VZCZCXRO9628
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DE RUEHC #8267/01 0271739
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 271731Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 7037
INFO RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 7152
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DTRA DULLES WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD// PRIORITY
CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 008267 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/15 
TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE OSCE NATO
SUBJECT: CFE/HLTF: GUIDANCE FOR JANUARY 28, 2010 HLTF 
AND RELATED MEETINGS 
 
REF: (A) USNATO 522: NOVEMBER 5 HLTF MEETING, (B) USNATO 
595: NATO-RUSSIA: SYG'S TRIP TO MOSCOW, (C) 
09MOSCOW3139:  EUR/RPM DIRECTOR TURNER DEC 16-18 MOSCOW 
VISIT, (D) STATE 127435: GUIDANCE ON RUSSIA'S DRAFT 
TREATY GOVERNING RELATIONS AMONG NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL 
MEMBER STATES 
 
Classified By: Richard A. Davis, VCI/CCA Director, for 
reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Allies reaffirmed in the December 2009 NATO 
Ministerial Statement their commitment to CFE as stated 
in the Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, confirmed a 
readiness to intensify efforts in 2010 to find a way 
forward on CFE, and noted it could be difficult to 
continue providing CFE information to Russia in the 
future if Russia's "suspension" continues.  Discussion 
at the January 28 High Level Task Force (HLTF) meeting 
will center on the need to intensify engagement with 
Russia on CFE, especially in the context of Russia's 
recently tabled proposals on a European Security Treaty 
and NATO-Russia Treaty.  Allies will look to the U.S. 
for ideas on how to move beyond the CFE impasse as we 
develop a unified approach on the broader Russian 
proposals in preparing for a NATO Summit, a possible 
NATO-Russia Summit and possibly an OSCE Summit 
anticipated in late 2010. 
 
¶2. (C) U.S. goals for the January 28, 2010 HLTF and 
associated meetings are as follows: 
 
- Stress that our focus in 2010 as we intensify efforts 
to find a way forward on CFE is to change the current 
dynamic with Russia without compromising NATO unity.  We 
do not want to enable Russia to exploit differences. 
 
- Emphasize the need to consider the way forward on CFE 
in light of other elements of the European security 
dynamic, including Russia's proposals for European 
Security and NATO-Russia Treaties, and the facts on the 
ground; seek Allied thinking on how these issues 
intersect and what a useful fruitful path forward might 
be. 
 
- Seek Allied views on next steps on resolving the CFE 
impasse while reinforcing the need for unity based on 
close consultations and aimed at moving toward a 
comprehensive solution. 
 
- Express support for continuing with the NATO CFE 
inspection plan and raising Russia's refusals in the 
Joint Consultative Group (JCG) stressing the negative 
impact of Russia's actions on the CFE regime and 
European security as a whole. 
 
- - - - - - 
Background 
- - - - - - 
 
¶3. (C) Since the last HLTF in November, Allies have 
continued to indicate strong interest in intensifying 
efforts to find a solution to the impasse on CFE. 
Allies share our dissatisfaction with the lack of 
progress on finding a solution on CFE to date, but some 
are concerned that any hasty shifts in the Alliance 
approach or new CFE initiatives could compromise NATO's 
principled positions and divide the Alliance.  Some 
Allies are not prepared to show additional flexibility 
to reach a CFE deal until Russia shows some willingness 
to compromise.  At the same time, there are some - 
Germany stands out - interested in seeing movement 
toward a solution in the near term.  It is unlikely 
Germany will press for action at this HLTF, although the 
German rep may lean further forward during pre-HLTF quad 
discussions. 
 
STATE 00008267  002 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) Engagement with Russia on CFE has been limited 
in recent months.  The NATO Secretary General's mid- 
December trip to Moscow (ref B) included discussion of 
Russia's proposal to define "substantial combat forces" 
in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) as well as some 
discussion on CFE.  FM Lavrov noted Russia has long 
sought to define "substantial combat forces" and 
expressed Russia's readiness to renew CFE negotiations 
on the package approach while stressing Russia was not 
considering resuming implementation of CFE at present. 
The International Staff intends to raise SYG Rasmussen's 
trip report for discussion in the HLTF and note the 
possibility that Russia's push to define "substantial 
combat forces" in the NRC is a concrete proposal that 
signals Russian interest in forward movement on CFE and 
deserves serious attention. 
 
¶5. (C) Alliance unity on CFE remains a priority for the 
United States.  We want to have an open discussion with 
Allies in seeking ideas on how to change the dynamic on 
CFE with Russia while maintaining unity and achieving a 
comprehensive solution that addresses the security 
interests of all CFE States Parties.  As we start 
exploring ideas and finding common ground on a way 
forward, the U.S. should try to temper any sense of 
urgency to respond to Russia's proposals without well- 
considered positions that lead us toward a solution, and 
continue to emphasize the need for a unified approach on 
CFE issues.   Allies may have heard about the 
appointment of a senior U.S. official dedicated to the 
CFE issue and will be very interested in any details, as 
well as any updates on START follow on negotiations. 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Talking points: 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶6. (SBU) U.S. Del should draw from the following points 
in discussions on the way forward on CFE: 
 
-- As we consider the way forward on CFE we believe we 
need to view next steps in light of our overall European 
security agenda this year, culminating in the Lisbon 
summit in November.  Secretary Clinton intends to give a 
major speech on European security tomorrow in Paris to 
frame U.S. thinking on work this year, and the enduring 
principles and goals we share. 
 
--Clearly, we need to do some thinking on how we move 
ahead on CFE, but we cannot sacrifice our unity or the 
underlying principles of sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, host nation consent and transparency.  At the 
same time, we need an approach that takes into account 
other elements of the European security dynamic, 
including Russia's proposals for European Security and 
NATO-Russia Treaties, and the facts on the ground.  The 
constructive engagement of Russia will facilitate 
greater European security.  We must calibrate our way 
forward on CFE and our response to Russia's EST and 
NATO-Russia Treaty proposals to encourage Russia to be a 
responsible stakeholder in European stability and 
security rather than a destructive outsider. 
 
-       (If asked whether the U.S. is abandoning the 
Parallel Actions Package supported by all Allies): 
The Parallel Actions Package addresses all the key 
issues on the table, and reflects key principles 
which we are not abandoning.  The question is what 
we can do to get from where we are to a more 
constructive place. 
 
 
- As a practical matter there are some aspects of the 
European security picture that have not changed for the 
better in the last several years.  And as NATO develops 
its new strategic concept, we will need to take account 
of how the Alliance can respond effectively to 
challenges that are far more complex than any we have 
faced before. 
 
 
STATE 00008267  003 OF 005 
 
 
- It is also the case that traditional measures of 
security have not changed for the better:  partly as a 
consequence of Russia's suspension of CFE, we have less 
military transparency in Europe than we had five years 
ago.  Transparency in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian 
regions of Georgia is lacking.  There are more gray 
areas in Europe today than there were a decade ago. 
Moreover, there is a need for greater transparency in 
all three dimensions of security, not just the pol- 
military area that is the focus of the HLTF's work. 
 
- There is no reason to suppose that the Russian 
position on CFE issues has changed.  But we know that 
Moscow has expressed continuing interest in discussions 
with NATO on the meaning of the NATO-Russia Founding Act 
language on stationing of "substantial combat forces," 
and other issues.  A key question for us is where CFE 
fits into this complicated picture, and how we translate 
"intensified efforts" to move forward on CFE into 
concrete results that solve the current impasse. 
 
-- Alliance unity remains important as we look to 
intensify our efforts and explore options to change the 
current dynamic with Russia to achieve progress on a 
comprehensive CFE solution. 
 
-- The U.S. is committed to working hard with you this 
year to find a solution that resolves CFE concerns and 
preserves the benefits of the CFE regime, as we also 
ensure that the solution meets current and forseeable 
security needs.  [If asked whether a senior official has 
been dedicated to the CFE issue: as I said, we are 
thinking creatively about how to invigorate our 
diplomacy but we're not ready to make any specific 
announcements.] 
 
-- At the December NATO and OSCE Ministerials, we made 
clear that Allies remain firmly committed to the CFE 
Treaty and still seek a solution with Russia while we 
signaled to Russia that it is past time to move forward. 
 
-- Although we are keen for progress and open to ideas, 
we cannot lose sight of the fact that any solution must 
address the security concerns of all 30 CFE States 
Parties.  We should continue to stress to Moscow that 
Russia needs to match the flexibility already shown by 
others and join us in implementing CFE. 
 
- - - - - - - - 
Russia's European Security and NATO-Russia Treaty 
Proposals 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶7. (C/REL NATO) Discussions on a way ahead for CFE will 
take place in parallel with the OSCE's Corfu Process as 
well as discussions on Russia's recent draft treaty 
proposals.  The NRC proposal includes a proposed 
definition of "substantial combat forces" which has CFE 
implications per ref D.  Moreover, the IS has suggested 
Russia's interest in defining this term could be read as 
an indicator of its interest in progress on CFE, 
although there is also the possibility that it is 
intended to replace CFE.  U.S. rep should seek Allied 
views and, as appropriate, note: 
 
-- We believe that the OSCE, with its inclusive 
membership and multi-dimensional approach to security, 
is an essential venue for discussions about European 
security that concern all OSCE participating States. 
Consistent with the Presidents' statements, we also 
intend to discuss elements of Russia's European security 
proposals in the NATO-Russia Council as appropriate. 
 
-- Regarding Russia's NRC proposal, there are some 
elements that could be useful to integrate into NRC 
work, but we remain concerned by many of the other ideas 
and look forward to continued discussions. 
 
-- It is not clear to us that Russia's push to define 
"substantial combat forces" is a sign of interest in 
achieving a CFE deal.  Moscow may well see that as a 
 
STATE 00008267  004 OF 005 
 
 
substitute for working this in the CFE context, rather 
than as a complement to it. 
 
-- The Russian Federation proposal aims to define 
explicitly the meaning of the term "substantial combat 
forces" as it is used in the NATO-Russia Founding Act by 
proposing both structural and numerical definitions. 
While the structural parameters suggested are familiar 
(e.g., 'brigade'), the numerical parameters for 
equipment are extremely restrictive.  Moreover, this is 
the first time we can recall the Russian Federation 
proposing that such a definition be made legally 
binding. 
 
-- While we welcome Russian proposals, we must consider 
carefully how to proceed with this aspect of it in the 
context of CFE discussions.  Our goal is to achieve 
agreement on an overall CFE solution before addressing 
specific elements, as appropriate, in the NRC and 
elsewhere.  Defining "substantial combat forces" is an 
element of the package approach and addressing it 
separately in the context of the NRC may not advance our 
efforts.  On the other hand, willingness to define 
"substantial combat forces" may eliminate the ambiguity 
surrounding NATO enlargement and stationing of troops in 
the Baltic States that Russia has long sought as a way 
to maintain stragegic predictability, providing a 
possible breakthrough for the CFE impasse. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
Contacts and Bilaterals 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8. (C/REL NATO) U.S.-Russia Bilateral Meetings: 
 
-- On December 7, U/S Tauscher met with Russian D/FM 
Ryabkov to discuss non-proliferation and missile defense 
cooperation.  Although there was not a specific 
discussion on CFE, both sides agreed it was an area in 
which we needed to make progress as it contributes to 
European stability. 
 
-- In addition, EUR/RPM Director Bruce Turner visited 
Moscow December 16-18 to discuss a range of European 
security and NATO-Russia issues, including CFE.  Turner 
met with MFA Department of Security Affairs and 
Disarmament (DVBR) conventional arms control director 
Anton Mazur who reiterated familiar positions on key 
issues and noted Russia's interest in finding a solution 
to the CFE impasse on the basis of the Parallel Actions 
Package approach.  Mazur suggested States Parties should 
seek to make some updates to the adapted CFE Treaty now, 
specifying that the flank issue cannot be put off.  He 
noted it would be better to build from the existing 
treaty through iterative adaptations rather than 
negotiate a completely new treaty. 
 
?       During General Jones' January 21 meeting with 
Russian Security Council Secretary Patrushev, he 
affirmed that the United States was ready to engage 
with Russia on President Medvedev's European 
Security proposals, including in the NATO-Russia 
Council. 
 
 
- - - - - - 
As Needed 
- - - - - - 
 
¶9. (C) Russia's proposal for a review of Vienna Document 
1999:   Per State 4427, we expect Russia to engage in 
the Forum for Security Cooperation early this year on 
the 2009 Ministerial agreement (MC.DEC/16/09), which, 
inter alia, calls on participating States (pS) to 
"explore ways in which to strengthen the OSCE's 
political-military toolbox, with particular attention to 
strengthening current arms control and CSBM instruments, 
including strengthening the Vienna Document 1999." 
Russia is likely to interpret this as a mandate to 
revive the Russian-Belarusian-Kazakh proposal to "re- 
open" VD99.  Washington currently is reviewing its 
 
STATE 00008267  005 OF 005 
 
 
approach to VD99 and proposed CSBMs in the context of 
broader European security discussions. 
 
-- If raised, U.S. del may note our interest in thorough 
discussions (either in Brussels or Vienna, or both) 
about the potential benefit(s) to NATO before Allies 
pursue specific CSBMs or changes to VD99 in the FSC. 
 
-- If raised, Washington is interested to know if 
delivery of Russia's draft treaty proposals has impacted 
Allies' willingness to review current instruments. 
 
¶10. (SBU) U.S.-Russia START negotiations:  Allies 
appreciate that current efforts underway to finalize 
START negotiations are a priority effort and have noted 
that a successful outcome could serve as impetus for 
progress on CFE.  If raised, U.S. del should utilize 
press guidance points below to provide any updates on 
the status and expected outcome of START negotiations. 
Delegation should steer away from commentary on the 
negotiations. 
 
-- Senior U.S. and Russian officials met last week in 
Moscow to continue discussions on a New START agreement 
as well as address a number of other important issues on 
the bilateral agenda. 
 
-- The U.S. and Russian delegations are working in 
Geneva to reach agreement.  We will not make any 
predictions about when we will finish negotiations. 
What is important is to arrive at a quality agreement 
that meets the needs and interests of both sides. 
 
- - - - - - 
Next Meeting 
- - - - - - 
 
¶11. (SBU) It is likely the next HLTF will be scheduled 
for sometime in March, prior to the April NATO Informal 
Minsterial.  HLTF rep should support such a meeting 
timeline. 
CLINTON