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Viewing cable 10USOSCE14, OSCE WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS: DECEMBER 22, 2009 -

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10USOSCE14 2010-01-21 07:20 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Mission USOSCE
VZCZCXRO3723
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0014/01 0210720
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210720Z JAN 10
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6820
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0163
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0129
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0174
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0125
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0026
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0180
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0153
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0180
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0172
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0215
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0156
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0116
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/SACEUR POLAD SHAPE BE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000014 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2019 
TAGS: MARR OSCE PGOV PREL GG KZ RU AF IR MD TI
TX, UP, HR, MK, KV 
SUBJECT: OSCE WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS: DECEMBER 22, 2009 - 
JANUARY 15, 2010 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Carol Fuller for reasons 1.4 (B) and ( 
D) 
 
Iran As An OSCE Partner for Cooperation? 
 
1. (C) Kazakhstani DCM Suleimenov told A/DCM December 22 that 
Kazakhstan had received preliminary inquiries from Iran 
regarding the possibility of becoming an OSCE Asian Partner 
for Cooperation.  We note that Suleimenov was previously 
posted to Iran, speaks the language, maintains ties there, 
and likely has promoted this ostensible interest.  The 
Kazakhstanis have speculated about other possible new 
Partners for Cooperation and are, at least at the delegation 
level, seeking to enhance participation from their region. 
Suleimenov said he was expecting a formal approach from Iran 
in January.  We underscored that any state seeking 
association with the OSCE should be willing to abide by its 
norms and principles and pointed out that any application by 
Iran would be closely scrutinized by capitals. 
 
Kazakhstanis Back Away from Proposal for ODIHR Office in 
Georgia 
 
2. (C) Kazakhstani Ambassador Abdrakhmanov insisted January 4 
that the Kazakhstani proposal to establish an ODIHR office in 
Tbilisi was floated only on an informal, unofficial basis. 
As described to several delegations December 22, the office 
would have operated in a not-further-defined "Georgia," dealt 
exclusively with human rights and democratization issues, and 
regularly sought access to the South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
regions.  Abdrakhmanov said that while the Chairmanship must 
thoroughly consider all proposals for an OSCE presence in 
Georgia, in the future it needed to be more "precise" and 
attuned to the situation on the ground. 
 
ODIHR Says Croatia's Second-Round Elections Compliant With 
Standards 
 
3. (U) On January 11 ODIHR released its statement of 
preliminary findings and conclusions on the second round of 
Croatia's presidential elections, held January 10.  The 
statement said the election generally complied with OSCE 
commitments and international standards, added that the 
process confirmed positive developments noted during the 
first round, and declared that voting was calm and orderly. 
It also highlighted consolidation and harmonization of the 
legal framework, continued reform of election administration, 
and enhanced voter education as issues that deserve continued 
attention.  In particular, it noted that the legal framework 
for complaints and appeals was not fully compliant, pointing 
to the failure of the Constitutional Court to render a 
decision on a complaint from a first-round candidate that the 
media had not provided equal conditions for all candidates. 
 
Kazakhstan Urged to Facilitate ODIHR/OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly Cooperation 
 
4. (SBU) CDA Fuller urged Ambassador Abdrakhmanov January 12 
to actively facilitate cooperation between the Parliamentary 
Assembly and ODIHR election monitoring teams ahead of the 
January 17 elections in Ukraine.  She pointed out that Greek 
Ambassador Marinaki took an active role in 2009 and helped 
secure a workable arrangement for Albania's elections last 
June.  We provided Abdrakhmanov with a copy of the 1997 
 
USOSCE 00000014  002 OF 005 
 
 
memorandum outlining cooperation between the two OSCE 
institutions. 
 
Moldova Mission Head Expects No Progress in 2010 on TN 
Region's Status 
 
5. (SBU) Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova Remler told CDA 
Fuller January 12 that ongoing political instability on both 
sides of the Nistru River would likely preclude formal 
negotiations on the status of the Transnistrian region this 
year.  He noted, however, that the sides could make progress 
building confidence, in part through continued meetings 
between Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister Osipov and 
Transnistrian Lead Negotiator Yastrebchak.  Remler also 
mentioned that the Kazakhstani Chairmanship had proposed an 
informal 5 2 meeting in mid-February or early March, but 
noted that the meeting's objectives were not yet clear. 
Remler said he had stressed the importance of having clear 
goals ) in part because the United States would demand them 
) but suggested to CDA Fuller that meetings in and of 
themselves might serve a purpose, if they helped the sides 
build trust and solve problems. 
 
CPC Seeking to Advance Central Asia Border Assessment Project 
 
6. (SBU) Conflict Prevention Center (CPC) staff told PolOffs 
January 13 that they planned to re-open discussions with 
Turkmen officials on a previously proposed assessment of the 
Turkmen border, in hopes of building on the positive momentum 
generated by the successful completion of two pilot programs 
involving Turkmen customs officials and border guards.  CPC 
staff likely will travel to Ashgabat in mid- to late February 
to discuss the matter.  Staff added that border assessments 
completed in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan between 2006 and 2008 
had provided a solid foundation for OSCE activities.  In 
Tajikistan, staff will continue to support the Border 
Management Staff College in Dushanbe; consider ways of 
continuing or building on a border patrolling project due to 
end in June; push the Tajik government to formally adopt an 
OSCE-supported national border strategy; and continue an 
existing customs training program. 
 
OSCE Engagement in Afghanistan Under Discussion 
 
7. (SBU) In a subsequent conversation January 13, CPC staff 
said the Secretary General's office had taken the lead in 
exploring ways to expand the OSCE's engagement in Afghanistan 
but had made no real progress, in part because Russia and 
other participating States continued to object to OSCE 
activities inside Afghanistan.  Nevertheless, staff are 
"floating" ideas for work inside Afghanistan and have taken a 
cursory look at revising, updating, or re-framing projects 15 
and 16 (proposed by the Secretariat in 2008 as part of a 
comprehensive package of activities).  CPC staff do not 
expect to develop formal proposals in the near future but 
believe they could present modified projects relatively 
quickly if change occurred at the political level, in part 
because the basic goal ) building the capacity of Afghan 
border personnel ) remains the same.  In the meantime, staff 
intend to try to include Afghans as often as possible in 
training activities outside Afghanistan (through the Border 
Management Staff College in Dushanbe, for example) and 
encourage coordination with Central Asian states on a range 
of issues, including borders, counter-narcotics, and customs. 
 
USOSCE 00000014  003 OF 005 
 
 
 Staff note, however, that historical animosities and poor 
organization often hinder effective regional cooperation. 
USOSCE will continue to stress the USG's ongoing interest in 
OSCE activities inside Afghanistan and will encourage the 
Secretariat, institutions, and field missions to consider 
creative ways of expanding OSCE engagement with Afghanistan. 
 
A Russian Opening on the OSCE Inside Afghanistan? 
 
8. (C) During their weekly bilateral meeting January 13, 
Russian Ambassador Azimov reminded CDA Fuller of their 
December discussion about the possibility of joint 
U.S.-Russian training in Central Asia.  The idea would be to 
provide concrete follow-up to the 2009 Ministerial decision 
on trans-national threats (terrorism, narcotics, 
cyber-security, etc.), which the United States and Russia 
co-sponsored.  Azimov suggested that joint training, perhaps 
in conjunction with the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, could be an 
excellent first step.  He added that it might help convince 
Moscow to change its mind on OSCE projects inside Afghanistan 
and consider a similar joint training project in Kabul, 
perhaps on counter-narcotics.  Asked if he had raised the 
joint training idea with Moscow, he replied that he had done 
so only informally.  USOSCE 11 provides additional 
information. 
 
Germany Warming Up on OSCE Training Inside Afghanistan? 
 
9. (C) The German ambassador told CDA Fuller January 15 that 
Berlin, which, along with Moscow, has been opposed to OSCE 
training inside Afghanistan, appeared to be changing its 
position.  Although he did not pinpoint the London 
conference, he stated that there could be a positive 
announcement of this change within the next two weeks. 
 
Secretariat Seeking Afghan Participation in Econ/Environment 
Forum 
 
10. (U) At the January 12 Economic and Environmental 
Committee meeting, Kazakhstan formally presented the agenda 
for the first segment of the Economic and Environmental Forum 
(EEF), to be held February 1-2 in Vienna.  The EEF focuses on 
the facilitation and security of land transport and the 
promotion of good governance at border crossings, and 
includes a session focusing on Central Asia and Afghanistan. 
In an aside, members of the Secretariat told PolOff they were 
inviting a representative of the Afghan Ministry of Trade to 
participate.  The Secretariat also said they could fund the 
participation of up to three Afghans and asked for U.S. 
assistance in encouraging participation. USOSCE has 
encouraged the Afghan mission in Vienna to respond positively 
to the invitation and has worked with Embassy Kabul to 
identify an appropriate participant from the Afghan Ministry 
of Commerce. 
 
Kazakhstan,s Chairmanship and the Zhovtis Case 
 
11. (SBU) On the margins of the Kazakhstani Chairmanship's 
inaugural events the week of January 11, Kazakhstani 
Ambassador-at-Large Madina Jarbussynova expressed frustration 
to CDA Fuller that the Zhovtis case would continue to hang 
over the Chairmanship.  She confided that after the October 
Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, she had worked hard 
to convince Kazakhstani government officials that the courts 
 
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needed to review procedural inadequacies in the trial and 
give the case another hearing, but had been overruled. 
Jarbussynova was not convinced anyone had truly explained the 
details of the case to President Nazarbayev or stressed the 
real import for the Kazakhstani Chairmanship of a lack of due 
process in following Kazakhstani laws.  She noted the human 
rights committee (which she chairs) of the Kazakakhstani OSCE 
Task Force would soon hold an interagency meeting in Astana 
and said she intended to raise the Zhovtis case again. 
 
Head of Mission in Skopje Likely to Propose Restructuring and 
Reductions for 2011 
 
12. (SBU) The head of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to 
Skopje, Jose Luis Herrero, told CDA Fuller January 13 that 
proposed changes for 2011 included restructuring, some 
reductions, and the potential closure of the Tetovo field 
office.  Herrero said Macedonia was an "unfinished success 
story," citing recent instances of progress such as the 2009 
elections and the positive EC report, but warned that not all 
risks had disappeared, especially with the indefinite waiting 
period for joining NATO and the EU.  He said the GoM was 
looking for recognition of its progress and argued that his 
proposed changes would both give them that progress and 
introduce operational changes that would allow the mission to 
do as much or more with fewer resources.  Depending on the 
circumstances closer to the date, the Tetovo field office 
would be closed in 2011, with its monitoring functions in the 
NW continued out of Skopje.  Herrero argued that 
participating States must recognize that the situation is not 
like it was in 2001, and asserted that the dependency on the 
OSCE and other internationals to resolve all disputes has to 
be reduced eventually.  CDA Fuller emphasized the importance 
of caution in proceeding with any of these changes and said 
the push from the GoM needs to be balanced with reality on 
the ground.  In response to the CDA's question about ethnic 
Albanian buy-in for closing Tetovo, Herrero said the initial 
reaction from an ethnic Albanian DPM had been positive, but 
he needed to consult more with other ethnic Albanian 
political leaders. 
 
OMIK Head of Mission on Plans for 2010 
 
13. (SBU) In a January 13 meeting, Head of the OSCE Mission 
in Kosovo (OMIK) Werner Almhofer told CDA Fuller he was 
working on implementing the budget for 2010, which in the 
immediate term meant the difficult process of letting go of 
some 120-130 local staff.  When questioned about a rumored 
Kazakhstani extra-budgetary project related to the Belgrade 
proposal for reception centers, Almhofer said only that he 
had heard a similar rumor.  He said there might also be 
expectations that 400,000 euro added back to the Human Rights 
and Communities department from unspent 2009 funds would be 
used to work on returnee issues, but that Belgrade's 
obsession with the mission doing more "outreach" to 
non-Albanian communities was unwarranted given the amount of 
work the mission is already doing with non-Albanian, 
including Serb, communities. Almhofer acknowledged that the 
mission potentially could do more on returnee issues by 
working with UNHCR, relevant ministries, and receiving 
municipalities on related projects, such as shelters, but 
recalled that the mission's own study had found the Belgrade 
proposal generally infeasible for an OMIK project.  CDA 
Fuller reiterated U.S. concerns about the Belgrade proposal, 
 
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noting its potential for sidestepping Kosovar institutions, 
and reminded Almhofer that OMIK's study had found the project 
not just infeasible, but outside the mission's mandate. 
 
Initial Feedback Positive on U.S. DHoM for OMIK, but Work 
Remains 
 
14. (C) Consultations with a variety of stakeholders on the 
prospect of a U.S. seconded deputy head of mission (DHoM) for 
OMIK have elicited positive feedback, but we still have 
further steps before the Kazakhstani Chairmanship can appoint 
the U.S. candidate.  CDA Fuller has raised the issue with the 
Chairmanship, OMIK HoM Almhofer, the SG, and the Serbian and 
Russian ambassadors, emphasizing that the point is to put 
forward a highly qualified candidate with management and 
leadership skills, since many delegations recognize the need 
for better management in the OSCE's largest field mission. 
Serbian Ambassador Beham agreed there are management issues 
in OMIK, saying it was in disarray, and said Belgrade's 
positive experience with U.S. seconded DHoMs in the OSCE 
Mission there would be a helpful factor.  Her personal view 
was that it would not be a problem.  She added that she was 
pleased with the prospect of a female candidate but said she 
would need to consult with Belgrade.  Russian AMB Azimov said 
he did not think it would be a problem for Moscow.  The 
incumbent is Finnish, and in consultations before the 
holidays, Finnish Ambassador Turunen also said he did not see 
it as a problem.  However, USOSCE recently has learned that 
the incumbent may be granted a six-month extension in order 
to help him bridge to his next assignment, as he is competing 
for a number of ambassadorships.  OMIK HoM Almhofer appeared 
ready to go with the flow, but did not take a definite 
position.  The SG, who originally encouraged us to propose a 
U.S. candidate, is currently consulting further with the HoM 
and with the Finns regarding potential timing issues, 
including the possibility of creating a temporary position to 
allow an overlap. Continuing to shepherd all these 
stakeholders to support a U.S. candidate will be crucial to 
giving the Kazakhstani Chairmanship the necessary level of 
comfort to make the appointment. 
FULLER