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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DTRA DULLES WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
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RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD// PRIORITY
ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 004427 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2020 
TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE
SUBJECT: FSC WINTER 2010 OPENING OF ROUND GUIDANCE 
 
REF: USOSCE 000284 
 
Classified by: Richard A. Davis, VCI/CCA Office 
Director, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action cable. See paras 4-25. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary.  USDel should continue to reaffirm our 
support to the OSCE through proactive and cooperative 
engagement in the FSC to further overall U.S. strategic 
objectives for the OSCE of promoting stability in the 
OSCE area, supporting international efforts to promote 
stability outside the OSCE area, partnership with 
Europe, addressing European hotspots, and engaging 
Russia.  USDel also is encouraged to continue to promote 
practical, results-oriented initiatives in the FSC and 
its Working Groups, versus activities to produce 
consensus texts for their own sake, particularly in 
advance of scheduled events, i.e., end of session; the 
Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC); and the Annual 
Implemenation Assessment Meeting (AIAM). 
 
¶3. (C) FSC work will be conducted against the backdrop 
of the Corfu Process and in the wake of Russia's 
distribution of a draft European Security Treaty and its 
NATO-Russia Council companion, "Agreement on Basic 
Principles Governing Relations Among NATO-Russia Council 
Member States in the Security Sphere."  USDel should 
continue to stress that we believe that the OSCE, with 
its inclusive membership and multi-dimensional approach 
to security, is an essential venue for discussions about 
European security that concern all OSCE participating 
States.  Consistent with the President's statements, we 
also intend to discuss elements of Russia's European 
security proposals in the NATO-Russia Council as 
appropriate.  U.S. activity in the FSC will complement 
our approach to broader discussions on European 
security.  End summary. 
 
¶4. (C) Kazakhstan's late-2009 co-sponsorhip of Russia's 
proposal for a review of Vienna Document 1999 could 
indicate that Russia may find a willing ally in the 
Kazakh Chairman in Office (CiO) for efforts to "reform 
the FSC" with a focus on "hard" security (some Allies 
have indicated they will also support this effort).  We 
expect Russia to engage early in the winter 2010 session 
on the 2009 Ministerial agreement (MC.DEC/16/09), which, 
inter alia, calls on participating States (pS) to 
"explore ways in which to strengthen the OSCE's 
political-military toolbox, with particular attention to 
strengthening current arms control and CSBM instruments, 
including strengthening the Vienna Document 1999." 
Russia is likely to interpret this as a mandate to 
revive the Russian-Belarusian proposal to "re-open" VD99 
(FSC.DEL/203/09/Rev. 1).  While we do not support the 
Russian-Belarusian proposal, Washington currently is 
reviewing its approach to VD99 and proposed CSBMs and 
expects to transmit a response to USOSCE 00286, along 
with guidance on current VD99 proposals, including 
Denmark's proposal for establishing a category called 
"VD99-plus." 
 
¶5. (C) Specific USDel priorities for the winter 2010 
session in other areas of FSC work are: 
 
-- Support Mission, as appropriate, for continuing 
political-military discussions within the Corfu Process 
framework. 
 
-- Reinforce U.S. policy with respect to work on SA/LW, 
specifically to resist broadening the current scope of 
the OSCE Document on SA/LW, especially if, as expected, 
the Greek FSC Chairmanship attempts to develop a plan of 
action by May 2010. 
 
-- Encourage pS to uphold OSCE rules and procedures by 
keeping FSC matters, such as the introduction of new 
proposals, in the FSC plenary and working groups rather 
than in separate venues, such as Heads of Verification 
 
STATE 00004427  002 OF 007 
 
 
(HOV) meetings.  Looking at efforts to divert attention 
at the December 2009 HOV meeting to discussion of 
proposals rather than implementation practices, the U.S. 
is not enthusiastic about the idea of scheduling 
separate HOV meetings in the future. 
 
-- Build on the momentum generated in 2009 to further 
UNSCR 1540 implementation, including encouraging other 
pS to author Best Practice Guide (BPG) chapters. 
 
-- Work with both the CiO and the FSC Chair to frame 
discussions of a cross-dimensional nature (i.e., 1540, 
crisis management, etc.) in the FSC Security Dialogue. 
 
-- Encourage pS who have not yet provided their annual 
CSBM data on military forces to forward their 
submissions. 
 
Continuing the "Corfu Process" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6. (SBU)  The December 2009 Ministerial Council decision 
on "Furthering the Corfu Process" (MC.DEC/1/09) tasked 
the Kazakh CiO, in close consultation with the 2010 FSC 
Chairmanships, to continue the informal, regular, and 
open dialogue in the framework of the Corfu Process.  We 
recognize that one of the issues for discussion under 
the Corfu Process is the "role of the arms control and 
confidence- and security-building regimes in building 
trust, in the evolving security environment" 
(MC.DEC/1/09).  USDel is encouraged to work 
constructively with 2010 FSC Chairs (Greece, Hungary, 
and Ireland, respectively) to ensure use of the FSC as 
the appropriate arms control expert forum for 
contributions to this process, thereby ensuring that 
discussions in the FSC complement, rather than 
duplicate, Corfu Process discussions addressing the 
range of European security issues. 
 
 
SALW/SCA 
- - - - - 
 
¶7. (SBU) The September 22-23, 2009 meeting to review the 
OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA/LW) 
(FSC.DOC/1/00) and its supplementary decisions resulted 
in a survey of suggestions (FSC.GAL/109/09).  Incoming 
FSC Chair Greece used that document in its entirety as 
the basis for a draft SA/LW plan of action to be adopted 
by the FSC by May 2010 (as tasked by Ministers).  With 
regard to the Greek FFT on the OSCE Plan of Action on 
SA/LW (FSC.DEL/213/09), Washington remains extremely 
reluctant to expand the nature of work on SA/LW beyond 
the already agreed scope of the OSCE Document on SA/LW. 
Many proposed activities in the Greek FFT go beyond the 
existing Document.  U.S. policy also maintains a 
distinct separation between SA/LW and Stockpiles of 
Conventional Ammunition (SCA), and we would oppose any 
attempt to consolidate the OSCE SA/LW and SCA normative 
documents.  More specific guidance on the Greek FFT 
paper will be provided as appropriate. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Washington believes that the FSC can 
successfully develop a general plan of action on SA/LW 
in the next few months to meet the tasking from 
Ministers.  Although there are some useful elements in 
the Greek FFT, it tries to capture all the elements of 
FSC.GAL/109/09, and addresses too many issues at the 
outset, including several that the U.S. cannot support. 
USDel should be aware of the following U.S. policy 
views: 
 
-- With regard to some of the suggestions on further 
SA/LW work made to date (FSC.GAL/109/09), USDel should: 
 
1) support proposals to provide assistance with 
destruction and stockpile security and management to 
requesting states; 
 
2) encourage individual governments to establish 
brokering controls based on the recommendations of the 
UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) (A/62/163); 
 
 
STATE 00004427  003 OF 007 
 
 
3) promote the implementation of the UN International 
Tracing Instrument (ITI) by all states; and 
 
4) emphasize that the United States continues to oppose 
any OSCE action that goes beyond the scope of the 
existing Document on SA/LW, including many of the items 
in the survey of suggestions. 
 
-- USDel should oppose efforts to: 
 
1) further amend the definition of SA/LW; 
 
2) require marking of ammunition, which is outside the 
scope of the ITI; 
 
3) create new mechanisms or agencies to enforce or 
monitor implementation of the OSCE Document or the ITI; 
 
4) adopt the International Small Arms Control Standards 
(ISACS) either as best practice or as part of the OSCE 
SA/LW plan of action, as ISACS crosses several U.S. 
redlines such as civilian possession; and, 
 
5) agree on standardized definitions of normative 
factors to consider when transferring SA/LW. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In order to move out quickly with development 
of the SA/LW plan of action, USDel should suggest that 
the Greek Chair focus attention on the three areas 
outlined in its FFT, rather than elaborating specific 
measures.  A plan of action could identify a timeline 
for discussions to address each of these three areas 
over the course of 2010, without prejudging the outcome 
of those discussions:  1) improvement of implementation 
of existing measures; 2) improvement of SA/LW technical 
standards and measures; and 3) issues for further 
consideration. 
 
¶10. (SBU) USOSCE should seek additional guidance from 
Washington on specific proposals as they are tabled. 
Proposals must be consistent with existing obligations 
under the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and 
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SA/LW in All Its Aspects 
(PoA). 
 
¶11. (SBU) With regard to brokering, the report of the UN 
GGE to Further Consider Steps to Enhance International 
Cooperation in Preventing, Combating and Eradicating the 
Illicit Brokering of SA/LW (A/62/163) was signed by the 
Secretary General, committing all states to its 
recommendations.  Therefore, any action within the OSCE 
on brokering should be based on the agreed-upon GGE 
recommendations and not EU brokering regulations, which 
have many loopholes. 
 
¶12. (SBU) With regard to developing national legislation 
on SA/LW, Washington believes it is better to focus on 
building capacity, as there are several examples of 
model legislation already available.  Washington is not 
in favor of developing either additional UN PoA focal 
point training or another best practice guide, as such 
initiatives will not move countries toward establishing 
the legal frameworks needed. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Washington has no objection to the OSCE 
participating in the Fourth Biennial Meeting of State 
Parties on the UN PoA, scheduled for 2010, provided that 
the OSCE not advocate for the expansion of the PoA's 
scope.  USDel should make clear that OSCE participation 
should be limited to reporting on OSCE activities under 
the SA/LW Document, sharing lessons learned, and 
coordinating with other organizations.  The OSCE should 
not advocate for additional agreements, regulations, 
reporting mechanisms, UN conferences, or norms. 
 
Landmines and cluster munitions (If raised): 
 
¶14. (SBU) If the issue of landmines is raised, USDel 
should be clear that any OSCE effort should not be 
duplicative of extensive on-going activities in this 
field.  On U.S. policy specifically, the Administration 
announced a comprehensive review in November, which is 
on-going.  In addition to the points below, the 
 
STATE 00004427  004 OF 007 
 
 
delegation can draw on Department Press guidance from 
November 27 and related fact sheets (provided via 
email). 
 
-- Any OSCE endeavor on landmines or humanitarian mine 
action (HMA) should be fully coordinated with other 
international, regional, and national efforts.  There is 
robust international activity on this issue and the OSCE 
should not duplicate efforts. 
 
-- Regarding U.S. landmine policy, the Administration is 
committed to undertaking a comprehensive review.  This 
review is under way, and we expect it to take some time. 
 
¶15. (SBU) If the issue of cluster munitions is raised 
under this topic or elsewhere, USDel should clearly 
outline U.S. policy on cluster munitions, their use, and 
related Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) concerns in line 
with the comments below (ref 08STATE125608): 
 
-- On June 19, 2008, Secretary Gates signed a new DoD 
Policy, "Cluster munitions and Unintended Harm to 
Civilians" 
(www.defenselink.mil/news/d20080709cmpolicy.p df).  This 
policy was designed to reduce the unintended harm to 
civilians and civilian infrastructure caused by the use 
of cluster munitions, a goal shared by many pS.  By 
2018, the U.S. will only employ cluster munitions that, 
after arming, have an unexploded ordnance (UXO) rate of 
no more than one (1) percent.  In the intervening 
period, the use of cluster munitions with a greater than 
one percent UXO rate requires Combatant Commander 
approval. 
 
-- Although the U.S. is not a signatory to the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), signed by 104 
governments, we share the goal of signatories to the CCM 
of reducing the humanitarian harm caused by these 
weapons, as reflected in this DoD policy.  The U.S. is 
also a global leader in humanitarian mine action and 
clearing ERW, including those created by cluster 
munitions. 
 
-- The U.S. continues to strongly support negotiations 
within the framework of the Convention on Conventional 
Weapons (CCW) on a protocol that would require states to 
phase in technical improvements to cluster munitions 
over time, minimizing the humanitarian impact of their 
use.  We believe that finalizing such a protocol in the 
CCW, which includes the world's major users and 
producers of cluster munitions, would have humanitarian 
benefits and complement CCW protocol V on Explosive 
Remnants of War. 
 
-- As with mine action, any OSCE endeavor on cluster 
munitions, including post-conflict clearance of 
unexploded submunitions, should be fully coordinated 
with other international, regional, and national 
efforts. 
 
HOV Meetings 
- - - - - - - 
 
¶16. (SBU) During the December 14, 2009 meeting of the 
OSCE Heads of Verification (HOV), two new Food-For- 
Thought papers - the Conflict Prevention Centre FFT on 
distribution of air base visits (FSC.GAL/139/09) and the 
Czech Republic FFT on organizing Chapter IV contacts and 
demonstrations (FSC.DEL/210/09) - were circulated for 
HOV review.  The HOV meeting is strictly a technical 
discussion forum on VD99 implementation issues and is 
not a working body of the FSC, nor is it empowered to 
make policy recommendations to the FSC.  As such, we do 
not believe it is the appropriate forum for pS to 
present new VD99 proposals in the form of Food-for- 
Thought papers.  Furthermore, while many pS employ their 
heads of verification to spearhead all VD99 activities, 
this is not universally the case.  Tabling new proposals 
for discussion and/or review in the HOV meeting 
therefore preempts full discussion by pS that do not 
centralize all VD99 activities under their respective 
HOV. 
 
 
STATE 00004427  005 OF 007 
 
 
¶17. (SBU) Washington has not yet reviewed the Czech 
Republic FFT, as we do not consider it to have been 
officially submitted for FSC review.  USDel should 
request that the paper be formally introduced to the 
FSC, per current practice, noting that the FSC remains 
the only appropriate forum for all new VD99 proposals 
and that we do not wish to see its authority weakened. 
The status of the CPC paper is unclear: it is useful for 
the CPC to provide information on implementation trends, 
but Washington believes this paper goes beyond that in 
proposing a specific planning mechanism in an attempt to 
solicit additional work for itself.  The CPC is tasked 
by the FSC to review implementation of VD99 and only to 
provide the AIAM with its findings (i.e., how many 
inspections, refusals, missing AEMI submissions).  The 
CPC is not tasked with providing the HOVs or AIAM with 
proposals for consideration. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Distribution of these two papers had the 
effect of introducing new proposals in the HOV, rather 
than keeping matters that fall under its purview in the 
FSC plenary and working groups.  As a result of this 
effort to divert attention at the December 2009 HOV 
meeting to discussion of proposals rather than 
implementation practices, the U.S. is not enthusiastic 
about the idea of scheduling separate HOV meetings in 
the future. 
 
UNSCR 1540 
- - - - - - 
 
¶19. (SBU) USDel should leverage the positive momentum 
achieved in 2009 to encourage other pS to draft 
additional Best Practice Guide chapters (such as France, 
Germany, and the UK, as well as other pS suggested in 
separate email).  Washington recommends approaching 
countries with the technical capacity to author 
chapters, as well as exploring the possibility of NGO 
assistance for countries without sufficient capacity to 
take on such an endeavor.  USDel should follow-up with 
the Canadian delegation on the status of its draft 
chapter on physical security and encourage formal 
distribution of the chapter as soon as possible.  This 
will enable countries' technical experts to begin 
reviewing the draft and suggesting constructive inputs. 
 
¶20. (SBU) USDel is also encouraged to continue efforts 
to institute the formation of a "Friends of 1540" group. 
USDel should follow up on British, Italian, and French 
commitment in establishing this group, along with other 
interested pS, which can contribute to developing 
concrete proposals on enhancing the implementation of 
1540 within the OSCE region.  USDel should also continue 
to work with the UK and the OSCE Secretariat/CPC 
(Matthew Geertsen) on establishing the OSCE 1540 Expert 
position in the Secretariat/Conflict Prevention Center 
(CPC) as an extra-budgetary project.  (Note.  The U.S. 
has sent funds for this project to Vienna.  The UK has 
indicated that it is in the process of committing funds 
and should be pressed to establish a timeframe for when 
FCO funds will be forthcoming.  Also, other pS 
contributions should be encouraged to devote funds to 
the project. End Note). 
 
¶21. (SBU) USDel should work with co-sponsors of the 
Food-for-Thought paper on a comprehensive OSCE strategy 
among Vienna-based IGOs to approach Kazakhstan to 
promote follow-on action with the OSCE in Fall 2010 to 
demonstrate leadership on nonproliferation through 
ongoing support for implementation of UNSCR 1540, as 
well as the December Ministerial Nonproliferation 
Declaration.  This support should be early agreement to 
organize, in its role as CiO, a workshop to mark the 
four-year anniversary of the OSCE November 2006 workshop 
on implementation of UNSCR 1540, which may require 
extra-budgetary contributions from Kazakhstan as well as 
other FFT sponsors. (Note.  The USG may be able to 
provide a modest financial contribution.  End Note.) 
USDel is requested to work with the U.S. Mission to 
UNVIE in coordinating with Kazakhstan to organize what 
we recommend should be a 1-2 day review of OSCE 
activities in support of nonproliferation, and include 
recommendations on how the OSCE, and other Vienna 
 
STATE 00004427  006 OF 007 
 
 
organizations, can work with the United Nations 1540 
Committee and its Panel of Experts.  Because we would 
expect significant costs to be associated with this 
effort, USDel should encourage the Kazakh CiO - and may 
also assist in this effort - to work with the Conflict 
Prevention Center to elaborate an extra-budgetary 
project to conduct the nonproliferation review 
seminar/workshop.  USDel can draw from the following 
points as appropriate: 
 
-- We support efforts to evolve the OSCE's approach to 
confronting new threats, including the threat from 
sensitive technologies for Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
 
-- In that respect, we hope both the PC as well as the 
FSC can make an active contribution to the ability of pS 
to advance their commitments as emphasized in UNSCR 
1887, which was adopted unanimously by the UN Security 
Council at the Heads of State/Government level, and 
underscored cooperative action and regional approaches. 
 
-- OSCE bodies can make 2010 a year in which the nexus 
between WMD proliferation and terrorism receives 
increased attention.  This approach would underline the 
OSCE's role as the vanguard "regional organization" and 
make it a model for 1540 and other nonproliferation- 
related implementation efforts by other international 
organizations. 
 
-- The OSCE can practically respond to the 1540 
Committee Chair's letter dated December 29, 2009 through 
an early decision to convene a review of the role of the 
OSCE in implementation of UNSCR 1540, also considering 
the contribution of sister institutions in Vienna, such 
as the IAEA and UNODC. 
 
¶22. (SBU) To help structure a common message on UNSCR 
1540, USDel may draw on the following points in 
discussions: 
 
-- We rely on (participating State) as a strong, 
original supporter of 1540 objectives, to actively 
support our common ability to assist other States - as 
we are doing with other partners like the EU, NATO, 
IAEA, UNODC, OPCW, INTERPOL, etc. 
 
-- Resolution 1810 is an important success not only 
because it achieved a three-year extension, but because 
it focuses on regional action toward implementation of 
UNSCR 1540 worldwide to prevent WMD proliferation. 
 
-- An OSCE 1540 expert will help facilitate OSCE efforts 
that support the multiple initiatives underway with 
regional, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental 
organizations. 
 
-- A group-of-friends is a useful approach and 
delegations could include from time to time 
representatives from capitals, as Washington has on 
occasion with its UNSCR 1540 Coordinator.  This may help 
in building a common understanding. 
 
Security Dialogue 
- - - - - - - - - 
 
¶23. (SBU) In the exchange of military information 
provided in December 2009, Russia reported a significant 
reduction in the number of reportable formations and 
units, as well as total equipment.  USDel is requested 
to ask Russia to provide information to the FSC on its 
military restructuring efforts within the context of the 
Security Dialogue. 
 
¶24. (SBU) USDel is encouraged to work with the FSC 
chairmanships to frame discussions of a cross- 
dimensional nature in the FSC Security Dialogue (i.e., 
energy security, 1540, etc.).  USDel should look for 
ways, when appropriate, to link PC discussions to issues 
addressed in the FSC, thereby increasing the role of the 
FSC Security Dialogue in enhancing Euro-Atlantic 
security.  USDel should also coordinate with the 
successive FSC Chairs to include substantive U.S. 
presentations on topics that advance U.S. strategic 
 
STATE 00004427  007 OF 007 
 
 
objectives, information on which will be provided as 
appropriate.  Washington notes the incoming Greek FSC 
Chair's interest in U.S. presentations on Missile 
Defense and START, as reported in reftel.  Without 
making a commitment, USDel should determine whether 
there is interest among other delegations for a Security 
Dialogue presentation on Missile Defense, as well as 
START Follow-On, within the broader context of 
nonproliferation efforts. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Once again, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan did not provide required VD99 data during the 
data exchange on December 15.  Request USDel approach 
these pS to inquire as to the status of their data. 
Additionally, USDel should ask whether Russia, which did 
not provide an electronic data set (compatible with the 
Automated Data System) when it provided its data on 
December 24, intends to distribute these files. 
CLINTON