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Mugisha also elucidated an aerial threat.  AMISOM, 
he said, has air defense guns but no capability to detect 
approaching aircraft.  He asked not only for radar, but also 
for unmanned aerial vehicles to assist with force protection 
and aerial surveillance.  Mugisha also appealed for basic 
airport security equipment to screen passengers, alluding to 
9/11 type threats to his headquarters. 
 
Still Losing the Propaganda War 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Despite now having three radio broadcast stations, 
Mugisha lamented that only the TFG-controlled station was 
operational.  Even the TFG's radio, he implied, is not 
effective because of a lack of technical capacity to prepare 
and deliver timely messages designed to divide the enemy and 
tout the successes of the TFG and AMISOM.  (Note: In the past 
year, the USG and the UN have both provided hardware and 
limited training for two radio stations in addition to the 
TFG-owned radio.  However, sources told USAU separately that 
politics and an inept public information officer within the 
office of the Special Representative for the Chairperson of 
the Commission (SRCC) are preventing the radios from going on 
the air.  UNSOA has the authority and money set aside for 
technical assistance and messaging, but is lacking only a 
signature from the SRCC.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Mugisha stated that his forces are constantly 
accused of disproportionate response and collateral damage in 
the extremist-dominated media.  AMISOM needs help in 
operationalizing its radio and develop its media campaign, 
said Mugisha. 
 
 
Boss Rants 
---------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Somali Defense Minister Abdulla Boss Ahmed amplified 
Mugisha's frustration with the worn-out promises of the 
international community and the incessant debates at the AU. 
He directed most of his anger at the AU and the European 
Union (EU), blasting partners for failing to make good on the 
majority of promises made at the March Pledging Conference in 
Brussels, and then blaming the AU for holding up transfer of 
the pittance that had been paid. The security sector, said 
Boss, is the most important sector.  None of the 
international community's other initiatives will succeed in 
Somalia without a foundation of security.  How is it that 
only about $3 million of the pledged $38 million has been 
received by the TFG? 
 
¶8. (SBU) Boss claimed to have 9,980 "former TFG" troops under 
arms in Mogadishu, as well as 2,000 ASWJ fighters loyal to 
the TFG.  Only 5,000 of these troops receive stipends, 
however.  Boss warned of impending mutiny if the 
international community continues to pay only a fraction of 
the Somali National Forces (SNF).  Boss also appealed for 
international assistance for Ogadeni fighters staging in 
Kenya.  He indicated that it would be beneficial to open a 
second front with these fighters, but that they lack 
equipment and ammunition. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Boss, as well as the UN Deputy Special 
Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG), made it 
clear that any future training of SNF is predicated on one 
year's post-training salary.  Boss stated that he would not 
even allow Somali trainees to be selected and transported to 
Uganda unless the EU could guarantee pay for their graduates. 
 Training without salary is simply throwing fuel on the fire, 
said Boss. 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000342  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
 
Burundian MoD Weighs In 
----------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Burundian Minister of Defense Germain Niyoyankana 
expressed similar frustration as Boss, albeit in a more 
diplomatic fashion.  The situation in Somalia is worsening 
daily, he said.  "We say the same things at every meeting. We 
make resolutions, yet nothing changes," he said.  Meanwhile, 
the enemy is getting stronger and its influence is growing. 
Niyoyankana spoke of a recent television spot on France 24 in 
which al-Shabaab paraded vehicles in broad daylight.  The 
column included armored vehicles, he said, reminding the 
audience of the adverse psychological impact such a brazen 
display can have on the Somali populace.  Some of our 
stronger partners ought to be able to strike such a convoy, 
said Germain looking at the U.S. delegation.  Alternatively, 
the international community should provide AMISOM with attack 
helicopters to interdict al-Shabaab convoys.  This appeal for 
attack helicopters was echoed by the Deputy SRSG. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Niyoyankana also appealed for UN equivalent 
stipends for AMISOM peacekeepers, in an effort to attract new 
TCCs.  He asked UNSOA to consider direct flights from 
Bujumbura to Mogadishu to avoid Burundian personnel getting 
stranded at Entebbe.  Niyoyankana asked Peace and Security 
Commissioner Lamamra for a long-overdue update on the status 
of the AU's inquiry into the March 2009 crash of the Ilyushin 
IL-76, stating the outcome was holding up payment of the 
death benefits to the families of the three Burundian troops 
who perished.  Finally, Niyoyankana questioned rhetorically 
who really owns the USG-procured equipment, suggesting that 
it was unclear whether the donated equipment really belongs 
to Burundi or is merely a loan for the peace operation. 
 
Uganda's Complaints 
------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Ugandan Minister of State for Defense Jeje Odongo 
reiterated pleas for UN reimbursement for lethal equipment 
owned by TCCs. He also asked for more lethal equipment 
donations for AMISOM troops.  Odongo put the UN on the spot 
for a response to a long-standing IGAD request for a naval 
blockade and no-fly zone to disrupt al-Shabaab resupply 
efforts.  (Note: In May 2009, the AU endorsed an IGAD request 
for a UN naval blockade on the ports of Kismayo and Merka, as 
well as no-fly zones in the vicinities of airports at KM50, 
KM90, Balidoogle, Waajid, Hudur, Isaley, Johwar, and the Gedo 
Region.) 
 
UNSOA's Appeal 
-------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Deputy SRSG Charles Petrie reported that the TFG 
has survived a year despite minimal outside assistance, and 
has emerged stronger for its effort.  He explained that the 
TFG provided direction at the December 2009 International 
Contact Group in Jeddah, and that its leadership there had 
resulted in the February 2010 breakthrough with the ASWJ. 
This success may entice skeptical potential donors to get off 
the fence and help create a "fragile government from a failed 
state."  He implored the international community not to miss 
this opportunity.  Otherwise, the future of Somalia is 
condemned to look like it has for the past 20 years. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) USAU notes the rare, perhaps unprecedented, 
appearance of Ethiopian Vice Minister Tekeda at the regular 
meeting of AMISOM TCCs, as well as his doubtful claims of 
Ethiopia's understated role in brokering the agreement 
between the TFG and ASWJ.  Perhaps more significant, however, 
was the shift in tone by some of the more regular attendees. 
USAU has never seen Somali Minister of Defense Boss so 
visibly frustrated, to the point that he lost his diplomatic 
decorum.  The Burundian and Ugandan Ministers were more 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000342  004 OF 004 
 
 
diplomatic, but also expressed unusual frustration, calling 
into account both the AU and the UN for bureaucratic snafus 
and unanswered requests. 
 
¶15. (C) Shortcomings noted by Mugisha provide opportunities 
for USG assistance.  The Department of Homeland Security, in 
conjunction with the regionally-based Offices of Regional 
Affairs, could respond to Mugisha's demand to improve airport 
security with basic equipment like magnetometers, x-ray 
machines, and explosive detection screening systems. They 
might also take advantage of this request to include Personal 
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System 
(PISCES) in the security upgrade package for Mogadishu 
Airport to capture immigration data and assist in terrorist 
interdiction. Sources tell USAU that the Mogadishu Airport 
manager would be amenable to security upgrades. 
 
¶16. (C) Another opportunity raised by Mugisha's complaints of 
extremist-dominated media might be to use funding and 
authorities resident in the Nairobi-based military 
information support team (MIST) to assist the AMISOM and the 
SRCC's office with messaging, website improvement, durable 
messaging goods, and possibly exploiting SMS text messaging 
support of AMISOM information operations.  USAU also notes 
that internal political wrangling under the previous SRCC may 
still be affecting UN support to AMISOM information 
operations.  UN sources tell USAU that they require only the 
SRCC's signature on a MOU before they can unleash millions of 
dollars of support that would provide technical specialists 
to develop and produce media messaging from a remote site in 
Nairobi. 
YATES