VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2126 0092320
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 092142Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 6202-6203
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8684-8685
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0977-0978
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0875-0876
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 2363-2364
DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6346-6347
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0778-0779
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 5961-5962
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCUSTR/USSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 002126 
 
 
C O R R E C T E D  COPY - CAPTION ADDED 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
GENEVA: FOR CD DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2035 
TAGS: AS CA CH MCAP NZ PARM PREL TSPA UK
SUBJECT: ADVISORY TO COMMONWEALTH ALLIES REGARDING CHINA,S 
IMPENDING INTERCEPT FLIGHT-TEST 
 
REF: (A) 07 LONDON 155 
 
Classified By: David E. Hoppler Reasons 1.4 (a),(d),(e),and(g) 
 
¶1. (S//NF) THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.  Embassies Canberra, 
London, Ottawa, and Wellington are instructed to deliver the 
talking points (and hand over as a U.S. Non-Paper) in 
paragraph 3 to appropriate Host Nation foreign and defense 
policy officials as soon as possible on Monday, January 11, 
2010, given that the intercept flight-test is expected 
imminently.  Embassies are requested to provide confirmation 
of delivery and any immediate responses. 
¶2. (S) BACKGROUND: The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses 
that China may conduct an intercept flight-test using an 
SC-19 missile from the Korla Missile Test Complex against a 
CSS-X-11 medium-range ballistic missile launched from the 
Shuangchengzi Space and Missile Center in the next several 
days.  An SC-19 was used previously as the payload booster 
for the January 11, 2007 direct-ascent anti-satellite 
(DA-ASAT) intercept of the Chinese FY-1C weather satellite. 
Previous SC-19 DA-ASAT flight-tests were conducted in 2005 
and 2006.  The United States does not expect China to provide 
any prior notification of its imminent intercept flight-test, 
post-test announcement, nor do we expect any post-event 
explanation without China being asked or questioned in a 
demarche. 
 
(S//NF) Action addressee posts should coordinate closely with 
host governments prior to, during, and after China conducts 
the next SC-19 flight-test to ensure that all necessary 
officials in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New 
Zealand have timely and complete information regarding 
China's activities.  The need for such close coordination was 
underscored in the aftermath of China's first successful 
SC-19 DA-ASAT flight-test on January 11, 2007 (UTC). 
Although UK analysts had provided key contributions to 
monitoring this program, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
and Cabinet Office officials said they had been "personally 
unaware" that China had been developing a DA-ASAT system 
until they were informed by Embassy London on January 14, 
2007, three days after China's flight-test. (REF A) 
 
¶3. (S//REL TO USA, CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL) BEGIN TALKING 
POINTS/U.S. NON-PAPER: 
 
-- Washington estimates that China may be planning to use its 
SC-19 missile to conduct an intercept flight-test against a 
CSS-X-11 medium-range ballistic missile that could happen 
within the next several days.  We anticipate that the SC-19 
will launch from the Korla Missile Test Complex (a new 
location for SC-19 activity) in western China.  The CSS-X-11 
will launch from Shuangchengzi Space and Missile Center, 
approximately 1,100 kilometers east of Korla. 
-- The SC-19 was used previously as the payload booster for 
the January 11, 2007, direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) 
intercept of the Chinese FY-1C weather satellite, as well as 
in DA-ASAT flight-tests conducted in 2005-06. 
 
-- The United States is currently examining the range of our 
diplomatic options and will closely consult with (Host 
Nation) regarding possible joint diplomatic responses after 
the flight-test.  The United States will also seek your ideas 
in how to respond over the longer-term. 
 
-- Since the national security imperative is not to 
jeopardize sensitive intelligence "sources and methods," as 
well as enable collection on this event, Washington has 
decided not to demarche Beijing prior to this expected 
flight-test.  Furthermore, it is our assessment that any 
demarche transmitted prior to the launch event will not 
dissuade China from conducting the SC-19 flight-test. 
 
-- U.S. diplomatic and public diplomacy strategies will be 
shaped by the observables of the event, China's 
diplomatic/public explanations (if any), and upon our 
post-test analysis of risks to "sources and methods." 
 
-- Should China's flight-test preparations progress, the 
United States is willing, to the greatest extent possible, to 
provide updates on significant milestones via diplomatic 
channels.  However, we also suggest communicating via 
established military-to-military and intelligence liaison 
channels as appropriate. 
 
END TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER. 
 
END CABLE TEXT. 
CLINTON