VZCZCXRO0246
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHUNV #0021/01 0281018
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281018Z JAN 10
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0513
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1827
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0936

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000021 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR IO, ISN, EUR, IO/GS, IO/UNP, ISN/MNSA, IO/UNP, 
EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020 
TAGS: AORC PARM SNAR IAEA KNNP KTNBT UNCND EUN
SUBJECT: US-EU CONSULTS: POST- LISBON EU FINDING ITS 
FOOTING IN VIENNA IOS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Spanish and EU Missions (Ambassadors Jose Luis 
Rosello Serra and Lars-Erik Lundin, respectively) co-hosted 
semiannual US-EU consultations on issues related to 
Vienna-based international organizations January 22; these 
were the first bilateral consultations held by the 
amalgamated EU/Spanish Presidency in Vienna.  Much of the 
discussion focused on transitional arrangements under the 
Spanish Presidency for EU representation in Vienna 
organizations pursuant to entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty.  While the Spanish Presidency will retain overall 
responsibility for external messaging, the EU Mission will 
co-chair all meetings and EU Mission officers are "twinned" 
with Spanish counterparts.  During this transition, the EU is 
seeking to sort out its observer status at the IAEA and CTBTO 
and to coordinate with New York and Geneva as to 
representation at UN agencies and bodies.  At the IAEA as 
elsewhere this presents some institutional and practical 
difficulties.  The EU circulated a note to all members on the 
transitional arrangements and is under instructions to 
operate on this basis until July 1.  Beyond that date the EU 
Mission is uninstructed, including with respect to the 
Belgian Presidency in the second half of 2010, but projects 
to add another Ambassador and 15 Vienna diplomats over time. 
 
¶2. (C) On IAEA issues, the EU continues to be solid with 
respect to Iran, and Spain shared our expectation (following 
an IAEA DG meeting with FM Moratinos) that Director General 
Amano will be factual in his assessment of safeguards 
implementation in Iran.  The EU and Spanish reps were much 
less conversant on the Syria nuclear file in response to U.S. 
concerns about "drift" on this issue.  They were supportive 
of a proposed June timetable for Board of Governors' 
consideration of the IAEA fuel reserve but cautioned that 
Amano may be reluctant to push the issue; the UK is also 
looking to table its assurance of supply proposal at the 
March Board.  While the EU has no coordinated position on the 
IAEA budget, they anticipated a substantial contribution to 
the Safeguards Analytical Lab (SAL).  The EU and Spanish reps 
also shared our priorities on the Nuclear Security Summit. 
However, they expressed pessimism as to the prospectsfor a 
successful NPT Revcon absent resolution of the Middle East / 
Israel conundrum, and feared that this issue could lay bare 
internal EU divisions. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The EU and Spanish reps expressed appreciation for 
U.S. activism at the CTBT Prepcom and proposed coordination 
of contributions to CTBTO.  The EU expects the G-77 will be 
aggressive at the June Prepcom on adoption of amendments to 
the Rules of Procedure.  The U.S. signaled that agreement on 
the thorny issue of Palestinian Observership may be possible. 
 Responding favorably to our preview of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, the EU and Spanish 
reps stressed the need for it to consider drugs and crime 
strategically, particularly in the transnational and 
transregional context.  The EU reported that it supported 
UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) programs, and 
announced it would be dedicating more funding, in general, to 
counterterrorism programs, in Pakistan and Yemen.  On finance 
and governance, the EU promoted the need for the Independent 
Evaluation Unit and whether to upgrade UNODC in the UN 
system.  The EU and Spanish representatives agreed with the 
need to work closely together to avoid the appearance of 
divisiveness on drug and crime issues, particularly at the 
Crime and Narcotics Commissions meetings.  The EU noted its 
participation in the Vienna "Energy Club" and UNIDO's overall 
role in energy issues. The U.S. and EU/Spanish reps agreed to 
continue close consultations in advance of upcoming meetings 
at Vienna organizations.End Summary. 
 
Managing the Lisbon Transition 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Noting this was their first joint consultation, EU 
Ambassador Lars-Erik Lundin and Spanish Ambassador Jose Luis 
Rosello Serra, flanked by their respective staffs, walked us 
through the transitional arrangements for EU representation 
in Vienna pursuant to Lisbon Treaty implementation (The EU 
delegation also circulated a nonpaper to EU members on the 
arrangements agreed with the Spanish Presidency).  While for 
the time being the Spanish Presidency would remain 
responsible for EU representation and coordination in Vienna, 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000021  002 OF 004 
 
 
the EU and Spanish Ambassadors would co-chair all meetings 
and integrate/"twin" their staffs, e.g. the EU DCM would 
shadow the Spanish DCM.  The intent, Serra explained, is to 
prepare the EU Mission for the eventuality of "flying solo" 
once the rotational EU Presidency is phased out in accordance 
with the Lisbon Treaty.  Lundin expected that this 
eventuality would require the addition of a second EU 
Ambassador, splitting the UN affairs and nonproliferation 
portfolios, and a substantial augmentation of the EU Mission 
staff to about 15 diplomats.  The EU Mission will take 
instruction from both the EU High Representative and the 
Commission, he noted, for example on energy/nuclear issues. 
Putting a team in place (i.e. recruitment) and raising the 
profile of the EU Mission in Vienna were priorities for the 
transition.  In a further illustration of the EU and 
Presidency division of labor, the nonpaper also proposes 
"special effort" to increase the external visibility of the 
EU delegation by hosting meetings with the heads of 
international organizations while leaving the Spanish 
Presidency in charge of political dialogue and outreach. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Davies questioned the practical effect on 
U.S.-EU coordination of the "twinned" EU-Spanish Presidency, 
citing the positive example of his own close coordination 
with Swedish Ambassador Lundberg on Middle East issues at the 
2009 IAEA General Conference during the Swedish Presidency -- 
in practice, who would will our interlocutor now be?  Serra 
acknowledged how Lundberg had leveraged U.S.-EU coordination 
to derive a common position among EU members on Middle East 
issues during the GC.  He noted that the U.S. position 
counted more than that of Brussels in this regard, and 
anticipated that he would do the same when presiding, i.e. 
use the U.S. position or strategy on an issue to settle 
internal EU disagreements (Comment:  During the last GC, 
Spain was one of the EU countries seeking accommodation of 
Arab group positions but the Spanish Mission in Vienna has 
toughened on these issues in recent months.  End comment). 
During the Spanish Presidency, Serra pledged that the EU 
delegation and Presidency would seek to appear "as one" but 
by the time of the General Conference, the EU delegation 
should be "in command."  He added that Spain was conducting 
outreach on Middle East issues with Egyptian Ambassador 
Fawzi.  Landin said he would ask Brussels for guidance on the 
question.  Ambassador Davies underlined the importance of the 
U.S.-EU relationship and looked forward to continued 
coordination in IAEA fora and the NPT Revcon. 
 
Challenges Ahead 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The EU Mission had no instructions as to what would 
happen at the conclusion of the Spanish Presidency June 30. 
Landin underscored that the EU would not "take any risks" in 
its institutional transition, including with respect to the 
incoming Presidency, and fully expected the Belgian 
Presidency to be helpful with respect to Lisbon Treaty 
implementation.  (Comment:  Separately, the Belgians have 
approached the UN Affairs Section at the Mission for 
consultations and expect to be an "activist" Presidency, 
somewhat contradicting the impression Landin gave at the 
lunch. End Comment.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Sorting out EU representation in UN and other 
international organizations posed a real challenge, Serra 
advised, requiring a re-examination of by-laws.  The 
transition nonpaper specifies that priority should be given 
to the IAEA, where Euratom (represented by the EU delegation) 
has observer status, and CTBT where the EU lacks any observer 
status, and notes that EU representation at other UN bodies 
and specialized agencies must be coordinated with New York 
and Geneva.  Serra cited the example of the IAEA Board of 
Governors where the EU Presidency currently delivers the EU 
statement at the opening of the Board debate on a particular 
agenda item.  For the time being, Spain would retain the 
coordination role on EU Board statements (e.g. on Iran, Syria 
etc.) but with the EU delegation as very much part of the 
"team."  It was not clear, however, what would happen in the 
future when the "EU speaks" since the EU cannot be a member 
state of the IAEA Board -- would the EU take the floor as a 
non-Board member under Rule 50 at the end of the debate?, he 
mused.  (Note:  When non-Board member states have held the EU 
Presidency, they delivered the EU statement at the opening of 
the debate along with G-77, NAM and regional groups.  End 
note.) 
 
IAEA and NPT Issues 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000021  003 OF 004 
 
 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Looking ahead at the next six months, IAEA Counselor 
presented U.S. priorities at the IAEA (March and June Board 
meetings) as well as the Nuclear Security Summit and NPT 
Revcon.  The EU and Spanish reps expected broad convergence 
of U.S. and EU positions at the IAEA.  With respect to the 
budget, there would not be a common EU position but the EU 
was preparing to make a "substantial" contribution to help 
fund the modernization of the Safeguards Analytical 
Laboratory (SAL) and shared the U.S. view of this as a 
priority.  Landin asked whether an additional U.S. 
contribution to SAL was forthcoming.  Among the other 
"headline" issues, Serra reported a recent EU demarche on DG 
Amano on assurance of nuclear fuel supply.  The EU had 
advocated that there not be a Board working group this issue 
so as to not give the G-77 the opportunity to block it. 
Serra cautioned that Amano seemed "very reluctant" to take 
the first step on assured supply/fuel banks and was inclined 
to leave this issue to Member States and the Board Chair to 
sort out. "We are not in safe waters," Serra concluded given 
the lack of consensus on the Board and noted the need for 
outreach.  He also confirmed that the UK expected to put its 
Nuclear Fuel Assurance proposal forward for consideration at 
the March Board.  Ambassador Davies took issue with the time 
horizon DG Amano had in mind with respect to Board approval 
of the IAEA fuel bank, considering that November to be too 
far away.  The EU and Spanish reps agreed with the June Board 
timeframe proposed by the U.S. and while they hoped for less 
confrontation on this issue, did not believe consensus 
approval of the IAEA fuel bank was possible.  They also noted 
that the Secretariat was thinking in terms of a discussion of 
the IAEA fuel bank in June followed by Board action in 
September.  Ambassador Davies solicited EU help in cleaving 
off key G-77 states to increase support for the fuel bank. 
 
¶9. (C) On Iran, the EU and Spanish reps underlined that the 
EU was united and saw sanctions as inevitable.  They awaited 
Amano's first DG report on Iran.  Serra reported that Amano 
in an introductory call by Spanish FM Moratinos was factual 
in his presentation of the Iran dossier but also very 
cautious.  Amano apparently told Moratinos that there had 
been no formal reply by Iran on the Tehran Research Reactor 
(TRR) deal when the media was reporting otherwise.  Neither 
the EU nor Spanish participants would be drawn out on Syria 
even as IAEA Counselor warned that allowing the Syrian issue 
to "drift" would undermine IAEA safeguards authorities.  In 
contrast, they fully shared our focus on nuclear security and 
looked forward to the April Summit.  The Spanish indicated 
that EU coordination for the NPT Revcon would be the 
responsibility of the Presidency.  Both the EU and Spanish 
reps were fairly pessimistic about the Revcon, Landin 
assessing that the outcome would be "not too bad" or "very 
bad" absent resolution of the Middle East issue.   Mission 
representatives underscored the need to address both sides of 
the NPT bargain.  EU and Spanish representsatives shared the 
view that while the U.S. had a good story to tell on peaceful 
use and disarmament, the Middle East issue could tip the 
balance at the Revcon.  They regretted that the Middle East 
debate had contaminated everything else and feared that this 
issue could expose EU internal differences. 
 
CTBT 
---- 
 
¶10. (SBU) On CTBT, the EU might seek formal observer status 
at the June Prepcom.  The EU and Spanish reps appreciated 
U.S. activism at the Prepcom and proposed coordination of our 
possible extrabudgetary contributions.   They expected the 
G-77 will aggressively push their amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure at the Prepcom.  Arms Control Counselor indicated 
that agreement on Observership for the Palestinian Authority 
is possible, though we had reservations on the amendments 
pertaining to NGOs and non-signatory states.   More broadly, 
the EU and Spanish reps understood that the U.S. cannot move 
forward on CTBT ratification unless certain of success, and 
would continue to hold the line with the G-77 in the interim. 
 
UN Organizations 
---------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Turning to UN organizations, we previewed the 
just-released Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization 
Strategy and stressed the need to develop synergy among the 
various UN organizations in Vienna, focusing on drugs, crime, 
corruption, border security, trafficking, and terrorism.  The 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000021  004 OF 004 
 
 
EU and Spanish representatives welcomed copies of the 
counternarcotics portion of the strategy, stressing that the 
EU wanted to take a strategic outlook in Vienna.  The Spanish 
representative also noted the nexus between UNODC and the 
OSCE on border management issues and reported that the UNODC 
would participate in the European security dialogue summit on 
transnational threats.  With regard to UNODC's 
counterterrorism programs, the EU agreed that UNODC's 
Terrorism Prevention Branch provided solid assistance. 
Agreeing that TPB had real value-added with regard to the 
promotion of international nuclear terrorism conventions, the 
Spanish representative offered to  organize a U.S.-EU meeting 
with TPB head Ruthstrom-Ruin.  The EU also reported that it 
would be providing 15 million euros for legal capacity 
building in Pakistan. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The EU and Spanish representatives agreed that 
efficient finance and governance within UNODC was critical to 
ensure its continued effectiveness.  The EU representative 
stressed the importance of ensuring the Independent 
Evaluation Unit becomes fully operational as soon as 
possible, and the Spanish representative noted the need to 
consider "upgrading" UNODC in the UN system.  We stressed the 
importance of working together in the UNODC context and 
offered to host regular working-level Major Donors' meetings 
in order to ensure that we, the EU, and other Major Donor 
countries were communicating well and regularly in order to 
minimize divisive public discussions.  In this regard, we 
stressed the need to work together closely in the run-up to 
the March Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in order to 
avoid the heated public disagreements of 2009.  The EU and 
Spanish representatives welcomed these suggestions. 
¶13. (SBU) With regard to UNIDO, the EU and Spanish 
representatives stressed the effectiveness of UNIDO head 
Yumkella and indicated its overall support for UNIDO 
programs.  Ambassador Davies noted he had met with Yumkella 
and agreed with the EU's assessment of his abilities. 
Ambassador Davies added that we were in the process of 
learning more about UNIDO and its programs, but that any 
discussions of the U.S. rejoining UNIDO would be well into 
the future.  The Spanish representative added that the EU was 
a participant in the Vienna "energy club," which included 
UNIDO, OSCE, OPEC, IAEA, IRENA, and IIASA (Note:  Mission 
will provide further information on the club septel End 
note.) 
 
¶14. (C) Comment:  While the EU and Spanish reps put the best 
face on internal coordination under the Spanish Presidency, 
they spent more time explaining how this will all work than 
in discussion of substantive issues at Vienna organizations. 
During this time of transition, we expect the EU -Presidency 
dynamic to continue to unfold as the EU seeks greater 
institutional clarity vis-a-vis international organizations. 
 With a strong Spanish Mission and with a less complicated 
Vienna meeting cycle in the first two quarters, the next six 
months should go smoothly.  The second half of 2010 will be 
much more complicated as we head to the IAEA General 
Conference where will be looking again for European 
leadership to help manage the contentious Middle East issues. 
 
DAVIES