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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 38 ULAANBAATAR 000016 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR, USTDA, OPIC, AND EXIMBANK 
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND EEB/CBA 
USAID FOR ANE FOR D. WINSTON 
USDOC FOR ZHEN-GONG CROSS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EINV ECON OPIC KTTB USTR MG
SUBJECT: 2010 Mongolia Investment Climate Statement 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  001.4 OF 038 
 
 
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ZFR                         ZFR 
 
PLS CANCEL ULAANBAATAR 16 AND BLANK ALL ASSOCIATED 
MCNS.   CABLE IS A DUPE OF ULAANBAATAR 17. 
SORRY FOR ANY INCONVENIENCE.   THKS. 
 
ZFR                         ZFR 
 
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ADDLETON 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  002.2 OF 038 
 
 
 
State participation (or share) is determined by an agreement on 
exploitation of the deposit considering the amount of investment 
made the state; or, in the case of a privately-explored strategic 
deposit, by agreement between the state and the firm on the amount 
invested by the state.    Parliament may determine the state share 
using a proposal made by the government or on its own initiative 
using official figures on minerals reserves in the integrated state 
registry. 
 
Importantly, the state equity provision is not expropriatory on its 
face, because the GOM has committed itself to compensating firms for 
the share it takes at fair market value.  Although experience is 
limited with the law, so far the GOM has honored this commitment, as 
experience with the recently signed agreement for the mega Oyu 
Tolgoi copper-gold mine project confirms. 
 
In addition, the current Minerals Law restricts the access of 
petroleum and mineral licenses to entities registered in Mongolia 
under the terms of the relevant company and investment laws.  A 
foreign entity, in its own right, cannot hold any sort of mining or 
petroleum license.    Should a foreign entity acquire a given 
license as either collateral or for the purpose of actual 
exploration or mining, and fail to create the appropriate Mongolian 
corporate entity to hold a given license, that failure may serve as 
grounds for invalidating the license.  In essence, the foreign 
entity may lose its security or its mining rights.  We advise 
investors with specific questions regarding the current status of 
their respective licenses to seek professional advice on the status 
of those licenses. 
 
Reaching Agreement on the Oyu Tolgoi Project 
 
In October 2009, the GOM, Ivanhoe Mines of Canada, and Rio Tinto 
jointly negotiated an investment and development agreement for the 
Oyu Tolgoi (OT) copper- gold deposit located in Mongolia's South 
Gobi desert.  The OT agreement vests the government of Mongolia with 
34 percent ownership of the project and provides guarantees for 
local employment and procurement. With estimated development costs 
in excess of USD seven (7) billion, this 40-year plus mine is 
conservatively expected to double Mongolia's annual GDP when it 
becomes fully operational around 2020. 
 
Observers of Mongolia's investment climate consider passage of this 
agreement an unambiguously positive sign for foreign investors. 
Although the deal took about six years to craft and several 
conditions must still be met before implementation begins, nearly 
all observers conclude that it shows Mongolia can say "Yes" to key 
projects undertaken with foreign involvement and investment.   In 
addition, the agreement confirms the GOM's commitment to 
compensating private rights holders of most deposits considered 
strategic under the current minerals.  Finally, the OT deal shows 
that the GOM and Parliament are willing to amend laws and 
regulations to enhance the commercial viability of mining projects 
in Mongolia. As other projects of varying scales have been waiting 
for OT to pass, the positive impact and message of the OT deal for 
investors should not be underestimated. 
 
2009 Laws Negatively Affecting Investor Rights 
 
Although the OT deal was the big positive story for foreign 
investors in 2009, the impact has been moderated by the passage of 
two key laws that many foreign and domestic investors think detract 
from Mongolia's claims to being a competitive, safe, and predictable 
destination for investment. 
 
The 2009 Uranium Law of Mongolia 
 
In 2009 the Parliament imposed significant new controls on mining 
and processing uranium in Mongolia.  The law creates a new 
regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of Mongolia 
(NRA), and a state-owned holding company, MonAtom, to hold assets 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  003.2 OF 038 
 
 
that the government will acquire from current rights holders.   The 
law imposes several conditions: 
 
--Immediately revokes all current uranium exploration and mining 
licenses and then requires all holders to register these licenses 
with the NRA, for a fee. 
 
--Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has an 
absolute right to take -- without compensation -- at least 51 
percent of the company that will develop the mine -- as opposed to 
just the deposit -- as a condition of being allowed to develop any 
uranium property. 
 
--Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime 
independent of the existing regulatory and legal framework for 
developing mineral and metal resources.  Prior to the Uranium Law, 
exploration licenses gave their respective holders the rights to 
discover and develop any and all mineral and metal resources 
discovered within that license area (this did not include petroleum 
resources, which are governed separately).   According to GOM 
officials, this new law means that the state can issue a distinct 
license for uranium exploration on a property otherwise dedicated to 
other mineral and metals exploration. 
 
The Law on the Prohibition of Minerals Exploration in Water Basins 
and Forested Areas of 2009 
 
In 2009, the Parliament passed a law prohibiting mining in water 
basins and forested areas of Mongolia.  The stated intent was to 
limit environmental damage caused primarily by placer gold mining in 
and around forests and watersheds.  The law imposes the following 
restrictions on exploration and mining rights: 
 
--Revokes or modifies licenses to explore for or mine any and all 
mineral resources within an area no less than 200 meters from a 
water or forest resource. 
 
--Requires the government to compensate rights holders for 
exploration expenses already incurred or revenue lost from actual 
mining operations. 
 
--Empowers local officials to determine the actual areas which can 
be mined.  In effect, the local official can extend the 200 meter 
minimum at his discretion. 
 
Both foreign and domestic investors have unambiguously criticized 
these new laws and their respective implementations as both 
non-transparent and potentially expropriatory.  They argue that 
these laws radically change the rules for investing in Mongolia's 
vital minerals sector quite late in the game, raising the question 
of Mongolia's reliability as an investment destination. 
 
Further, observers note that these laws also raise the specter of 
outright expropriation, which heretofore has not been present in 
Mongolia.  Although the Water Law requires compensation, the 
government of Mongolia has not devised detailed plans for 
indemnifying rights holders.  In regards to the Uranium law, the 
legislation explicitly rejects any obligation to compensate 
investors for loss of economic rights and property; hence, 
generating credible investor fears of government of expropriation. 
 
 
Investors note that both laws passed without sufficient public 
review and comment; and that the subsequent regulatory drafting 
process occurred with little participation of the affected parties. 
The resulting regulatory regimes do not generally specify how and on 
what basis licenses will be revoked, nor do these new process detail 
how investors might appeal non-renewals.  The open-ended powers 
seemingly granted Mongolian officials seem to give central, 
regional, and local officials broad discretionary powers to curtail 
rights without apparent limit. 
 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  004.2 OF 038 
 
 
Pending Elimination of the Windfall Profits Tax on Copper and Gold 
 
Since passage in 2006, the Windfall Profits Tax Law has drawn 
criticism regarding the GOM's commitment to creating an open, 
predictable, and fair environment for foreign direct investment. 
The speedy legislative process for passing the WPT was 
unprecedented:  The law passed in six days with no consultation on 
any of its provisions with stakeholders.  The entire process raised 
concerns among investors about the stability and transparency of 
Mongolia's legislative and regulatory environment, which three 
intervening years of legislating have done little to alleviate. 
 
The WPT imposes a 68 percent tax on the profits from gold and copper 
mining respectively.  For gold, the tax originally kicked in when 
gold price hit USD500 per ounce; however, in late 2008 Parliament 
raised the threshold to USD850.   For copper, the threshold is USD 
2,600 per ton.  Mining industry sources claim that the 68 percent 
tax rate, when combined with other Mongolian taxes, makes the 
effective tax 100 percent on all proceeds above the copper threshold 
price.  In theory, the WPT proceeds are set aside in a special fund 
for a combination of social welfare expenditures and a reserve fund, 
although that fund, too, was modified in late 2009. 
 
The recent OT Investment Agreement entailed further amendment to the 
WPT as a condition precedent to its passage.  OT's private investors 
successfully argued that they would not be able to run a 
commercially viable OT operation when faced with the WPT. 
Consequently, Parliament amended the WPT Law: The WPT will 
officially end for all copper concentrate and gold products in 2011. 
 
 
Revisions of the Mongolian Tax Code 
 
Effective since January 1, 2007, the current tax code reduces tax 
rates, flattens the tax schedule, removes discriminatory loopholes 
and exemptions, and provides for appropriate deduction opportunities 
for corporate investment. The current code allows firms to deduct 
more types of legitimate business expenditures: training, business 
travel, cafeteria expenses, etc.  The law also imposes a level 
playing field between foreign and domestic investors. Specifically, 
the current code eliminates the majority of discriminatory tax 
exemptions and holidays (most of which favored international 
investors). 
 
As with the WPT, the OT Agreement had a salutary effect on key tax 
provisions long-desired by foreign and domestic investors alike. 
Before OT, firms could only carry-forward losses for two (2) years 
after incurring the loss  While most businesses approved of this 
provision, many, especially those requiring large and long-term 
infrastructure development, note that the two year carry-forward 
limit is insufficient for projects with long development lead times, 
as is typical of most large-scale mining developments.  As a 
condition precedent of passing the OT Agreement, Parliament extended 
loss-carry forward to eight (8) years. 
 
On the down side, Mongolia's Parliament revoked an exemption 
available on value-added tax (VAT) taxes of 10 percent on equipment 
used to bring a given mine into production, except on equipment to 
be used in the production of highly processed mining products.  For 
example, if the OT project decides to smelt copper, imported 
equipment supporting production of metallic copper might qualify for 
a 10 percent reduction on VAT.  However, in a effort to promote 
value-added production in Mongolia, the GOM defines the production 
of copper concentrate -OT's likely copper product - as 
non-value-added output; and so, equipment imported to develop and 
operate this sort of operation would not qualify for the 10 percent 
VAT exemption. 
 
Most jurisdictions, recognizing that most mines have long 
development lead times before production begins, either waive or do 
not tax such imports at all.  Parliament, with no consultation with 
investors, international advisors provided by donor organizations, 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  005.2 OF 038 
 
 
or even of its own tax officials, chose to impose the VAT,  which 
immediately makes Mongolian mining costs 10 percent higher than they 
would otherwise be, impairing competitiveness and dramatically 
varying from global practice. 
 
Whether any mining output qualifies for this exemption seems 
completely at the discretion of the GOM, which has not set out in 
regulation or statute a process by which it will regularly 
adjudicate such VAT exemption requests. 
 
Unfinished Business (Including Customs Rates) 
 
Both the GOM and Parliament continue to intend to debate additional 
tax reform measures.  Discussed since 2007, no substantive progress 
has been made since.  Proposed measures include revisions to the law 
on customs and customs tariffs.  While the exact nature of the 
proposed changes in the customs law remains murky, the GOM states 
that changes will be consistent with Mongolia's WTO obligations and 
investment climate enhancement goals. 
 
Despite overall solid, positive changes, international financial 
institutions warn that the 2007 tax reforms by themselves are 
insufficient to improve Mongolia's business environment.  They 
report that reform efforts need to go beyond changes to the tax code 
to restructure the operations of the key agencies - the tax 
department, the customs administration and the inspections agency - 
that directly interact with private firms and individuals. 
 
Issues in the Telecom and Aviation Sectors 
 
While the Mongolian government supports FDI and domestic investment, 
both foreign and domestic report that individual agencies and 
elements of the judiciary often use their respective powers to 
hinder investments into such sectors as meat production, 
telecommunications, aviation, or pharmaceuticals.  Investors report 
similar abuses of inspections, permits, and licenses by Mongolian 
regulatory agencies. 
 
Abuses in Mongolia's telecom and information technology sector have 
raised public and business concerns. The state-owned telecom 
company, Mongol Telecom (MT) uses its regulatory and technical clout 
to forestall or attack competition.  As the monopoly supplier of 
land-based lines through which much internet traffic has 
traditionally flowed, MT charges predatory rates for access to all 
other Internet Service Providers (ISPs) at a rate 10 times the 
charges assessed to the state-owned ISP.  These per-minute charges 
add up and are hard for competitor ISPs to absorb.  In addition, 
some observers believe that the GOM, in an effort to make Mongol 
Telecom more attractive for privatization, is inclined to make MT 
the sole portal for all telecommunication into Mongolia.  The 
apparent intent here is to require licenses for both 
telecommunication services and technology, which only MT could 
satisfy.  There has been significant lobbying against this policy by 
ISPs, voice-over IP providers, cellular rights holders, 
multi-lateral organizations, and diplomatic missions as contrary to 
Mongolia's own competition law and long-term interests.  So far 
these efforts have delayed the passage of any damaging legislation. 
 
Compounding these problems are the non-transparent activities of the 
Mongolian Information, Communication Technology, and Post Agency 
(ICTPA), which is charged with providing policy guidance to the 
Communication Regulatory Commission of Mongolia (CRC).  Companies 
report that these agencies routinely act in ways that seem to have 
no basis in law or regulation and which have harmed American 
interests, not to mention those of investors from Mongolia and other 
countries.  For example, ICTPA has attempted to order internet 
service providers to charge set access prices, without recourse to 
the market.  The CRC routinely tenders licenses for frequency and 
information technology service allocation through a completely 
non-transparent process that invariably seems to favor certain 
domestic interests over other Mongolian companies and foreign 
investors.  While agreeing that the GOM has an interest in 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  006.2 OF 038 
 
 
allocating frequency, domestic and foreign investors question why 
either the ICTPA or CRC need to interfere in the provision of  ICT 
services, which they believe should be left to the consumers to 
decide. 
 
The state also involves itself in the domestic aviation sector. 
Mongolia has two domestic service providers, the privately owned 
Aero Mongolia and EZNIS.  Government regulation recommends maximum 
ticket prices that airlines may charge for all domestic routes, but 
the law does not strictly forbid airlines from charging fees higher 
than the state carrier (which does not currently operate 
domestically).  However, the GOM frowns on domestic airlines that 
charge more for service.  These state prices are well below 
operating costs and inhibit the private carriers from charging a 
break-even fee.  However, private carriers have decided to shake off 
GOM prohibitions and are charging rates that might yield profits and 
support safe and efficient flying arrangements. 
 
State-owned MIAT formerly ran domestic operations which were heavily 
subsidized, primarily through its foreign routes.  This 
state-subsidized competition with private carriers has inhibited 
investors from participating in the provision of private domestic 
service and consequently limited the aviation products and services 
that U.S. firms might sell into the Mongolian market.  Apart from a 
brief and no-longer operating domestic service in 2009 using 
aircraft from their international fleet, MIAT and the GOM have 
failed to upgrade the domestic air fleet, which is effectively 
non-existent.  This seems to have opened the field for private 
investment into the aviation sector. 
 
The Mongolian Judiciary and the Sanctity of Contracts 
 
We find no concerted, systematic, institutional abuse specifically 
targeted at foreign investment.  In the case of the 
judiciary-corruption aside (see A. 11 Corruption)-most problems 
arise from ignorance of commercial principles rather than antipathy 
to foreign investment.  In principle, both the law and the judiciary 
recognize the concept of sanctity of contracts.  However, the 
practical application of this concept lags, with both foreign and 
domestic investors reporting inconsistent enforcement of contracts 
by the judiciary.  This inconsistency comes from the slow transition 
from Marxist-based jurisprudence to more market oriented laws and 
judicial practices.  Recent decisions in banking and land use cases 
in which contract provisions were upheld reflect a growing 
commercial sophistication among Mongolia's judges.  As more judges 
receive commercial training and as Soviet era (1921-1990) jurists 
retire, we expect to see the gradual improvement of the entire 
judicial system. 
 
Concerns over Exit Visa's 
Although not strictly a judicial issue, in 2009 a trend intensified 
involving abuse of the country's requirement for exit visas by both 
Mongolian public and private entities to exert pressure on foreign 
investors to settle commercial disputes.  The required valid exit 
visas are normally issued at the port of departure (e.g. the 
international airport), but may be denied for a variety of reasons 
including civil disputes, pending criminal investigation, or for 
immigration violations.  If denied for a civil dispute, the visa may 
not be issued until either the dispute is resolved administratively 
or a court has rendered a decision.  Neither current law nor 
regulations establish a clear process or time-table for settlement 
of the issue.  Nor does the law allow authorities to distinguish a 
criminal and civil case when detaining a person.  In fact, the 
Mongolian government maintains the right to detain foreign citizens 
indefinitely without appeal until the situation has been resolved. 
 
Research into issue has revealed that investors from countries other 
than the U.S. are being affected by abuse of the exit-visa system. 
All cases have a similar profile.  A foreign investor has a 
commercial dispute with a Mongolian entity, often involving assets, 
management practices, or contract compliance.  The Mongolian 
entities respond by filing either civil or criminal charges with 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  007.2 OF 038 
 
 
local police or prosecutorial authority.  It is important to note 
that at this point there need be no actual arrest warrant or any 
sort of official determination that charges are warranted: Mere 
complaint by an aggrieved party is sufficient grounds to deny exit. 
We should note that Mongolian investors are not subject to similar 
detention when involved in commercial disputes.  Mongolian citizens 
do not require exit visas to depart Mongolia and can only be denied 
exit with if an actual arrest warrant has been issued. 
 
An investor in this situation is effectively detained in Mongolia 
indefinitely.  Some foreign investors have resolved the impasse by 
settling, allowing them to depart Mongolia.  If unwilling to settle, 
the foreign investor will have to undergo the full investigatory 
process, which may lead to a court action.  Investigations commonly 
take up to six months, and in one case an American citizen has been 
denied an exit visa for two years pending a criminal investigation 
into a failed business deal.  In addition, even if a dispute seems 
settled, it can be filed in the same venue again -- if the local 
police and prosecutors are willing -- or in a different venue. 
 
Privatization Policies and Resistance of Mongolian firms to Foreign 
Investment 
 
Privatization policies have favored foreign investment in some key 
industries, including banking and cashmere production.  The bidding 
processes for privatizations and other tenders have generally been 
transparent, and after some legal disputes among the winners and 
losers lasting from late 2006 through mid-2008, most participants 
have accepted the results. 
 
Although the GOM routinely announces that it plans to privatize its 
remaining assets, we have seen little real movement to privatize 
state holdings in the aviation, telecommunications, power, and 
mining sectors.  Recent moves by the GOM to acquire assets in the 
minerals sector - especially in uranium and coal -suggest to some 
that, to the contrary, the GOM has no intention to extract the state 
from ownership. 
 
That said, the GOM has recently discussed initial public offerings 
(IPO) for certain state-owned power, infrastructure, and mining 
holdings.  To date, the IPO discussion has developed at the 
conceptual level, with little focus on the details. 
 
Foreign companies and investors are subject to the same legal regime 
imposed on Mongolian domestic firms regarding incorporation and 
corporate activities.   For example, casinos are illegal under 
Mongolian law; and so, neither Mongolians nor foreigners may own or 
operate them (except in one specifically designated free trade zone, 
although no casino has been established there). 
 
Generally, Mongolian private businesses seek foreign participation 
and equity in all sectors of the economy.  That said, some Mongolian 
businesses use Mongolian institutions to stop competitors, if they 
can.  These actions represent no animus against foreign investment 
as such; rather, they reflect individual businesses desire to keep 
competitors, Mongolian or foreign, at bay. 
 
Key Investment Laws 
 
The Foreign Investment Law of Mongolia (FILM) transformed the 
anti-business environment of the Soviet era into today's generally 
investor-friendly regime.  Under the old system, everything not 
provided for in law was illegal.  Because such economic activities 
as franchising, leasing, joint venture companies were not 
specifically mentioned in earlier Mongolian statutes, they were 
technically illegal.  In 1993, the GOM enacted FILM to legalize all 
manner of foreign investment in Mongolia (amended in 2002 to allow 
for representative offices and franchises).  This law and its 
subsequent amendments define broad ranges of activity that would 
otherwise have limited validity under Mongolian law.  It also 
defines the meaning of foreign investment under the civil code 
without limiting activities that foreign investors can conduct. 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  008.2 OF 038 
 
 
FILM also establishes registration procedures for foreign companies. 
 Specifically, the law requires that any investment with 25 percent 
or more of FDI must register as a foreign-invested firm with the 
government.  The law creates a supervisory agency, the Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Trade Agency (FIFTA), that runs the 
registration process, liaises among businesses and the Mongolian 
government, and promotes in- and out-bound investments. 
 
In 2008, the Parliament of Mongolia amended the FILM.  The stated 
intent of the revision was to improve FIFTA's ability to track 
foreign investment and to enhance the services provided by FIFTA to 
foreign investors.  The amendments apply only to investments 
registered after the new law came into force in summer 2008.  The 
new law has raised the minimum level for new foreign investment from 
USD 1,000 to USD 100,000 and imposed a series of requirements on 
foreign investors seeking registration.  Registered foreign 
companies must now have FIFTA certify that their by-laws, 
environmental practices, their technologies, etc., comply with 
standards determined by FIFTA. 
 
FIFTA officials admit that procedures are still under development; 
and that because they lack specific expertise in most of these 
areas, they will have to consult with the relevant ministries and 
agencies as they assesses each firm's request for investment 
registration.  FIFTA has also not clearly defined what the precise 
processes it will use to evaluate investments, what the exact 
standards will be for any given investment, how it will determine 
those standards, and how an investor might seek redress if  FIFTA 
denies a registration request.  Foreign investors have expressed 
concern over what they perceive as FIFTA's broad and seemingly 
un-transparent regulatory authority; however, we have not received 
any complaint of abuse of these new powers to date. 
 
 
New Ministerial Structure Impacts Foreign Investment 
 
In late 2008, the Parliament re-organized the government structure 
by combining various ministries and agencies in an effort to 
streamline government functions.  Relevant to foreign investors, 
Parliament took trade policy and trade promotion functions that had 
been vested in the former Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) and 
FIFTA respectively and merged them with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.  The new Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) has 
assumed direct control all formulation and execution of trade 
policies and promotion efforts, which includes export promotion and 
in-bound investment efforts.  FIFTA is now under MFAT's direct 
supervision.  Other units of MIT were absorbed by the now-named 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Light Industry and Ministry of 
Nature, Environment, and Tourism. 
 
Ministry officials have stated that the government will concentrate 
on promoting Mongolian exports and foreign investment into Mongolia. 
 They want FIFTA to resemble counterpart agencies in South Korea, 
Japan, or the U.S.; and have told both us and businesses that they 
plan to get FIFTA out of the regulatory business.  The intent is to 
limit FIFTA's activities to supporting business in their efforts to 
work in Mongolia and to registering in-bound investment for purposes 
of investment tracking only. 
 
 
A.2 CONVERSION AND TRANSFER POLICIES 
 
The Mongolian government employs a limited regulatory regime for 
controlling foreign exchange for investment remittances and 
maintains exceptionally liberal policies for these transactions. 
Foreign and domestic businesses report no problems converting or 
transferring investment funds, profits and revenues, loan 
repayments, or lease payments into whatever currency they wish to 
wherever they wish.   There is no difficulty in obtaining foreign 
exchange, whether the investor wants Chinese Renminbi, Euros, 
English Pounds, Rubles, or U.S. Dollars. 
 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  009.2 OF 038 
 
 
In regards to domestic transactions, the Parliament of Mongolia in 
2009 closed a loophole that allowed local transactions to occur in 
any currency desired.  Now, all domestic transactions must be 
conducted in Mongolia's national currency, the Tugrik, excepting 
those entities allowed specific waivers as determined by the 
Mongolian central bank, the Bank of Mongolia. 
 
The Mongolian government wants funds to flow easily in and out of 
the nation, with one exception.  Foreign-held interest bearing 
dollar accounts remain subject to a 20 percent withholding tax.  The 
bank retains 20 percent of all such interest payments sent abroad, 
and remits this withholding to the Tax Authority of Mongolia. 
Otherwise, businesses report no delays in remitting investment 
returns or receiving in-bound funds.  Most transfers occur within 
1-2 business days or at most a single business week. 
 
Ease of transfer aside, foreign investors criticize Mongolia's lack 
of sophisticated mechanisms for converting currencies and parking 
money.  Letters of credit are difficult to obtain, and legal 
parallel markets do not exist in the form of government dollar 
denominated bonds or other instruments for parking funds in lieu of 
payment.  Many Mongolian financial institutions lack experience with 
these arrangements.  Moreover, Mongolian banking law currently 
provides incomplete statutory grounds and regulatory support for the 
activity to take place.  The immediate impact has been to limit 
access to certain types of foreign capital, as international 
companies resist parking cash in Mongolian banks or in local debt 
instruments. 
 
A.3 EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION 
 
Mongolia respects property rights as they apply to most asset types. 
 In 2009, we detected no wide-scale changes in policies, statutes, 
or regulations related to the use and ownership of private property. 
 Foreigners face no legal bias in asset ownership (except that only 
citizens of Mongolian may own land) or how they structure ownership. 
 Foreign investors need not seek local partners or share ownership 
of most assets or endeavors as a condition of doing business. 
However, in foreign-investor dependent crucial mining sector, 2009 
saw the government of Mongolia (GOM) cross from actions that might 
represent "creeping expropriation" to what many consider explicitly 
expropriatory acts sanctioned through force of law, especially in 
the uranium mining sector. 
 
Security of Ownership 
 
Mongolia and the United States signed and ratified a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty (BIT) which entered in force in 1997, and which 
specifically enjoins both signatories from expropriatory acts 
against private property and investments. In addition, both 
Mongolian law and the national constitution recognize private 
property and use rights and specifically bar the government from 
expropriation of such assets. To date, the government of Mongolia 
(GOM) has not expropriated any American property or assets.  Thus, 
we have no precedent from which to assess how the Mongolian system 
would respond to seizure and compensation. 
 
Like most governments, the Mongolian government can claim land or 
restrict use rights in the national interest.  Currently, this means 
little, as most land outside Mongolia's few urban centers remains 
government property, as provided in Mongolia's constitution.  The 
government has no plans to privatize these vast countryside 
holdings, but it leases parcels for such economic activities as 
mining, pasturage, timbering, etc.  This practice remains in flux 
because the government must still determine how to let these rights 
and what fees to charge.  Except for mining, most foreign firms 
remain inactive in these sectors. 
 
Since May 2003, land in the urban areas has been privatized to 
citizens of Mongolia or leased to both citizens and foreigners for 
periods ranging from 3-90 years.  The legislation and implementing 
regulations are evolving, but so far investors believe that the GOM 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  010.2 OF 038 
 
 
generally respects recently enacted property rights and leases. 
 
I: Implications of the Current Minerals Laws 
 
Minerals Law of 2006 
 
We closely watch the key mining sector, Mongolia's major foreign 
exchange earner and chief engine for economic and commercial growth 
and development.  The current Minerals Law has several provisions 
that raise red flags for investors and observers alike.  The law 
does not allow the GOM to usurp rights to explore and exploit 
natural mineral, metal, and hydrocarbons resources per se.  Instead, 
the law imposes procedural requirements and grants powers to 
central, provincial, and local officials - powers that, if abused, 
might prevent mineral license holders from exercising their 
exploration or mining rights. The current law has the potential to 
deny the rights holder access to his rights without formally 
revoking use rights. 
 
An example is the new tender process for apportioning some 
exploration rights.  The old law awarded exploration rights on a 
"first come, first served" basis, a process that gave little 
discretion to government officials to intervene.  The new law lays 
out a different procedure for obtaining exploration rights on land 
explored with state funds or lands where the current holder has 
forfeited exploration rights.  The Mineral Resources Authority of 
Mongolia (MRAM) will tender such exploration rights only to firms 
technically qualified to conduct minerals work. The new tender 
procedure neither requires nor allows for a cash-bid.  Only the 
technical merits of exploration proposals will determine who gains 
exploration rights.  MRAM staff has the authority and responsibility 
to assess the merits of proposals to determine who wins the 
tenders. 
 
Both MRAM and its supervising authority, the Ministry of Mineral 
Resources and Energy, now have broad discretionary authority to 
select who will get tenements.  Under the current system, it is 
possible for a company to prospect virgin territory, and scope out a 
potential exploration site, only to risk losing the site should MRAM 
decide to grant the rights to another exploration company.  This 
authority disturbs miners, who fear this power will be the source of 
corruption and arbitrary decisions by MRAM.  Evidence suggests that 
local mining guilds will define an expert in Mongolian mining as a 
person who received a degree from a Mongolian institution, such as 
the National University, rather than an internationally recognized 
institution.  While this enforced employment program for Mongolian 
geologists would be an annoyance, the discretionary power MRAM now 
has generates the most concern.  If MRAM rejects a firm's experts 
and mining plan as unqualified, no recourse is spelled out under the 
new law, and the firm will in effect lose its rights. 
 
The concept of "expertise" allows another potential avenue for 
expropriation of rights by denying or preventing their use.  The law 
has the potential to limit the ability of rights holders to seek 
financing, because it forbids transfer of mining licenses and 
exploration rights to non-qualified individuals.  Consequently, a 
miner will not be able to offer his licenses as secured collateral 
to banks or to any lender lacking the professional qualifications to 
receive these rights if the miner defaulted on his debt obligations. 
  A given bank is unlikely to set up a "qualified" mining firm just 
to receive a pledged license offered as collateral. Thus, the law 
limits the investment pool that a mining firm might tap to finance 
its mine, which might prevent bringing a property into production, 
again denying licensees access to their legal economic rights. 
 
The current law removed from its predecessor the Mongol word for 
"exclusive" from the grant of exploration rights. The old article 
read, "To conduct exclusive exploration for minerals within the 
boundaries of an exploration area in accordance with this law." The 
new article reads, "To conduct exploration for minerals. . . ." It 
is unclear what, if anything, this deletion means.  However, the 
deletion would seem to allow the government to apportion mineral 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  011.2 OF 038 
 
 
rights per metal or mineral rather than as a whole, which has been 
the standard practice.  The deletion was apparently done 
intentionally, as the word appeared in earlier drafts, right up to 
the passage of the law. 
 
Investors and observers are also concerned about new authority 
granted to the MRAM Chairman to approve transfers of existing and 
new licenses.  The law grants final approval authority to the MRAM, 
without specifying any check or balance on this official's 
authority.   This power is not a revocation but if abused would 
certainly prevent exercise of economic rights. 
 
Complicating matters is that in 2008 MRAM had been moved under the 
direct authority of the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy in 
a sweeping re-organization of the government.  Prior to this 
restructuring, MRAM had been a quasi-independent agency, the acts of 
which did not require ministerial approval.  In the new structure, 
the ministry can intervene in the registration and transfer of 
exploration and mining licenses.  The ministry seems to have only 
intervened in cases where the license involves a "strategic" 
deposit. (See A.1 Openness to Foreign Investment for explanation of 
strategic deposits.)  In this specific category, ministerial 
officials have ordered MRAM to freeze all transfers and transactions 
involving properties near or in strategic deposits, which includes 
uranium deposits of any size and massive coal and copper deposits 
near the Chinese border.  Further, these same officials have 
indicated that the government may then revoke the rights of those 
holding exploration rights or mining licenses in or near strategic 
deposits.  Although the law seems to allow for compensation, the 
ministry has not presented formal compensation packages or even 
issued compensation guidelines to those potentially affected by its 
actions. 
 
Expropriatory Aspects of the 2009 Law on Uranium Mining 
 
In 2009 the Parliament passed a new law imposing significant new 
controls on mining and processing uranium in Mongolia.  The law 
created a new regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of 
Mongolia (NRA), and a state-owned holding company, MonAtom, to hold 
assets that the government will acquire from current rights holders. 
  The law imposes several key policies: 
--Immediately revokes all current uranium exploration and mining 
licenses and then requires all holders to register these licenses 
with the NRA, for a fee. 
 
--Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has an 
absolute right to take -- without compensation -- at least 51 
percent of the company (as opposed to the deposit) that will develop 
the mine as a condition of being allowed to develop any uranium 
property. 
 
--Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime 
independent of the existing regulatory and legal framework existing 
for mineral and metal resources.  Prior to the Uranium Law, 
exploration licenses gave their respective holders the rights to 
discover and develop any and all mineral and metal resources 
discovered within that license area (this did not include petroleum 
resources, which are governed separately).   According to GOM 
officials, this new law means that the state can issue a distinct 
license for uranium exploration on a property otherwise dedicated to 
other mineral and metals exploration. 
 
To many foreign and domestic investors, this law is outright, 
statutorily sanctioned expropriation, which heretofore had not been 
present in Mongolia.  Although the Minerals Law of Mongolia and 
other pieces of legislation officially state that the GOM must 
compensate rights holders for any taking, the Uranium Law gives the 
GOM the unfettered right to take uranium holdings from whomever it 
will with no obligation to compensate the rights holders. 
Complicating the issue is that the law seems to conflate the deposit 
and company mining the deposit, allowing the GOM to claim an 
uncompensated share in any entity that might mine the deposit.  In 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  012.2 OF 038 
 
 
effect, the GOM is demanding a free-carried, non-compensated 
interest of no less than 51 percent of any uranium mine. 
 
Acts of Provincial Administrations: 
 
With regard to the issuance of both exploration permits and mining 
licenses, provincial officials reportedly routinely use their 
authority arbitrarily to block access to mining rights legally 
granted under the current law.  For example, reports regularly 
circulate that some provincial government officials use their 
authority to designate land as "special use zones" to usurp mining 
exploration tenements.  In a common technique, provincial governors 
often reclassify property that has never felt the touch of the plow 
or felt the tread of a tourist for agricultural use or cultural 
tourism respectively, although the central government has legally 
granted exploration rights to miners.  In one case, a miner could 
not gain access to the subsurface resources because the provincial 
government claimed that doing so would damage a potato farm that had 
suddenly appeared over the site. 
 
Other miners harshly criticize the misuse of the local officials' 
rights to comment on permits for water use and mining licenses. 
Comments are advisory, and have limited legal force regarding 
disallowing activity, but the central government routinely hesitates 
to reject a governor's negative comment no matter the motives behind 
it.  The effect has been to stop progress for months, limiting 
access to the resource and costing rights holders' time and money. 
Whatever the motives, these provincial actions are often seen as a 
creeping bureaucratic expropriation through denial of access and use 
rights.  The current Minerals Law provides no clear limit on 
provincial control of permits and special use rights or guidance on 
how to apply these powers beyond codifying that the provincial and 
local authorities have some authority over activities occurring in 
their provinces and soums (counties). 
 
Faced with these unclear boundaries of authority, the central 
government often interprets the rules and regulations differently 
from the provincial authorities, creating administrative conflicts 
among the various stakeholders.  The central government acknowledges 
the problematic ambiguity but has yet to definitively clarify the 
situation in law or practice, even though the situation threatens 
accessing one's rights.  Mongolian and foreign permit holders have 
advised the government that letting this problem fester raises 
perceptions among investors that they may risk losing their economic 
rights, which can scare away inbound investors. 
 
Expansion of License Revocation Powers to the Soum Level 
 
The recently passed Law on the Prohibition of Minerals Exploration 
in Water Basins and Forested Areas of 2009 represents a considerable 
extension of unregulated authority to Mongolia's 320 soum (county) 
administrations in regards to mining activities within their 
respective jurisdictions. 
 
In 2009, the Parliament prohibited mining in water basins and 
forested areas of Mongolia.  The stated and laudatory intent was to 
limit environmental damage caused primarily by placer gold mining in 
and around forests and watersheds.  The law imposes the following 
restrictions on exploration and mining rights: 
 
--Requires the government of Mongolia to revoke or modify licenses 
to explore for any and all mineral resources within an area no less 
than 200 meters from a water or forest resource. 
 
--Requires the government to compensate rights holders for 
exploration expenses already incurred or revenue lost from actual 
mining operations. 
 
--Empowers local officials, the soum or county governors, to 
determine the actual areas which can be mined.  In effect, the local 
official can extend the 200 meter minimum at his discretion. 
 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  013.2 OF 038 
 
 
Current rights holders are concerned that the power of local 
governors to curtail mining in their respective jurisdictions seems 
unlimited and unregulated.  Although the governor cannot allow 
mining within the 200 meter limit, the law sets no upper limit on 
mining near water courses and forests in the respective soum. The 
local administration has full discretion to prohibit operations 400 
meters, 600, 1000, or more.  Mining companies have to work out the 
issue with the local governor; and should any company disagree with 
a given soum administration's ruling, the law makes no provision for 
administrative appeal.  A company would then have to pursue redress 
through a lengthy case in Mongolia's courts.  In either case, the 
rights holder would lose access to their economic rights for a 
protracted period or permanently. 
 
A.4 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 
The GOM consistently supports transparent, equitable dispute 
settlements, but executing good intentions has proven problematic. 
These problems largely stem from a lack of experience with standard 
commercial practices rather than from any systemic intent by public 
or private entities to target foreign investors.  The framework of 
laws and procedures is functional, but many judges remain ignorant 
of commercial principles. 
 
Problems with Dispute Settlement in Mongolia's Courts 
 
Court structure is straightforward and supports dispute settlement. 
Disputants know the procedures and the venues.   Plaintiffs bring 
cases at the district court level before a single district judge or 
panel of judges, depending on the complexity and importance of the 
case.  The district court renders its verdict.  Either party can 
appeal this decision to the Ulaanbaatar City Court, which rules on 
matters of fact as well as matters of law.  It may uphold the 
verdict, send it back for reconsideration or nullify the judgment. 
Disputants may then take the case to the Mongolian Supreme Court for 
a final review.  Matters regarding the constitutionality of laws and 
regulations may be taken directly before the Constitutional Court of 
Mongolia (the "Tsetz") by Mongolian Citizens, Foreign Citizens, or 
Stateless Persons residing legally in Mongolia. 
 
Problems arise for several reasons.  First, commercial law in 
Mongolia and broad understanding of it remain in flux.  New laws and 
regulations on contracts, investment, corporate structures, leasing, 
banking, etc. have been passed or are being considered at both the 
ministerial and parliamentary levels.  Mongolian civil law does not 
work on precedents but from application of the statute as written. 
If a law is vague or does not cover a particular commercial 
activity, the judge's remit to adjudicate can be severely limited or 
non-existent.  For example, until recently leasing did not exist in 
the Mongolian civil law code as such, but seemed to be covered under 
various aspects of Mongolian civil law regarding contracts and other 
agreements.  But judgments on leasing made under these laws might 
not have applied to an arrangement not otherwise specifically 
recognized under its own exclusive law.  Further, because precedents 
are not legally relevant or binding on other judges and Mongolian 
courts, decisions reached in one case have no legal force in other 
suits, even when the circumstances are similar or even before the 
same court and judges. 
 
Trained in the former Soviet era, many judges lack training in or 
remain ignorant of commercial principles, in some cases willfully. 
They dismiss such concepts as the sanctity of the contract.  This is 
not a problem of the law, which recognizes contracts, but what most 
conclude is faulty interpretation.  In several cases courts have 
misinterpreted provisions regarding leases and loan contracts, 
allegedly intentionally in some cases.  Judges regularly ignore 
terms of a contract in their decisions.  If someone defaults on a 
loan, the courts often order assets returned without requiring the 
debtor to compensate the creditor for any loss of value.  Judges 
routinely assert that the creditor has recovered the asset, such as 
it is, and that is enough.  Bad faith and loss of value simply have 
no formal standing in judicial calculations of equity. 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  014.2 OF 038 
 
 
Replacing old-school judges is not an option.  It is politically 
impossible-if not functionally impractical-for the Mongolians to 
dismiss its cadre of Soviet-era judges.  There is a realistic hope 
that young justices, trained in modern commercial principles by 
international experts, will gradually improve judicial protections 
for commercial activities in Mongolia.  Lately, we have seen better 
decisions in several cases involving Americans seeking to recover on 
debts and contractual fees and to hold Mongolian government entities 
to the terms of their respective contracts and regulations, but 
these results tend to be limited to courts where modern-educated 
judges preside. 
 
Bankruptcy and Debt Collection 
 
Mongolia's bankruptcy provisions and procedures for securing the 
rights of creditors need serious reform.  Mongolian law allows for 
mortgages and other loan instruments backed with securitized 
collateral.  However, rudimentary systems for determining title and 
liens and for collecting on debts make lending on local security 
risky.  Banks frequently complain that onerous foreclosure rules are 
barely workable and unfair to creditors. 
 
Although a system exists to register immovable property-structures 
and real estate-for the purpose of confirming ownership, the current 
system does not record existing liens against immovable property. In 
addition, no system exists to register ownership of, and liens on, 
movable property.  Consequently, Mongolian lenders face the added 
risk of lending on collateral that the debtor may not actually own 
or which may have already been offered as security for another debt. 
 It is hoped that a project sponsored by the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation to create a more modern and efficient property 
registration system will help improve the ability of creditors and 
debtors to prove ownership.  For program details go to 
http://www.mca.mn. 
 
Overall, the legal system does recognize the concept of 
collateralized assets provided as security for loans, investment 
capital, or other debt-based financial mechanisms.  The legal system 
also provides for foreclosure, but this process is exceptionally 
onerous and time consuming.  A 2005 change to Mongolian law 
attempted to simplify the process by allowing creditors to foreclose 
without judicial review.  Prior to this law, all creditors had to go 
to court to collect on securitized collateral, adding months to the 
entire collection process.  However, the Constitutional Court of 
Mongolia voided the law on constitutional grounds, slowing down debt 
collection to pre-2005 levels.  Waits of up to 24 months for final 
liquidations and settlement of security were not uncommon. 
 
Once a judgment is rendered, the disputant faces a relatively 
hostile environment to execute the court's decision.  For example, a 
bank collecting on a debt in Mongolia must allow debtors to put 
forward assets for auction and set the minimum bid price for those 
assets.  If assets do not sell, a second round of auctions occurs in 
which a reduced minimum bid is put forward. The State Collection 
Office (SCO) supervises this process but does not set the price. 
However, the SCO receives 10 percent from the sales price or from 
the second auction minimum price even if there is no sale. 
 
The SCO does not allow collateralized assets to be valued by neutral 
third parties.  Because it derives income from the forced sale of 
assets, the SCO has a conflict of interest; and, anecdotally, seems 
to have failed as an impartial arbiter between debtors and 
creditors.  For banks, this has meant that forcing a company into 
bankruptcy may be the safest way to recover rather than forcing 
piecemeal sales of assets.  This approach automatically puts all 
assets into play rather than those selected by the debtor.  However, 
this procedure is onerous without a clear process behind it. 
 
Purchase financing remains tricky.  For example, a local car dealer 
financed an auto for USD 20,000 down and USD 60,000 in credit, 
complete with a local bank guarantee. The buyer subsequently 
defaulted on the loan, the bank refused to honor its guarantee, and 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  015.2 OF 038 
 
 
the dealer took the buyer to court.  Under current Mongolian law, 
interest payments are suspended for the duration of such a case, 
from first filing to final appeal before the Supreme Court of 
Mongolia.  Possibly months of interest-free time can pass while the 
asset rusts in an impound lot.  In this case, the dealer simply 
reclaimed the car and dropped the lawsuit, swallowing the lost 
interest payments and loss of value on the car.  Domestic and 
foreign businesses often respond by requiring customers to pay in 
cash, limiting sales and the expansion of the economy. 
 
Binding Arbitration: International and Domestic 
 
The Mongolian government supports and will submit to both binding 
arbitration and international settlement procedures.   However, 
glitches remain in local execution.  Mongolia ratified the 
Washington Convention and joined the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes in 1991.  It also signed and 
ratified the New York Convention in 1994. 
 
To our knowledge, the government of Mongolia has accepted 
international arbitration in five disputes where claimants have 
asserted the government reneged on a sovereign guarantee to 
indemnify them.  In all cases the government has consistently 
declared that it would honor the arbitrators' judgments.  However, 
this resolution has not been put to the test.  In the four cases 
where a decision has been rendered, Mongolia has won each case; and 
so, its commitment to imposing a negative international arbitral 
decision remains untested. 
 
More widely, Mongolian businesses partnered with foreign investors 
accept international arbitration, as do government agencies that 
contract business with foreign investors, rather than avail 
themselves of the Arbitration Bureau operated by the Mongolian 
National Chamber of Commerce and Industry.  These entities tell us 
that they seek redress abroad because they perceive that domestic 
arbitrators are too politicized, unfamiliar with commercial 
practices, and too self-interested to render fair decisions. 
 
Although arbitration is widely accepted among business people and 
elements of the government, support for binding international 
arbitration has not penetrated local Mongolian agencies responsible 
for executing judgments.  In two cases, the Mongolian-state-owned 
copper mine lost two international arbitral cases.  The awards were 
certified and recognized as valid and enforceable by Mongolian 
courts.  But the local bailiff's office has consistently failed to 
execute the collection orders.  Local business people routinely cite 
the failure of SCO and the bailiffs to enforce court-ordered 
foreclosures and judgments as the most common problem threatening 
resolution of debt-driven disputes. 
 
A.5 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND INCENTIVES 
 
Mongolia imposes few performance requirements on, and offers few 
incentives to, investors. The few requirements imposed are not 
onerous and do not limit foreign participation in any sector of the 
economy.  Performance requirements are applied somewhat differently 
to foreign investors in a limited number of sectors. 
Formally quite generous to foreign investors, the current Tax Law of 
Mongolia (amended in 2006) offers few incentives and exemptions. 
While preferential tax agreements made with most foreign investors 
have been allowed to run their courses, the government of Mongolia 
(GOM) has attempted to limit both exemptions and incentives and to 
make sure that tax preferences offered are available to both foreign 
and domestic investors. 
 
Current exemptions are granted for imports of staples as flour and 
for imports in certain sectors targeted for growth, such as the 
agriculture sector.  Exemptions apply to both import duties and 
Mongolia's value-added tax (VAT).  In addition, the GOM will extend 
a 10percent tax credit on case by case basis to investments in such 
key sectors as mining, agriculture, and infrastructure. 
 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  016.2 OF 038 
 
 
Foreign investors have accepted phasing out of tax incentives, 
because the amendments have brought some needed best practices to 
the tax code.  These include provision for 8-year 
loss-carry-forwards, five-year accelerated depreciation, and more 
deductions for legitimate business expenses including but not 
limited to marketing and training expenses. 
 
Revocation of the VAT Exemption 
 
Investors view 2009's changes into the tax code's treatment of 
exemptions as something of a mixed bag.  On the down side, 
Mongolia's Parliament revoked an exemption available on value-added 
tax (VAT) taxes of 10percent on equipment used to bring a given mine 
into production, except on equipment to be used in the production of 
highly processed mining products.  For example, if the Oyu Tolgoi 
(OT) copper-gold project were to smelt copper, imported equipment 
supporting production of metallic copper might qualify for an 
exemption from the VAT.  However, to promote value-added production 
in Mongolia, the GOM defines the production of copper concentrate 
-OT's likely copper product - as non-value-added output; and so, 
equipment imported to develop and operate this sort of operation 
would not qualify for the 10percent VAT exemption. 
 
Most jurisdictions, recognizing that most mines have long 
development lead times before production begins, either waive or do 
not tax such imports at all.  Parliament, with no consultation with 
investors, international advisors provided by donor organizations, 
or even with its own tax officials, chose to impose the VAT,  which 
immediately makes Mongolian mining costs 10percent higher than they 
would otherwise be, impairing competitiveness and dramatically 
varying from global practice. 
 
Pro-Investment Changes to the Tax Code 
 
On the plus side, Parliament revised both the Windfall Profit Tax 
(WPT) and loss-carry forward provisions.  Under the old regime, the 
WPT imposed a 68percent tax on the profits from gold and copper 
mining respectively. (For more details on the WPT see Chapter A.1: 
Openness of Government to Foreign Investment.)  The recent OT 
Investment Agreement entailed further amendment to the WPT as a 
condition precedent to its passage.  OT's private investors 
successfully argued that they would not be able to operate OT 
commercially if burdened with the WPT.  Consequently, Parliament 
amended the WPT Law: The WPT will officially end for all copper 
concentrate and gold products in 2011. 
 
Regarding the granting of more generous loss carry-forward 
provisions, as a condition precedent of passing the OT Agreement, 
Parliament extended the provision from two (2) years to eight (8) 
years after incurring a loss.  Most investors find eight years 
sufficient for many Mongolian investments that require impose long, 
expensive development horizons before producing any sort of profit. 
 
Few Restrictions on Foreign Investment 
 
The government applies the same geographical restrictions to both 
foreign and domestic investors.  Existing restrictions involve 
border security, environmental concerns, or local use rights.  There 
are no onerous or discriminatory visas, residence, or work permits 
requirements imposed on American investors.   Generally, foreign 
investors need not use local goods, services, or equity, or engage 
in substitution of imports.  Neither foreign nor domestic businesses 
need purchase from local sources or export a certain percentage of 
output, or have access to foreign exchange in relation to their 
exports. 
 
Although there remains no formal law requiring the use of local 
goods and services, the GOM encourages firms to do value-added 
production in Mongolia, especially for firms engaged in natural 
resource extraction.  All Mongolian senior officials and politicians 
make in-country processing a consistent feature of their public and 
private policy statements regarding the development of mining. For 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  017.2 OF 038 
 
 
example, the current but soon to sunset WPT applied the tax to 
copper concentrate, but exempted metallic copper produced in 
Mongolia.  Recently concluded negotiations on the OT copper-gold 
project ended with commitments by the companies to explore copper 
smelting in Mongolia.  Government talks on coal production 
constantly feature discussions of power generation and coals-to- 
liquid processing in Mongolia. Government plans also call for 
increased investment in businesses and activities that keep the 
"value" of a resource in Mongolia.  Consequently, firms should 
continue to expect the GOM to press aggressively for value-added 
production in Mongolia. 
 
Generally, foreign investors set their own export and production 
targets without concern for government imposed targets or 
requirements.   There is no requirement to transfer technology.  As 
a matter of law, the government imposes no offset requirements for 
major procurements.  Certain tenders may require bidders to agree to 
levels of local employment or to fund certain facilities as a 
condition of the tender, but as matter of course such conditions are 
not the normal approach of the government in its tendering and 
procurement policies. 
 
Investors, not the Mongolian government, make arrangements regarding 
technology, intellectual property, and similar resources and may 
generally finance as they see fit.  Foreign investors need sell no 
shares to Mongolian nationals.  Equity stakes are generally at the 
complete discretion of investors, Mongolian or foreign -- with one 
key exception for strategic mining assets (For more detail on what 
constitutes a strategic mining asset see Chapter A.1: Openness of 
Government to Foreign Investment).    Although Mongolia imposes no 
official statutory or regulatory requirement, the GOM, as a matter 
of foreign policy, sometimes negotiates restrictions on what sort of 
financing foreign investors may obtain and with whom those investors 
might partner or to whom they might sell shares or equity stakes. 
These restrictive covenants will most likely be imposed in certain 
sectors where the investment is determined to have national impact 
or national security concerns, especially in the key mining sector. 
 
 
Regarding employment, investors can locate and hire workers without 
using hiring agencies-as long as hiring practices are consistent 
with Mongolian Labor Law.  However, Mongolian law requires companies 
to employ Mongolian workers in certain labor categories whenever a 
Mongolian can perform the task as well as a foreigner.  This law 
generally applies to unskilled labor categories and not areas where 
a high degree of technical expertise not existing in Mongolia is 
required.  The law does provide an escape hatch for all employers. 
Should an employer seek to hire a non-Mongolian laborer and cannot 
obtain a waiver from the Ministry of Labor for that employee, the 
employer can pay a fee of around USD140 per employee per month. 
Depending on the importance of a project, the Ministry of Labor may 
grant an employer a 50percent exemption of the waiver fees as an 
incentive. 
 
Limited Performance Requirements 
 
Requirements in the Petroleum and Mining Sectors 
 
Performance requirements are sparingly imposed on investors in 
Mongolia with the exception of petroleum and mining exploration 
firms.   The Petroleum Authority of Mongolia (PAM) issues petroleum 
exploration blocks to firms, which then agree to conduct exploration 
activities. The size and scope of these activities are agreed upon 
between PAM and are binding. If the firm fails to fulfill 
exploration commitments, it must pay a penalty to PAM based on the 
amount of hectares in the exploration block, or return the block to 
PAM.  These procedures apply to all investors in the petroleum 
exploration sector. 
 
Under the current Minerals Law of Mongolia, receiving and keeping 
exploration licenses depends on conducting actual exploration work. 
Each year exploration firms must submit a work plan and report on 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  018.2 OF 038 
 
 
the execution of the previous year's performance commitments, all of 
which are subject to annual verification by the Minerals Authority 
of Mongolia (MRAM).  Failure to comply with work requirements may 
result in fines, suspension, or even revocation of exploration 
rights.  Work commitments expressed in terms of US dollar expenses 
per hectare per year: 
 
-2nd and 3rd years miners must spend no less than US D.50 per 
hectare on exploration 
 
--4th to 6th years miners must spend no less than US D1.00 per 
hectare on exploration 
 
--7th to 9th years miners must spend no less than US D1.50 per 
hectare on exploration 
 
In addition to these performance requirements, the law also requires 
holders of mining licenses for projects of strategic importance to 
sell no less than 10percent of company shares on the Mongolian Stock 
Exchange. Vaguely presented in the statute, the GOM has provided no 
formal clarification in law or regulation of what this provision 
means in practical terms or how it is to be implemented. 
 
In 2009 the Parliament passed a new law imposing significant new 
controls on mining and processing uranium in Mongolia.  This law 
created a new regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Authority of 
Mongolia (NRA) and a state-owned holding company, MonAtom, to hold 
assets that the government will acquire from current rights holders. 
  The law imposes several conditions: 
 
--Immediately revokes all current uranium exploration and mining 
licenses and then requires all holders to register these licenses 
with the NRA, for a fee. 
 
--Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has an 
absolute right to take -- without compensation -- at least 50percent 
of the company (as opposed to the deposit) that will develop the 
mine as a condition of being allowed to develop any uranium 
property. 
 
--Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime 
independent of the existing regulatory and legal framework existing 
for mineral and metal resources.  Prior to the Uranium Law, 
exploration licenses gave their respective holders the rights to 
discover and develop any and all mineral and metal resources 
discovered within that license area (this did not include petroleum 
resources, which are governed separately).   According to GOM 
officials, this new law means that the state can issue a distinct 
license for uranium exploration on a property otherwise dedicated to 
other mineral and metals exploration 
 
Requirements Imposed on Foreign Investors Only 
 
All foreign investors must register with the Foreign Investment and 
Foreign trade Agency (FIFTA).   The Foreign Investment Law of 
Mongolia requires all foreign investors to show a minimum of USD 
100,000 in assets (cash, working stock, property, etc.) registered 
in Mongolia as a precondition for registration.  In addition to this 
particular requirement, all foreign investors must pay an initial 
processing fee of some 12, 000 Mongolian tugrik or about USD 8.00. 
Foreign Investors must then pay a yearly prolongation fee of 6,000 
Mongolian tugrik or about USD 4.00. 
 
In addition to these fees, foreign investors must annually report on 
their activities for the coming year to the government through 
FIFTA.  Businesses need not fulfill plans set out in this report, 
but failure to report may result in non-issuance of licenses and 
registrations and suspension of activities.  This requirement 
differs from that imposed on domestic investors and businesses. 
Local investors have no yearly reporting requirement.  Mongolians 
pay lower registration fees, which vary too much to say with any 
precision what the fees actually are. 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  019.2 OF 038 
 
 
 
FIFTA explains that the higher registration costs for foreign 
investors arise from the need to compensate for the services it 
provides to foreign investors, including assistance with 
registrations, liaison services, trouble-shooting, etc.  The 
different reporting requirements provide the government with a 
clearer picture of foreign investment in Mongolia.  Foreign 
investors are generally aware of FIFTA's arguments and largely 
accept them, but they question the need for annual registrations. 
Investors recommend that FIFTA simply charge an annual fee rather 
than require businesses to submit a new application each year. 
 
Regarding reports, foreign businesses are concerned about the 
security of their proprietary information.  Several foreign 
investors have claimed that agents of FIFTA routinely use or sell 
information on business plans and financial data.  We have yet to 
verify these claims, but FIFTA acknowledges that data security 
largely depends on the honesty of its staff, as there are few 
internal controls over access to the annual reports. 
 
Tariffs 
 
Mongolia has one of Asia's least restrictive tariff regimes.  Its 
export and import policies do not harm or inhibit foreign 
investment.  Low by world standards, tariffs of 5percent on most 
products are applied across the board to all firms, albeit with some 
concerns about consistency of application and valuation. However, 
some non-tariff barriers, such as phyto-sanitary regulations, exist 
that limit both foreign and domestic competition in the fields of 
pharmaceutical imports and food imports and exports.  The testing 
requirements for imported drugs, food products, chemicals, 
construction materials, etc., are extremely nontransparent, 
inconsistent, and onerous.  When companies attempt to clarify what 
the rules for importing such products into the country are, they 
receive contradictory information from multiple agencies. 
 
WTO TRIMS Requirements 
 
Mongolia employs no measures inconsistent with WTO TRIMs 
requirements, nor has anyone alleged that any such violation has 
occurred. 
 
A.6 RIGHT TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND ESTABLISHMENT 
 
Mongolia has one of Asia's most liberal ownership and establishment 
regimes.  Unless otherwise forbidden by law, foreign and domestic 
businesses may establish and engage in any form of remunerative 
activity.  All businesses can start up, buy, sell, merge; in short, 
do whatever they wish with their assets and firms, with exceptions 
in the mining and petroleum sectors. 
 
Competition from the State-Owned Sector 
 
Mongolia passed and implemented a competition law applying to 
foreign, domestic, and state-owned entities active in Mongolia.  As 
a practical matter, competition between state-owned and private 
businesses has been declining for the simple reason that many 
parastatals have been privatized.  The exceptions are the 
state-owned power and telecom industries, a national airline 
(international only at present), the national rail system 
(half-owned by Russia), several coal mines, and a large copper 
mining and concentration facility (also half-owned by Russia). 
 
Currently, firms from Mongolia, China, Japan, Europe, Canada, and 
the U.S. are actively seeking opportunities for renewable and 
traditional power generation in Mongolia.  However, few want to 
invest in the power generation field until the regulatory and 
statutory framework for private power generation firms up and 
tariffs are set at rates allowing profits. 
 
Regarding its railway sector, Mongolia has no plans to privatize its 
existing railroad jointly held with the government of Russia, but 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  020.2 OF 038 
 
 
current law does allow private firms to build, operate, and transfer 
new railroads to the state.  Under this law several private mining 
companies have proposed rail links, and obtained licenses to 
construct these new lines from their respective coal mines to the 
Chinese border or to the currently operating spur of the 
Trans-Siberian Railroad.  However, because landlocked Mongolia and 
its neighbors have yet to resolve transnational shipping issues, 
companies may not be able to access rights granted under these 
licenses. 
 
Although the trend had been for the GOM to extract itself from 
ownership of firms and other commercial assets, both the current 
Minerals Law of Mongolia and the 2009 Uranium Law bring the state 
back into mining. (See Chapter A.1:  Openness of Government to 
Foreign Investment for fuller discussions of both the 2009 Uranium 
Law and Minerals Law)  Under both laws, the GOM granted itself the 
right to acquire equity stakes ranging from 34 percent to perhaps 
100 percent of certain deposits deemed strategic for the nation. 
Once acquired, these assets are to be placed with one of two 
state-owned management companies: Erdenes MGL, for non-uranium 
assets; or MonAtom for uranium resources.  These companies are then 
mandated to use the proceeds from their respective activities for 
the benefit of the Mongolian people. 
 
The role of state as an equity owner, in terms of management of 
revenues and operation of the mining asset, remains unclear at this 
point.   There are some concerns over the capacity of the GOM to 
deal with conflicts of interest arising from its position as both 
regulator and owner of these strategic assets.  Specifically, firms 
are worried that the GOM's desire to maximize local procurement, 
employment, and revenues may comprise the long term commercial 
viability of any mining project.  In addition, discussions are 
underway to set up three new state-owned holding entities to manage 
assets in three priority areas -- mining, energy, and infrastructure 
-- then take the companies public to raise investment revenues 
through the capital markets. 
 
A.7 PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
The right to own private, movable and immovable property is 
recognized under Mongolian law. Regardless of citizenship (except 
for land which only citizens of Mongolia can own), owners can do as 
they wish with their property.  One can collateralize real and 
movable property.  If debtors default on such secured loans, 
creditors do have recourse under Mongolian law to recover debts by 
seizing and disposing of property offered as security.  The only 
exceptions to this liberal environment are current mining laws, 
which either bar transfer of exploration and mining licenses to 
third parties lacking professional mining qualifications or status 
as a Mongolian registered entity, or which threaten to expropriate 
without compensation certain mineral holdings outright. 
 
Mongolia's Current Regime to Protect Creditors 
 
The current protection regime for creditors functions but needs 
reform.  The legal system presents the greatest pitfalls.  Although 
the courts recognize property rights in concept, they have a 
checkered record of protecting and facilitating acquisition and 
disposition of assets in practice.  Part of the problem is ignorance 
of, and inexperience with, standard practices regarding land, 
leases, buildings, and mortgages.  As noted in Chapter A.4 Dispute 
Settlement, some judges, largely out of ignorance of the concepts, 
have failed to recognize these practices.  Some newly trained judges 
are making a good faith effort to uphold property rights, but need 
time to learn how to adjudicate such cases. 
 
Mongolia's bankruptcy provisions and procedures for securing the 
rights of creditors need reform.  Mongolian law allows for mortgages 
and other loan instruments backed with securitized collateral. 
However, rudimentary systems for determining title and liens and for 
collecting on debts make lending on local security risky.  Banks 
frequently complain that onerous foreclosure rules are barely 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  021.2 OF 038 
 
 
workable and unfair to creditors. 
 
Although a system exists to register immovable property-structures 
and real estate-for the purpose of confirming ownership, the current 
system does not record existing liens on  immovable property; nor 
does  the current system record ownership and liens on movable 
property.  Consequently, Mongolian lenders risk lending on 
collateral that the debtor may not actually own or which may have 
already been offered as security for another debt.  It is hoped that 
a project sponsored by the Millennium Challenge Corporation to 
create a more modern and efficient property registration system will 
go some way to improving the ability of creditors and debtors to 
prove ownership.  For details: http://www.mca.mn. 
 
Overall, the legal system recognizes the concept of collaterized 
assets as security for loans, investment capital, or other 
debt-based financial mechanisms.  The legal system also provides for 
foreclosure, but this process has proven exceptionally burdensome 
and time consuming.  Current law bars creditors from non-judicial 
foreclosure, requiring them to submit all contested foreclosure 
actions for judicial review through Mongolia's court system.  This 
approach slows debt collection substantially: Waits of up to 24 
months for final liquidations and settlement of security are not 
uncommon. 
 
Debt Collection Procedures 
 
Even with the delays, getting a ruling is relatively easy compared 
to executing the court's decision.   The problem is not the law but 
the enforcement.  A judge orders the State Collection Office (SCO) 
to move on the assets of the debtor.  The SCO orders district 
bailiffs to seize and turn those assets over to the state, which 
then distributes them to creditors.  However, foreign and domestic 
investors claim that the state collection office and the district 
bailiffs frequently fail in their responsibilities to both courts 
and creditors. 
 
In some cases, bailiffs refuse to enforce the court orders.  The 
perception is that they do so because they have been bribed or 
otherwise suborned.  Bailiffs are often local agents who fear local 
retribution against them and their interests if they collect in 
their localities.  In some cases, bailiffs will not collect unless 
the creditor provides bodyguards during seizure of assets. 
Creditors also have reason to believe that the state collection 
office accepts payments from debtors to delay seizure of assets. 
 
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
 
Mongolia supports intellectual property rights (IPR) in general and 
has protected American rights in particular.  It has joined the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and signed and 
ratified most treaties and conventions, including the WTO TRIPS 
agreement.  The WIPO Internet treaties have been signed but remain 
un-ratified by Parliament.  However, even if a convention is 
un-ratified, the Mongolian government and its intellectual property 
rights enforcer, the Intellectual Property Office of Mongolia 
(IPOM), make a good faith effort to honor these agreements. 
 
Under TRIPS and Mongolian law, the Mongolian Customs Authority (MCA) 
and the Economic Crimes Unit of the National Police (ECU) also have 
an obligation to protect IPR.  MCA can seize shipments at the 
border.  The ECU has the exclusive power to conduct criminal 
investigations and bring criminal charges against IPR pirates. The 
IPOM has the administrative authority to investigate and seize fakes 
without court order.  Of these three, the IPOM makes the most 
consistent good faith effort to fulfill its mandates. 
 
Problems stem from ignorance of the importance of intellectual 
property to Mongolia and of the obligations imposed by TRIPS on 
member states.  Customs still hesitates to seize shipments, saying 
that their statutory mandate does not allow seizure of such goods, 
but Mongolian statutory and constitutional laws clearly recognize 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  022.2 OF 038 
 
 
that international treaty obligations in this area take precedence 
over local statutes and regulations.  A clear legal basis exists for 
Customs to act, which has been recognized by elements of the 
Mongolian Judiciary, the Parliament, and the IPOM.  Customs officers 
may occasionally seize fake products, but it seems that Mongolian 
customs law will have to be brought into formal compliance with 
TRIPS before Customs will fulfill its obligations.   The ECU has 
also been lax.  The ECU hesitates to investigate and prosecute IPR 
cases, deferring to the IPOM.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that ECU 
officials fear political repercussions from going after IPR pirates, 
many of whom wield political influence. 
 
The IPOM generally has an excellent record of protecting American 
trademarks, copyrights, and patents; however, tight resources limit 
the IPOM's ability to act.  In most cases, when the U.S. Embassy in 
Ulaanbaatar conveys a complaint from a rights holder to the IPOM, it 
quickly investigates the complaint.  If it judges that an abuse 
occurred, it will (and has in every case brought before it to date) 
seize the pirated products or remove faked trademarks, under 
administrative powers granted in Mongolian law. 
 
We note two areas where enforcement lags.  Legitimate software 
products are rare in Mongolia.  Low per capita incomes have given 
rise to a thriving local market for cheap, pirated software.  The 
IPOM estimates pirated software constitutes at least 95percent of 
the market.  The Office enforces the law where it can but the scale 
of the problem dwarfs its capacity to deal with it.  The IPOM will 
act if we bring cases to its attention. 
 
Pirated optical media are also readily available and subject to 
spotty enforcement.  Mongolians produce no significant quantities of 
fake CD's, videos, or DVD's, but import such products from China, 
Russia, and elsewhere.  Products are sold through numerous local 
outlets and sometimes broadcast on private local TV stations.  The 
IPOM hesitates to move on TV broadcasters, most of which are 
connected to major government or political figures.  Rather the IPOM 
raids local ("street") DVD and CD outlets run by poor urban youth 
who lack the political and economic clout of the TV broadcasters. 
Again, when an American raises a specific complaint, the IPOM acts 
on the complaint, but IPOM rarely initiates action. 
 
Restrictive Aspects of Current Mining Laws 
 
Minerals Law of 2006 
 
The current Minerals Law of Mongolia would seem on its face to 
prevent transfer of exploration or mining rights to any third party 
lacking professional mining qualifications as determined by the 
Mineral Resources Authority of Mongolia (MRAM). 
 
Under the Minerals Law, the concept of mining expertise can either 
qualify or disqualify any entity from acquiring, transferring, 
securitizing exploration and mining rights.  The law has the 
potential to limit the ability of rights holders to seek financing, 
because it forbids transfer of mining licenses and exploration 
rights to non-qualified individuals.  Consequently, a miner might 
not be able to offer his licenses as secured collateral to banks or 
to any lender lacking the professional qualifications to receive 
these rights if the miner defaulted on his debt obligations. 
 
In addition, no foreign entity, in its own right, can hold any sort 
of mining or petroleum license; only entities registered in Mongolia 
under the terms of relevant company and investment laws may hold 
exploration and mining licenses.    Should a foreign entity acquire 
a license as collateral or for the purpose of actual exploration or 
mining, and fail to create the appropriate Mongolian corporate 
entity to hold a given license, that failure may serve as grounds 
for invalidating the license.  In essence, the foreign entity may 
lose its security or mining rights.  We advise investors with 
specific questions regarding the current status of their respective 
to seek professional advice on the status of those licenses. 
 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  023.2 OF 038 
 
 
Uranium Law of 2009 
 
The Uranium Law of 2009 dramatically curtails property rights 
protection regime protecting most exploration and mining licenses. 
The law imposes the following conditions upon investors in the 
uranium mining sector: 
 
--Immediately revokes all current uranium exploration and mining 
licenses and then requires all holders to register these licenses 
with the NRA, for a fee. 
 
--Requires investors to accept that the Mongolian state has an 
absolute right to take - without compensation - at least 51percent 
of the company (as opposed to the deposit) that will develop the 
mine as a condition of being allowed to develop any uranium 
property. 
 
--Creates a uranium-specific licensing, regulatory regime 
independent of the existing regulatory and legal framework existing 
for mineral and metal resources.  Prior to the Uranium Law, 
exploration licenses gave their respective holders the rights to 
discover and develop any and all mineral and metal resources 
discovered within that license area (this did not include petroleum 
resources, which are governed separately).   According to GOM 
officials, this new law means that the state can issue a distinct 
license for uranium exploration on a property otherwise dedicated to 
other mineral and metals exploration 
 
To both investors and observers, this law statutorily sanctions 
expropriation, a concept heretofore alien to Mongolian law. 
Although the Minerals Law of Mongolia and other pieces of 
legislation officially state that the GOM must compensate rights 
holders for any taking, the Uranium law allows the GOM unfettered 
power to seize holdings with no obligation to compensate rights 
holders.  Complicating the issue, the law conflates deposits with 
the companies developing those deposits, letting the GOM claim an 
uncompensated share of any entity that might mine the deposit.  In 
effect, the GOM demands a free-carried, non-compensated interest of 
no less than 51percent of any uranium mining firm in Mongolia. 
 
Affected uranium rights holders contested the constitutionality of 
these provisions before Mongolia's Constitutional Court, and lost 
the case.  The Court upheld the law, asserting that the all minerals 
in the ground are the property of the Mongolian state even if 
separated from the ground.  Legal experts with whom we consulted 
explained that the Court seems to make the extraordinary and 
unprecedented claim that Mongolia's ownership extends to products 
created with the ore; hence the state has a "legitimate" claim on 
both the ore body and any company mining the resource.  This theory 
appears to undermine the property rights of uranium investors and 
chips away at property rights protections granted both under the 
constitution and Mongolia's Minerals, Company, and Foreign 
Investment Laws. 
 
A.8 TRANSPARENCY OF THE LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROCESS 
 
Generally, Mongolia's problem is not lack of laws and 
regulations-Mongolia has passed more than 1,600 laws since 
undertaking its transition to a market economy 20 years ago-but 
rather, the problem is that legislators lack knowledge on what 
foreign and domestic investors need from the state when investing; 
and that they do not consult with those affected by their 
legislative actions. Corruption aside, the fact that laws and 
regulations change with little consultation creates a chaotic 
situation for all parties. 
 
Problems with the Drafting Process for Legislation and Regulations 
 
Normally, laws can be crafted in two ways.  Once rare but now 
common, Members of Parliament and the President of Mongolia may 
draft their own proposals for direct submission to the Parliament. 
Such bills need not be submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers but can 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  024.2 OF 038 
 
 
be delivered directly to the Speaker of Parliament for consideration 
by the relevant Standing Committee.  The relevant Standing Committee 
may either reject the bill (in which case it dies in committee) or 
pass it on to the Parliament's plenary body, unaltered or revised 
for a general vote.  More typically, Parliament or the Cabinet of 
Ministers requests legislative action.  These institutions send such 
requests to the relevant ministry. The Minister relays the request 
to ministerial council, which in turn sends the request to the 
proper internal division or agency within the respective ministry, 
which in turn forms a working group.  The working group prepares the 
bill, submits it for ministerial review, makes any recommended 
changes, and then the bill is reviewed by the full Cabinet of 
Ministers.  Relevant ministries are asked to comment and recommend 
changes in the legislation. 
 
Prior to a final vote by the Cabinet of Ministers, the National 
Security Council of Mongolia (NSC)-consisting of the President of 
Mongolia, the Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament-can review 
each piece of legislation for issues related to national security. 
Although the government has never clarified the legal and 
constitutional authority of the NSC to veto or recommend changes to 
draft legislation, the Cabinet to our knowledge will not and has 
never overruled NSC recommendations. 
 
Once through NSC and Cabinet reviews, the bill goes to Parliament. 
In Parliament, the bill is vetted by the relevant Standing 
Committee, sent back for changes or sent on to the full Parliament 
for a vote.  The President can veto bills, but his veto can be 
overcome by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of Parliament. 
 
For regulations, the process is truncated.  The relevant minister 
tasks the working group that wrote the original law to draft 
regulations.  This group submits their work to the minister who 
approves or recommends changes. In most cases, regulations require 
no Cabinet approval, and become official when the relevant incumbent 
minister approves them.  When legislation crosses inter-ministerial 
boundaries, the Cabinet will authorize the most relevant ministry to 
supervise an inter-ministerial approval process for regulations. 
 
The Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs (MOJHA) plays an important 
role in drafting both laws and regulations.  MOJHA vets all statutes 
and regulations before they are passed for final approval.  In the 
case of legislation, MOJHA reconciles the language and provisions of 
the law with both existing legislation and the constitution of 
Mongolia, after which the law passes to the Cabinet and then 
Parliament.  In the case of regulations, MOJHA vets the regulations 
to ensure consistency with current laws and provisions of the 
constitution.  In effect, MOJHA can either modify or even veto legal 
or regulatory provisions that it finds inconsistent with the 
statutes and constitution. 
 
System lacks Transparency 
 
Absent from these drafting processes is a statutory, systematic, 
transparent review of legislation or regulations by stakeholders and 
the public.  Ministerial initiatives are not publicized until the 
draft passes out of a given ministry to the full Cabinet. 
Typically, the full Cabinet discusses and passes bills on to 
Parliament, without public input or consultations.  Parliament 
itself issues neither a formal calendar nor routinely announces or 
opens its standing committees or full chamber hearings to the 
public.   While Parliament at the beginning of each session 
announces a list of bills to be considered during the session, this 
list is very general and often amended.  New legislation is commonly 
introduced, discussed and passed without public announcement or 
consideration.   For example, in 2006, Parliament passed the 
(since-amended) Wind Fall Profits Tax Law bill in six days without 
consulting any business, NGO, or other entity about the impact and 
desirability of the bill.  In 2007, Parliament significantly amended 
the Law on State Procurement within thirty days without any public 
notification or comment regarding new limits on competitive, 
transparent bidding practices and limits on access tender 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  025.2 OF 038 
 
 
opportunities to foreign bidders.  In 2009, Parliament passed 
legislation threatening property rights in the mining sector that 
many view as expropriatory and revoked key tax exemptions affecting 
major mining and construction projects, all with no formal or 
informal public comment and review. 
 
The U.S. Embassy in Ulaanbaatar and foreign and domestic investors 
have repeatedly urged the Mongolian government to utilize the 
government's Open Government web site to post draft and pending 
legislation for public consultation and review before it is 
finalized and sent to Parliament.  Over the past couple of years, we 
have noticed some improvement in the timeliness and completeness of 
the postings. 
 
To supplement this effort, the U.S. Embassy and local business 
organizations have jointly created an informal system to identify 
legislation and regulations under review.  Once identified, we meet 
with working groups, provide information on how other nations have 
handled such legislation, share stakeholders' points of view, and 
widely distribute publicly available draft bills, preferably before 
they reach a minister's desk.  Should a piece of vital legislation 
pass on to the Minister, Cabinet, or Parliament, these 
non-government organizations are prepared to lobby at the 
appropriate level.  Over the last three years we have found that 
many agencies and Members of Parliament welcome our advice and 
information, particularly if given in a non-confrontational way that 
respects Mongolia's political process and right to deliberate. 
 
Regulators resist consultation when it comes to implementation. 
Bureaucrats are only slowly becoming comfortable with the concepts 
and practices of broad, public consultation and information sharing 
with their own citizens, let alone foreigners.  Many times 
businesses ask for a clear copy of the current regulations, only to 
be met with blank stares or outright refusals.  The government has 
long acknowledged that the Soviet-era State Secrets Law requires 
substantial amendment.  Currently, most government 
documents-including administrative regulations affecting investments 
and business activities-can be technically classified as "state 
secrets" not for release to the public.   This technicality allows 
bureaucrats and regulators a convenient excuse to deny requests for 
information or, more commonly, to demand extra-legal fees to provide 
documents.  The legacy of secrecy has also resulted in cases where 
government officials themselves cannot get up-to-date copies of the 
rules.  Mongolia is considering a freedom of information law for 
several years, but it remains in its formative stages. 
 
High officials acknowledge the value of, and need for, a more open, 
transparent system.  While laws are easy to fix, the behavior of 
individual bureaucrats, Members of Parliament, and the judiciary 
will only gradually change, with training and experience.  Already a 
younger generation of professionals, many trained abroad or during 
Mongolia's democratic era, is taking hold and moving into senior 
positions of authority.  This bodes well for Mongolia's continuing 
transition to a private sector-led, open, market economy underpinned 
by good government and corporate governance. 
 
The Impact of NGOS and Private Sector Associations on GOM Policy 
 
The Mongolian government actively protects its prerogatives to 
legislate and regulate economic activities in its domain.  While 
NGOs and private sector associations have wide latitude to run their 
activities, the government of Mongolia has never allowed any 
non-governmental entity-be it business, civil society, trade union, 
etc.-to serve more than an advisory role over the formulation and 
execution of  both laws and rules, which also applies to setting 
standards for various industries.  Based on experience, the GOM will 
routinely resists any expanded role for civil society and NGOs. 
This unarticulated but tacit policy of the government of Mongolia 
applies to both domestic and foreign entities. 
 
Laws, Regulations, and Policies that Impede FDI 
 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  026.2 OF 038 
 
 
While the GOM supports FDI and domestic investment, individual 
agencies and elements of the judiciary reportedly use their 
respective powers to hinder investments into such sectors as meat 
production, telecommunications, aviation, or pharmaceuticals.  Both 
domestic and foreign investors report similar abuses of inspections, 
permits, and licenses by Mongolian regulatory agencies.  However, we 
generally note no consistent, systematic pattern of abuse 
consistently initiated by either government or private Mongolian 
entities aimed against foreign investors in general or against U.S. 
investment in particular.  The impediments more often than not are 
opportunistic attempts by individuals to misuse contacts to harass 
U.S. and other foreign investors with whom the Mongolian entity is 
in dispute. 
 
Alternatively, other reports suggest that Mongolians use connections 
to well-placed regulators at all levels to extract extra-legal 
payments from both foreign and domestic businesses or otherwise 
hinder their work.  In the latter case the general approach is to 
demand some sort of payment in lieu of not enforcing work, 
environmental, tax, health and safety rules, otherwise imposing the 
full weight of a contradictory mix of Soviet Era and the current 
reformed rules on the firm.  Most foreign businesses refuse to pay 
bribes, and in turn accept the punitive inspections, concede to some 
of the violations found, and contest the rest in the City 
Administrative Court.  In our experience companies that show resolve 
against such predatory abuse of statutory and regulatory power will 
face impediments at the start; but these usually ease over time as 
state agents look for easier targets. 
 
Although we have note no systemic and routine abuse of Mongolia's 
legal system to hinder FDI and investors, a worrisome trend 
affecting implementation of Mongolia's requirement for exit visas by 
both Mongolian public and private entities to exert pressure on 
foreign investors to settle commercial disputes. 
Required, valid exit visas are normally issued pro forma at the port 
of departure (e.g. the international airport), but may be denied for 
a variety of reasons including civil disputes, pending criminal 
investigation, or for immigration violations.  The law does not 
allow authorities to distinguish a criminal and civil case when 
detaining a person.  If denied for a civil dispute, the visa may not 
be issued until either the dispute is resolved administratively or a 
court has rendered a decision.  Neither current law nor regulations 
establish a clear process or time-table for resolution.   In fact, 
the Mongolian government maintains the right to detain foreign 
citizens indefinitely without appeal until the situation has been 
resolved. 
Research into issue has revealed that investors from countries other 
than the U.S. are affected by abuse of the exit-visa system.  All 
cases have a similar profile.  A foreign investor has a commercial 
dispute with a Mongolian entity, often involving assets, management 
practices, or contract compliance.  The Mongolian entities respond 
by filing either civil or criminal charges with local police or 
prosecutorial authority.  It is important to note that at this point 
there need be no actual arrest warrant or any sort of official 
determination that charges are warranted: Mere complaint by an 
aggrieved party is sufficient grounds to deny exit. 
 
An investor in this situation is effectively detained in Mongolia 
indefinitely.  Some foreign investors have resolved the impasse by 
settling, thereby allowing them to depart Mongolia.  If unwilling to 
settle, the foreign investor will have to undergo the full 
investigatory process, which may lead to a court action. 
Investigations commonly take up to six months, and in one case an 
American citizen has been denied an exit visa for two years pending 
a criminal investigation into a failed business deal.  In addition, 
even if a dispute seems settled, it can be filed in the same venue 
again -- if the local police and prosecutors are willing -- or in a 
different venue.  In one case, an American citizen has been denied 
an exit visa for over two years pending a criminal investigation 
into a failed business deal with the Government of Mongolia. 
 
We note that Mongolian investors are not subject to similar 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  027.2 OF 038 
 
 
impositions of their immigration codes when involved in commercial 
disputes.  Mongolian citizens do not require exit visas to depart 
Mongolia and can only be denied exit with a pending arrest warrant. 
 
 
A.9 EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT 
 
Mongolia currently lacks the experience and expertise needed to 
sustain portfolio investments.  It has no regulatory apparatus for 
these activities, and both the state and private entities are just 
beginning to engage in them.  However, Mongolia has active capital 
markets.   The government of Mongolia (GOM) imposes few restraints 
on the flow of capital in any of its markets.  Multilateral 
institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund, have 
typically found the regime too loose, especially in the crucial 
banking sector. 
 
Although the government has clear rules about capital reserve 
requirements, loan practices, and banking management practices, the 
Bank of Mongolia (BOM), Mongolia's central bank, has historically 
resisted restraining credit flows and interfering with operations at 
Mongolia's commercial banks, even when the need to intervene has 
been apparent.  However, in response to the severe impact of the 
ongoing global financial crisis on Mongolia's banking sector, the 
BOM is striving to improve it capacity to deal with those insolvent 
banks and improperly managed banks that have impaired the health of 
Mongolia's financial system.   To illustrate, two (2) of the 
country's 16 banks are currently in receivership, and additional 
consolidation under BOM supervision is likely. 
 
Capital and Currency Markets 
 
The global economic crisis savaged Mongolia's currency, capital, and 
equity markets.  While the currency had proved resilient, holding 
its value against most international currencies, it fell some 40 
percent against the U.S. dollar from late 2008 into spring 2009, as 
the worst of the crisis hit.  It has remained relatively stable and 
even resilient since then.  The currency's resiliency has largely 
been attributed to the commodities boom, which saw Mongolia selling 
such raw materials as copper, gold, and coal, primarily to China. 
In mid 2008, the commodity markets began to cool and Mongolia's 
foreign trade began to fall, leading to growing trade deficit as 
imports no longer balanced or exceeded exports.  Subsequently, once 
the tugrik began to slide relative to the U.S. dollar, 
import-related trade was affected as well. 
 
Complicating matters, major banks and other institutions that 
formally had access to international capital flows (in the form of 
dollars, yen, Renmimbi, Euros, etc, which were parked in 
high-interest yielding tugrik accounts), found in-flows reversing as 
foreign depositors repatriated their funds, either because these 
entities needed the money to weather their own financial crises or 
feared that the tugrik's collapse would eat away the value of their 
deposits.  Banks no longer had access to easy capital and liquidity, 
and began and continue to restrict lending to almost all clients, 
who in turn found they lacked funds to finance construction 
projects, trade, and other activities. 
 
After several months of tapping reserves to slow the tugrik's 
decline, Mongol Bank curtailed such infusions.  Instead, the Bank 
sells dollars into the system by auction to the local commercial 
banks and lets the market decide the value of the exchange rate 
rather than attempting to set the rate. . In addition, Parliament 
closed a loophole that allowed local transactions to occur in any 
currency desired.  Now, all domestic transactions must be conducted 
in Mongolia's national currency, the Tugrik, excepting those 
entities allowed specific waivers as determined by the Mongolian 
central bank, the Bank of Mongolia.  The move was intended to 
bolster the value of the Tugrik by increasing demand for the 
currency. 
 
Overall liquidity is sufficient but affordable capital remains 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  028.2 OF 038 
 
 
scarce.  Local credit interest rates for customers range from 
12percent for the most credit worthy to perhaps 90percent per annum 
(or more) for the least.    Foreign investors can easily tap into 
these domestic capital markets;  however, they seldom do, because 
they can do better abroad or better locally by simply taking on an 
equity investor, Mongolian or otherwise. 
 
Equity Markets 
 
Investors do not use stocks to raise equity for investment but to 
gain control of companies listed on the exchange.  As most of the 
firms have been bought up, the market sees little trading. 
 
Mongolian firms do not use shareholding relationships to restrict 
foreign investment at this point.  Part of this arises from lack of 
experience with such devices.  It also arises from the fact that 
Mongolians prefer to concentrate ownership in their own hands, 
rather than disperse it through complicated shareholding 
relationships.  They perceive such devices as weakening their 
ability to control the companies, which is more important than 
safeguarding the firm from foreign or domestic raiders or raising 
capital for investment.  If a foreign company wanted to purchase a 
Mongolian firm, the foreign entity would have to contact the 
shareholders and buy them out.  These could not be hostile 
takeovers, because few outstanding shares remain on the market to 
buy.  Eager to take on equity partners or sell businesses entirely, 
the Mongolians would employ few defenses beyond sharp negotiating. 
 
The current Minerals Law of Mongolia contains a provision that 
requires that holders of mining licenses for projects of strategic 
importance must sell no less than 10percent of the resulting 
entity's shares on the Mongolian Stock Exchange.  Vaguely presented 
in the statute, what this new provision means in practical terms and 
how it is to be implemented has yet to be spelled out in regulation. 
 
 
The Banking Sector 
 
Weakness in Mongolia's banking sector concerns all players, 
including the International Monetary Fund (IMF: http://www.imf.org). 
 Small by American standards, the total assets of Mongolia's 
remaining fourteen (14) commercial banks (down from 16 in 2008) adds 
up to just around USD2 billion.  The system has been through massive 
changes since the Soviet era, during which the banking system was 
divided into several different units.  This early system failed 
through mismanagement and commercial naivety in the mid-90s, but 
over the last decade has become more sophisticated and somewhat 
better managed. 
 
Mongolia has three large, generally well-regarded banks owned 
primarily by Japanese and Mongolian interests respectively.  They 
follow international standards for prudent capital reserve 
requirements, have conservative lending policies, up-to-date banking 
technology, and are generally well managed.  As the global financial 
storm has descended on Mongolia's banking sector, these banks have 
weathered it well - so far. 
 
However, concerns remain among bankers and the sector's observers 
about the effectiveness of Mongolia's legal and regulatory 
environment.  As with many issues in Mongolia, the problem is not 
lack of laws or procedures but the will and capacity of the 
regulator, BOM, to supervise and execute mandated functions, 
particularly in regard to capital reserve requirements and 
non-performing loans. 
 
From 1999 through late 2008, BOM consistently refused to close any 
commercial bank for insolvency or malpractice.   In late 2008, 
Mongol Bank took Mongolia's fourth largest bank into receivership. 
Most deposits were guaranteed and their depositors paid out at a 
cost of around USD 150 million -- not an inconsequential sum in an 
economy with a USD 5 billion per annum GDP.  In 2009, Mongolia's 
fifth largest bank went into receivership, and three (3) other 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  029.2 OF 038 
 
 
mid-tier banks are at the center of widespread discussion of future 
consolidation. 
 
The BOM and Mongolia's financial system have so far endured the 
crisis.  However, most observers note that the insolvent banks had 
shown signs of mismanagement, non-performing loans, and 
ill-liquidity for several years before the BOM moved to safeguard 
depositors and the financial sector.  They argue further that the 
BOM withheld effective supervision fearing that closure would signal 
weakness to, and spur panic among, the general public; and because 
of interference on the part of those whose financial interests in 
the troubled banks would have been threatened by regulatory action. 
 
The latest crisis has spurred the BOM to develop a short run plan to 
identify and close insolvent banks while preserving the integrity of 
financial system.  Reserve requirements will be raised to deal with 
the on-going non-performing loan problem, too.  Beyond this triage, 
the BOM is in the process of instituting long-term reforms to 
enhance its ability to supervise the banking system; however, such 
reform depends on Parliament to amend both Mongolia's banking and 
banking supervision laws, a process that may be completed by 
mid-2010. 
 
A.10 POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
 
Mongolia is peaceful and stable.  Political violence is rare. 
Mongolia has held nine (9) peaceful presidential and parliamentary 
elections in the past 16 years.  However, a brief but violent 
outbreak of civil unrest followed disputed parliamentary elections 
on July 1, 2008.  Accompanied by some property destruction and 
bodily injury, the unrest was quickly contained and order restored. 
There has been no repeat of this civil unrest since July 1. 
Mongolia held peaceful presidential elections in May 2009 in which 
the incumbent president was defeated and power smoothly transitioned 
to the current president 
 
Mongolia has an ethnically homogenous population: 97percent of the 
population is Khalkh Mongol. The largest minority, numbering an 
estimated 90,000 people, is Kazakh (Muslim), concentrated in the far 
western part of the country. 
 
There have been no known incidents of anti-American sentiment or 
politically motivated damage to American projects or installations 
in at least the last decade.  However, Mongolia has seen a gradual 
and perceptible level of rising hostility to foreign nationals in 
general and to Chinese nationals in particular. This hostility has 
led to some instances of improper seizure of Chinese-invested 
property; and in more limited cases acts of physical violence 
against the persons and property of Chinese nationals resident in 
Mongolia.  Other Asians living in Mongolia have expressed concern 
that they may inadvertently become victims of this hostility. 
 
A.11 CORRUPTION 
 
Corruption in Mongolia, including bribery, raises the costs and 
risks of doing business.  Corruption corrodes market opportunities 
in Mongolia for U.S. companies as well as the overall Mongolian 
business climate.  It also deters international investment into 
Mongolia, stifles economic growth and development, distorts prices, 
and undermines the rule of law. 
 
It is important for U.S. companies, irrespective of their size, to 
assess the business climate in Mongolia to have an effective 
compliance program or measures in place to detect and prevent 
corruption, including foreign bribery.  U.S. individuals and firms 
operating or investing in such foreign markets as Mongolia should 
take the time to become familiar with the relevant anticorruption 
laws of both Mongolia and the United States in order to comply with 
them, and where appropriate, they should seek the advice of legal 
counsel. 
 
The U.S. Government seeks to level the global playing field for U.S. 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  030.2 OF 038 
 
 
businesses by encouraging other countries to take steps to 
criminalize their own companies' acts of corruption, including 
bribery of foreign public officials, by requiring them to uphold 
their obligations under relevant international conventions.  A U. S. 
firm that believes a competitor is seeking to use bribery of a 
foreign public official to secure a contract should bring this to 
the attention of appropriate U.S. agencies, as noted below 
 
Current Views on Mongolian Corruption 
 
In mid-2005, the USAID Mission to Mongolia, in collaboration with 
USAID/Washington and The Asia Foundation (TAF), funded a corruption 
assessment conducted by Casals & Associates, Inc. (C&A)  The 
complete report is available at http://www.usaid.gov/mn.  Follow-up 
surveys of the problem show that the results of this assessment 
remain valid in 2010.  The study found that opportunities for 
corruption continue to increase in Mongolia at both the "petty" or 
administrative and "grand" or elite levels.  Both types of 
corruption should be of concern to Mongolians, but grand corruption 
should be considered a more serious one because it solidifies 
linkages between economic and political power that could negatively 
impact or ultimately derail or delay democracy and development. 
Several inter-related factors contribute to Mongolia's corruption 
problem: 
 
--A blurring of the lines between the public and private sector 
brought about by systemic conflicts of interest at nearly all 
levels; 
 
--A lack of transparency and access to information, stemming in part 
from a broad State Secrets Law that surrounds many government 
functions and has yielded criticism that it renders the media 
ineffective and hinders citizen participation in policy discussions 
and government oversight; 
 
--An inadequate civil service system that gives rise to a highly 
politicized public administration and the existence of a "spoils 
system;" 
 
--Limited political will to actually implement required reforms in 
accordance with the law, complicated by conflicting and overlapping 
laws that further inhibit effective policy implementation; 
 
--Weak government control institutions, including the Central Bank, 
National Audit Office, parliamentary standing committees, Prosecutor 
General, Generalized State Inspection Agency, State Property 
Committee, and departments within the Ministry of Finance. 
 
The aforementioned systemic shortcomings have allowed for an 
evolution of corruption in Mongolia that "follows the money," 
meaning that graft on the most significant scales generally occurs 
most often in the industries and sectors where there is the most 
potential for financial gain.  During the early 1990s, in the early 
transition toward democracy and market economy, two areas that 
offered particular opportunities for grand scale corruption at that 
time were foreign donor assistance and privatization of state-owned 
enterprises.  As Mongolia later embarked on further policy changes 
to institutionalize capitalistic practices, corruption reared its 
head in the process of privatizing public land.  As the economy 
continues to develop, emerging areas for corruption include the 
banking and mining sectors.  There also are several areas that 
provide stable and consistent opportunities for corruption, both 
grand and administrative in nature, such as for procurement 
opportunities, issuance of permits and licenses, customs, 
inspections, the justice sector, among high-level elected and 
appointed officials, and in the conduct a variety of day-to-day 
citizen- and business-to-government transactions, notably in 
education, health care, and city services. 
 
Despite the fact that few of the conditions to prevent corruption 
from getting worse are in place, the situation has not reached the 
levels that are evident in many other countries with contexts and 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  031.2 OF 038 
 
 
histories similar to that of Mongolia. Perhaps more importantly, 
there are a number of efforts underway to actively combat 
corruption, including: 
 
--Government commitments to international anti-corruption regimes 
and protocols, such as the Anti-Corruption Plan of the Asian 
Development Bank/Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (ADB/OECD) and the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC); 
 
--Development of a National Program for Combating Corruption and 
formation of a National Council for coordinating the Program and a 
Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Working Group; 
 
--Implementation of an anti-corruption law that has included the 
formation of an independent anti-corruption body; 
 
--Short- and medium-term anti-corruption advocacy and "watchdog" 
programs initiated by civil society organizations, often with 
international donor support. 
 
There is, in fact, time for Mongolians and the international 
community to nurture these efforts and take further action before 
corruption grows too large to rein in.  In general, the main need in 
Mongolia is to develop effective disincentives for corrupt behavior 
at both the administrative and political levels.  In its broadest 
configuration, this implies a strategy of increasing transparency 
and effective citizen oversight, as well as intra-governmental 
checks and balances.  Without these major changes, administrative 
reforms may provide some small improvements, but they are unlikely 
to solve the problem. Specifically, the aforementioned 
USAID-sponsored report of 2005 makes several strategic 
recommendations, which remain relevant in 2010, including: 
 
--Diplomatic engagement focused on keeping anti-corruption issues on 
the policy agenda, promoting implementation of existing laws related 
to anti-corruption, and highlighting the need for further measures 
to promote transparency and improved donor coordination; 
 
--General programmatic recommendations to address conflict of 
interest, transparency/access to information, civil service reforms, 
and the independent anti-corruption body, with a definitive focus on 
engaging civil society and promoting public participation utilizing 
UNCAC as a framework; 
 
--Specific programmatic recommendations to address loci of 
corruption, such as citizen- and business-to-government 
transactions, procurement, privatization, customs, land use, mining, 
banking, the justice sector, and the political and economic elite 
 
In addition, the reputable international anti-corruption NGO 
Transparency International (TI) opened a national chapter in 
Mongolia in 2004 (for more information, see: www.transparency.org). 
U.S. technical advisors are working with TI to train Mongolian staff 
to monitor corruption and to advocate on behalf of anti-corruption 
legislation and, TI first included Mongolia in its annual 
"Perceptions of Corruption" survey in September 2004.  In that 
initial survey, Mongolia ranked 85 out of 145 countries and its 
score of 3 on the Corruption Perception Index was "poor." (TI's CPI 
Score relates to "perceptions" of the degree of corruption as seen 
by business people and country analysts and ranges between 10 
(highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). TI's 2005 Survey ranked 
Mongolia 85 out 158; and again Mongolia earned a "poor" score of 3. 
In TI's 2006 survey, Mongolia had dropped to 99 out of 163 
countries, receiving a score of 2.8-poor.  In 2007, Mongolia was 
still 99 but out of 179 nations and had achieved a score of 3.0, a 
slight uptick but still poor.  2008 saw Mongolia drop to 102 out 180 
nations, maintaining its poor score of 3.  2009 found Mongolia 
dropping to 124 out of 180 nations, and declining to a poorer score 
of 2.7, In short, Mongolia has declined. 
 
One factor raising concerns about Mongolia's commitment to fight 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  032.2 OF 038 
 
 
corruption is the series of amnesties granted to Mongolians found 
guilty of corruption or those under investigation for abuses.  These 
amnesties happen about every three years, usually through 
presidential legislative action, with the most recent occurring in 
late 2009.  Because they allow corrupt officials and those who 
enable them to avoid substantial prison time and fines for their 
improper acts, these amnesties are demoralizing for the IAAC and the 
public, who question the value of tackling corruption with a 
government lacking the will to hold malefactors to account. 
 
Current Anti-Corruption Law 
 
In 2006, Parliament passed an Anti-Corruption Law (ACL), a 
significant milestone in Mongolia's efforts against corruption.  The 
legislation had been under consideration since 1999. 
The ACL created an independent investigative body, the Independent 
Authority Against Corruption (IAAC).  The IAAC has four sections. 
The Prevention and Education Section works to prevent corruption and 
educate the public on anti-corruption legal requirements. The 
Investigation Section receives corruption cases and executes 
investigations. The third section collects, checks, and analyzes the 
legally required property and income statements of government 
officials.   The fourth section, the IAAC's Secretariat, handle s 
administrative tasks.  The IAAC formally began operations in August 
¶2007.  (For a review of  the IAAC's activities from its inception 
through late 2008 and a general assessment of the public's current 
views of corruption in Mongolia see the series of Mongolia 
Corruption Benchmarking Surveys prepared for USAID Mongolia: 
http://www.usaid.gov/mn;  and by The Asia Foundation Mongolia: 
http://asiafoundation.org 
 
Anti-Corruption Resources Available to U.S. Citizens about the 
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: In 1977, the United States 
enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), which makes it 
unlawful for a U.S. person, and certain foreign issuers of 
securities, to make a corrupt payment to foreign public officials 
for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business for or with, or 
directing business to, any person. The FCPA also applies to foreign 
firms and persons who take any act in furtherance of such a corrupt 
payment while in the United States. For more detailed information on 
the FCPA, see the FCPA Lay-Person's Guide at: 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal 
 
Guidance on the U.S. FCPA: The Department of Justice's (DOJ) FCPA 
Opinion Procedure enables U.S. firms and individuals to request a 
statement of the Justice Department's present enforcement intentions 
under the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA regarding any proposed 
business conduct.  The details of the opinion procedure are 
available on DOJ's Fraud Section Website at 
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa. Although the Department of 
Commerce has no enforcement role with respect to the FCPA, it 
supplies general guidance to U.S. exporters who have questions about 
the FCPA and about international developments concerning the FCPA. 
For further information, see the Office of the Chief Counsel for 
International Counsel, U.S. Department of Commerce, Website, at 
http://www.ogc.doc.gov.  More general information on the FCPA is 
available at the Websites listed below. 
 
Other Assistance for U.S. Businesses: The U.S. Department of 
Commerce offers several services to aid U.S. businesses seeking to 
address business-related corruption issues.  For example, the U.S. 
and Foreign Commercial Service can provide services that may assist 
U.S. companies in conducting their due diligence as part of the 
company's overarching compliance program when choosing business 
partners or agents overseas.  The U.S. Foreign and Commercial 
Service can be reached directly through its offices in every major 
U.S. and foreign city, or through its Website at www.trade.gov/cs. 
 
 
The Departments of Commerce and State provide worldwide support for 
qualified U.S. companies bidding on foreign government contracts 
through the Commerce Department's Advocacy Center and State's Office 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  033.2 OF 038 
 
 
of Commercial and Business Affairs.  Problems, including alleged 
corruption by foreign governments or competitors, encountered by 
U.S. companies in seeking such foreign business opportunities can be 
brought to the attention of appropriate U.S. government officials, 
including local embassy personnel and through the Department of 
Commerce Trade Compliance Center "Report A Trade Barrier" Website at 
tcc.export.gov/Report_a_Barrier/index.asp. 
 
Exporters and investors should be aware that generally all countries 
prohibit the bribery of their public officials, and prohibit their 
officials from soliciting bribes under domestic laws.   Most 
countries are required to criminalize such bribery and other acts of 
corruption by virtue of being parties to various international 
conventions discussed above. 
 
Other Instruments: It is U.S. Government policy to promote good 
governance, including host country implementation and enforcement of 
anti-corruption laws and policies pursuant to their obligations 
under international agreements. Since enactment of the FCPA, the 
United States has been instrumental to the expansion of the 
international framework to fight corruption.  Several significant 
components of this framework are the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (OECD Antibribery Convention), the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption (UN Convention), the Inter-American 
Convention against Corruption (OAS Convention), the Council of 
Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions, and a growing list of 
U.S. free trade agreements.  Mongolia is party to the UN Convention 
Against Corruption and prohibits the bribery and solicitation of its 
public officials. 
 
OECD Antibribery Convention: The OECD Antibribery Convention entered 
into force in February 1999.  As of December 2009, 38 nations are 
party to it, including the United States (see http://www.oecd.org). 
Major exporters China, India, and Russia are not parties, although 
the U.S. Government strongly endorses their eventual accession to 
the Convention.  The Convention obligates the Parties to criminalize 
bribery of foreign public officials in the conduct of international 
business. The United States meets its international obligations 
under the OECD Antibribery Convention through the U.S. FCPA. 
Mongolia is not a party to the OECD Antibribary convention. 
 
UN Convention: The UN Anticorruption Convention entered into force 
on December 14, 2005, and there are 143 parties to it as of December 
¶2009. The UN Convention is the first global comprehensive 
international anticorruption agreement.  The UN Convention requires 
countries to establish criminal and other offences to cover a wide 
range of acts of corruption.  The UN Convention goes beyond previous 
anticorruption instruments, covering a broad range of issues ranging 
from basic forms of corruption such as bribery and solicitation, 
embezzlement, trading in influence to the concealment and laundering 
of the proceeds of corruption.  The Convention contains 
transnational business bribery provisions that are functionally 
similar to those in the OECD Antibribery Convention and contains 
provisions on private sector auditing and books and records 
requirements.  Other provisions address matters such as prevention, 
international cooperation, and asset recovery.  Mongolia is a member 
of the UN Convention Against Corruption. 
 
Local Laws: U.S. firms should familiarize themselves with local 
anticorruption laws, and, where appropriate, seek legal counsel. 
While the U.S. Department of Commerce cannot provide legal advice on 
local laws, the Department's U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service can 
provide assistance with navigating the host country's legal system 
and obtaining a list of local legal counsel. 
 
Anti-Corruption Resources: Documents and Contacts 
 
Resources for combating corruption in global markets include the 
following: 
 
--Information about the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  034.2 OF 038 
 
 
including a "Lay-Person's Guide to the FCPA" is available at the 
U.S. Department of Justice's Website at: 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa. 
 
--Information about the OECD Antibribery Convention including links 
to national implementing legislation and monitoring reports is 
available at: http://www.oecd.org.  See also new Antibribery 
Recommendation and Good Practice Guidance Annex for companies: 
http://www.oecd.org 
 
For general information about anticorruption initiatives, such as 
the OECD Convention and the FCPA, including translations of the 
statute into several languages, go to the Department of Commerce 
Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce at: 
http://www.ogc.doc.gov. 
 
--Transparency International (TI) publishes an annual Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI).  The CPI measures the perceived level of 
public-sector corruption in 180 countries and territories around the 
world.  CPI is available at: http://www.transparency.org.  TI also 
publishes an annual Global Corruption Report which provides a 
systematic evaluation of the state of corruption around the world. 
It includes an in-depth analysis of a focal theme, a series of 
country reports that document major corruption related events and 
developments from all continents and an overview of the latest 
research findings on anti-corruption diagnostics and tools.  See 
http://www.transparency.org. 
 
--The World Bank Institute publishes Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI),which six dimensions of governance in 212 countries, including 
Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law 
and Control of Corruption.  See http://info.worldbank.org.   The 
World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys 
may also be of interest and are available at: 
http://go.worldbank.org. 
 
--The World Economic Forum publishes the Global Enabling Trade 
Report that assesses both border administration transparency 
(focused on bribe payments and corruption) and corruption and the 
regulatory environment: http://www.weforum.org 
 
--For additional information on corruption see the U.S. State 
Department's annual Human Rights Report at http://www.state.gov. 
--Global Integrity, a nonprofit organization, publishes its annual 
Global Integrity Report, which provides indicators for 92 countries 
with respect to governance and anti-corruption. The report 
highlights the strengths and weaknesses of national level 
anti-corruption systems. The report is available at: 
http://report.globalintegrity.org/ 
 
A.12 BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 
 
(NOTE: Table of bi-lateral investment agreements entered into by 
Mongolia deleted due to requirements of cable format. END NOTE.) 
 
Taxation issues of Concern to American Investors 
 
Taxation remains a key concern for Americans, other foreign 
investors, and Mongolian domestic investors and businesses.  2009 
saw some changes in the Mongolian tax system, most of which, with 
the exception of the revocation of the value-added tax exemption for 
mining equipment,  were greeted positively by most foreign and 
domestic investor in Mongolia.  Observers noted that recent 
experience with tax-code revisions does suggest that both the GOM 
and Parliament are amenable to revising legislation if the economic 
benefits to the state, the public, and investors can be proven. 
 
Windfall Profits Tax on Copper and Gold Sunsets in 2011 
 
Since passage in 2006, the Windfall Profits Tax Law has generated 
criticism regarding the depth of the GOM's commitment to creating an 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  035.2 OF 038 
 
 
open, predictable, and fair environment for foreign direct 
investment.  The speedy legislative process for passing the WPT was 
unprecedented.  This bill was passed in six days without any 
consultation with outside stakeholders on any its provisions.  The 
entire process raised concerns among investors about the stability 
and transparency of Mongolia's legislative and regulatory 
environment, which intervening years and experience with other 
non-transparently passed legislation did little to alleviate. 
 
The WPT imposes a 68percent tax on the profits from gold and copper 
mining respectively, and for gold originally kicked in when gold the 
price for gold hit USD500 per ounce; however, in late 2008 
Parliament raised the threshold to USD850.   For copper, the 
threshold is USD 2,600 per ton.  Mining industry sources claim that 
the 68percent tax rate, when combined with other Mongolian taxes, 
makes the effective tax 100percent on all proceeds above the copper 
threshold price. 
 
The recent Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement entailed further 
amendment to the WPT as a condition precedent to its passage.  OT's 
private investors successfully argued that they would not be able to 
run a commercially viable OT operation when faced with the WPT. 
Consequently, the Parliament agreed to amend the WPT Law: The WPT 
will officially end for all copper concentrate and gold products in 
¶2011. 
 
Revisions of the Mongolian Tax Code 
 
Effective since January 1, 2007 the current tax code reduces tax 
rates, flattens the tax schedule, removes discriminatory loopholes 
and exemptions, and introduces appropriate deduction opportunities 
for corporate investment.  The current law allows firms to deduct 
more types of legitimate business expenditures: training, business 
travel, cafeteria expenses, etc.  The current law levels the playing 
field between foreign and domestic investors, eliminating the 
majority of discriminatory tax exemptions and holidays, most of 
which favored international investors. 
 
2009 changes into the tax code's treatment of exemptions present 
something of a mixed bag for investors.  On the down side, 
Mongolia's Parliament revoked an exemption available on value-added 
tax (VAT) taxes of 10percent on equipment used to bring a given mine 
into production.  Most jurisdictions, recognizing that most mines 
have long development lead times before production begins, either 
waive or do not tax such imports at all.  Parliament, with no 
consultation with investors, international advisors provided by 
donor organizations, or even of its own tax officials, chose to 
impose the VAT,  which immediately makes Mongolian mining costs 
10percent higher than they would otherwise be, impairing 
competitiveness and dramatically varying from global practice. 
 
On the plus side, Parliament revised loss-carry forward provisions, 
extending from two (2) years to eight (8) years the ability to 
deduct losses from taxes after incurring a loss.  Like the revision 
of the WPT, this change is also a condition precedent of passing the 
OT Agreement.  Most investors find eight years sufficient for many 
Mongolian investments that require impose long, expensive 
development horizons before producing any sort of profit. 
 
Unfinished Taxation Business: Improving Institutions and Practices 
 
As reported in the 2009 Investment Climate Statement and Country 
Commercial Guide, both the GOM and Parliament has been intending to 
take up additional tax reform measures since 2007 but have made no 
substantive progress since promising additional reforms.  These 
measures include revisions to the law on customs and customs 
tariffs.  While the exact nature of the proposed changes to the 
customs law remains murky, the GOM states that changes will be 
consistent with Mongolia's WTO obligations and best practices. 
 
Despite overall solid, positive changes, international financial 
institutions warn that tax reforms by themselves are insufficient to 
 
ULAANBAATA 00000016  036.2 OF 038 
 
 
improve Mongolia's business environment.  They report that reform 
must go beyond changes to the tax code to restructure the operations 
of the key agencies - the tax department, the customs administration 
and the inspections agency - that directly interact with private 
firms and individuals. 
 
Specifically, tax authorities charged with enforcing the tax codes 
require a more customer-based approach to dealing with their 
business clientele and a more detailed and rigorously enforced 
regulatory framework under which to audit company accounts.  Many 
foreign and domestic investors argue that the lack of such a clear, 
implementable code of ethics and enforceable set of guidelines leads 
to arbitrary, capricious, or predatory tax audits. 
 
A.13 OPIC AND OTHER INVESTMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS 
 
The U.S. government's Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC: 
(www.opic.gov) offers loans and political risk insurance to American 
investors involved in most sectors of the Mongolian economy. 
 
The U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIM: www.exim.gov)offers programs in 
Mongolia for short-, medium-, and long-term transactions in the 
public sector and for short- and medium-term transactions in the 
private sector. 
 
Mongolia is a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA: www.miga.org). 
 
¶A. 14 LABOR 
 
Mongolia's labor pool is generally well educated, relatively young, 
and adaptable, but shortages exist in most professional categories 
requiring advanced degrees or training. Only time and investment in 
education and training will remedy this deficit of trained skilled 
labor.  Unskilled labor is sufficiently available.  Shortages exist 
in both vocational and professional categories because Mongolians 
who obtain such skills frequently go abroad to find higher wages. 
Foreign-invested companies are dealing with this situation by 
providing in-country training to their staffs, raising salaries to 
retain employees, or hiring expatriate workers to provide skills and 
expertise unavailable in the local market. In addition, the USG 
funded Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is underwriting a 
five-year training and vocational education program (TVET) to 
develop sustainable programs to help Mongolia meet its needs for 
skilled blue- collar workers (http://www.mca.mn or 
http://www.mcc.gov). 
 
Mongolian labor law is not particularly restrictive.  Investors can 
locate and hire workers without using hiring agencies -- as long as 
hiring practices are consistent with Mongolian Labor Law.  However, 
Mongolian law requires companies to employ Mongolian workers in 
certain labor categories whenever a Mongolian can perform the task 
as well as a foreigner.  This law generally applies to unskilled 
labor categories and not areas where a high degree of technical 
expertise nonexistent in Mongolia is required.  The law does provide 
an escape hatch for all employers.  Should an employer seek to hire 
a non-Mongolian laborer and cannot obtain a waiver from the Ministry 
of Labor for that employee, the employer can pay a fee of USD 140.00 
per employee per month.  Depending on a project's importance, the 
Ministry of Labor can exempt employers from 50percent of the waiver 
fees per worker. 
 
Foreign and domestic investors consistently argue that they bear too 
much of the social security costs for each domestic and foreign hire 
under the amended 2008 Social Insurance Law enacted in July 2008. 
Foreign employees became liable for social insurance taxes if they 
reside within Mongolia for 181 days within a 365 day period.  Under 
this law, foreign and domestic workers pay up to 108,000 tugrik per 
month (USD 74) for this tax, no matter their respective rates of 
pay.  Employers must pay a tax equivalent to 13percent of the annual 
wage on both domestic and foreign workers.  Given that state 
pensions have yet to broach even USD 100, employers argue that 
 
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pensions are not commensurate with worker contributions, especially 
those of highly-paid ex-patriot employees.  In addition, workers 
must pay in for twenty years in order to be vested, highly unlikely 
for many ex-patriot employees, who reside in Mongolia for less than 
three years on average.  Local and foreign business associations are 
attempting to work with both the government and Parliament to 
address these perceived inequalities. 
 
ILO conventions 
 
Mongolia has ratified 15 ILO conventions (http://www.ilo.org) (NOTE: 
Table of ILO conventions ratified by Mongolia deleted due to 
requirements of cable format. END NOTE.) 
 
¶A. 15 FOREIGN TRADE ZONES/FREE PORTS 
 
The Mongolian government launched its free trade zone (FTZ) program 
in 2004. Currently there are two FTZ areas located along the 
Mongolia spur of the trans-Siberian highway: one in the north at the 
Russia-Mongolia border town of Altanbulag and the other in the south 
at the Chinese-Mongolia border at the town of Zamyn-Uud.  Both FTZs 
are inactive, with no development at either site.  The port of entry 
of Tsagaan Nuur in Bayan-Olgii province is being considered as the 
site of a third FTZ. 
 
Management for the Zamyn-Uud Free Trade Zone (ZUFTZ) was originally 
tendered to a Chinese firm.  In 2006, the GOM voided the agreement 
for non-compliance with the terms of the tender.  The GOM 
re-tendered the management contract in 2006, but later voided that 
contract, alleging that the current holder of the management rights 
in the ZUFTZ had failed to live up to the terms of the tender. 
 
So far, there are no indications that government will not keep 
promises to open the zone to any who satisfy the relevant legal 
requirements.  However, there are concerns about the Mongolian free 
trade zones in general and Zamyn-Uud in particular.  In April 2004, 
the USAID sponsored Economic Policy Reform and Competitiveness 
Project (EPRC: http://www.eprc-chemonics.biz/) made the following 
observations of Mongolia's FTZ Program.  In 2010, these issues 
remain concerns: 
 
--Benchmarking of Mongolia's FTZ Program against current successful 
international practices shows deficiencies in the legal and 
regulatory framework as well as in the process being followed to 
establish FTZs in the country. 
 
--Lack of implementing regulations and procedural definitions 
encapsulated in transparency and predictability quotient required to 
implement key international best practices. 
 
--A process of due diligence, including a cost-benefit analysis, has 
not been completed for the proposed Zamyn-Uud FTZ. 
 
--Identifiable funding is not in place to meet off-site 
infrastructure requirements for Zamyn-Uud and Altanbulag sites. 
 
--Deviations from international best practices in the process of 
launching FTZs risks repeating mistakes made in other countries and 
may lead to "hidden costs" or the provision of subsidies that the 
government of Mongolia did not foresee or which will have to granted 
at the expense of other high priority needs. 
 
¶A. 16 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STATISTICS: 
 
The Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency (FIFTA) provides 
most of the data for tracking FDI in Mongolia.  However, the data 
has limitations: 
 
Incomplete reporting 
 
Many foreign firms provide FIFTA with inaccurate or incomplete data 
on their annual investment amounts.  FIFTA's registration regime 
 
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requires companies to document business plans and total FDI for the 
coming year.  FIFTA uses these amounts to determine FDI for the 
year.  However, firms reportedly believe FIFTA may not be able to 
guarantee the confidentiality of proprietary business information, 
and so they withhold complete data on their actual activities. 
 
Mongolia suffers from promised investment that never materializes or 
which comes in at a lower level than originally stated.  FIFTA does 
not update reports to account for these or other changes to 
investments during the year. (See Chapter 6, Section A.5: 
Performance Requirements and Incentives). 
 
Many of Mongolia's largest foreign- owned or foreign-invested 
entities are in the mining sector, which because of a quirk of the 
current Minerals Law of Mongolia are not necessarily defined as 
foreign-invested firms.  The current minerals law specifies that 
only domestically registered mining firms can have mining licenses 
registered in their names, which means that foreign investments 
associated with mining may not be recorded by FIFTA, even though the 
investment is demonstrably foreign.  For example, the investment by 
Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia (a Canadian company) into Mongolia has 
reached nearly USD 1 billion, yet this investment is not recorded 
among the data provided by FIFTA. 
 
Data not Available 
 
Neither FIFTA nor any other Mongolian agency to our knowledge tracks 
Mongolia's direct investment abroad. 
 
(NOTE: Mongolian FDI statistics deleted due to requirements of cable 
format. END NOTE.)