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FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0329
INFO ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0002
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0001
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI TW 0001
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0004
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0004
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0001
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0002
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0001

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 ABU DHABI 000089 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO AMCONSUL ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA 
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PASS TO AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/21 
TAGS: SENV KGHG ENRG PGOV AE
SUBJECT: PROGRESS MADE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY 
AGENCY, BUT LONG ROAD AHEAD 
 
REF: 09 STATE 73217; 08 BERLIN 493 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard G. Olson, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: At the third Preparatory Commission (Prep Com) of 
the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in Abu Dhabi, 
critical progress was achieved on a number of programmatic, 
administrative and legal fronts related to establishing a 
transparent, progressive and efficient international organization. 
A compromise between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Germany 
regarding the work and timing of the launch of the Bonn Innovation 
Center was struck.  Important steps regarding Israeli participation 
in the UAE-hosted international organization were also made. 
However, the nascent IRENA has been slow in establishing itself, in 
part due to an unimpressive and problematic Secretariat. The United 
States must remain actively engaged on multiple fronts to help 
guarantee IRENA's relevancy and success.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The IRENA Prep Com on January 17 in Abu Dhabi was attended 
by 120 of 141 member states (signatories to the IRENA Statute) and 
26 observer countries, including Brazil, Canada, China and Saudi 
Arabia.  Three countries, including South Africa, signed the IRENA 
Statute.  [Note: Please see paragraphs 22 and 13 respectively for 
complete lists of member and observer countries. End note.]  The 
IRENA Administrative Committee (Admin Com), held January 16, 
consisted of mostly working level participants from member states 
only.  Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Science 
Affairs (OES) Assistant Secretary Dr. Kerri-Ann Jones led the U.S. 
delegation, which also included representatives from the Bureau of 
Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, the Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs, the Bureau of Legal Affairs, and OES.  Nearly 
all discussion at the Admin Com and the Prep Com centered on 
institutional matters, such as rules and regulations for staff, 
finances, secondments, governance, etc; discussion on the 
programmatic details of renewable energy in the formal proceedings 
was very limited.  A/S Jones had bilateral meetings with UAE 
Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, Israeli Minister of 
National Infrastructures Uzi Landau, and German State Secretary of 
Environment Juergen Becker, and the Japanese and Greek delegations. 
The U.S. delegation cooperated closely with the delegations from 
Australia, Israel, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, and the United 
Kingdom. 
 
Significant Progress in Abu Dhabi-Bonn Compromise 
 
¶3. (SBU) A hard won agreement between the UAE and Germany regarding 
the work and timing of the launch of Bonn's Innovation Technology 
Center (ITC) was finally struck, in part due to pressure from the 
U.S. and Japan, and in part due to concerns about bad public 
relations.  An opening ceremony for the Abu Dhabi headquarters will 
take place in early spring 2010, with German Environment Minister 
Norbert Roettgen in attendance.  Bonn will launch the ITC in 
May/June, on the margins of the UN climate negotiations hosted in 
Bonn, May 31-June 11.  A senior UAE official will attend.  The 
agreement between the UAE and Germany paved the way for the 
important Prep Com formal decision to accept the 2010 Work Program 
and Budget. 
 
The IRENA Secretariat 
 
¶4. (C/NF) Helene Pelosse of France was elected Interim Director 
General (IDG) at the June 2009 Prep Com.  Several member states, 
including Australia, Germany, Japan, Spain, Tonga, the UAE, and the 
UK, voiced concerns to the U.S. delegation about the IDG's handling 
 
ABU DHABI 00000089  002 OF 008 
 
 
of several issues, including failure to manage the Abu Dhabi-Bonn 
problem, failure to appreciate the sensitivity of member states in 
handling Taiwan's desire to participate in the Prep Com as an 
observer, and unwillingness to find time to interview two Argentine 
secondment candidates (sent as part of the Argentine delegation 
specifically to be interviewed).  In addition, Pelosse largely 
avoided the U.S. delegation, and her staff responded with 
indifference, at best, to a request for a meeting between A/S Jones 
and the IDG.  We also have growing concern over Pelosse's lack of 
sensitivity to the need to respect governance processes of the 
organization (she accorded special access to members of the French 
delegation to sensitive negotiations between the Secretariat and 
the UAE over headquarters arrangements, and has habitually failed 
to meet process deadlines or consult with key member states when it 
would be in the interest of the Secretariat to do so). 
 
¶5. (C/NF) The Secretariat and the UAE have a strained relationship. 
In part, this is due to lack of capacity within the UAE to quickly 
and nimbly handle all the institutional and administrative tasks 
necessary to stand up IRENA.  At the same time, the Secretariat has 
not demonstrated sufficient flexibility on outstanding issues such 
as housing for the IDG and staff and expectations for UAE-funded 
per diem and gym membership.  [Comment: IDG Pelosse's limited 
English language ability likely does not help Secretariat 
communications with the UAE.  End comment.] 
 
¶6. (SBU) IRENA will transition from interim authority under the 
Preparatory Commission to permanent governance under the IRENA 
Statute once the Statute is ratified by 25 countries and enters 
into force.  The U.S. will be actively engaged on a host of 
transition-related matters, including the selection of a permanent 
DG. 
 
High Level UAE Engagement 
 
¶7. (C/NF) During a meeting between UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh 
Abdullah bin Zayed (AbZ) and A/S Jones and Deputy Chief of Mission 
Douglas Greene, AbZ expressed strong gratitude for U.S. support of 
the UAE's bid to host IRENA.  AbZ noted his desire to elevate 
IRENA's profile, but lamented that IDG Pelosse "is not the wisest 
choice for IRENA" and recommended that efforts be made to assist 
with her departure from the organization.  AbZ proposed the 
creation of a fund that combines US-UAE financing and expertise to 
help countries in South America, Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Caribbean to develop renewable energy programs.  A/S Jones noted 
that IRENA needs to look at how to transition the management of 
IRENA and look at the convergence of ideas and activities that the 
US and the UAE share. 
 
¶8. (C/NF) In response to A/S Jones' comment about equal treatment 
for all members, AbZ admitted that the issue of an Israeli 
permanent mission in Abu Dhabi presents sensitive security 
questions.  AbZ prefers to house the office in IRENA's own 
facilities in order to provide security that he does not feel would 
be possible in a commercial building.  A/S Jones advised that there 
are a number of sensitivities with Israel and that often things 
could be misread even if the UAE's motives were in the interest of 
security.  AbZ offered assurances that all IRENA members would be 
treated equally in the UAE.  [Comment: AbZ's comments were 
significant because it reconfirmed the UAE's commitment to allow, 
eventually, for the Israelis to have an IRENA permanent mission in 
Abu Dhabi, a commitment made previously by AbZ to the National 
Security Council and the Office of the Vice President in spring 
 
ABU DHABI 00000089  003 OF 008 
 
 
2009.]  AbZ advised A/S Jones that he had rejected a bilateral 
meeting with the Israeli delegation, pointing out that the 
conference was about IRENA not about UAE-Israel relations and that 
this was not the time to enter into talks with Israel. 
 
Israeli Participation 
 
¶9. (C/NF) The Israeli delegation, led by Minister of National 
Infrastructures Uzi Landau, with representatives from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Infrastructures, 
was relatively large (seven or eight individuals).  The delegation 
was under instruction from capital to be assertive and aggressive 
in pursuit of its objectives, which largely centered on the goal of 
a permanent mission. Israel was one of the countries that presented 
an opening statement. Several steps taken as "security" measures 
heightened Israeli sensitivities.  UAE officials did not admit 
Israeli representatives through normal immigration channels, 
instructed them not to move beyond the hotel or the conference 
venue (including disinviting them from an IRENA dinner outside the 
hotel), and took other steps to limit the profile of their 
participation, such as instructing them not to speak Hebrew or 
display Hebrew reading material.    None were issued visas.    The 
delegation did sit behind their flag in the negotiating room and 
otherwise participated alongside other member states.  Also, the 
Israeli head of delegation was only displayed in close-up on the 
video monitors for a limited time at the end of his opening 
statement. 
 
¶10. (C/NF) During A/S Jones bilateral meeting with Minister Landau, 
the Israelis sought reassurance of strong US support for an Israeli 
permanent mission in Abu Dhabi.  A/S Jones assured him that the US 
strongly supports equal rights and privileges for all IRENA member 
states.  Minister Landau cautioned that the interim headquarters 
agreement (HQA) (which is established between the UAE and the IRENA 
Secretariat, with technical input from several member states, 
including the US) should have language about future establishment 
of permanent missions because postponing the issue to the permanent 
HQA negotiations will only lead to more political difficulties. 
A/S Jones underscored the US commitment to help advance Israeli 
interests, as an IRENA signatory, in the ongoing negotiations for 
both the interim and permanent HQAs.  She also noted the UAE's 
commitment to making IRENA a successful international organization. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Minister Landau expressed Israel's desire to add water 
and climate change to IRENA's mandate, as well as Israeli interest 
in technical cooperation on these issues with its neighboring 
countries.  A/S Jones suggested limiting IRENA's focus, during this 
early stage of its establishment, to renewable energy to ensure its 
success and focus; she indicated the  natural link to climate 
change. 
 
Headquarters Agreement 
 
¶12. (C/NF) A HQA Working Group with participation from France, 
Germany, Austria, Argentina, Tonga, the UAE, and the US made 
important progress on the interim HQA.  Prior to the negotiations 
on the HQA, UAE officials approached the US delegation and signaled 
their willingness to confirm equal treatment for all members under 
the HQA, but an objection to providing for permanent missions when 
the IRENA structures were not yet permanent.  The UAE further 
signaled an intent to address the issue in the permanent agreement 
when the IRENA Statute enters into force and a permanent 
Secretariat is established.  The US delegation discussed this issue 
 
ABU DHABI 00000089  004 OF 008 
 
 
with members of the Israeli delegation, who noted that such an 
outcome presented a practical way forward.  During the Working 
Group negotiations it was agreed that the interim HQA will not 
provide for the establishment of permanent missions, but, at the 
insistence of the US delegation, will include language noting that 
all members will be accorded benefits under the agreement, 
notwithstanding any lack of diplomatic relations between the UAE. 
[Note: This issue is not an Israel-specific issue, as we understand 
there are seven other countries that are signatories to the IRENA 
statute but do not have diplomatic relations with the UAE. End 
note.]  The US delegation, along with several others, re-emphasized 
a collective understanding that permanent arrangements will provide 
for permanent missions.  It is anticipated that the interim HQA 
will be finalized in the next month, and then negotiations on the 
permanent HQA will begin immediately thereafter. 
 
Observer Countries and Organizations 
 
¶13. (SBU) The following countries attended the Prep Com as 
observers:  Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, 
Canada, China, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, New Zealand, Qatar, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Suriname, 
Thailand, Tuvalu, Ukraine, and Vietnam.  The Kyrgyz Republic, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, and South Africa signed the IRENA 
Statute, the first step toward membership.  During Foreign Minister 
Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed's remarks at the Prep Com, he noted Saudi 
Arabia's intention to join IRENA.  The Canadian representative, 
from the local embassy, stated Canada is very likely to join IRENA 
in one to two years. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Working level members of the Chinese delegation, from the 
National Development Resource Council and the National Energy 
Agency, informed the US delegation that they would be reporting to 
NDRC for a decision about whether or not to join.  They intended to 
recommend participation, but noted the lack of capacity within the 
Chinese government to participate in all multilateral energy fora, 
including the lack of government representatives with fluent 
English language skills.  According to the United Kingdom, it was 
Taiwan's interest in attending IRENA as an observer that prompted 
China's participation, not a keen interest in IRENA itself. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Weeks in advance, Taiwan had expressed interest in 
participating in the Prep Com as an observer.  A Taiwanese 
delegation was scheduled to attend, with UAE visas already issued, 
however Taiwan did not attend and was not listed on the document of 
observing parties.  Our understanding is that the IRENA Secretariat 
mishandled Taiwanese participation either by disinviting the 
delegation when China confirmed its attendance as an observer 
and/or by disinviting the delegation once realizing that the 
Secretariat had incorrectly registered Taiwan as a country, rather 
than usual protocol, and was unable to fix the problem in a timely 
fashion.  Regardless of the exact details, the Secretariat did not 
act in the best interests of IRENA or member states. 
 
¶16. (U) Among the 43 observing organizations were the American 
Council on Renewable Energy, the Asian Development Bank, the Arab 
League, the International Solar Energy Society, the Palestinian 
Energy Authority, the Palestinian Energy and Environment Research 
Center, and the World Future Council. 
 
IRENA's 2010 Work Program and Budget 
 
ABU DHABI 00000089  005 OF 008 
 
 
¶17. (SBU) The 2010 Work Program and Budget was formally approved 
based on the agreement between Abu Dhabi and Bonn.  The Work 
Program seeks to reconcile the need to acknowledge the current 
state of institutional actions occurring in this field thereby 
avoiding duplication, with the need to demonstrate early success 
and added value.  More details will be needed regarding the 
implementation of the specific tasks that are now shared by the Abu 
Dhabi Headquarters and the Bonn Innovation Center. 
 
Important Progress on Several Institutional Arrangements 
 
¶18. (SBU) Financial Rules and Regulations, Staff Rules and 
Regulations, Staff Provident Fund, and Secondment Rules and 
Regulations:  The package of administrative and financial 
regulations manifested a significant area of USG and other 
signatory state disagreement with IDG Pelosse.  She has espoused a 
vision of an institutional trajectory for IRENA that would have it 
replicate UN administrative financial structures, facilitating its 
absorption (in some way) into the UN system.  The regulations 
advanced by the Secretariat, and approved before the US was 
substantively engaged in the organization, reflect that vision.  At 
this meeting member states were asked to approve amendments to the 
existing regulations, though the US delegation took the opportunity 
to open the full package of regulations and consider them anew. 
Not much progress was made on revisions to these regulations at 
this session, though the US delegation expressed its desire to take 
advantage of IRENA's structure as an organization independent from 
the UN to secure a level of openness and transparency not currently 
provided for under UN financial regulations.  In particular, the US 
delegation noted its desire to have the regulations allow for IRENA 
to be audited by an independent, third party auditor (such as a big 
four accounting firm), allow it to develop its own administration 
of justice system (current regulations require that it participate 
in the UN system).  The US secured significant support for this 
approach from several member States (in particular, the UK, the 
UAE, and Japan) and identified France and Germany, in particular, 
as countries that will be difficult on these issues going forward. 
 
The US delegation encountered particular problems with Germany over 
changes needed to the Secondment Regulations prior to the 
secondment of any US officials to the Secretariat.  Current 
regulations require that the seconding state retain liability for 
most all acts of its seconded officials while working in the 
Secretariat.  This is a structure which exists in the EU, but is 
virtually unknown in the realm of international organizations.  All 
countries in the working group assigned to this issue agreed to 
make adjustments on this issue but for Germany, who stood as the 
lone hold out blocking consensus reached among 10 other member 
states (including EU counterparts France and the UK).  The US 
delegation expects to continue discussions with Germany over this 
key issue. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Governance:  The Prep Com adopted a hard-fought decision 
to formalize three working groups to address overarching issues 
pertaining to governance, legal, and the work program.  Over the 
course of the preparatory process, the Admin Com and IRENA 
secretariat had established a number of ad hoc working groups to 
aid in the work of establishing the organization.  The composition, 
process, and purpose of these working groups was unclear. 
Formalizing three groups will allow Signatories an official and 
transparent process for communicating input on important 
foundational issues to the secretariat, as well as improve 
communication between Signatories on difficult issues.  The 
 
ABU DHABI 00000089  006 OF 008 
 
 
decision on working groups should not have been contentious, but 
both France and Germany expressed concerns over "constricting" the 
role of the Secretariat in IRENA's development.  The US delegation 
argued that it is the purview of Signatories to take the decisions 
needed to establish IRENA, not the Secretariat.  An impending issue 
is the question, pushed by Spain, of the respective rights of 
participation for signatories, signatories that contribute 
voluntarily, and ratified members.  The working group on Governance 
will address this in the coming months. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Executive Management Selection Committee:  The Prep Com 
agreed to the creation of an Executive Management Selection 
Committee, composed of member states, which will hire an executive 
search firm to identify and screen qualified candidates for IRENA's 
senior positions.  Then, a small team (IDG Pelosse and 2 member 
states on the committee) will interview and select candidates.  The 
UAE asked the US and Japan to introduce this proposal in order to 
increase transparency within the Secretariat and expedite the 
hiring process.  The US has already volunteered to serve on the 
committee. This step is viewed as a very positive and necessary 
step to heighten the professionalism of the organization. 
 
2010 IRENA Calendar 
 
¶21. (U) The Admin Com will meet at least two times during 2010 in 
Abu Dhabi, with preliminary dates of late May and October/November. 
Germany will maintain the role of Chair of the Admin Com, and the 
appointments of Vice-Chairs remain to be determined.  The timing of 
the next Prep Com also remains in question, though it was agreed it 
will take place the day following the second Admin Com.  The IRENA 
Secretariat has proposed October 25, to precede DIREC, the 
International Renewable Energy Conference in New Delhi, which 
begins October 26.  Spain will assume the Chair of the fourth Prep 
Com.  Should the IRENA Statute enter into force by mid-2010, the 
October meeting may be an IRENA Assembly rather than a gathering of 
the Preparatory Commission. 
 
IRENA Signatory and Member States 
 
¶22. (U) As of the conclusion of the Prep Com on January 17, 
membership in IRENA consists of the following countries: 
 
AF: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, CC4te d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Republic of Congo, 
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leon, Somalia, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
 
EAP:  Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Fiji, Japan, 
Kiribati, Mongolia, Nauru, Nepal, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Vanuatu 
 
EUR: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
European Union, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom 
 
ABU DHABI 00000089  007 OF 008 
 
 
NEA: Algeria, Bahrain, Benin, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab 
Emirates, Yemen 
 
SCA: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Maldives, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
 
WHA: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru, United States, Uruguay, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
 
The following eight countries have ratified and thus are members, 
as opposed to signatories, of IRENA: Germany, Kenya, Liechtenstein, 
Maldives, Norway, Palau, Sweden, and the UAE. 
 
Comments: 
 
¶23. (SBU) While progress on a suite of issues was achieved during 
the Prep Com, IRENA's progress overall remains frustratingly slow. 
This is due in part because representatives to IRENA are often 
renewable energy policy experts with little knowledge of the IO 
institutional, legal, and administrative experience that is 
critical during this early stage of development.  Dogged US 
engagement in the coming several months will continue to be 
necessary to help guarantee that IRENA becomes an international 
organization that the Department and the US Congress deem worthy of 
US membership.  Since IRENA is the first international organization 
in an NEA country, the US has a vested interest in ensuring that 
the UAE creates an IRENA with rules, regulations and procedures 
that will be a good model for the region.  Increased US involvement 
will help to spur progress on key elements of IRENA's 
establishment, such as the creation of a permanent headquarters 
agreement and rules of procedure governing the IRENA Assembly and 
Council.  Other longer-term issues such as the question of whether 
IRENA should become a specialized agency within the UN System will 
be held in abeyance.  IRENA is a critical issue for the UAE, with 
engagement at senior-most levels; in turn, IRENA is a priority 
issue in our bilateral relationship with the UAE. 
 
¶24. (SBU) The US remains firmly committed to the principal 
objectives of IRENA and continues to support the critical need for 
its operations.  Despite its uneven administrative start, the 2010 
Work Program reflects US policy on renewable energy deployment and 
addresses the very reasons why IRENA was created and why we are so 
aggressively supporting its successful formation: the need to 
programmatically respond to the global deficiencies in policy and 
regulatory structures to foment the widespread deployment of 
renewable energy technologies. 
 
¶25. (C/NF) The US will need to maintain vigilance to safeguard 
against any backsliding by the UAE on the issue of permanent 
missions.  Though there had been prior agreement by UAE officials 
on Israeli participation and the establishment of missions, there 
was a clear sense of discomfort among several levels of UAE 
representatives on the practical implications of this 
participation. However, UAE statement both at the opening of the 
Prep Com and in A/S Jones' bilateral meeting with the Foreign 
Minister made it clear that they fully intended to comply with 
their obligations. Though the US (and others) provided some 
maneuvering room to the UAE officials to come to terms with these 
issues at this first meeting, we also made our expectations for 
future engagement quite clear.  The UAE resolve to make good on its 
commitment will manifest itself in negotiations over the HQA. 
 
ABU DHABI 00000089  008 OF 008 
 
 
Should there be any hedge on the issue of equal treatment or the 
establishment of permanent missions, the US delegation will not 
hesitate to quickly elevate the issue to the level necessary to 
ensure an outcome consistent with the commitments made by the UAE 
when it was selected as host country of IRENA.  End Comment. 
OLSON