VZCZCXRO4464
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHNO #0008/01 0110607
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 110607Z JAN 10
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3767
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0785
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1325
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0513
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0004
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0589
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0819
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000008 
 
SIPDIS 
 
S/SRAP OFFICE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2020 
TAGS: PREL MOPS AF MCAP NATO
SUBJECT: ALLIED RESPONSE TO STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN 
COORDINATION IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: STATE 132520 
 
Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan for reasons: 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1. (U) In response to reftel request for Allied positions on 
strengthening civilian coordination in Afghanistan, the 
following reflects recent feedback from Allies.  Post will 
provide updates, if needed, after Afghanistan-related NATO 
meetings in advance of the January 28 London conference on 
Afghanistan. 
 
¶2. (C/REL UK) Summary and Comment.  Allies support 
strengthening and better resourcing the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG).  Allies are 
unanimous that UNAMA must remain the highest coordinating 
authority of international civilian assistance.  At the same 
time, they also recognize the need for better coordination of 
ISAF partners' assistance.  Nations want to boost the role of 
NATO's Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) to develop a 
strong civilian and political counterpart to the Commander of 
the International Assistance Force (COMISAF).  How willing 
they are to coordinate national interests with Afghan and 
ISAF priorities remains unclear.  Germany and France have 
called for clear definitions and roles for an enhanced SCR's 
office to ensure that national priorities for civilian 
programs are maintained.  All oppose dual-hatting the U.S. 
Ambassador or giving an American the role of the SCR under an 
enhanced mandate, however, there is general support for an 
American as Deputy SCR.  The NATO Secretary General (SYG) 
seeks agreement on the concept to strengthen UNAMA and the 
NATO SCR's office, as well as identify a SCR candidate, 
before the January 28 London conference on Afghanistan. 
 
¶3. (C/ REL UK) Summary and Comment cont.  As Allied feedback 
indicates, overcoming resistance to having a robust SCR 
coordinate ISAF nations' civilian efforts will be the 
toughest part of selling the concept, despite general 
agreement that such coordination is needed.  The London 
Conference offers an opportunity for Foreign Ministers to 
deliver a firm message that all nations (including the U.S.) 
must coordinate their efforts with Afghan and ISAF 
priorities; strengthening UNAMA and SCR will ensure a 
coherent approach that is essential to the success of our 
mission.  END Summary and Comment. 
 
------- 
Canada: Skeptical But Supportive 
------- 
 
¶4. (C/REL UK) Canadian representatives supported an enhanced 
NATO SCR office but were concerned that a new SCR mandate 
might interfere with the national priorities Ottawa had set 
for civilian activities within its PRT, including programs 
for sub-national governance, development, and community 
planning.  In Canada's view, harmonization between PRTs was 
not the most pressing need; instead there was a need for 
better vertical coordination between individual PRTs in the 
field and Kabul.  Canada preferred utilizing NATO common 
(civil budget) funding rather than Voluntary National 
Contributions as a more permanent support mechanism for an 
enhanced SCR office. 
 
--------------- 
The Netherlands: Development over Defense SCR 
--------------- 
 
¶5. (C/REL UK) The Hague representatives supported an enhanced 
SCR structure that demonstrates closer coordination and 
transparency with the UN SRSG on ISAF's efforts in governance 
and development, preferring a candidate for the role to be a 
 
USNATO 00000008  002 OF 003 
 
 
former Development or Foreign Minister.  The Hague noted that 
any robust SCR structure and terms of reference must lay out 
clear and distinct roles and responsibilities from the SRSG 
to avoid "mission creep" into the UN's areas of 
responsibility.  The Dutch also suggested strengthening the 
Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), possibly in 
response to SRSG Kai Eide's idea to create an Executive 
Steering Board in Kabul.  They embraced expanding the SCR's 
office to mimic that of the military chain of command and 
giving it executive authority to coordinate the PRT's 
civilian activities.  However, the Hague representatives were 
skeptical the U.S. would submit to the SCR's coordination, 
but viewed it as an opportunity for the U.S. to lead other 
nations to accept the expanded SCR structure. 
 
------- 
Germany: Expanded SCR Role Definitions 
------- 
 
¶6. (C/REL UK) While acknowledging the need for improved 
coordination of civilian efforts, German representatives 
resisted coordination of all PRT activities by a more 
operational and empowered SCR.  Germany wanted any expanded 
SCR to have clearly defined roles and responsibilities in 
regard to PRT reintegration, governance, and anti-corruption 
activities.  Berlin considered many of its PRT activities as 
separate and distinct from ISAF's "clear, hold, build, and 
transfer" operations, and viewed many of its civilian 
contributions as long-term development initiatives that 
coordinate with and report directly to the UN and the Afghan 
government. 
 
------ 
France: Focused On The Personality 
------ 
 
¶7. (C/REL UK) In an unexpected show of support, France 
acknowledged the need to strengthen the coordination of 
civilian activities in the field, adding that the 
personalities of a new SCR and SRSG would be the primary 
concern.  Paris preferred a stronger personality as SRSG than 
as SCR to ensure UNAMA is not undercut politically in Kabul. 
French representatives also expressed concern about how 
expanding the SCR's mandate would affect national civilian 
activities.  Paris was comfortable with the SCR's office 
coordinating NATO/ISAF related activities, such as 
reintegration and reconciliation, but hesitant to accept SCR 
involvement in clinics and schools.  France opposed using 
NATO civilian common funding for the expansion and resourcing 
of the SCR's office, preferring voluntary national 
contributions.  France supported SRSG Kai Eide's suggestion 
to create an Executive Steering Group as an impartial and 
independent coordination authority, inclusive of the SCR and 
COMISAF, but under the lead of UNAMA and the Afghan 
government.  France rejected the idea of dual-hatting 
national civilians in the field to also have an ISAF role, 
stating that Paris's ultimate support depended upon the 
definition of the SCR's role.  France strongly reiterated 
that UNAMA was the only overarching authority to coordinate 
civilian activities. 
 
----- 
Italy: Preserve National Priorities 
---- 
 
¶8. (C/REL UK) Italian representatives supported pursuing a 
Comprehensive NATO Approach but was skeptical of a SCR 
mandate that gave it the authority to coordinate civilian 
activities at the PRT field level.  Italy supported France's 
rationale to create a Kabul-based Executive Steering Group to 
serve as the authority to prioritize and direct civilian 
activities in the field.  Italy cautioned that it already 
 
USNATO 00000008  003 OF 003 
 
 
experienced turf wars within its capital for the coordination 
of Italian civilian activities, noting Rome preferred to 
retain coordination of its national civilian priorities under 
its PRT.  Italy supported NATO endorsing the concept to 
strengthen civilian coordination before the January 28 
conference but preferred that NATO not delve into the details 
of the SCR's terms of reference or office structure until 
after the conference. 
 
----- 
Spain: Clear Roles Between SRSG and SCR 
----- 
 
¶9. (C/REL UK) Madrid's representatives supported an expanded 
SCR structure and said there was a imminent need for clearly 
defined roles between the SRSG and the SCR without creating 
an overly bureaucratic structure.  Spain was on the fence as 
whether there was a need to create a parallel civilian chain 
of command to the existing military structure, but remained 
open to the idea. 
 
----------- 
UK And U.S.: On The Same Page 
----------- 
 
¶10. (C/REL UK) The UK viewed the NATO SCR role as clearly 
defined and distinct from the UN SRSG authority, adding that 
the SCR should be given increased executive powers to 
prioritize PRT resources and activities.  UK Representatives 
said that an expanded SCR's office should focus on 
stabilization vice long-term development, particularly in the 
south and east where ISAF's counterinsurgency operations are 
most robust.   In the UK view, stabalization is an area of 
focus not under UNAMA or NGO mandates and an area in which an 
ISAF civilian representative can have the most impact.  The 
UK said that there is an immediate need for synchronization 
of civilian and military efforts after an ISAF operation to 
ensure stabilization activities give immediate effect to 
Aghans in the area.  Unlike the French, UK representatives 
supported a parallel military and civilian chain of command 
down to the PRT level.  In their view, the parallel structure 
would ensure NATO/ISAF civilian efforts are properly 
coordinated and complementary to ISAF's "clear, hold, build, 
and transfer" operations.  The UK mission acknowledged that 
all nations would have to accept coordination, unlike the 
current situation under the JCMB's lead. 
 
---- 
SYG: A Decision Before London 
---- 
¶11. (C/REL UK) The SYG wants the NAC to agree on the concept 
to strengthen the NATO SCR's mandate, and, although no 
candidates have been officially identified yet, also wants an 
agreement on the candidate for the enhanced SCR position 
before the January 28 London conference.  In the SYG's view, 
the candidate must meet the following criteria to be selected 
for the post: 
 
- Be willing to commit to full time presence in Afghanistan 
for at least 12 to 18 months, preferably through summer 2011; 
 
- Be a political figure who is action oriented - "we don't 
need a red-carpet guy; we need someone who can write his own 
reports." 
HEFFERN