VZCZCXRO7551
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHYE #0022/01 0140523
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 140523Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY YEREVAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9940
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1884
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0840
RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA 0032
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000022 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL TU AJ AM
SUBJECT: ARMENIA'S CONSTITUTIONAL COURT  APPROVES TURKEY-ARMENIA 
PROTOCOLS 
 
YEREVAN 00000022  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) On January 12 Armenia's Constitutional Court ruled that the 
provisions of the Armenian-Turkish protocols on establishing 
diplomatic relations and developing bilateral relations are in 
compliance with the Armenian constitution.  Addressing criticisms 
from opponents of the protocols, the Court stated that the protocols 
did not contradict Armenia's constitutional imperative to seek 
international recognition of the Armenian "genocide."  The Court 
also stressed that the development of bilateral relations would 
involve further specific agreements, and that these agreements would 
themselves be subject to the same ratification requirements as the 
protocols.  Some nationalists who oppose the protocols see this 
statement as a silver lining, interpreting it to mean that Armenia 
has not legally accepted the current border with Turkey.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
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COURT'S QUICK, RESTRICTIVE REVIEW OF PROTOCOLS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (U) On January 12, Armenia's Constitutional Court (its 
counterpart to the U.S. Supreme Court) reviewed a request by 
President Serzh Sargsian to ascertain whetherthe provisions of the 
Armenian-Turkish protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and 
developing bilateral relations (signed October 10, 2009, in Zurich) 
complied with the requirements of the Armenian constitution. 
 
¶3. (U) The Court restricted the format of the session, allowing the 
media access for only four minutes, which  Gagik Harutiunian, the 
Court's chairman, used to announce that the court's nine judges 
would consider only written statements submitted by the Armenian 
Foreign Ministry and other interested parties.  The chosen format 
excluded public hearings or questioning of government officials and 
experts.  Explaining the review, Harutiunian declared that "all (of) 
those written documents that have been submitted to the 
Constitutional Court are available in the deliberations room and the 
members of the court can take them into account."  Harutiunian noted 
that the Court would also consider the nine-page-long petition 
submitted by the nationalist Dashnakstutiun party and other 
opponents of the protocols. 
 
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FEEBLE PROTEST OUTSIDE THE COURT 
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¶4. (SBU) Throughout the day, dozens of Dasnhaks, members of 14 other 
political parties (including the opposition Heritage party), and 
NGOs that oppose the protocols gathered outside the Court to protest 
the widely anticipated positive ruling of the Court.  News reports 
indicated that diaspora members of the Dashnaktsutiun party also 
participated in the small protest, coming from as far away as the 
United States. 
 
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RULING SEEKS TO PREEMPT DOMESTIC OPPOSTION? 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In its ruling, the Court made a number of statements that 
appear intended, at least in part, to counter criticisms of the 
protocols, criticisms that have been made most forcefully by the 
nationalist opposition and by many in the Armenian diaspora. 
Specifically, the Court stated in its ruling that: 
 
--  The protocols "cannot be interpreted or applied in a way that 
may contradict" provisions of Armenia's Constitution and 
Independence Declaration that dedicate the state to seeking 
international recognition of the Armenian "genocide."  This 
statement appears to serve three purposes:  to imply that the 
protocols themselves to do not contradict Armenia's position on the 
"genocide;" to reassure the public that any future action taken 
under the protocols will not create such a contradiction; and to 
give Armenian negotiators an explicit constitutional mandate they 
can cite to Turkey as limiting room for Armenian compromise on 
historical issues. 
 
--  The protocols impose no obligation on Armenia regarding its 
relations with any third country (i.e., Azerbaijan), and no third 
country can use the protocols to impose demands on Armenia. 
 
--  The protocols' preamble language, "confirming," "considering," 
"guided by," etc., does not impose binding obligations on Armenia, 
 
YEREVAN 00000022  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
and no other obligations could come into force until the two main 
obligations under the protocols, establishment of diplomatic 
relations and opening the border, have been fulfilled.  For 
Armenians, the most sensitive among these clauses in the protocols' 
preamble may be the one saying:  "Confirming the mutual recognition 
of the existing border between the two countries as defined by the 
relevant treaties of international law;" 
 
--  The protocols focus mainly on creating the conditions for 
further development of relations, and this further development will 
require additional specific agreements, all of which will be subject 
to the Armenian constitution and the same ratification process that 
the protocols themselves are going through now. 
 
--  The commitment to open the border "refers to Armenia's readiness 
of addressing legal, organizational and infrastructure issues 
related to ensuring ongoing operation of border checkpoints."  This 
statement may also be intended to avoid explicit recognition of the 
current border.  Additionally, it may have been included to make 
Armenia's point that Turkey, not Armenia, closed the border, and 
that therefore in a legal sense action by Turkey alone would be 
sufficient to reopen it.[If we wanted to shorten, we might take this 
sub-para out.] 
 
¶6. (SBU)  A Dashnak leader told us that he sees the requirement for 
ratification of any more specific agreements as a plus, despite his 
overall wish that the Court had shot down the protocols, because he 
interprets it to mean that the Court is not treating the protocols 
as acceptance of the current Turkey-Armenia border. 
 
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ON TO RATIFICATION?  NOT UNTIL TURKEY RATIFIES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (U) The Court's ruling legally paved the way for the ratification 
of the protocols by Armenia's National Assembly (parliament).  The 
parliament's ratification, however, is not a given.  In December, 
2009, Hovik Abrahamian, the Speaker of the National Assembly, stated 
that Armenia would ratify the protocols only after Turkey's 
parliament ratified them.  Eduard Sharmazanov, spokesman for 
President Sargsian's ruling Republican Party of Armenia, who 
attended the Court's review, insisted that "the Turkish side must be 
the first to ratify them (the protocols) because it's the Turkish 
side that has always talked in the language of preconditions and 
ultimatums."  Armen Rustamian, a Dashnak leader who has led most of 
theDashnak protests of the protocols, expressed hope after the 
ruling that President Sargsian will now add "reservations" to the 
Court's decision before he presents it to the National Assembly. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶8. (SBU) Given the interpretations in the Court's ruling, we think 
it unlikely that President Sargsian will see a need to attach 
reservations to the protocols when he submits them to the National 
Assembly.  He will probably judge that this ruling has sufficiently 
answered his domestic critics, and thus equipped him with the 
maneuvering room he deems necessary to proceed with eventual 
ratification.  Judging by the feeble showing of the Dashnaks, 
however, the forceful remarks of the ruling party spokesperson, and 
President Sargsian's control of the judicial and legislative 
branches, the last real hurdle for ratification -- at least from the 
Armenian political establishment's perspective -- lies in the 
Turkish parliament. 
 
PENNINGTON