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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000291 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ASEC SO ET
SUBJECT: ETHIOPIA:  FORMER ONLF LEADER URGES U.S. MEDIATION 
IN SOMALI REGION CONFLICT 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 2977 
 
Classified By: CDA John Yates for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) According to a former leader from the early days of 
the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Ismael Sheikh 
Abdi, continued conflict between the ONLF and the Government 
of Ethiopia (GoE) has resulted in the deterioration of 
humanitarian conditions in Ethiopia's Somali region over the 
past two years.  Ismael said he believes the GoE-created 
obstacles to humanitarian assistance and trade with conflict 
areas has led to increased smuggling, raising additional 
security risks.  He criticized the current ONLF leadership 
for planning and executing raids on humanitarian convoys and 
concludes that the ONLF's armed struggle is now doing more 
harm than good for the Somali population.  Ismael speculated 
that the ONLF would be willing to negotiate an end to the 
conflict and urged the U.S. to mediate such negotiations with 
the GoE.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) During a late 2009 trip to Jijiga, capital of 
Ethiopia's Somali Regional State, PolOff met with Ismael 
Sheikh Abdi, an ethnic Ogadeni and former leader in the 
ONLF's political wing during the 1980s and early 1990s, i.e., 
before the ONLF split with the ruling Ethiopian People's 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).  (Note:  During the 
Derg regime, Ismael participated in the armed struggle 
against the government together with the Tigrayan People's 
Liberation Front (TPLF) led by present Ethiopian Prime 
Minister Meles Zenawi.  In 1991 he was elected secretary 
general of the ONLF which, in alliance with the TPLF, 
effectively governed the Somali region until the adoption of 
the current constitution.  When the EPRDF severed its 
alliance with the ONLF in favor of the Somali People's 
Democratic Party (SPDP), Ismael left the government and the 
ONLF.  End note.) 
 
High Expectations, Dashed Hopes 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In a 90 minute conversation, Ismael described the 
early days of the EPRDF government and the ONLF's role in 
governing the Somali region.  He described strong cooperation 
between the ethnically segregated ONLF and the TPLF and an 
atmosphere of hope among Somalis that their participation in 
the government would lead to increased prosperity and 
security.  Even at that time, Ismael recalled, divisions 
within the ONLF and a lack of clarity on many policies -- 
particularly relating to autonomy, independence, and 
relations with Somalia and ethnic Somalis throughout the Horn 
of Africa -- strained party cohesion. 
 
¶4. (C) Over time, Ismael said, ONLF leaders realized that 
Meles had no intention of granting them greater autonomy in 
any form - independence, semi-autonomy, or even greater power 
within the EPRDF - leading to the eventual departure of the 
ONLF from government, and its replacement with the SPDP. 
Ismael candidly described the bitterness and hostility that 
led many in the ONLF to return to armed conflict.  He 
acknowledged that the ONLF has achieved very little, 
politically or militarily, after years of fighting.  He said 
his own frustration led him to leave political life 
altogether. 
 
Conditions Have Worsened, with Blame on Both Sides 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (C) Turning to the present, Ismael assessed that years of 
conflict, repression, and withholding of needed development 
programs and funding had left Ethiopia's ethnic Somalis worse 
off than they have been in many years.  He claimed the GoE's 
counterinsurgency tactics over the past two years in 
particular had crippled the local population.  He cited many 
of the same GoE abuses as other regional contacts (especially 
ethnic Ogadenis) cited in reftel, including warrantless 
arrests, detention without trial, and extrajudicial killing. 
According to Ismael, the GoE continues to utilize tactics 
similar to those it used in the aftermath of violent ONLF 
attacks on a Chinese oil facility in April 2007, albeit with 
lesser visibility.  Ismael said the only exception to the 
GoE's continued use of these tactics is village burning and 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00000291  002 OF 002 
 
 
rape, which have either ended altogether or reduced to such 
levels that indicate they are solitary incidents, rather than 
part of a coordinated GoE policy. 
 
¶6. (C) Ismael said the GoE's concern that the ONLF is 
"taxing," stealing, and otherwise benefiting from 
humanitarian relief supplies brought into the region by the 
UN and NGOs is entirely legitimate, but he emphasized that it 
is the local people who are suffering from a curtailing of 
humanitarian assistance within conflict zones and the closure 
of trade routes between the Somali Regional State and 
neighboring Somalia.  He added that with the formal closure 
of these routes, cross-border smuggling has increased, 
thereby raising the risk of illegal movement of people and 
arms across the Ethiopia-Somalia border. 
 
Ismael:  Somalis Want Peace, Prosperity - Not Independence 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Asked to describe the current policy goals of the 
ONLF, Ismael responded that he was not in direct contact with 
ONLF leaders, but said he believed most Ethiopian Somalis 
(including ONLF members and supporters) want to be able to 
trade legally and prosper financially, improve the quality of 
their lives, live in peace, and be respected by their 
government and military.  They want an end to extrajudicial 
arrests, killings, and trade blockages.  Demands for 
independence made by the ONLF years ago, Ismael said, were 
very different from its current agenda, and were in hindsight 
highly unrealistic.  He underscored that the ONLF's armed 
insurgency, and the local population's support for the use of 
violence, is merely a means to an end; the end being peace, 
prosperity, and respect.  While not optimistic that peace 
could be easily achieved, Ismael said if peace is acheived 
and the GoE promotes trade and development in the region, 
most ethnic Somalis would abandon the idea of independence or 
unification with Somalia. 
 
¶8. (C) Ismael told PolOff he believed the ONLF would be 
willing to talk to the GoE and negotiate an end to violent 
insurgency if the situation in the Somali region improved. 
The GoE would have to recognize the ONLF as a legitimate 
organization, at least for the purpose of holding talks, if 
not as a political body.  Ismael noted such talks would 
likely have to be facilitated by a third party who was 
respected and viewed as neutral by both parties.  He stated 
that the U.S. was the ideal - and possibly only - candidate 
to facilitate such discussions, and urged the U.S. to 
consider taking on the role of mediator. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) Despite his former affiliation with the ONLF and 
strongly held views about the illegitimacy of the GoE's 
counterinsurgency tactics, Ismael was candid about the 
unrealistic nature of the ONLF's past demands, the ONLF's 
failure to achieve any appreciable military or political 
success despite years of fighting, and the negative impacts 
of the ONLF's actions on the local population.  It is unclear 
how much contact he currently has with ONLF leadership, and 
whether his assertions regarding the ONLF's agenda and desire 
for mediation represent their views, rather than views he or 
the local populace hold more broadly.  End comment. 
 
YATES