VZCZCXRO2027
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHVI #0070/01 0191527
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 191527Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4031
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 VIENNA 000070 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG ECON PREL CZ AU
SUBJECT: CZECH-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS: NEIGHBORLY DIFFERENCES 
 
REF: 09 VIENNA 173 
 
VIENNA 00000070  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (U) This is a joint Embassy Vienna/Embassy Prague report. 
 
¶2. (U) Summary: Twenty years after the collapse of the Iron Curtain, 
commercial relations are strong but environmental and other concerns 
have caused friction in the somewhat-testy Czech-Austrian 
relationship.  Czech PM Fischer's visit to Vienna in August 2009 
provided a chance to overview Czech-Austrian relations, which show 
two nations agreeing on general principles but often disagreeing on 
their approach.  Austria's nuclear-phobic public appears to be 
unsuccessfully mounting a last-ditch effort to halt the Czech 
Temelin nuclear reactor expansion.  The Brno-Vienna Highway has 
foundered on environmental issues on the Czech side.  End summary. 
 
Differences on Energy Policy 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Austrian Chancellor Faymann, after a meeting on August 24 in 
Vienna with Czech PM Fischer, pronounced Czech-Austrian relations 
"wide and full of trust," but acknowledged differences on the issue 
of energy.  While Austria views new gas pipelines such as Nabucco 
and South Stream and the development of renewable energy as key to 
its long-term energy security, the Czechs view the expansion of 
nuclear energy as imperative, hoping to reduce their dependence on 
Russian gas and oil (as well as dirty domestic coal). 
 
¶4. (U) As a result, the majority state-owned Czech energy company 
CEZ launched a public tender to install two additional nuclear 
reactors at the Temelin Nuclear Power Plant, with an option to 
install additional reactors elsewhere in Europe, including at the 
Dukovany NPP.  Both Temelin NPP (in southern Bohemia) and Dukovany 
NPP(in southern Moravia) are near the Austrian border.  Temelin's 
critics in strongly anti-nuclear Austria assert that the plant is a 
hazardous combination of Soviet-era engineering and Western safety 
standards and technology.  Austrian critics have also charged that 
expanding Temelin will not enhance the Czech Republic's energy 
independence, because the necessary nuclear fuel would most likely 
come from Russia.  Czech officials dismiss these claims and note 
that while the Russian company TVEL currently supplies the nuclear 
fuel for the existing Czech reactors, both the U.S. company 
Westinghouse and French Areva (together with the Russian 
AtomStroyExport) are competing for the tender for new reactors, 
which will include fuel for the new units).  Furthermore, the Czech 
Republic still mines uranium (which has to be transformed into fuel 
abroad, allegedly giving it more leverage in nuclear fuel 
negotiations). 
 
¶5. (U) A recent poll indicated that 71 percent of Czechs support 
nuclear power, up from 56 percent four years ago.  In contrast, 
according to one poll 90 percent of Austrians oppose nuclear energy. 
 The Czech artist David Cerny mocked Austria's nuclear phobia in his 
now-infamous "Entropa" sculpture, which depicted Austria as a green 
region covered with nuclear reactors. 
 
¶6. (SBU) After some unsuccessful attempts at negotiation, Austrian 
national politicians have largely avoided confronting the Czechs on 
Temelin, preferring to let local governments and NGOs take the lead. 
 These efforts received a setback in October 2009 when the European 
Court of Justice ruled against a suit by the government of Upper 
Austria seeking to close Temelin on the grounds that the plant's 
proximity to the border posed a danger to the Austrian province. 
Nonetheless, Austrian grassroots efforts, led by the Greens and the 
NGO Atomstopp, continue unabated.  Austrian anti-nuclear activists 
have repeatedly blocked border crossings into the Czech Republic to 
register their opposition to Temelin.  The Austrian activists' best 
hope to oppose nuclear energy may be the Czech Greens, who had used 
their position within the Topolanek government to block nuclear 
expansion.  This obstacle, however, disappeared when the Topolanek 
government fell in a vote of confidence in March.  Hurt by an 
internal split, the Czech Greens are polling well below the five 
percent national vote needed to win parliament seats and generally 
thought unlikely to return to parliament after elections in May. 
All other Czech political parties support expanding nuclear power. 
 
 
¶7. (U) Three energy firms active in the Czech Republic have 
announced plans to build gas interconnectors between the two 
countries and to connect the Czech Republic to the Austrian gas 
grid.  While it is unlikely that all three will be built, the 
connection will further enhance Czech security of supply by creating 
a third source for gas after Russia (via Ukraine) and Norway (via 
Germany). 
 
Brno-Vienna Highway 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Despite close economic ties, no major highway connects the 
two neighbors, and given the legal problems with the Brno-Vienna 
project, this is likely to remain true until at least mid-decade. 
In January 2009 Czech Ambassador to Austria Jan Koukal and Austrian 
 
VIENNA 00000070  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
FM Spindelegger signed an agreement to link highways on both sides 
of the border through the Czech border town of Mikulov.  However, 
controversy surrounding the environmental impact study resulted in 
lawsuits by environmental groups, and the European Commission (EC) 
withdrew its financial support pending a resolution of the court 
battle.  The EC expressed concern over the lack of a comparative 
economic and ecological study that would assess alternatives routes, 
in accordance with Czech and EU laws. 
¶9. (U) In August 2009 Chancellor Faymann announced that the Austrian 
part of the road leading up to the Czech border should be finished 
by 2013.  The Czechs and Austrians have pledged to continue the work 
since the GoA has completed one-third of the project, but no 
construction has begun on the Czech side.  Czech PM Fischer promised 
his Austrian counterpart that he would try to earmark funds for the 
highway in the next budget, but that seems less likely given the 
prospects of a record deficit of the Czech budget both this and next 
year. 
Sudeten German Restitution Concerns 
----------------------------------- 
¶10. (U) In October 2009 Faymann expressed his disapproval of Czech 
President Klaus' demand to receive an exemption for the Czech 
Republic regarding the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a part of the 
Lisbon Treaty.  Klaus demanded (and received) the exemption because, 
he maintained, the Charter could allow Germans and Hungarians 
expelled from the Czech Republic after World War II to bypass Czech 
courts and enforce their restitution claims at the European Court of 
Justice.  Although there is an active Sudeten German group in 
Austria, there has been no indication that claims of restitution 
were gaining momentum either in the courts or the media.  (Note: The 
Czech Embassy in Vienna recently sponsored two historical 
exhibitions on the Sudetenland.) 
Carbon Emissions 
---------------- 
 
¶11. (U) After missing its Kyoto emissions targets by a wide margin, 
Austria in October 2009 purchased 3.5 million additional carbon 
emissions credits from the Czech Republic.  (While the Czechs are 
one of the largest polluter per capita within the EU, they are well 
below their Kyoto targets, which were set based on 1990 levels - 
i.e. before the Czech Communist-era industrial giants were 
dismantled.)  A Czech government official said in July that the 
country expected to sell most of its 100 million tons of surplus 
emissions rights this year to European Union governments and private 
companies. 
Comment: The Past Still Casts Shadow 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (SBU) Twenty years after the collapse of the Iron Curtain, 
economic and environmental "neighborly" concerns dominate 
Czech-Austrian relations.  In part, these concerns and sensitivity 
relate to past history, particularly Austria's 400-year occupation 
of Bohemia and the post-World War II settlement.  This past history 
affects the perceptions and attitudes on border issues.  The 
conflict over nuclear energy is fueled by both differing attitudes 
about the risks of the technology, as well as different approaches 
to relations with Russia. 
Eacho