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PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL
RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0028/01 0291828
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291828Z JAN 10
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6854
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6855
RHMCSUU/SACEUR POLAD SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/USAREUR POLAD HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000028 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI 
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER, 
NILSSON, FRIEDT 
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL) 
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE RS XG
SUBJECT: OSCE: 1/27 FSC RESPONSES TO RUSSIA ON 
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO EUROPEAN SECURITY 
 
REF: A. STATE 4427 
     ¶B. USOSCE 0018 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  In response to Russia's insistence for 
clarification on why its proposed European Security Treaty 
(EST) cannot be discussed separately ("sectorally") from the 
Corfu Process or the human and economic dimensions, all 
interventions by participating States (pS) supported 
comprehensive, cross-dimensional engagement on issues that 
impact the OSCE area.  Belarus was the lone exception.  UK 
noted the EST went beyond "hard security" and entered the 
realm of security "principles" that necessitated a 
comprehensive approach within the Corfu Process.  Russia was 
not &satisfied8 with the responses, but welcomed the open 
exchange of views as a significant achievement for the Forum 
for Security Cooperation.  The presence of several 
ambassadors who normally do not attend the FSC and the 
unified messages that &hard security8 was only one aspect 
of the overall Corfu Process discussions on European security 
bodes well for upcoming negotiations.  Other issues discussed 
included Denmark's proposal for developing a Vienna 
Document-plus mechanism, and the Greek proposal for a Small 
Arms Light Weapons Plan of Action. A request for guidance 
regarding Russia's intention to discuss a crisis management 
and conflict resolution draft decision in Working Group "B" 
is in Para 19 below.  End summary. 
 
Strategic Dialogue: Russia's wants "sectoral" approach for EST 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Russian Chief Delegate to the FSC (Ulyanov) 
opened the 1/27 Forum for Security Cooperation discussion 
repeating assertions made the previous week (Reftel). 
Ulyanov accused "the West" of attempting to dilute the 
Russian initiative for a European Security Treaty (EST) by 
not supporting a dialogue on "hard security" issues separate 
from the Corfu Process.  He asked the pS if there really was 
a different conceptual approach to European Security. 
Ulyanov insisted comprehensive security was core to Russia's 
Foreign Policy doctrine, that Russia had worked to help 
establish the concept in the 1970s, and that in was both 
inappropriate and unjustified to suggest Russia's proposal 
for a European Security Treaty was not aligned with this 
approach. He pledged Russia,s support to work actively in 
all three dimensions, "including the Corfu Process." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Russia argued that the most urgent problems were in 
the hard security basket, and the EST was aimed at remedying 
the imbalance among the three OSCE dimensions*political 
military, human, and economic/environmental*to achieve 
better implementation of the comprehensive approach.  Russia 
complained that the OSCE has given most of its attention to 
decisions on human rights and elections while simultaneously 
according the political-military issues a "Cinderella 
status."  Russia said it was really one question: "can we 
have accords in specific security dimensions or can there 
only be a comprehensive agreement?"  Russia believes that 
"sectoral agreements are admissible and justified, and have 
shown their merits through history.8 
 
¶4. (SBU) Ulyanov noted that the reverse logic could call into 
question the legitimacy of agreements and conventions that 
were focused on only the human dimension, like those of the 
Council of Europe. "These were not comprehensive," Ulyanov 
accused, adding "In this sense the CFE treaty would also be 
inappropriate."  Acknowledging that the logic could be taken 
to the "realm of the absurd," Ulyanov reiterated the idea of 
a new treaty in the "hard security" arena is legitimate and 
has precedence (e.g., CFE, START, and the Open Skies Treaty). 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ulyanov recognized that the parallelism to the arms 
control treaties was inexact, but Russia was interested in 
 
USOSCE 00000028  002 OF 005 
 
 
procedure.  He noted the Vienna Document did not impose 
limits on arms but ventured into a broader range of political 
military issues including on budgets and transparency, yet no 
one accused the Vienna Document of being not in line with a 
comprehensive approach to security.  Russia wanted to know 
why some pS were arguing for a different approach for the 
EST.  In summation, Ulyanov said though security is 
comprehensive, attention should be given to consolidate 
efforts in each of the dimensions, and it was only logical to 
pay greater attention to "hard security" where the situation 
was most deplorable.  He argued there was every reason to 
strive for agreement on specific, sectoral issues; "like 
Kyoto, the draft EST is valid in its own right." Russia 
believed agreement on sectoral issues not only strengthened 
one but all dimensions. 
 
UK lays out illogic of Russia's approach 
 
¶6. (SBU) With the exception of Belarus, which made a fairly 
weak intervention in support of Russia, pS gave a strong 
response in favor of dealing with the Russian draft treaty as 
a contribution to the much larger debate on European security 
in the Corfu Process, while still acknowledging Russian 
concerns which had led it to propose the draft.  They 
promised to give serious consideration to Russia's proposed 
EST in this process, noting that &hard security8 is only 
one element of the broader dialogue, and argued for the 
primacy of the comprehensive approach.  Fifteen delegations 
made interventions on the Russian questions.  The UK (Cliff) 
gave an eloquent intervention, rejecting the assumption that 
the political military dimension was relegated to "Cinderella 
status" within OSCE.  Expressing concern about the roll-back 
of human dimension issues within the OSCE space, the UK said 
attention to these issues did not detract from the "pillars 
of the Political-Military dimension like CFE, which along 
with Vienna Document and Open Skies were about the nuts and 
bolts of arms control8 and an important base for European 
Security. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The UK also countered the Russian argument for a 
hard security "sectoral" approach to the proposed EST, noting 
the Russian initiative did not address size of forces or 
military equipment, but principles that must be examined 
within the framework of the long-standing, comprehensive 
values of the OSCE.  The UK said the fundamental principle of 
the Russian initiative that a party must not affect the 
security interest of another party, was a cross-dimensional 
issue.  For example, the UK noted that territorial integrity 
and independence were equally important to the right to join 
alliances of one's choosing.  Crises in the Balkans, 
Transnistria, and the Caucasus were linked to questions of 
free expression of human and political, especially minority, 
rights.  In Central Asia issues concern human and religious 
rights, and two winters' past, Europe was to dealing with 
energy issues that could have triggered security-related 
problems.  Finally, the UK noted that the rise of 
trans-national threats, like terrorism and criminality make 
it impossible to look at broad European Security principles 
solely in terms of "hard security." 
 
E pluribus, Unum 
 
¶8. (SBU) France (Gonzalez) put the Russian initiative within 
the context of the Helsinki Final Act, the 35-year evolution 
of new threats in Europe, and the special relevance of the 
Corfu Process including the progress already made to enhance 
existing conflict prevention mechanisms.  France said the EST 
would have meaning only within the Corfu Process framework in 
support of a genuinely shared security community. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Germany (Genrich) assured Russia it would look at 
 
USOSCE 00000028  003 OF 005 
 
 
the proposed EST with great care, especially individual 
components that could be built into the Corfu Process. 
Germany expressed appreciation for Russia providing substance 
and an impetus to give more attention to improving mutual 
understanding.  This entailed going forward with what the 
OSCE provides: an approach on comprehensive security that 
ensured forward momentum to modernize existing mechanisms, 
including democracy, rule of law, and fundamental freedoms. 
Germany said there should be no limitation for engaging on 
thematic mechanisms for consultation and conciliation, and 
the Corfu Process provided the ingredients for consensus and 
did not exclude specific military elements. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The U.S. (Charge Fuller) said the U.S. was &open 
to discussing all proposals for enhancing European security 
in the context of the Corfu Process,8 including Russia,s 
proposed European Security Treaty.  She reiterated U.S. 
support for the Ministerial Declaration on European Security 
approved in Athens, the concept of comprehensive, 
cooperative, and individual security, the need for full 
implementation of our commitments in all three OSCE 
dimensions, and the primacy of effective multilateralism. She 
also reiterated the principles of territorial integrity, the 
right of countries to choose their security arrangements, and 
host country consent for military deployments.  The U.S. also 
noted the link between peace and security, and the promotion 
of fundamental rights, economic and social progress and 
well-being for all peoples.  Fuller pointed out that the OSCE 
comprehensive security approach provided the most effective 
tools for fortifying States and enhancing their ability to 
adapt peacefully to changing political conditions And 
asserted that the OSCE is the most appropriate venue for 
discussion about European security, including Arms Control 
and CSMBs and Russia,s proposed EST. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Poland (Grudzinski) gave one of the most pointed 
responses.  He expressed concern that the proposed EST would 
weaken the role and effectiveness of existing structures like 
NATO and EU, as well as reestablish &spheres of influence8 
and prevent pS from joining the alliance of their choice. 
Poland said that OSCE pS should aim to reconfirm existing 
norms and enhance them when and as necessary, adding "We want 
OSCE-plus not minus."  The Netherlands (Kleinjan) expressed 
concern over the timing and choice of forum for the Russian 
EST initiative because it was distributed during the more 
comprehensive security exercise within the Corfu Process, 
which in turn was developed to engage directly on concerns 
raised by Russia.  Turkey (Begec) noted the need to give 
equal attention to all three security dimensions, and pledged 
to examine the merits of all proposals put forward on 
strengthening European Security.  This did not mean, however, 
that Turkey wanted to see each of the three security elements 
in every proposal, but was prepared to discuss the EST in 
terms of its contribution to the overall comprehensive 
approach. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Belgium (Van de Velde) noted Russia's focus on hard 
security and interstate relations was not in line with the 
real threats to security that are more transnational than 
state-centric.  Latvia's intervention echoed Belgium's. 
Romania (Feruta) said the Russian initiative for an EST 
required careful study for its political and legal 
implications.  Romania believes the Corfu Process addresses 
Russia's concerns, adding that the problem is not one of 
lacking principles, but full compliance with the norms in all 
three dimensions; "we must revitalize our commitments, not 
replace them." Austria, Switzerland, Greece and Kazakhstan 
(the current Chairman-in-Office) gave varying notes on the 
theme of support for the Corfu Process and the need to 
address the EST proposal in a cross-dimensional and 
comprehensive manner. 
 
USOSCE 00000028  004 OF 005 
 
 
 
Russia rebuts 
 
¶13. (SBU) Ulyanov Russia responded that although he did not 
agree with everyone's input, he believed that the engagement 
and discussion of the issue clearly demonstrated progress 
"from the wall of silence Russia use to receive two, three 
years ago."  He referred to the plenary discussion as a major 
achievement.  Ulyanov added he was not &satisfied8 with the 
answers to the question of how the sectoral approach 
preferred by Russia relates to the comprehensive approach 
advocated in the Forum.  He noted that Russia was still 
waiting for replies from capitals to President Medvedev,s 
letter on the EST so it can correlate and analyze any inputs 
in order to see how to proceed with the EST proposal. 
Ulyanov "insisted" on the validity of the view that the 
political-military dimension has not been given equal 
attention to the human dimension over the last decade. 
Russia seeks to remedy the imbalance.  Russia wants respect 
for its proposed EST to be judged on its own values and not 
linked to other problems.  Russia favors addressing 
cross-dimensional issues, but not everything needs to be put 
into a single basket, Ulyanov noted, adding somewhat 
illogically that there was no link between EST and climate 
change, for example.  He concluded that there was sufficient 
reason to continue the dialogue. 
 
¶14.  Comment:  The pS were very polite in saying they will 
study the proposed EST, that they consider it a contribution 
to the Corfu Process, and welcoming Russia,s clarification 
of its position.  They then joined forces to reaffirm the 
concept of comprehensive security and the need to consider 
cross-dimensional aspects of security and not segregate them 
into &hard8 and &soft8 security.  A number of ambassadors 
who don,t normally attend the FSC participated in order to 
reaffirm this message.  This unity of message bodes well for 
the upcoming Corfu Process discussions. 
 
Any Other Business 
 
¶15. (SBU) Spain (Anson) gave an update on the Dayton Article 
V Committee including the information exchange and reports on 
supplementary inspections.  France is next to take the chair. 
 The update will be attached to the Journal of the Day. 
Bulgaria (Iliev) briefed on the Seventh Annual Consultation 
on Black Sea CSBMs.  Romania assumes the Chair in 2010.  The 
report will be attached to the Journal of the Day.  Austria 
(Eischer) will circulate an updated questionnaire of the 
April 15 exchange under the Code of Conduct, and asked that 
the issue be placed on the agenda for Working Group "A." 
 
¶16. (SBU) Denmark (Peterson) briefed on the distribution of 
its Food-for-Thought to establish a new procedure for 
updating Vienna Document 1999 (FSC.DEL/9/10).  Noting a 
"changed attitude" towards addressing VD99, Denmark has 
offered a mechanism that does not open the document for 
wholesale review, and facilitate the incorporation of 
targeted changes into the regime (called "VD-plus").  Denmark 
would like to begin discussion in two weeks (2/10).  Russia 
(Ulyanov) announced it has recommended Moscow to support the 
Danish proposal for VD-plus, as "worthwhile, meriting further 
study."  Ulyanov did lay down a marker that the timeline for 
the Danish proposal does not change the urgency to update 
VD99 this year. 
 
Working Group "A" - Digital Cameras and SALW 
 
¶17. (SBU) Turkey reintroduced its proposal to extend usage of 
digital cameras in Vienna Document application 
(FSC.DEL/124/09/Rev. 1).  The UK, Germany, France, Canada, 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Austria all made statements in 
 
USOSCE 00000028  005 OF 005 
 
 
support of the Turkish proposal.  The Greek Chair (Sourani) 
asked if the draft could be moved to plenary.  The U.S. 
(Ellis) noted it was not prepared to agree to move the 
Turkish proposal out of WG "A."  The proposal will remain on 
the agenda for the next meeting. Following the meeting, the 
UK (Hartnell) approached U.S. del to note concern that the 
U.S. continued to stall finalization of the proposed draft 
decision on digital cameras, and that the current state of 
affairs, if continued, would likely suffocate the proposal. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Greece (Kalpadakis) introduced its Food-for-Thought 
paper on developing a Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW; FSC.DEL/213/09).  The UK (Hartnell) and 
Germany (Risse) supported the Greek paper.  The U.S. (Ellis) 
gave a general overview of those elements it could support 
(e.g., stockpile destruction/security assistance, UN GGE 
brokering controls, implementation of UN International 
Tracing Instrument) and those it would oppose (e.g., 
expanding scope of current OSCE Document on SALW, new 
mechanisms/agencies, additional norms regulations or 
reporting mechanisms).  Greece explained its philosophy was 
to cover the broadest possible scope of suggestions, 
recognizing the ambitious character of some specific 
elements.  Sweden announced an Informal Friends of SALW 
Working Group would meet on 2/29 for a detailed exchange of 
views. 
 
RFG 
 
¶19. (SBU) The next FSC Plenary and Meeting of Working Groups 
"B" and "A" will be held on February 3.  Col Wolfgang Richter 
of the German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs will be the feature speaker focusing on Vienna 
Document and other related CSBMs under the Security Dialogue. 
 Russia plans to present its draft paper on Conflict 
Prevention and Crisis Management (FSC-PC.DEL/1/10/Corr.1) in 
WG "B"; unless instructed otherwise, USDEL will argue a point 
of order, rejecting the application for an FSC decision on an 
issue (Russia's joint FSC-PC proposal for a draft decision) 
that is simultaneously before the PC for a separate decision 
(Russia introduced the proposal in the 791st PC on 1/21). 
Per ref a guidance, USDEL will note that due to the 
cross-dimensional character of crisis management, this topic 
should be discussed in the context of the FSC Security 
Dialogue. 
FULLER