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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0016/01 0221627
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221627Z JAN 10
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0503
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0267
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0354
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1824

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000016 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, IO/GS, ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA, VCI/NA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020 
TAGS: AORC PARM IAEA KTBT IS EG SY
 
SUBJECT: NPT REVCON:  EGYPT UNMOVED BY ISRAELI OVERTURE ON 
MIDDLE EAST ISSUES 
 
REF: A) TEL AVIV 11 B) 09 UNVIE 0547 
 
Classified By: Ambassador  Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: According to a January 21 readout from 
Israeli Ambassador Azoulay, an Israeli-Egyptian bilat on NPT 
Revcon and related IAEA General Conference Middle East issues 
registered no substantive progress.  Azoulay said he repeated 
Israeli National Security Advisor Arad's late December appeal 
to FM Gheit as to common regional security interests on Iran 
(ref a) but Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi hewed to standard 
Egyptian insistence on signaling out Israel's non-NPT status 
at the Revcon. In a separate meeting with DCM, visiting 
Israeli Atomic Energy Director Danieli expressed low 
expectations for the Revcon and said Israel is already 
strategizing about overturning the close vote on the Israeli 
Nuclear Capabilities Resolution at the IAEA GC.  In other 
news, Israel reaffirmed its flexibility on Palestinian 
Observership at the CTBT Prepcom (ref b) and proposed 
resumption of bilateral US-Israeli consultations on CTBT/OSI 
that had been suspended during the Bush Administration.  DCM 
used a follow on meeting with Azoulay January 22 to suggest 
closer U.S.-Israel tactical coordination of IAEA briefings, 
so we can better support the intention of new Director 
General Amano to take a more factually based approach to IAEA 
reports on Iran and Syria. End summary. 
 
NPT Revcon/ IAEA GC 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) Israeli Ambassador Azoulay reported to Ambassador 
Davies January 21 that Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi was friendly 
but not forthcoming in response to Israel's overtures on 
setting aside differences on a Middle East Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zone (NWFZ) in the NPT Revcon and IAEA fora.  The 
Fawzi-Azoulay meeting was a follow up to Egyptian FM Abu 
Gheit's late December discussion with Israeli National 
Security Advisor Arad (ref a).  Azoulay recapped the 
arguments Arad had made in Cairo that Egyptian sniping at 
Israel's non-NPT status was counterproductive and detracted 
focus from the real and common threat to regional security 
coming from Iran.  Israel's non-NPT status was never a threat 
to Egypt, he noted to Fawzi, and aside from the NWFZ issue, 
Israel and Egypt were now at a peak in their relations, with 
more in common than divided them.  Azoulay argued further 
that it would be futile to try to impose a NWFZ on Israel, 
that this could only be achieved through regional 
cooperation.  Unmoved, Fawzi insisted that Israel's non-NPT 
status and nuclear ambiguity are a threat to Egypt's national 
security regardless of Iran and that Egypt has every right to 
insist on implementation of the 1995 Revcon resolution on the 
Middle East.  In short, the Vienna meeting revealed no 
evolution in the Egyptian position. 
 
¶3. (S) Comment: While Fawzi and Azoulay agreed to keep in 
touch, there is little if any prospect for a solution to the 
Revcon Middle East conundrum coming out of the Vienna 
channel. (Note:  Indeed, in a follow-on January 22 discussion 
with DCM, Azoulay confirmed he had no instructions or plans 
to further engage Fawzi on the NPT Revcon. His focus/mandate 
is the IAEA General Conference.  End Note.)  Asked what more 
the U.S. could do, in light of high-level interventions in 
Cairo to date, Azoulay saw the Egyptian MFA as a dead end and 
suggested a direct approach to President Mubarak on the 
margins of the April Nuclear Security Summit. 
 
¶4. (C) In a separate meeting with DCM January 19, visiting 
Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) Deputy Director 
Danieli had low expectations for the Revcon, assessing that 
Egypt would not mind if it collapsed.  Azoulay was more 
magnanimous than others in Tel Aviv, Danieli said, in seeing 
Egypt as motivated more by fear of Iran than disinterest in 
the NPT.  He reported that Israel had not decided whether to 
participate as an Observer at the Revcon.  In the meantime, 
Israel is already strategizing about the IAEA General 
Conference and FM Lieberman had sent a letter to a select 
list of 19 countries that voted in favor of the Israeli 
Nuclear Capabilities (INC) resolution (text at para 9) (Note: 
 Danieli did not share the full list but it included 
Singapore, Kazakhstan, Bangladesh, Russia and others that 
might be subject to persuasion.  End note.)  In this 
connection, in their January 20 conversation Azoulay 
acknowledged Ambassador Davies' point, however, as to 
sequencing with respect to the Revcon from the U.S. 
perspective, i.e. first things first.  Ambassador Davies 
agreed that lobbying in NAM/G-77 capitals--after the 
 
Revcon--is the right approach in seeking to defeat the INC in 
the IAEA GC. 
 
Iran/ Syria 
----------- 
 
¶5. (S) Danieli also reported that IAEC Director General 
Chorev would come to meet IAEA DG Amano in February, and 
Israel welcomed and expected toughening of the IAEA stance on 
Iran and Syria.  Danieli expressed concern as to slow-motion 
legitimation of Qom and asked about working the Secretariat 
to press for the release of the PMD "annex," which DCM 
advised against.  On Syria, interestingly, Danieli explicitly 
refuted the French suggestion that Tel Aviv would like to 
soft pedal the Syria file, arguing to the contrary that 
pressure on Syria could be helpful in driving a wedge between 
Damascus and Tehran.  In his meeting with Azoulay, Ambassador 
Davies cautioned that Amano cannot overreach and will be 
deliberative in his approach on Iran and Syria.  Azoulay 
understood this and had moderated GOI expectations 
accordingly. 
 
¶6. (S) DCM used a follow up meeting with Azoulay January 22 
to propose that the U.S. and Israel should consider 
reinitiating closer consultation regarding intelligence 
information we share with the IAEA, noting that such 
coordination had been common practice in the past.  DCM said 
this would facilitate a better and more organized approach to 
our respective efforts to share information with the IAEA on 
countries of common concern.    Azoulay replied that Israel 
already shares the information it briefs to the IAEA with 
counterparts through intelligence channels, and said he 
believed such pre-consultations already take place between 
our governments.  DepCouns corrected Azoulay's impression in 
this regard, noting that he could attest to the fact that the 
depth and timeliness of U.S.-Israeli consultations on 
info-sharing with the IAEA had significantly reduced in 
recent years.  Azoulay pledged to relay the suggestion for 
renewed consultations to capital. 
 
CTBT 
---- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Azoulay and Danieli raised CTBT issues as well, 
confirming a shift in Israeli policy on Palestinian 
Observership at CTBTO, as Azoulay had suggested on the 
margins of the CTBT Preparatory Commission meeting last 
November (ref b).  Azoulay indicated that Israel could "live 
with" a G-77 proposal to amend the rules of procedure in such 
a way as to allow Palestine to observe, but without 
mentioning Palestine by name.  As reported in reftel, Israel 
also proposed two amendments, the first relating to 
nominations from geographical groups and the second dealing 
with procedures should an issue come to a vote in the 
Preparatory Commission.  Danieli was clear that Israel would 
not insist on its amendments and did not want to complicate 
the efforts of the Australian Chair to resolve the PA issue 
in a satisfactory manner. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Azoulay also relayed an Israeli request for 
resumption of Clinton-era U.S.-Israeli Bilateral 
Consultations on CTBT/OSI that had been suspended by the Bush 
Administration.  The Israeli nonpaper (passed to Department) 
proposes that U.S. and Israeli dels to the February 15- March 
5 Working Group B session meet to discuss details, agenda and 
logistics of future bilateral consultations. 
 
 
¶9. (U) Text of FM Lieberman's letter to INC supporters: 
 
Excellency, 
 
I am writing to you to bring to your attention that the 53rd 
General Conference (GC) of the IAEA (14-18 September 2009) 
has witnessed yet another deterioration in the politicization 
of the professional body as it pertains to the situation in 
the Middle East and the treatment of Israel.  By their 
uncompromising attitude and anti-Israeli move, the Arab 
sponsors of the GC's "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the 
Middle East" resolution and the so-called "Israeli Nuclear 
Capabilities" resolution sought to divert attention away from 
the blatant cases of non-compliance with NPT obligations by 
several Middle Eastern states. 
 
It should be noted that prior to and during the GC, Israel 
exerted every effort in order to regain consensus on the 
 
"Middle East Package" whereby the "Application" resolution is 
submitted containing agreed language and the "Capabilities" 
resolution is not acted upon in lieu of an agreed 
Presidential statement.  Israel conducted negotiations on 
this subject matter with Egypt, under the auspices of Sweden 
(as the Presidency of the EU) and the United States.  These 
negotiations reflected a candid, forthcoming and flexible 
attitude on Israel's part.  Unfortunately, this approach was 
not met with corresponding attitudes by member states of the 
Arab group who were aiming solely at singling out Israel. 
 
It is our belief that the results of the IAEA's GC impairs 
the GC's ability to address constructively the issues of the 
Middle East.  Furthermore, these results run counter to the 
professional characteristics of this esteemed body. 
 
As the international community has recognized with regard to 
other regions, the establishment of a nuclear weapons free 
zone (MWEZ) can only emanate from within the region, stemming 
from direct negotiations.  Israel strongly believes that only 
through an inclusive process, which takes into account the 
positions of all relevant states in the region and which is 
firmly based on consensus, can the vision of a nuclear 
weapons free zone in the Middle East be promoted. 
 
Those who wish to superimpose on the Middle East resolutions 
or initiatives regarding the NWFZ which do not enjoy the 
support of all regional states will not contribute to the 
realization of this goal.  Nor will they succeed in bringing 
about regional dialogue and a spirit of cooperation and trust 
which are essential in order to advance this matter further. 
 
In our view, progress towards realizing the vision of a 
Middle East free of nuclear weapons cannot be made without a 
fundamental change in regional circumstances, including a 
significant transformation in the attitude of states in the 
region towards Israel. 
 
It should be noted that Israel attaches great importance to 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime and has made great 
efforts over the past years to bring itself closer whenever 
possible.  Despite the worsening of the geo-political 
environment in the Middle East, it has been Israel's long 
standing policy to support, and whenever possible, to join 
arms control and other international treaties that do not 
detract from its uniquely narrow security margins. 
 
In light of the above, I kindly request that the Government 
of the Russian Federation reconsider its position toward s 
the "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities" resolution if brought up 
during the 54th GC of the IAEA to be held in September 2010. 
 
Moreover, I would appreciate the Government of (the Russian 
Federation) sending a clear message, in the different form 
and initiatives addressing relevant issues, that it expects 
the Arab group to pursue consensus rather than divisive 
attitudes. 
 
Israel remains, as always, ready to engage in dialogue on 
these issues. 
 
Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest 
consideration. 
 
End Israeli Text. 
DAVIES