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C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 000331 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/C, AF/E, AND IO/UNP 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020 
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL KPKO AU
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT -- U.S. DELEGATION MEETS WITH CONGOLESE 
FOREIGN MINISTER THAMBWE 
 
Classified By: USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle, reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
This message is from USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle. 
 
¶1. (U) February 1, 2010; 2:45 p.m.; Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
 
¶2. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
Under Secretary Maria Otero 
Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson 
NSC Senior Africa Advisor Michelle Gavin 
Special Advisor Howard Wolpe 
Deputy Special Advisor Jim Yellin 
USAU Military Advisor Ellington (notetaker) 
 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Foreign Minister Alexis Thambwe Mwamba 
 
¶3. (C) Summary: On the margins of the African Union (AU) 
Summit in Addis Ababa, Congolese Foreign Minister Alexis 
Thambwe told the American delegation that both the Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the  Lord's 
Resistance Army (LRA) have been diminished, but blamed United 
Nations Mission in Congo's (MONUC) tepid operational support 
on the fact that FDLR is not yet defeated.  He cited three 
government demands on MONUC: the redeployment of all MONUC 
combat forces to Eastern Congo; MONUC-led defense sector 
reform; and a phased MONUC disengagement plan beginning with 
at least a symbolic withdrawal by June 30.  Thambwe reported 
normalizing relations with Rwanda and Uganda, but sought USG 
intervention in the growing oil dispute between Angola and 
DRC.  He predicted another LRA-type cycle of violence if 
Mbororo transhumance is not reined in by neighboring 
governments, and denied a government offensive against the 
Banyamulenge.  Thambwe indicated that the GDRC wants to move 
forward on the National Command Training Initiative 
previously proposed by Wolpe.  End Summary. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In response to A/S Carson's solicitation of 
Thambwe's thoughts on developments in DRC, the security 
situation, and the future of the MONUC, the Foreign Minister 
characterized the past 15 months as mostly positive.  He 
stated that while the FDLR and the LRA have not been 
defeated, they have been "diminished."  Thambwe chastised 
MONUC for not providing sufficient operational support to the 
Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) in its offensive against the 
FDLR, suggesting that the FDLR might have been defeated had 
MONUC not limited its support to rations and transportation. 
Things might have been different had MONUC intervened with 
all its military might, said Thambwe. 
 
Much-maligned MONUC 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Thambwe outlined three GDRC objectives regarding 
MONUC.  First, all of MONUC's combat forces should be 
relocated to Eastern DRC.  Thambwe blamed NGO pressure for 
MONUC's tepid support to Operation Kimia, and said that "if 
MONUC can't fight the FDLR, then they should go."  While he 
admitted that without MONUC's presence the GDRC would have 
lost territory in the past, Thambwe claims that the security 
situation in the Kasais, Katanga, Bas-Congo and elsewhere no 
longer merits MONUC presence. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Second, MONUC should "help us develop a real army." 
Thambwe blamed MONUC's lack of emphasis on defense sector 
reform for FARDC's ineffectiveness on the battlefield, and 
entreated the United Nations to train an unspecified number 
of brigades that would form the "backbone" of Congo's new 
army. 
 
¶7. (C) Finally, Thambwe demanded a MONUC disengagement plan. 
He indicated that MONUC's withdrawal should be phased, but 
must begin with at least a symbolic departure by the June 30 
independence day celebrations. 
 
Zero Tolerance? 
--------------- 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) When pressed about conflict and sexual violence in 
particular, Thambwe admitted that there are small pockets 
where rape continues to be a problem.  He invoked President 
Kabila's "zero tolerance" policy and claimed that military 
tribunals are investigating and prosecuting FARDC 
perpetrators, per Secretary Clinton's request. 
 
Regional Relations and Security in the East 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) On regional relations, Thambwe said that things are 
going well with Rwanda.  He reported that the presidents 
speak regularly, that ministers are in touch, and that the 
joint commission is operational.  Thambwe reported similar 
success in Congo's relations with Uganda.  He offered as an 
example of normalizing relations a hot-pursuit incident about 
three weeks earlier in which Ugandan forces chased rebels 22 
kilometers into Congolese territory.  Congo reportedly 
protested and the GOU apologized, the whole matter being 
sorted out within 24 hours, said Thambwe. 
 
¶10. (C) In response to a question about Ugandan operations 
against LRA in Northeastern Congo, Thambwe denied that 
Ugandan Peoples Defence Forces (UPDF) are engaged in combat 
operations on Congolese territory.  Only small UPDF 
intelligence units continue to operate against LRA inside 
Congo, he claimed, towing the party line.  Thambwe reported 
that while most of the LRA has decamped to the Central 
African Republic, small groups of 5-6 LRA fighters continue 
to operate in the vicinity of Garamba National Park.  Thambwe 
stated that he was not certain where Kony is located. 
 
¶11. (C) Thambwe then launched into a rather emotional 
indictment of the Mbororo people, threatening to wage war on 
the pastoralists if neighboring governments fail to rein them 
in.  (Comment: The Mbororo are a large subgroup of the Fulani 
or Peul ethnic group who span several countries in West and 
Central Africa.  Mbororo people generally practice Islam, and 
often come into conflict with cultivators as they travel in 
search of water and pasture for their livestock.  End 
Comment.)  Thambwe explained that in years past Congolese 
peasants tolerated the seasonal migration of the Mbororo, but 
that recently the pastoralists are staying longer and are 
arming themselves.  He warned implausibly that inaction now 
would lead to an LRA-type situation in a few years.  Thambwe 
said that the GDRC would ask neighboring governments to 
recall the Mbororo, and seek AU diplomatic intervention at a 
meeting in March 2010.  Failing that, Thambwe threatened 
military force.  When Carson questioned the wisdom of this 
course, Thambwe relented a bit and suggested a police action 
instead.  Carson reminded Thambwe that police actions have a 
nasty habit of escalating, and suggested as alternatives 
mediation through a regional body or an eminent personality. 
 
¶12. (C) Asked about reports of a significant offensive on the 
Banyamulenge of Minembwe (South Kivu), Thambwe told Wolpe it 
was nothing more than a pro-integration element of the 
Banyamulenge community attacking another.  One group is close 
to the GDRC and wants to integrate with the FARDC, and the 
other refuses, he explained rather unconvincingly. The only 
clashes in the Kivus these days are more police in nature, 
Thambwe claimed. (Comment: Non-GDRC sources separately told 
the American delegation of a FARDC offensive in Minembwe 
during the period January 23 to February 4 in which at least 
13 villages were attacked and pillaged by government troops 
under the overall command of Colonel Gifaru, a former Hutu 
militia Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance (PARECO) 
officer now integrated in the FARDC.  The second in command 
is reportedly Colonel Manga.  There were reportedly 4,000 
government troops participating in the offensive, comprised 
of a brigade commanded by Colonel Kazungu, the 112th 
Integrated Brigade commanded by Colonel Santos who was 
injured in the course of the fighting and replaced by a 
Mai-Mai named Mwilambwe wa Mwilambwe Brown, and two separate 
battalions from Kalehe.  End Comment.) 
 
The Western Front 
----------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Thambwe stated that the GDRC's sole preoccupation in 
the west is Congo's continental shelf.  Both DRC and Angola 
have petitioned the UN regarding their dispute over offshore 
petroleum reserves in the Cabinda area.  Angola is a friendly 
neighbor, said Thambwe, and shares ethnic groups with Congo. 
The GDRC seeks a peaceful resolution to the dispute but, 
regardless of the outcome, Thambwe warned that the Congolese 
people would accuse their government of selling out to the 
Angolans.  Thambwe suggested that a bilateral resolution was 
out of the question, despite the fact that the two 
governments had exchanged diplomatic notes on the dispute. 
Thambwe beseeched Carson for USG mediation, suggesting that 
the Congolese people would distrust the outcome of any other 
mechanism.  We are seeking your "good offices," said Thambwe. 
 This will help our president explain the eventual outcome to 
his constituency.  Without USG intervention, the only 
alternative is international court which would take years and 
risk growing violence between the oil-producing neighbors. 
 
¶14. (C) Carson recommended the International Arbitration 
Court, saying the best way to damage the USG's good relations 
with both the GDRC and the Angolan government is to get mixed 
up in an oil dispute between the two.  Carson mentioned that 
DRC faces similar challenges in other places, namely Lake 
Albert and Lake Kivu.  Thambwe added that there is also 
potential for conflict over Lake Tanganyika's natural 
resources. 
 
¶15. (C) Thambwe insisted that the USG use its good offices 
before the GDRC resorts to jurisprudence, warning that it 
might be in U.S. interest to settle out of court or risk 
having American oil companies operating in Angola brought 
before an international court and accused of stealing 
Congolese oil. 
 
National Command Training Initiative 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (SBU) In a sidebar with Wolpe, Thambwe indicated that the 
GDRC wants to move forward on the National Command Training 
Initiative previously proposed by Wolpe.  Thambwe said that 
he had spoken with President Kabila who was in complete 
agreement. 
 
Comment: 
------- 
 
¶17. (C) Thambwe was amiable, if not mendacious at times.  In 
what is a Congolese national pastime, he blamed everybody 
else for Congo's woes, with particular condemnation for 
MONUC.  MONUC probably would have been more helpful in 
anti-FDLR operations had FARDC consulted during the planning 
phase, and had the FARDC's behavior not been so 
objectionable.  Thambwe's gave an overly optimistic 
assessment of the security situation in Congo, at the same 
time probably overstating the threat from the Mbororo.  He 
also underestimated (and arguably seemed undisturbed by) the 
prevalence and severity of sexual and gender-based vilolence. 
Thambwe appeared to be extremely disingenuous regarding the 
FARDC's offensive against the Banyamulenge in South Kivu's 
high plains of Minembwe. 
 
¶18. (U) U/S Otero and A/S Carson have cleared this cable. 
S/A Wolpe has not cleared this cable. 
YATES