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DE RUEHDS #0299/01 0440742
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FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7769
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 8068

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 000299 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, NEA/ARP, NEA/IR AND IO/UNP 
NSC FOR MGAVIN 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2020 
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PTER SO AU
SUBJECT: USAU: COMMISSIONER LAMAMRA BENDS GENERAL WARD'S 
EAR ON SOMALIA 
 
Classified By: USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle, reasons 1.4 (b) and ( 
d). 
 
This message is from USAU Ambassador Michael A. Battle 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In what has become a regular exchange during 
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General Ward's 
semiannual visits to Addis Ababa, African Union (AU) Peace 
and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra broke with his 
tradition of providing a security tour d'horizon and devoted 
almost an entire hour to developments in Somalia.  He warned 
that decisive action must be taken in 2010 if the TFG is to 
be successful before the end of its mandate 18 months from 
now, including military operations to extend TFG control 
throughout Mogadishu and possible seizure of Kismayo.  He 
lamented that the long-awaited offensive by the TFG and 
AMISOM has not materialized largely because of insufficient 
international support, singling out the Arab states for 
particular condemnation. 
 
The status quo is untenable 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In what has become a regular exchange during General 
Ward's semiannual visits to Addis Ababa, Peace and Security 
Commissioner Lamamra broke with his tradition of providing a 
security tour d'horizon and instead exchanged views with his 
guests on Somalia for approximately one hour on February 9. 
The issue was fresh on Lamamra's mind as he had met with the 
Somali Deputy Prime Minister Sharif Hassan earlier that day. 
The commissioner had also visited Mogadishu just 15 days 
before, where he said one can "feel how dangerous the 
situation is."  He recounted how TFG President Sheikh 
Sharif's chief of staff warned him to stay away from the 
window of the TFG office or risk being shot by a sniper. 
 
¶3. (C) Lamamra said the AU and the international community 
can ill afford to have another year like 2009, all the 
progress of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the 
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) notwithstanding.  Something 
must be done to change the dynamic, he warned, and the TFG 
has only until October 2011 to tip the balance.  The TFG must 
demonstrate more authority than it has, alluding to a host of 
capacity challenges.  He credited the TFG for relaunching 
some government activities.  The situation in Somalia "can go 
either way," he assessed. 
 
¶4. (C) Lamamra identified two centers of gravity to shift the 
momentum in the TFG's favor.  The TFG must succeed in pushing 
al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and regaining control of the 
capital.  Lamamra also advocated denying the port town of 
Kismayo to the insurgents.  Lamamra said an eventual 
TFG-AMISOM offensive in Mogadishu is widely rumored, with 
al-Shabaab moving reinforcements from Kismayo in 
anticipation.  However, he lamented that no action has been 
taken yet. 
 
"Pay stimulates patriotism" 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) No longer is the number of friendly fighters the 
issue, Lamamra asserted.  What is needed now are salaries and 
equipment.  Lamamra reported that the government of Dubai 
recently donated 30 four-wheel drive vehicles for the 
offensive, but that the TFG lacks the heavy machine-guns to 
transform them into "technicals."  Lamamra lamented the lack 
of support to the TFG, especially by the Arab states whom the 
AU has unsuccessfully courted for months.  Besides Dubai's 
donation of vehicles, modest support has come from Libya in 
the form of $2 million for TFG salaries, and a commitment by 
Sudan to equip and transport Djibouti's AMISOM contingent. 
(Note: Lamamra said the Arab League is considering convening 
a meeting on Somalia by the end of March before the League 
holds its Summit in Libya.  End Note.) But Lamamra fears this 
is too little, too late.  "We are producing handicrafts, 
which are beautiful, when what we really need is industrial 
production."  Lamamra requested high-level USG diplomacy in 
pressuring the Arab and other states for support, citing 
Qatar and Turkey in particular. (Note: Lamamra reported that 
President Museveni is preparu)6J#QB3VZCZ 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000299  002 OF 003 
 
 
for the TFG technicals.) 
 
¶6. (C) Asked if the AU could publicly defend an 
AMISOM-supported offensive, Lamamra indicated that AU 
advocacy would accompany the campaign but not precede it. 
Explaining that the best defense is a good offense, Lamamra 
said al-Shabaab's regular attacks on AMISOM positions argues 
for offensive action to create space between the insurgents 
and friendly positions, if nothing else. 
 
¶7. (C) Lamamra reported that al-Shabaab is recruiting and is 
able to pay its fighters, some of whom are Kenyan, higher 
salaries than the TFG can offer.  He attributed al-Shabaab's 
relative purchasing power to its control of Kismayo sea port, 
and quite possibly to its connections with pirate syndicates. 
 Al-Shabaab is so brazen now that it has established training 
camps and broadcasts graduation ceremonies as part of its 
propaganda campaign.  That said, Kenyan Army maneuvers along 
the Somali border had caused al-Shabaab to shift its forces, 
indicating that its strength is insufficient to counter 
threats on multiple fronts.  Lamamra also noted al-Shabaab's 
links with al-Qaida and cited the recent killing in Mogadishu 
of a Jordanian al-Shabaab leader by his own bodyguard.  The 
suicide attacks in Mogadishu further suggest al-Qaida's 
influence. 
 
¶8. (C) Responding to a question by USAU Ambassador Battle 
about AMISOM's mandate, Lamamra was adamant that it is 
flexible enough, especially given the troop-contributing 
countries' willingness to take off the gloves.  The Force 
Commander, Major General Nathan Mugisha, wants to go on the 
offensive.  AMISOM troops would be accompanied by 
approximately 6,500 Somali Security Forces, whom Mugisha has 
been training and mentoring.  He only needs assurance that 
his fighters, Somali and AMISOM, will be remunerated, as well 
as combat multipliers like rotary wing and maritime assets. 
 
Counterpiracy tactics 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Lamamra recommended an adjustment in counterpiracy 
tactics, echoing conventional wisdom that says pirates cannot 
be defeated at sea.  International vessels engaged in 
counterpiracy should hug Somali's coastline, paying 
particular attention to the harbors and coastal villages 
pirates are known to frequent, and perhaps even disembarking 
for limited engagements.  The sea is vast, suggested Lamamra, 
but the pirates all have to return to shore sooner or later. 
 
The time for inclusion is over 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) On the political front, Lamamra said that "inclusion 
has its limits."  The TFG is representative enough. Ahlus 
Sunnah wal Jamaah (ASWJ) can be accommodated, but not 
al-Shabaab or Hizbul Islam.  In his discussion with the 
Deputy Prime Minister, Lamamra said he was told that most 
Somalis are "sick and tired" of al-Shabaab. 
 
Iran's interest in Somalia 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Lamamra reported that the Iranian foreign minister 
attended the recent AU Summit and in a meeting with the 
Somali president, offered to give the Somali Security Forces 
3,000 military uniforms.  Furthermore, if AMISOM accepts, 
Iran will supply a hospital in Mogadishu.  The Iranian 
intent, Lamamra said, is to "show they are not supportive of 
radical groups" in Somalia. 
 
Comment: 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) Most of what Lamamra said was old hat.  What was 
noteworthy, however, was that he clearly had a message to 
deliver on Somalia and, pleasantries aside, he dedicated 
almost an entire hour doing it.  Lamamra is adamant that 
action must be taken to change the status quo, and reminded 
the international community that not only is the TFG our only 
option, but it comes with an expiration date.  He is also 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000299  003 OF 003 
 
 
clearly frustrated with the lack of assistance from the 
League of Arab States and seeks USG help in changing that 
dynamic as well. 
 
¶13. (U) General Ward has not cleared this cable. 
YATES