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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000171 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, AF/PDPA, DRL, INR/AA 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/26 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SOCI KCRM KDEM NI
SUBJECT: ANAMBRA IMPRESSIONS -- PROGRESS, BUT MUCH WORK TO DO 
 
REF: ABUJA 0149 AND PREVIOUS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: James P. McAnulty, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy 
Abuja, Political Section; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
 
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¶1. (C) Many observers had expected a messy, even violent, vote 
going into the February 6 gubernatorial election in Anambra State. 
That the worst of Nigerian elections past did not materialize this 
time may be the most encouraging outcome of this vote.  The 
peaceful, largely violence-free, process proved largely credible, 
albeit administratively flawed.  The Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC) poorly managed  key elements of the elections, 
notably timely delivery of voting materials and maintenance of 
accurate voter registration lists.  Voter apathy and 
disenfranchisement also overshadowed Anambra's election results, 
widely hyped as a "harbinger" for 2011.  Despite flaws in the 
conduct of the election, however, most observers viewed the results 
as reflecting the will of voters.  INEC's flaws affected the 
prospects of all candidates and did not seem to favor any 
individual contender.  INEC will need to improve its capabilities 
dramatically when Nigeria conducts elections in 35 additional 
states in 2011.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
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POSITIVE, PEACEFUL PROCESS 
 
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¶2.  (SBU) Incumbent Governor Peter Obi handily won re-election in 
the widely-anticipated gubernatorial election in Anambra State on 
February 6 (reftel).  Obi (All Progressive Grand Alliance, AGPA) 
received 97,843 votes -- well ahead of his nearest rivals Chris 
Ngige (Action Congress, AC) with 60,240 votes and Chukwuma Soludo 
(People's Democratic Party, PDP) with 59,355 votes.  Obi not only 
garnered the most votes among all 25 contenders but at least 25 
percent of the votes cast in at least two-thirds of Anambra's 21 
Local Government Areas (LGAs) (he actually won 18), as required by 
election laws to forestall a run-off election. 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Obi and his record in office proved popular, at least among 
those who voted, and the powers of incumbency certainly helped him. 
U.S. Mission Nigeria election observers noted that most obvious 
roadside billboards in and around the major population centers of 
the capital Awka and market town Onitsha featured Obi.  His two 
main, well-funded rivals Ngige and Soludo of the more prominent 
(nationally) AC and ruling PDP may have cancelled out each other's 
efforts.  When INEC announced election results at its Awka 
headquarters on February 7, the bystanders greeted the news with 
applause, calmness, and acceptance. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Those who voted, and many others who tried, behaved 
commendably.  The security situation over the February 5 to 8 
period in Anambra remained peaceful, a noteworthy feat in a state 
known for roughness around elections.  Authorities deployed over 
23,000 Nigeria Police Force (NPF) personnel from around the nation 
to the state with a "thick as fleas" presence, which helped 
maintain calm and order. 
 
 
 
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DELAYS AND SETBACKS 
 
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ABUJA 00000171  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5. (C) Despite assurances from INEC officials that they came 
prepared for the election, they badly bungled key aspects of the 
actual execution, with delays in delivery of voting materials and 
ballots to 326 wards and 4,627 polling stations across the state 
and distribution of inaccurate voter registration lists that left 
many unable to vote.  INEC deserves nearly all the blame for late 
deployment and the ensuing chaos around the polls on Election Day, 
although some fault the police for not stepping up and providing an 
earlier presence near the polling stations.  INEC officials claimed 
to election observers in the field that they did not want to leave 
ballots and election paraphernalia at polls unprotected.  The 
wrangling continued and voting did not start in earnest until late 
morning or early afternoon, well after the original 0800 starting 
time. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) The single largest shortcoming involved the highly 
inaccurate voter registration lists.  At many polling stations 
(including those in Onitsha, Awka, and in rural villages visited by 
U.S. observers), the lists proved inaccurate or badly out-of-date. 
People lined up, presented their voter registration cards, and 
showed up at their designated stations, only to be told that the 
list did not contain their names.  This created a standoff for a 
while, but ultimately some INEC poll workers (with political party 
agents and election observers watching), made a judgment call  to 
allow people in line to vote on a provisional basis, even if their 
name did not appear on the register.  This defused tensions, 
although some polling stations lacked sufficient ballots for those 
in line or even any voting materials at all (such as one rowdy 
scene observed in Awka South).  These would-be voters felt 
"disenfranchised" and promised to file protests.  One domestic 
observer called INEC's poor delivery and administration of voting 
materials and lists "disgraceful." 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Even with all these administrative "hiccups" (per INEC's 
Anambra Commissioner), voting proceeded peacefully in most places 
once it started.  Patient people already on queue were allowed to 
vote.  Many stayed until later in the day to watch the counting, to 
ensure it went smoothly and ballot boxes would not be pilfered. 
They appreciated the presence of observers, and often smiled when 
the U.S. team randomly appeared at their remote site.  Polling 
stations reported their results throughout Saturday night and 
Sunday morning up the chain to wards and LGA headquarters.  By 0900 
on Sunday, the last LGA read its results at INEC "Election 
Central."  With the final count in, INEC declared Peter Obi of AGPA 
winner without need of a run-off. 
 
 
 
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LOOKING TO 2011 
 
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¶8. (C) In the end, voter turnout came in quite low (at around 16 
percent), but people who did show up came determined to make 
democracy and elections work in Nigeria.  INEC did not make the 
task for them any easier, as they did not mark polling stations 
clearly (at least for observers).  Yet this should not have been a 
problem for Anambrans, as polling stations were supposed to be 
within walking distance of home and well-known to locals.  A ban on 
driving across the state (except for official vehicles) should not 
have deterred people coming out to vote.  Some may have been 
intimidated by the heavy NPF presence, fearing that the police 
might resort to intimidation or violent tactics if things went 
badly.  These fears were largely unjustified, and the NPF was 
well-behaved.  U.S. observers heard of but did not witness a few 
instances of poll-related violence, thuggery, and vote buying. 
 
 
 
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ABUJA 00000171  003 OF 003 
 
 
COMMENT 
 
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¶9. (C) Was Anambra really the "harbinger" for 2011 as many 
anticipated?  The contest turned out better than past ones in the 
state, and if such tranquility could carry over into 2011, then 
Anambra may have served as a useful rehearsal for the national 
vote.  The more valuable lesson from Anambra, however, is that it 
exposed INEC's lack of efficiency and competence in key areas. 
INEC has considerable work to do, especially in updating voter 
registration lists, arranging for the prompt delivery of materials, 
and enhancing  voter education  to overcome voter apathy and low 
turnouts. 
 
 
 
¶10. (U) ConGen Lagos prepared and coordinated this telegram with 
Embassy Abuja, which transmitted this telegram on behalf of ConGen 
Lagos. 
SANDERS