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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHSI #0125/01 0291437
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P 291437Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2782
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0354
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4986
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000125 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS EAID RS GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA APPROVES STATE STRATEGY ON OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES 
 
REF: A. 09 TBILISI 2204 
     ¶B. BASS-KAIDANOW EMAILS 12/21/09 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bass for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The Government of Georgia approved the 
"State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through 
Collaboration" on January 27.  The strategy presents the 
government's vision for engaging the disputed territories of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and preventing their isolation. 
State Minister of Reintegration Temuri Yakobashvili 
coordinated his efforts on the strategy with international 
partners, including the United States, who provided 
suggestions at several stages during the drafting of the 
document.  The government now plans to focus on the 
development of an Action Plan for implementation of the 
strategy, which the Georgians expect to take approximately 
six months.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment.  The final version of the strategy does 
incorporate a number of the Quad's suggestions and is a 
considerable improvement over earlier drafts (reftels).  It 
begins with a positive vision for Georgia's future and 
emphasizes Georgia's commitment to the non-use of force to 
reintegrate the territories up front in the preamble.  The 
strategy also acknowledges past mistakes made by all parties 
and the resulting suffering of the civilian population on all 
sides.  While contentious phrases still remain in the 
document, the language overall reflects the most 
forward-leaning step toward the separatist regions that we 
have seen from this government. 
 
¶3. (C) Several concerns remain, however.  While the current 
status review section, which details Georgia's version of the 
history of the conflict, was shortened and revised to present 
more factual circumstances, the very existence of such a 
section may be viewed as provocative and may shift discussion 
of the strategy aay from the future and back to the past. 
In addition, in a section on human rights, the ethnic 
cleansing of ethnic Georgians is singled out as a focus of 
special concern, undermining the claim made in the document 
of equal treatment. The final version also includes a 
glossary, not seen in earlier drafts, which uses 
controversial and non-neutral language, clearly intended to 
appease some government hardliners.  End comment. 
 
GOVERNMENT APPROVES AND PRESENTS STRATEGY 
 
¶4. (C) On January 27, the Government of Georgia announced its 
approval of the "State Strategy on Occupied Territories: 
Engagement Through Collaboration."  In statements to the 
press, Yakobashvili said the strategy outlines peaceful 
measures for the de-occupation of the separatist regions, IDP 
return and safety and the restoration of territorial 
integrity.  He added that "we are saying no to the isolation 
of the populations in the breakaway regions...We will ensure 
conditions for their education, healthcare, cultural and 
economic development....A neutral status working group will 
be formed and headed by an international organization to 
coordinate the strategy."  According to the government, the 
strategy will be presented to the international community, 
first to the Council of Europe, as well as to OSCE, the UN 
and the EU.  Yakobashvili told the Ambassador that now that 
the strategy is in place, we can begin to plan projects, even 
without an Action Plan.  The document is available publicly 
on www.smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/SRM-Strategy-en.p df. 
Qon www.smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/SRM-Strategy-en.p df. 
 
YAKOBASHVILI TRIES TO DEFLECT HARD-LINERS 
 
¶5. (C) Yakobashvili told the Ambassador that during 
discussions with the government, he was surprised at some of 
the wild suggestions he received from hard-liner colleagues, 
such as that the text should refer to the de facto 
authorities as "puppet regimes."  The addition of a glossary, 
which incorporates some of the suggestions the Ministry 
received from the government, was included as a way to pacify 
these colleagues while avoiding the use of potentially 
controversial language in the text of the strategy itself. 
 
COORDINATION WITH THE ABKHAZ? 
 
¶6. (C) Yakobashvili speculated that, although Abkhaz de facto 
"minister of foreign affairs" Sergey Shamba may feel 
constrained in his public comments about the strategy at 
first -- especially right now when he is seeking the de facto 
"prime minister" position -- Shamba can nevertheless accept 
much of the strategy in the long term.  Yakobashvili 
indicated that he has been in close contact with the Abkhaz 
 
TBILISI 00000125  002 OF 002 
 
 
de facto authorities, primarily Shamba, during the 
preparation of the strategy, who have reacted positively in 
particular to some of the concrete proposals in the strategy. 
 
THOUGHTS ON IMPLEMENTATION 
 
¶7. (C) According to Yakobashvili, a major challenge now will 
be organizing implementing mechanisms.  The Ministry will 
form working groups to address different elements of the Plan 
and Ministry officials plan to travel extensively during the 
next several months to gather suggestions from around the 
world.  Yakobashvili is currently leaning toward UNDP as an 
umbrella organization for implementation; while they would 
not necessarily implement projects, they could provide 
transportation and other logistical suggestions.  The Abkhaz 
de facto authorities proposed a "Commission for Humanitarian 
Programs" under the Geneva process to oversee activities. 
While the Georgians do not necessarily object to such a 
formulation, they do not like the idea of putting this under 
Geneva, which would inject the Russians into the process. 
BASS