VZCZCXRO6945
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0073/01 0491637
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181633Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0172
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0021

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000073 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID IV
SUBJECT: COTE d'IVOIRE: FACTORS AFFECTING FORMATION OF A NEW 
GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: OUAGADOUGOU 118; ABIDJAN 71 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Wanda Nesbitt, Ambassador, State, Embassy Abidjan; 
REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  President Gbagbo's decision to dissolve the 
government and the independent electoral commission (CEI) has 
bought him time to improve his standing with the Ivorian electorate 
but undermined his credibility with the opposition.  This has 
hampered PM Soro's ability to form a new government and electoral 
commission as quickly as hoped; a cabinet is unlikely to be 
announced before next week.  President Compaore's apparent success 
in securing a commitment from Gbagbo to respect the OPA and prior 
accords will help, but the opposition still wants assurances that 
the independence of the electoral commission will be respected. 
Sporadic demonstrations and outbreaks of violence can be expected 
until the latest crisis is settled. End Summary 
 
 
 
ELECTORAL COMMISSION IS THE KEY ISSUE 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
 
 
¶2. (C)  There is a consensus among the international community in 
Abidjan that with the dissolution of the government and CEI, Gbagbo 
has succeeded in:  1) buying time to change the electoral dynamic 
in his favor; 2) ridding himself of a dysfunctional government, 
several of whose members were channeling government funds to the 
opposition; and 3) sending a signal that he will not allow the OPA 
process to completely escape his control.  There is also general 
agreement that the current situation could have been avoided had 
the opposition encouraged CEI President Mambe to resign, rather 
than dig in his heels, once it was clear that he had made mistakes, 
if not fraud.  Unfortunately, Gbagbo's action has also solidified 
the opposition's belief that he will never permit a fair election 
to take place and hardened their willingness to negotiate.  RDR 
President Ouattara told Emboffs on Feb. 16 that Gbagbo's action was 
illegal and thoroughly unjustified; the president must be brought 
to understand that he cannot control the electoral commission.  The 
commission is the key issue for the opposition, he said, a new 
government is secondary; the opposition is not interested in 
negotiating a new government until the issue of the commission is 
resolved.  As of Feb. 18, PDCI president Bedie (according to SRSG 
Choi) continued to insist that Gbagbo reverse his decision and 
reinstate the CEI - a position no one finds realistic.  Close aides 
to PM Soro, who is continuing negotiations with the opposition, 
believe that both Ouattara and Bedie will eventually agree to new 
leadership at the CEI as long as the existing structure is 
maintained. 
 
 
 
COMPAORE LETTER RAISES HOPE 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (C)  The broad outline of a letter sent to Pres. Gbagbo by Pres. 
Compaore has been reported in the local media and has raised hopes 
that the Facilitator's insistence on respect for all prior 
agreements, and ECOWAS' statement of support for Compaore's 
mediation will be heeded by Gbagbo. So far, however, the presidency 
has made no statement or comment.  The letter, a copy of which was 
given to Embassy, asks Gbagbo to respect the Linas Marcoussis and 
Pretoria accords in forming a new government and CEI; to give the 
new government a clear roadmap to elections; to preserve the 
provisional electoral list which confirmed 5.3 million individuals 
as Ivorians; and to resolve contested cases within established 
guidelines.  SRSG Choi and the PM's office are hopeful that Gbagbo 
will accept the Facilitator's guidance and will communicate his 
acceptance of the approach outlined by Compaore in a way that will 
reassure the opposition and permit an inclusive government to be 
formed. 
 
 
 
 
 
BUT OPPOSITION STILL TEMPTED TO HIT BACK 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
ABIDJAN 00000073  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶4. (C)   The need for a positive signal to be given to the RHDP 
(opposition party coalition) is important given their strong belief 
that Gbagbo's February 12  action was "unconstitutional and 
undemocratic".  Although Gbagbo's decision was triggered by Mambe's 
refusal to resign when he met with Blaise Compaore on Feb. 11, many 
question that such a radical step was needed to resolve the issue. 
Alassane Ouattara told emboffs that Gbagbo did not seek his or 
Bedie's help to persuade Mambe to resign, clearly implying that 
they could have done so to avert a new crisis.  Amb. Badini also 
insisted during the Feb 17 meeting  that Mambe would have agreed to 
resign had the facilitation been given more time to reason with 
him.  According to Badini, Gbagbo told Compaore of his intent to 
invoke article 48 of the constitution when the latter called to 
report that Mambe had not resigned as anticipated.   The 
facilitation believes Gbagbo had already decided that he needed to 
reshape the political landscape and wanted to do so before  the 
contestation process officially ended on February 15.   Had he 
allowed the contestation period to end, Gbagbo would have found it 
more difficult to prevent a final electoral list from being drawn 
up.  PDCI and RDR reps who met with emboffs this week were still 
very angry about Gbagbo's "coup" and inclined to tolerate - if not 
precisely encourage - demonstrations by the RHDP's youth wing to 
show the president that his action was not without consequences. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C)   Comment:  The impact on the relative standing of the key 
players is an important, if less visible aspect of this latest 
"crisis".  Badini agreed with Ambassador's assessment that Gbagbo 
chose the use of article 48 to reassert his primacy in the crisis 
resolution process and to demonstrate that the electoral commission 
is not beyond his reach.  Compaore's letter is a firm response, 
clearly signalling that the Facilitator does not intend to 
relinquish control of the OPA process.  Interestingly, the Prime 
Minister's office has been far more sympathetic to Gbagbo than the 
opposition, noting that Mambe's intransigence had stymied the 
electoral process and that his removal will, at a minimum, force 
the parties to discuss how they can move forward.  The Forces 
Nouvelles has formally endorsed the PM's efforts to form a new 
government and we understand from a close Soro associate that the 
PM is actively seeking a neutral candidate to replace Mambe.  The 
prospect that the Forces Nouvelles may be seen as the party that 
can be most trusted to operate the independent electoral commission 
in a neutral manner is a formidable indication of how much clout 
Soro has acquired, despite the ongoing stalemate over the 
elections. 
NESBITT