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Viewing cable 10USNATO40, NATO'S SCR RANKS REINTEGRATION, DELIVERING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10USNATO40 2010-01-28 17:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Mission USNATO
VZCZCXRO0631
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHNO #0040/01 0281735
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281735Z JAN 10
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3812
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0793
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1339
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0521
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0012
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0597
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0827
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000040 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020 
TAGS: PREL MOPS AF MCAP NATO
SUBJECT: NATO'S SCR RANKS REINTEGRATION, DELIVERING 
CIVILIAN EFFECT, AND 2010 AFGHAN ELECTIONS AS FOCAL POINTS 
 
Classified By: Political Advisor Kelly Degnan for reasons: 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
1. (C/REL ISAF) Summary. NATO's Senior Civilian 
Representative (SCR) in Afghanistan, Fernando Gentilini, told 
ISAF representatives January 27 that reintegration, enhancing 
NATO's civilian effect on the ground, and the 2010 Afghan 
Parliamentary elections were the three most important issues 
facing ISAF before the spring Kabul conference on 
Afghanistan.  Notable for his positive tone, Gentilini said a 
more "progressive" relationship between the Afghan government 
and the international community had developed in recent 
months.  The NATO Secretary General, Rasmussen, called on 
nations to fully resource the NATO Training Mission - 
Afghanistan (NTM-A), stressing the importance of NTM-A 
training to the longer-term goal of transferring lead 
security responsibility to Afghans.  Rasmussen also 
introduced Gentilini's successor, current UK Ambassador to 
Kabul Mark Sedwill, and discussed NATO's participation at the 
January 28 London conference on Afghanistan.  Germany 
announced several new contributions to the effort in 
Afghanistan. END Summary. 
 
------------------------------- 
Reintegration Mechanisms Needed 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (C/REL ISAF) During his last meeting with Allies and ISAF 
non-NATO troop contributors on January 27, Ambassador 
Gentilini struck a positive tone while underscoring the 
challenges of ISAF's mission.  Reintegration, enhancing 
NATO's civilian effect on the ground, and the 2010 Afghan 
Parliamentary elections were the three most important issues 
for ISAF before the spring Kabul conference. Gentilini 
supported expanding the SCR's mandate to improve civilian 
coordination, with UNAMA retaining the overall lead.  UK 
Ambassador to Afghanistan Mark Sedwill also joined the 
meeting; Rasmussen named Sedwill as Gentilini's successor. 
 
3. (C/REL ISAF) Gentilini said that a positive momentum had 
developed within the Afghan government on reconciliation and 
reintegration policy in the last few months but political and 
operational challenges still remained.  The Afghan 
government's approach on reconciliation and reintegration 
encompasses both a top-down and a bottom-up approach, he 
explained.  Gentilini encouraged ISAF to start its 
reintegration efforts, including developing a funding 
mechanism, while the Afghan government developed its 
high-level efforts.  He suggested ISAF strengthen the 
integration of its civilian and military efforts.  Both would 
allow the international community to be more effective on the 
ground while giving the Afghan President a position of 
strength in reconciliation and reintegration talks. ISAF must 
set the conditions for success then step back and allow the 
Afghans to take over. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Strengthening ISAF's Civilian Effect 
------------------------------------ 
 
4. (C/REL ISAF) Gentilini agreed with nations that UNAMA must 
retain the lead on coordinating international assistance in 
Afghanistan, but noted it was also critical to strengthen the 
NATO SCR's office and better align ISAF's civilian efforts 
with the military's strategy, particularly with the 
military's district-by-district prioritization of its 
operations.  According to Gentilini, civilian efforts should 
be focused in the military's priority districts to maximize 
the civilian and military integration of effort.  While 
France stressed the UN's role in Afghanistan, the PermRep 
said France favored enhancing the SCR's role and reinforcing 
the links between ISAF and other international community 
actors on the ground, as long as this took place under 
 
USNATO 00000040  002 OF 003 
 
 
UNAMA's leadership. 
 
5. (C/REL ISAF) In response to Norway's question on how to 
best strengthen the SCR's office, Gentilini said that the 
most important resource provided would be the people.  He 
encouraged the Council to avoid over-developing the SCR's 
Terms of Reference and mandate, focusing instead on 
mobilizing ISAF civilians and getting the right people with 
the right skills in place. Newly appointed SCR Sedwill 
supported this view and said his goal would be to leverage 
the people and capacities already in Kabul at the NATO 
Embassies, not try to build a new empire.  His aim would be 
to deliver a more coherent approach to civilian efforts by 
cohesively combining the ideas of NATO Ambassadors and their 
national agendas in order to achieve unity of effort that 
would better mirror COMISAF's unity of command. 
 
6. (C/REL ISAF) Sweden supported Gentilini's view that the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) should share the 
responsibility for the coordination of ISAF's civilian 
effects. Gentilini encouraged nations to build upon existing 
mechanisms such as the PRT Executive Steering Committee and 
the Independent Directorate of Local Governance as a means 
for ISAF to strengthen its delivery of civilian effects on 
the ground.  According to Gentilini, the donor community 
should also mobilize itself in support of all civilian 
activities on the ground to make the largest impact. 
 
-------------- 
2010 Elections 
-------------- 
 
7. (C/REL ISAF) Gentilini cautioned that the 2010 
Parliamentary Elections should not become a distraction to 
ISAF's reintegration and civilian efforts. In his view, 
Allies were too consumed with all aspects of the 2009 
Presidential and Provincial elections.  ISAF should allow the 
United Nations Development Program to lead on all political 
aspects of elections, concentrating instead on demonstrating 
ANSF progress and providing a supportive security element. 
The Independent Electoral Commission's announcement to 
postpone the 2010 elections until the Fall was a good sign of 
the IEC's political maturation and greater understanding of 
the current security situation.  According to Gentilini, this 
was an example of a stronger partnership between the 
international community and the Afghan government. 
 
---------------------------- 
We've Got a Partner in Kabul 
---------------------------- 
 
8. (C/REL ISAF) Gentilini said the relationship between the 
international community and the Afghan government in Kabul 
was "progressive" compared to a couple of months ago, adding 
the Ministries of the Interior and Defense were reliable 
partners.  Gentilini highlighted the January 20 Joint 
Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) meeting as an 
example of the Afghan government being well-prepared and 
organized, lauding the Afghans for presenting well-developed 
concepts and papers that were eventually adopted or noted at 
the JCMB meeting.  But, Gentilini said, the international 
community must maintain pressure on the Afghan government to 
reduce corruption. 
 
--------------- 
Trainers Needed 
--------------- 
 
9. (C/REL ISAF) SecGen Rasmussen called on Allies to fully 
resource NTM-A, stressing that the training to be provided to 
the Afghan security forces was necessary if ISAF was to 
successfully carry out its goal of transferring lead security 
responsibility to the Afghan authorities.  The SYG recognized 
that the January 20 JCMB approval to grow the ANSF to 300,000 
 
USNATO 00000040  003 OF 003 
 
 
by 2011 was ambitious and a challenge for NATO, but he 
stressed that this growth must be resourced. 
 
10. (C/REL ISAF) Reporting on the January 26-27 meeting of 
NATO Chiefs of Defense, the Director of the International 
Military Staff (DIMS) said that COMISAF had confirmed a gap 
of 1300 trainers for the ANSF's development.  As a result, 
DIMS tasked SHAPE to draft a comprehensive report of the 
resource gap implications which he planned to brief to ISAF 
nations in February. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Rasmussen's Participation at London 
----------------------------------- 
 
11. (C/REL ISAF) Rasmussen said that he and COMISAF would 
attend the January 28 Afghanistan Conference in London, where 
he planned to present Ambassador Sedwill as the new NATO SCR. 
 Rasmussen planned to highlight ISAF's new troop commitments 
of more than 37,000 pledged at the December 7 ISAF Force 
Generation Conference, outline NATO's approach on transition, 
and stress the need for ISAF and the international community 
to coordinate civilian efforts on the ground.  The SYG 
stressed that ISAF's transition strategy was not an exit 
strategy, but a strategy that created the conditions for the 
ANSF to gradually take over security responsibility in 
districts and provinces.  Rasmussen expected a concrete 
commitment at the Conference from the Afghan government and 
the international community in support of COMISAF's efforts 
in Afghanistan. 
 
-------------------------- 
Germany's New Contribution 
-------------------------- 
 
12. (C/REL ISAF) Germany announced it would double its 
development and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan to 
430 million Euro in 2010 and provide 50 million Euros to a 
Reintegration Trust Fund, once it was formally established. 
Germany also planned to increase its current troop ceiling in 
Afghanistan from 4,500 to 5,000 and restructure its military 
presence on the ground by devoting 1,400 troops to training. 
In addition and separate from raising its troop ceiling, 
Germany announced it would have 350 new troops on reserve, 
probably for use as election reinforcements.  Germany also 
planned to add 80 additional police to train the Afghan 
National Police and increase its contribution to the European 
Union Police Training Mission in Afghanistan to 60. 
Parliamentary approval, expected after the London conference, 
would be necessary. 
 
13. (C/REL ISAF) COMMENT: Gentilini's final remarks to ISAF 
nations were notable for their positive tone.  He left the 
strong impression that even with the tough challenges he has 
faced in the job, he remains confident ISAF's mission in 
Afghanistan can be accomplished. 
DAALDER