VZCZCXRO0376
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHNT #0045/01 0281324
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281324Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1801
INFO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/CDR USTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TASHKENT 000045 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/28 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UZ
SUBJECT: Uzbek Deputy FM Kamilov Urges Progress in Key Areas 
 
REF: TASHKENT 19; TASHKENT 43 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Nicholas Berliner, Pol-Econ Chief; REASON: 1.4(A), 
(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador paid a courtesy call on newly-installed 
First Deputy Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov on January 28. 
Kamilov assessed the climate in the bilateral relationship as very 
favorable, noting a recent decree from President Karimov on 
strengthening relations with the U.S. that had been sent to all GOU 
ministries.  He stressed the importance of moving quickly on 
getting the Special Working Group (SWG) to Tashkent to follow up on 
Uzbekistan's request for "military-technical assistance," which the 
GOU believes to be firmly in Washington's court at this time. 
Kamilov also reiterated the GOU's strong interest in having 
Secretary Clinton visit Uzbekistan, this time noting that the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Uzbekistan chairs 
this year and whose summit will be held in Tashkent in June, would 
agree to accept the U.S. as an observer, but that China and Russia 
would only acquiesce to U.S. participation at the ministerial 
level.  Kamilov also made a plea for swift agrement for his 
replacement as Ambassador to the U.S., Ilkhamdjan Nematov.  The 
Ambassador told Kamilov that the U.S. would follow up quickly on 
these issues and noted the opportunities presented by President 
Karimov's speech to Parliament (Ref B), particularly in the area of 
supporting independent journalism in Uzbekistan amidst renewed 
pressure on the media. End Summary. 
 
 
 
Special Working Group 
 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) First Deputy Foreign Minister Kamilov assumed his new duties 
on Jan. 27, following his return from Washington after six years as 
Ambassador.  He stressed that the U.S. Ambassador's was the first 
courtesy call he received.  The U.S. and Uzbekistan are "at a good 
stage in relations" that has been marked by "strengthening mutual 
trust," he observed.  He noted that President Karimov had recently 
instructed all agencies of the Government to strengthen cooperation 
with the U.S. in accordance with the goals identified by the GOU 
for the ABC process (Ref A) and that he had made extensive 
reference to the U.S. during his speech to the opening session of 
the Parliament on January 27 (Ref B).  The task before us now, said 
Kamilov, is to keep the momentum going to produce results. 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) In that vein, Kamilov stressed the importance of following 
through on President Karimov's request of last August to General 
Petraeus for enhanced "military-technical cooperation."  He said 
that the GOU is ready to receive the Special Working Group (SWG) 
and is only waiting for the U.S. side to communicate the dates. 
Kamilov reiterated the GOU's expectation that the SWG be able to 
engage at the expert level and that the visit be more than a simple 
exchange of views.  The Ambassador said that the U.S. envisioned 
the SWG as a thorough needs assessment that would be carried out in 
close cooperation with the GOU, a view with which Kamilov seemed to 
concur. 
 
 
 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Raising the subject of U.S. participation in the SCO Summit 
in Tashkent in June (Uzbekistan chairs the SCO this year), Kamilov 
said that most SCO member states were amenable to this. However, 
China and Russia remained skeptical and insisted that such 
participation would only be acceptable at the ministerial level, 
with the participation of the Secretary. Kamilov urged the U.S. to 
consider having the Secretary come to Tashkent, noting that this 
would be an important opportunity to establish contact with the SCO 
(as well as accomplish a GOU goal of hosting a high-level American 
visitor).  He noted that, in the years following the SCO's 
establishment, Uzbekistan shared information about the 
organization's workings and coordinated positions to temper 
anti-American initiatives put forward by China and Russia.  In 
addition to the Secretary's participation, Kamilov said that 
Uzbekistan would need to communicate to Russia and China what 
issues the U.S. would raise at an SCO meeting. 
 
TASHKENT 00000045  002 OF 002 
 
 
Other Issues 
 
------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Agrement - Kamilov requested that the Department respond 
quickly to the GOU request for agrement for his replacement as 
Ambassador in Washington, Ilkhamdjan Nematov. The Ambassador said 
that he believed a response would be forthcoming shortly. 
 
 
 
Congressional Visit - Before leaving Washington, Kamilov said that 
Congressman Faleomavaega, as head of the Central Asian Caucus, had 
agreed to visit Uzbekistan again in February, although he did not 
have firm dates. 
 
 
 
American Educational Institutions - Kamilov made a plea for help in 
having a U.S. university open a branch in Uzbekistan, noting that 
as Foreign Minister, he had worked to bring the U.K.'s Westminster 
University to Uzbekistan. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) The Ambassador cited President Karimov's speech to 
Parliament on January 27 (Ref B) as an opening for deeper 
cooperation in a number of areas, including parliamentary 
exchanges, Afghanistan (where Karimov again reiterated the 
importance of involving the neighbors), and reinforcing 
journalistic independence in the face of mounting pressure on the 
media.  He noted that the ABCs provided a good framework for 
working together to advance this goal. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) Kamilov's return to Tashkent is another positive development 
in the bilateral relationship.  He is a familiar and trusted 
interlocutor who understands Washington.  At the same time, 
President Karimov has given the signal to his government to move 
the ABC agenda forward and he will expect results.  Having the SWG 
visit Tashkent as soon as possible is critical in this regard, as 
"military-technical cooperation" is one of the signals the GOU is 
looking for to assess U.S. sincerity.  The Uzbeks believe that they 
have given a lot in terms of support for Afghanistan.  They know we 
are concerned about human rights and are willing to channel these 
concerns into a substantive dialogue through the ABC process.  As 
we prepare to ask for further enhancements to NDN, we must first 
demonstrate that we can deliver the goods in the military-technical 
area.  This will require not only the immediate visit of the SWG, 
but a clear commitment to pursue the necessary engagement with 
Congress to facilitate the delivery to Uzbekistan of some sort of 
military equipment.  Follow through in this area, together with 
high-level Washington engagement, is necessary to secure expanded 
Uzbek cooperation and support on Afghanistan and NDN. 
NORLAND