VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #0056/01 0121131
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121131Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3525

S E C R E T SANAA 000056
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ECON EAID AMGMT MASS YM
SUBJECT: YEMEN: STRATEGIC DIALOGUE PAVES THE WAY FOR FM’S
WASHINGTON VISIT
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. In anticipation of Foreign Minister
Abubakir al-Qirbi’s January 20 meeting in Washington with
Secretary Clinton, post conducted a strategic dialogue with
the ROYG covering key aspects of the bilateral relationship,
including counter-terrorism and military cooperation,
political reforms and economic assistance, and Embassy
operations. While few outstanding issues were resolved
during the process, which included representatives from a
number of ROYG ministries and agencies, the very fact that a
candid and generally positive dialogue took place represents
a significant step forward. Notable challenges identified
include the U.S. position on Yemen’s internal political
crises such as the Sa’ada War, and ongoing obstacles to the
operations of Embassy Sana’a, particularly those related to
restrictions imposed on diplomatic pouches. In general, the
dialogue provided an important opportunity to address the
bilateral relationship in a holistic fashion and gain a
better understanding of the issues each country expects to
figure into the agenda for the Minister’s visit.
(Scenesetter to follow septel) END SUMMARY.
COUNTER-TERRORISM EFFORTS
-------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Counter-terrorism (CT) cooperation is one of the
most important areas of the bilateral relationship, but
significant weaknesses persist. Overall CT cooperation could
be strengthened by greater communication among Yemen’s
diverse security services and military units. Discussions,
which included representatives from RSO, LEGATT and a Special
Operations Command forward element (SOC FWD), and ROYG
counterparts in the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the
National Security Bureau (NSB), focused on coordination among
Yemen’s various CT players on issues such as the creation of
a national CT strategy and the establishment of a National
Counter-Terrorism Training Center. EmbOffs emphasized the
necessity of delineating responsibilities among the security
services, which prompted the idea of creating a subcommittee
of the Supreme Security Committee focused on ensuring a
unified and coordinated fight against al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and overseeing distribution of CT resources
provided to the ROYG. The two sides also agreed to establish
a standing bilateral working group. The Ambassador noted
that a prerequisite for the continued provision of CT
training and materiel will be its use against AQAP, rather
than other domestic insurgencies such as the Houthi rebels or
the secessionist Southern Movement.
MILITARY COOPERATION
--------------------
¶3. (S/NF) Historically, military cooperation has been
another strong aspect of the U.S.-Yemeni partnership, and has
grown stronger with the arrival of SOC FWD elements in early
¶2009. The strategic talks between representatives from OMC
and SOC FWD and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) produced
several suggested areas for future cooperation: 1) joint
exercises, 2) provision of additional equipment, 3)
increasing the number of liaison officers with U.S. units, 4)
increasing the number of Yemeni officers in exchange programs
in the U.S., and 5) the release of purchased military
equipment still in the U.S. It was noted that English
language training will be a key requirement for increasing
officer exchanges. MOD also said it would provide a list of
requirements for fighting AQAP to post’s OMC. One
controversial topic raised was U.S. support for Yemen’s right
to purchase arms from "any country not blacklisted." (Note:
The ROYG has repeatedly asked for our assistance in
convincing Eastern European countries such as the Czech
Republic to sell heavy artillery and ammunition to Yemen.
Post has demurred on providing a response to date pending
instructions from Washington. End Note.)
POLITICAL CHALLENGES
--------------------
¶4. (S/NF) One of the most challenging aspects of the
bilateral relationship is disagreement over how the ROYG can
resolve Yemen’s ongoing political crises, most notably the
dysfunctional democratic process, the Sa’ada War and
increasing discontent in the southern governorates. As the
DCM said at the December 30 kick-off session for the
strategic dialogue, the bilateral political relationship is
"weak in all areas," a situation that remained unchanged at
the end of the talks on January 11. PolOff met with
representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
and the Office of the Presidency in a series of sessions
focused on how the U.S. could use its international and
financial influence to positively impact Yemen’s multiple
crises. Wary of what they perceived as USG interference in
internal Yemeni affairs, ROYG officials were extremely
reluctant to embrace any direct U.S. involvement, instead
suggesting that the U.S. could adopt softer methods,
including: encouraging the opposition Joint Meeting Parties
(JMP) to participate in political dialogue with the ruling
General People’s Congress (GPC), providing development
assistance to aid in the reconstruction of Sa’ada governorate
and address southern grievances, using the media to send
messages of support for Yemen’s unity and stability, issuing
press statements encouraging the ROYG to hold the April 2011
parliamentary elections on schedule, and supporting
institutions like the National Democratic Institute (NDI).
ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
-----------------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Productive talks between EconOff and USAID Mission
Director and ROYG counterparts led by the Ministry of Finance
(MOF) focused on the U.S. commitment to providing substantial
economic and development assistance and support for
structural economic reforms. In order to do so, emphasized
the Ambassador, both the U.S. and other donors need to know
what steps the ROYG plans to take to make the environment
more receptive to the implementation of international
development initiatives. An improved security environment, a
drastic reduction in corruption, and greater absorptive
capacity are all required in order for donors to commit
substantial resources to Yemen’s reform and development
needs. In addition, said the Ambassador, the ROYG needs to
identify clearly the reform path to which it is committed.
Meanwhile, of prime importance to the ROYG is U.S. support
for increasing Yemen’s access to GCC labor markets and
Yemen’s accession to the WTO, two issues the ROYG perceives
as vital to the country’s economic recovery. The two sides
also affirmed the necessity of working together to implement
USAID’s new three-year stabilization strategy in order to
improve the ROYG’s service delivery to rural areas.
¶6. (S/NF) At the January 11 wrap-up session, Vice Minister
for Planning and International Cooperation Hisham Sharaf
raised two new ideas with the DCM that had not been discussed
at all in the working group: balance of payment support and
debt relief. He came to the meeting without any supporting
figures and was therefore unable to discuss either proposal
in even minimal detail.
EMBASSY OPERATIONS
------------------
¶7. (S/NF) Logistical impediments to Embassy operations are
perhaps the weakest aspect of the current bilateral
relationship. The strategic talks, which brought post’s
management officer together with the MFA’s Protocol
Department and the Office of the Presidency, focused on three
troublesome issues: purchase of new land for embassy housing,
issuance of additional non-diplomatic (blue) license plates
and a significant increase in the number of diplomatic
pouches allowed (currently set at 10 pouches per week). The
ROYG extended the current land purchase offer for an
additional six months and provided assurances that it will
resolve the conflicting ownership claims that have prevented
the deal from reaching closure. EmbOff resubmitted required
information to secure 25 additional non-diplomatic license
plates, which MFA promised would be issued in the near future
after securing MOI and NSB approval. The ROYG has not yet
responded to post’s request to allow unlimited diplomatic
pouches into the country, but indicated it was likely to come
back with a counter-offer of a specified number. (Note:
We’ve been hearing such assurances on all three of these
topics, as well as on many other logistical issues, for years
now with no concrete results. End Note.)
COMMENT
-------
¶8. (S/NF) The recent strategic dialogue represented a
sincere, and to a great extent, unprecedented effort on
behalf of the ROYG to address a variety of issues in the
bilateral relationship. Existing areas of weakness ) such
as political and logistical cooperation ) remain
problematic, while traditionally strong areas of partnership
) CT and military cooperation ) were advanced by the
dialogue. Overall, however, the effort provided a useful and
timely opportunity to assess the state of the bilateral
relationship in advance of the upcoming conversation between
FM Qirbi and Secretary Clinton. END COMMENT.
SECHE