VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVEN #0022/01 0290736
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290736Z JAN 10
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6838
INFO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0153
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000022 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020 
TAGS: OSCE PREL KZ KG TI TX UZ AF
SUBJECT: PERSPECTIVES ON KAZAKHSTAN,S OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP IS 
FOCUS OF DCM SPRATLEN,S VISIT TO VIENNA 
 
Classified By: CDA Carol Fuller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The visit of Embassy Astana DCM Pamela 
Spratlen to Vienna January 20-22 helped promote useful 
exchanges of views on Kazakhstan's Chairmanship, facilitated 
discussion of OSCE engagement in Afghanistan, and provided an 
opportunity to promote further interaction among Central 
Asian PermReps.  NATO Caucus PermReps agreed that Kazakhstan 
is focusing more on process than content and that supporters 
of the Corfu Process will need to work hard to ensure good 
substantive results.  Central Asian PermReps affirmed their 
support for Kazakhstan's Chairmanship and the work of OSCE 
field missions but cautioned that the OSCE was "no magic 
wand" for advancing change in their countries.  OSCE 
Secretary General de Brichambaut urged continued engagement 
with Kazakhstan at all levels, noted the United States would 
have to play a leading role in shaping the Chairmanship's 
agenda, and cast doubt on some participating States' belief 
that an OSCE Summit in 2010 is inevitable.  Kazakhstani 
PermRep Abdrakhmanov reiterat 
ed the Chairmanship's willingness to work with the United 
States, particularly on Afghanistan.  The director of the 
Conflict Prevention Center shared insights on the delicate 
relationship between Abdrakhmanov and Kazakhstani Foreign 
Minister Saudabayev, as well as between Abdrakhmanov and the 
Kazakhstani ambassador to Austria and the UN Vienna.  End 
summary. 
 
----------- 
NATO CAUCUS 
----------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) At the January 20 meeting of the NATO Caucus, 
PermReps discussed the priorities of the Kazakhstani 
Chairmanship, including the proposed Summit and Afghanistan. 
All lamented that the draft agenda for the Corfu Process is 
very "event-driven," focusing on process, lacking political 
direction, and aiming primarily at a Summit, while leaving 
the substance up to the participating States (pS).  The 
Polish PermRep pointed out a paradox:  those who were against 
the idea of a Summit are now in the paradoxical position of 
supporting the Corfu Process, which will provide some of the 
substance.  Hungary wondered if the Chairmanship could really 
"deliver" Russian approval for OSCE involvement inside 
Afghanistan.  All called for closer coordination among NATO 
allies to focus on our priorities in all three dimensions and 
ensure there is substance for the interim report in June. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Estonian Chair of the NATO Caucus then invited 
DCM Spratlen to provide insight on how the Chairmanship is 
seen by the diplomatic community in Astana and on how 
Kazakhstan relates to Russia.  DCM Spratlen began by 
stressing how important the OSCE Chairmanship is to 
Kazakhstan.  Everyone in Kazakhstan now knows about the OSCE 
and expects the Chairmanship to bring honor and prestige to 
the country; any OSCE events within the country will 
"resonate" with the population and have an impact.  DCP 
Spratlen urged NATO allies to help shape the substance of the 
Kazakhstani agenda, seeking opportunities to influence the 
way Kazakhstan approaches its work, through cooperation, 
coordination, and dialogue.  Kazakhstan has enormous 
self-confidence and therefore does not always "hear" us -- 
the 56 pS will need appropriate repetition of key messages we 
want Kazakhstan to hear.  She noted that Kazakhstan pursues a 
balanced foreign policy, and although most in the government 
still see Russia as Kazakhstan's most imp 
ortant partner, they treasure their sovereignty and pursue 
independent priorities.  NATO allies have an opportunity to 
help shape the year for Kazakhstan, to help it as a state and 
to help make the OSCE a success. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
OSCE IS POSITIVE, BUT IT'S NO MAGIC WAND 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Central Asian PermReps on January 21 welcomed the 
new focus on Central Asia that has accompanied Kazakhstan's 
Chairmanship and praised the work of OSCE field missions. 
Most of them also voiced their support for Kazakhstan's 
announced priorities as Chair.  Turkmen PermRep Aydogdyev 
said his government was interested in seeking common ground 
 
with Central Asian neighbors.  He praised the OSCE Center in 
Ashgabat but indicated there was a limit to what the OSCE 
could do, arguing, for example, that there was "no need" for 
OSCE involvement in law enforcement activities, as Central 
Asian states already enjoyed good cooperation on such 
matters.  Several questioned the OSCE's emphasis on human 
dimension issues, contending that it duplicated the work of 
the UN's Human Rights Council.  The Turkem PermRep, seconded 
by others, cautioned that their cultures need to change 
slowly, and pushing too hard, too fast is counterproductive. 
The Tajik and Turkmen PermReps and the Uzbek Charge 
complained that they are small 
 missions and have difficulty following all of the issues, 
and USOSCE Charge pledged that USOSCE would try to stay in 
closer touch with them. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The Kyrgyz and Tajik PermReps praised the OSCE's 
overall role but joined their colleagues in highlighting the 
difficulty of cooperating on certain issues, including 
Afghanistan.  All said it frequently was difficult to obtain 
visas for Afghan officials, and several identified logistical 
hurdles as key obstacles to including Afghans in OSCE 
training in their countries.  There was no reaction when the 
Kazakh DCM announced that they had designated as the 
Chairmanship's liaison for OSCE coordination a senior 
official in the Kazakhstani embassy in Kabul. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
SG URGES CONTINUED, COORDINATED ENGAGEMENT 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Noting that his priority was to defend the 
"integrity and respectability" of the OSCE, Secretary General 
de Brichambaut emphasized January 22 that continued 
engagement with Kazakhstan in Vienna and capitals was 
critical to ensuring the OSCE continued to work "in the right 
way" during the Kazakhstani Chairmanship.  De Brichambaut 
urged the United States and the EU to coordinate their 
expectations of the Corfu Process, identify "decent outcomes" 
(particularly for the June interim report), and deliver a 
unified message at all levels.  Lamenting the EU's "lack of 
direction," de Brichambaut said the United States would have 
to lead the Corfu Process -- and potentially could be left as 
the only pS to try to impose conditions on Kazakhstan's 
desire for a Summit.  De Brichambaut suggested that a Summit 
might not be inevitable, but that Vienna might be a desirable 
location for such a meeting, particularly if it turned out to 
be little more than a "jubilee exercise" -- a phrase 
introduced by the Russian PermRe 
p during the last Corfu Process meeting. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Turning to day-to-day management issues, de 
Brichambaut said he spoke "three times a day" to Kazakhstani 
PermRep Abdrakhmanov, frequently on purely logistical 
matters, and added that he expected an "authoritarian streak" 
to show itself (he noted that Chairmanships often suffer from 
a "master of the universe" syndrome).  De Brichambaut further 
observed that the cycle of consultations and the pressure of 
building consensus likely would start to wear relatively 
quickly on the Kazakhstani delegation and recommended that 
interlocutors be "discreet" and avoid surprises, particularly 
given Abdrakhmanov's preoccupation with "face" and image.  On 
one final note, de Brichambaut said the Chairmanship was 
reluctant to reconsider its draft human dimension agenda, 
despite significant pressure from the United States and the 
EU, as Abdrakhmanov believed doing so would open a "Pandora's 
box" of conflicting demands.  De Brichambaut declined the 
Chairmanship's request to get involved, saying he had "no 
mandate" for su 
ch issues. 
 
-------------------------------- 
KAZAKHSTAN'S ROLE ON AFGHANISTAN 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) In a subsequent meeting January 22, Kazakhstani 
PermRep Abdrakhmanov answered a question about Russian 
PermRep Azimov's hints of a possible change in Russia's 
long-standing opposition to OSCE activities inside 
Afghanistan by saying his government was unaware of any such 
change.  Abdrakhmanov said that while the Chairmanship wanted 
 
to find a niche for the OSCE vis-a-vis Afghanistan, it 
remained concerned about the security situation and 
participating States' continuing reservations about work 
inside the country.  He added that Kazakhstan was "not too 
influential" in this matter and suggested that much would 
depend on the January 28 London conference and on ongoing 
U.S.-Russia and EU-Russia dialogues.  Abdrakhmanov did 
confirm, however, that the Chairmanship had identified Second 
Secretary Dauren Tishtykbayev at Kazakhstan's embassy in 
Kabul as a liaison officer for OSCE issues. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
LIFE IS NOT EASY FOR THE KAZAKHSTANI PERM REP 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Asked about his perceptions of the Kazakhstani 
Chairmanship, OSCE Conflict Prevention Center Director 
Herbert Salber (Germany) observed that there is no high 
expectation of Abdrakhmanov's ability to manage OSCE issues. 
In fact, he asserted, the GOK had considered replacing 
Abdrakhmanov prior to assuming the Chairmanship, and 
bilateral Ambassador Yerzhan Kazyhanov (who also serves as 
PermRep for the UN) might be to a certain extent keeping an 
eye on his compatriot.  (Note: Salber is privy to some direct 
information due to the secondment of a German national, 
Dieter Boden, as policy adviser to the GOK in Astana.) 
Kazyhanov had been a personal aid to the president, was once 
head of international relations for the GOK, and remains 
close to Saudabayev.  In contrast, Abdrakhmanov tries to stay 
out of Saudabayev's proximity and even refused to take the 
seat next to him in the car when he arrived in Vienna for the 
inaugural festivities held January 14.  Salber also recounted 
"dueling events" January 13.  Sho 
rtly after Abdrakhmanov issued invitations for a gala concert 
at 6:30, Kazyhanov issued an invitation to a presentation of 
President Nazarbayev's book "The Kazakhstan Way": same time, 
same place; the concert had to be delayed. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Interlocutors' recommendations for dealing with the 
Kazakhstanis -- from "discreetly" delivering messages to 
providing ways for the Kazakhstani delegation to "save face" 
when making difficult decisions -- suggest we have a range of 
tools at our disposal for shaping the Chairmanship. 
Coordination among NATO allies, both in Vienna and Brussels, 
is essential for helping counterbalance Russian pressure on 
Kazakhstan and ensuring our messages are heard.  Our 
continued cooperation with Embassy Astana and with other 
Missions in Central Asia will be key, particularly as we seek 
to expand OSCE engagement with Afghanistan and promote 
further interaction among Central Asian states.  DCM 
Spratlen's visit proved valuable from many perspectives and 
showed that occasional visits by U.S. officials to Vienna can 
help promote our objectives.  USOSCE urges Washington and 
Brussels officials to make similar visits, especially during 
the Corfu Process discussions that will contribute to the 
June interim report. 
FULLER