VZCZCXRO5953
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #0071/01 0481657
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171657Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0170
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABIDJAN 000071 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PASS TO AMEMBASSY MALABO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/17 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC KDEM IV
SUBJECT: SORO TO FORM NEW GOVERNMENT; OPPOSITION SPLIT 
 
REF: ABIDJAN 65 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Mary Townswick, Section Chief, STATE, POL/ECON; 
REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  On February 12, President Gbagbo dissolved the 
government, charging PM Soro with naming a new cabinet and 
restructuring the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI).  Soro 
continues to consult with opposition parties in an attempt to reach 
a compromise on a new government; reports that he would announce 
the new line up on February 16 were premature.  While the Ivoirian 
populace remained generally calm, and Gbagbo's announcement caught 
the opposition parties off guard, the electoral process will 
certainly not benefit.  It remains to be seen whether any momentum 
towards elections will be re-established; if not, splits in the 
opposition parties, especially with their respective youth wings, 
indicate that the potential for political unrest remains 
heightened.  End Summary 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) During his surprise announcement on February 12 dissolving 
the government and the Independent Electoral Commission (reftel), 
President Laurent Gbagbo gave Prime Minister Guillaume Soro 72 
hours to form a new government.  FPI contacts told Emboffs the move 
is intended to both streamline and de-politicize the government. 
Soro has reportedly been instructed to set up a smaller cabinet of 
20 ministers (versus the current 33) and choose people based on 
technical expertise, not political party ties.  (Note:  the 
recently dissolved government of "national unity," which was 
corrupt and dysfunctional, had eight FPI ministers, eight Forces 
Nouvelles ministers, five PDCI ministers, and five RDR ministers, 
with the remainder allotted to smaller parties and civil society. 
End Note)  Soro spent the weekend consulting with the opposition 
and the international community, and met February 16 in Bouake 
with the Forces Nouvelles.  Although it was reported that Soro 
would announce a new government at 16:00 local time February 16, 
the announcement was later postponed until the end of the week, to 
give Soro more time to reach an agreement with the opposition 
parties. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) SRSG Choi told the Ambassador that he believed an agreement 
was likely, as long as Gbagbo respects the OPA, which he agreed to 
do his public address.  (Note:  The OPA, which subsumes the tenets 
of the Linas-Marcoussis and Pretoria agreements, requires that the 
structure and numbers of the Cabinet and CEI be maintained.  End 
Note) Choi told Ambassador February 16 that if the OPA were 
respected, the opposition likely would go along with the formation 
of a new government. The key will be maintaining the current 
representation of  political parties in the CEI, although with 
different personnel as commissioners. 
 
 
 
Opposition Divided 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C)  Initial press reports indicated negative opposition 
reaction to Gbabgo's announcement. The RHDP said that they no 
longer recognized him as the head of state, and called his 
unilateral action "anti-democratic" and "unconstitutional." 
However, no large protests were organized (in spite of rumors that 
the RDR would stage a massive rally), and as the weekend wore on, 
the opposition appeared to be more open to working with Gbagbo, 
provided their conditions could be met.  The head of the coalition 
of opposition parties (RHDP), for example, announced February 14 
that they would support the new government as long as the CEI is 
reconstituted.  We have heard that there are significant divisions 
within the opposition, particularly with their respective youth 
wings, regarding any compromise with the President's camp. 
Divisions among various factions of the Forces Nouvelles could also 
complicate the situation. 
 
 
 
Scattered Outbreaks of Violence 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C)  The timing of Gbagbo's  announcement (8 p.m. on Friday) 
appeared to be chosen to minimize the risk of a mass popular 
reaction.  However, no such reaction materialized.  Although there 
were isolated protests throughout the country (in Abengourou in the 
east, Tafire in the north, and in the Abidjan neighborhood of 
Yopougon after false rumors circulated that Chief of the Armed 
Forces General Mangou had been arrested), there was little reaction 
from the Ivoirian population.  Heavy rains on Sunday afternoon also 
 
ABIDJAN 00000071  002 OF 002 
 
 
reduced movement and, with it, the potential for unrest. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Comment:  All signs point to an event that was carefully 
choreographed.  Ministers reportedly lost their security details on 
Friday evening, and were locked out of their offices.  Some were 
even evicted from their residences over the weekend.  In spite of 
inflammatory press remarks, a stunned opposition offered little 
concrete response to Gbagbo's surprise initiative.  While Gbagbo 
appeared ill at ease while making his televised statement (recorded 
hours earlier), the FPI's campaign against the "fraud" perpetrated 
by CEI President Mambe appears to have resonated with the 
population, with some Ivoirians voicing hope in a newly constituted 
Commission.  The impact of this latest move, and Gbagbo's full 
rationale may not be known immediately, but this new political 
landscape means that elections this spring, or even this year, 
appear increasingly unlikely. 
NESBITT