VZCZCXRO2914
RR RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHKUK RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHAD #0107/01 0560942
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 250942Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0369
INFO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
IRAN COLLECTIVE
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 000107 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/02/25 
TAGS: PREL PTER EFIN AE IR AF
SUBJECT: D/S Wolin Presses UAE for More Cooperation on Iran - Af/Pak 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard G. Olson, Ambassador, State Department, U.S. 
Embassy Abu Dhabi; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
TREASURY FOR WOLIN, LEVEY, COHEN, BAUKOL, MENDELSOHN 
 
STATE FOR S/SRAP, SCA, AND NEA/ARP 
CENTCOM FOR GEN PETRAEUS, GEN MCCHRYSTAL 
 
 
 
¶1. (S) Summary. On 15-16 February 2010, Treasury Deputy Secretary 
Neal Wolin met with UAE officials to press for continued 
cooperation on illicit finance issues with respect to Iran and the 
Taliban. UAE officials noted progress made and yet to come, and 
expressed concern about international resolve to confront Iran. 
Wolin met with Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al 
Nahyan, Minister of State for Financial Affairs Obaid al Tayer, 
Minister of Foreign Trade Sheikha Lubna al Qasimi, Minister of 
Cabinet Affairs Mohammed al Gergawi, Central Bank Governor Sultan 
bin Nasser al Suweidi, and Ahmed al Tayer, who serves as Governor 
of the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) and Chairman of 
Emirates - National Bank of Dubai (E-NBD). End Summary. 
 
 
 
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IRAN 
 
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¶2. (S/NF) Deputy Secretary Wolin noted that attempts to address the 
Iranian threat through diplomatic engagement have thus far been 
unsuccessful and expressed the intention of the U.S. government to 
increase financial pressure on the Iranian regime. He thanked UAE 
officials for their government's strong partnership on Iran and 
encouraged further cooperation and economic measures to protect 
against Iranian abuse of the financial sector. Wolin praised UAE 
officials for the significant restrictions placed on Persia 
International Bank (PIB) and urged further vigilance with respect 
to the DIFC-licensed entity. He expressed concerns about Iranian 
financial institutions operating within the UAE (Bank Melli and 
Bank Saderat), as well as the UAE's largest bank, Emirates NBD, 
which continues to maintain substantial relationships with Iran. 
Wolin highlighted new U.S. sanctions targeting the IRGC and IRISL. 
 
 
 
¶3. (S/NF) With respect to Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, Governor 
Suweidi said that the UAE Central Bank has stepped up examinations 
to twice per week and that the overall size of banking activity was 
"shrinking, not growing." He said the Central Bank is watching all 
transfers over 100,000 (not clear if dollars or dirhams), but that 
shutting down these institutions was a "sovereign decision" to be 
taken "by a higher authority." He described these banks as "quite 
isolated" in that many UAE banks will not deal with them. 
 
 
 
¶4. (S/NF) On Emirates NBD, the Governor stated that the bank had 14 
correspondent accounts for Iranian banks that originated with the 
National Bank of Dubai before its merger with Emirates Bank 
International. He said facilities at the bank for Iran were 
shrinking and alluded to a $500 million facility that now stands at 
$50 million (nfi). He asked for more time to close the Iranian 
accounts, stating that some had already been closed. The Governor 
assessed that working with the U.S., the UAE has put tremendous 
pressure on Iran and will continue to work with the U.S. to put 
more pressure on Iran. 
 
 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Minister of State for Financial Affairs Obaid al Tayer 
noted the progress made by the UAE resulting from close cooperation 
with the Treasury Department, citing regular visits by Under 
 
ABU DHABI 00000107  002 OF 004 
 
 
Secretary Levey as an important catalyst. He referenced reductions 
in overall levels of Iran-related financial activity and 
restrictions placed on Iranian institutions. Obaid al Tayer 
stressed the confluence of interests between the U.S. and the UAE 
on Iran, but also mentioned the legitimate trade that takes place 
between the UAE and Iran as well. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S/NF) Minister of Cabinet Affairs Mohammed al Gergawi 
emphasized the quiet but effective role played by UAE with respect 
to Iran sanctions, noting enforcement of UNSCRs, heightened caution 
by UAE banks, that the DIFC's recent steps against Persia 
International Bank. However, he also pointed to the UAE's security 
vulnerability saying the UAE must be careful. He added "please 
inform us before shifting positions; don't embarrass us, our 
position is quite sensitive," expressing concern that the U.S. will 
ultimately cut a deal with Iran leaving the UAE exposed. Gergawi 
said Iran often fires back publicly at the UAE, specifically 
mentioning the U.S. Consulate's Iran Regional Presence Office 
(IRPO) as placing the UAE in an uncomfortable situation. 
Nonetheless, he reaffirmed the UAE's resolve to continue working 
together with the U.S. on Iran. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S/NF) Gergawi said the internal struggle in Iran needs to be 
watched closely, but he dismissed expectations that Mousavi would 
pursue a different policy course, noting that Mousavi was of the 
"old ideology" and "part of the problem, not the solution." He 
pointed to Mousavi's tenure as prime minister in the 1980s, 
underscoring his troubling track record. Gergawi said that 
Ahmedinejad has been successful in making the opposition an upper 
class movement, with demonstrations largely confined to Tehran, 
Esfahan and Shiraz. He cautioned the U.S. against overly supporting 
the opposition, which would discredit them. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S/NF) DIFC Governor and Emirates NBD Chairman Ahmed al Tayer 
confirmed the shared interests between the U.S. and the UAE on 
Iran, adding that the region has suffered for 30 years from Iran. 
DFSA Chief Executive Paul Koster described the DFSA's recent 
actions against Persia International Bank. (Note: Koster first 
explained that he was sharing the information under the umbrella of 
the DIFC Governor, not as DFSA CEO which would be inconsistent with 
his regulatory obligations. End Note). Koster explained that PIB in 
the DIFC is organized as a branch of the UK parent. He said that 
PIB's DIFC branch was specifically excluded from the UK FSA's 
decree banning activity between PIB and its majority owner Bank 
Mellat. He described this exclusion as "unusual," and said the DFSA 
approached the UK FSA to rectify the situation as its effect was to 
push financial activity from London to Dubai. The UK regulator 
dismissed the DFSA complaints, so the DFSA elected to unilaterally 
extend the UK FSA decree to cover the activities of PIB's DIFC 
branch. Koster said the DFSA has also stepped up oversight of PIB 
to bi-monthly inspections. (NOTE: In a subsequent conversation, the 
DFSA Director of Supervision said the new restriction would cut out 
at least 30% of PIB's local activity. END NOTE.) 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S/NF) Shifting the conversation to Ahmed al Tayer's role as 
Chairman of Emirates NBD, Wolin raised concerns about the bank's 
ties to Iran.  Ahmed al Tayer said that with respect to Iran "your 
concern is our concern." He noted the bank's enforcement of UNSCRs 
and a general scaling down of credit exposure to Iran. He asked 
about the exchange of letters between Emirates NBD and OFAC and 
stated the bank's intention to strictly comply with OFAC 
regulations. When asked about the numerous correspondent accounts 
held at Emirates NBD for Iranian banks, Ahmed al Tayer could not 
provide a substantive response. CEO Rick Pudner requested a follow 
up meeting with the Treasury AttachC) to review the matter. (NOTE: 
In a subsequent meeting with Treasury AttachC), Pudner asked 
 
ABU DHABI 00000107  003 OF 004 
 
 
detailed questions about U.S. concerns over Iranian correspondent 
accounts and letter of credit activity. He noted a lack of guidance 
from the UAE Central Bank  and asked where his bank stood in 
relation to other international financial institutions in dealings 
with Iran. Pudner took detailed notes and pledged to further review 
the matter with Ahmed al Tayer and respond. END NOTE.) 
 
 
 
¶10. (S/NF) Sheikha Lubna stressed the need for multilateral 
measures against Iran, as bilateral pressure was "awkward" for the 
UAE considering its demographic size and geographic location. She 
pointed to export controls as a successful and effective area where 
the UAE plays significant role. 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
SHEIKH ABDULLAH 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶11. (S/NF) Responding to Deputy Secretary Wolin's review of the 
current state of play on Iran and issues of concern in the UAE, 
Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah stated the UAE hope for a new UN 
resolution and the need to project a clear, bold and unified 
position on Iran. Sheikh Abdullah said that "stalling is very 
dangerous." He said the UAE tried talking to the Chinese several 
times regarding its position on Iran, but saw no improvement. 
Noting the composition of the UN Security Council, he doubted the 
possibility of serious UN action. Expressing deep pessimism, Sheikh 
Abdullah said that he does not see enough countries relevant to 
Iran willing to act, noting that the EU has been talking about 
action for 18 months with no movement.  He asked about Austria's 
posture with respect to Iran and offered to use the UAE's influence 
there, derived through its ownership stake in Austrian energy firm 
OMV. 
 
 
 
¶12. (S/NF) Sheikh Abdullah said it is premature to talk about the 
GCC countries with all these holes remaining, and reiterated 
security concerns felt by the UAE when it acts without sufficient 
international cover. That said, he pointed to the recent bold steps 
taken by the DIFC to limit the activity of PIB, and credit limits 
coming down at Emirates NBD. He acknowledged that the UAE still has 
more to do on Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, which was a bit more 
"tricky" for the UAE. He said the UAE needs other countries to act 
simultaneously. 
 
 
 
¶13. (S/NF) Sheikh Abdullah cited China - Iran trade at $50 billion 
in 2009. He said the issue there is energy and that China views the 
U.S. presence in Central Asia as a threat to its energy security. 
He asked about the impact, timing and motivations behind U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan and the Dalai Lama visit with the President. He 
recommended approaching Australia about putting pressure on China 
and asked out loud, "are the Chinese trying to get something in 
return?" Sheikh Abdullah stated that the UAE has noticed increased 
transactions from Iran to the Chinese Military Bank (nfi). 
 
 
 
¶14. (S/NF) When asked about formalizing Iraq debt relief, Sheikh 
Abdullah said that the UAE will take the necessary steps after the 
elections. He said the issue is being handled by the joint 
commission between the UAE and Iraq, even though the debt 
technically belongs to the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. Sheikh Abdullah 
said that he will ultimately sign on behalf of the UAE and Abu 
Dhabi. 
 
ABU DHABI 00000107  004 OF 004 
 
 
¶15. (S/NF) On aid to the Palestinian Authority, Sheikh Abdullah 
cited UAE assistance at $250 million for 2009, but added that 2010 
would be much lower - $100 million tops. He said if other countries 
don't pay up early in the year, March/April is going to be a 
problem, and added that the UAE wants Prime Minister Salam Fayyad 
to focus on more serious issues than how to collect money. 
 
 
 
 ¶16. (S/NF) Sheikh Abdullah asked about the Taliban integration 
fund and specifically where the Saudis stood. He said firmly that 
the UAE is only interested in contributing if it is involved in 
oversight and management for financial and domestic Afghani 
reasons. Moving to Pakistan, Sheikh Abdullah raised a series of 
commercial disputes between the UAE and Pakistan, including UAE 
telecom Etisalat and Abu Dhabi SWF International Petroleum 
Investment Company (IPIC). He said if the issues were not resolved, 
the UAE would not go forward with the Khalifa Port refinery, a $5-7 
billion project. He added that because of these issues, the UAE is 
not going forward with its Pakistan commitments at this time. 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
 
AF/PAK ILLICIT FINANCE 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶17. (S/NF) Wolin commended the UAE on its cooperation with the U.S. 
in addressing terrorist finance issues in the UAE, and urged deeper 
cooperation and additional attention on funding to the Taliban and 
other violent extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He 
noted the recently begun effort by GPRO and Treasury to increase 
information sharing with the UAE security services focused on 
Taliban finance matters, and urged the UAE to commit further 
resources. He thanked the UAE for its partnership on bulk cash 
training and exercises, to commence during the week of 21 February. 
 
 
 
 ¶18. (S/NF) Wolin noted that the UAE lacks regulations requiring 
declaration of cash leaving the country. He cited this lapse as a 
strategic vulnerability and encouraged the UAE to immediately 
implement a remedy. Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah, Finance 
Minister Obaid al Tayer and Minister of Cabinet Affairs Mohammed al 
Gergawi all pledged to look into the issue. 
 
 
 
This cable has been cleared by Treasury. 
OLSON