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OO RUEHBC RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0001/01 0031433
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O 031433Z JAN 10
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0022
INFO IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RPO DUBAI 000001 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/03 
TAGS: PGOV IR PREL
SUBJECT: IRAN:MOUSAVI MESSAGE SPLITS PRINCIPLISTS? 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alan Eyre, Director, DOS, IRPO; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On January 1 Green Path Opposition (GPO) leader Mir 
Hossein Mousavi issued his 17th declaration, titled "The Events of 
Ashura and the Following Days." Decrying Ashura-day regime 
brutality and describing as futile government efforts to end the 
current crisis via mass arrests and suppression, he proposed a five 
point solution, to include creating a fair and transparent election 
law, freeing all political prisoners, instituting press freedom and 
recognizing the peoples' right to gather and to form political 
associations and parties.  Noticeably, he did not call for the 
abrogation of the June election and said that the Majlis and 
Judiciary should deal with the Ahmadinejad administration within 
the framework of the Constitution.  Some moderate Principlists such 
as Mohsen Rezai expressed support for Mousavi's letter, while 
Principlists associated with President Ahmadinejad denounced both 
Mousavi, and Rezai for supporting him.  As one prominent Iranian 
political analyst expressed to IRPO, this latest Mousavi letter 
seems designed primarily to foster division within Iran's ruling 
factions and to allow whatever moderates there are left more 
ammunition in supporting  Mousavi and working against Ahmadinejad. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
¶2. (U) On Friday, January 1 Green Path Opposition (GPO) leader Mir 
Hossein Mousavi issued his 17th Declaration, on "The Events of 
Ashura and the Following Days." Decrying Ashura-day regime 
brutality and describing as futile government efforts to end the 
current crisis via mass arrests and suppression, he proposed a five 
point solution, adding that movement towards fulfilling any one of 
these points could help considerably in fostering unity.  The five 
proposals were: 
 
 
 
- (1) 'ANNOUNCING THE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
IN RELATION TO THE NATION, THE MAJLIS,AND THE JUDICIARY...'such 
that it is not given unusual support in the face of its weaknesses 
and shortcomings, and it is directly accountable for the problems 
it is creating for the nation. If the Administration is effective 
and deserving it will be able to answer the people and the Majlis 
and if it is inefficient and insufficient, the Majlis and the 
Judiciary can deal with it within the Constitutional framework." 
 
 
 
- (2) CREATING A TRANSPARENT AND CONFIDENCE-CREATING ELECTION LAW 
 
 
 
- (3) FREEING ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS AND RESTORING THEIR 
REPUTATIONS 
 
 
 
- (4) FREEDOM OF PRESS/MEDIA AND ALLOWING PRINTING OF NEWSPAPERS 
THAT HAVE BEEN SHUT DOWN 
 
 
 
- (5) OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZING THE PEOPLES' RIGHTS FOR LEGAL 
GATHERINGS, FORMATION OF PARTIES AND OTHER GROUPS, AND OBSERVANCE 
OF ARTICLE 27 OF THE CONSTITUTION [NOTE: Article 27 [Freedom of 
Assembly]: 'Public gatherings and marches may be freely held, 
provided arms are not carried and that they are not detrimental to 
the fundamental principles of Islam.'] 
 
 
 
¶3. (U) Other highlights of Mousavi's statement included: 
 
 
 
- ADMINISTRATION'S CORRUPTION, ECONOMIC INABILITY: Mousavi 
condemned corruption 'arising from bad policies and lack of 
planning... We are ready to show...that today the rights and 
interests of the oppressed and workers and laborers and other 
classes of the nation are being drowned in one great 
corruption...the Twenty Year National Plan, approved by all parts 
of the System, today has become a worthless scrap of paper.' 
 
DUBAI 00000001  002 OF 004 
 
 
- ATTACK ON 'IRGC INC:' Mousavi called for the IRGC to withdraw 
from its economic activities: '...if a great and powerful 
institution like the Sepah-e Pasdaran is calculating the rising and 
falling of stock shares every day, it cannot defend the nation and 
the nation's interests. It itself becomes corrupt and also draws 
the country into corruption.' 
 
 
 
ASHURA VIOLENCE/EXCESSES: Mousavi condemned the indiscriminate 
violence of regime security forces on Ashura, saying that whatever 
excesses and 'desecrations' there were on the part of some 
protestors, they were in reaction to regime brutality, which was 
'the worst type of desecration.' 
 
 
 
- FUTILITY OF REPRESSION AND DECAPITATING OPPOSITION: Mousavi said 
that while arrests, violence and suppression might bring temporary 
quiet, it won't solve the root causes of the crisis. Similarly, 'an 
order to execute, kill or imprison Karrubi, Mousavi or our like 
won't solve anything.' 
 
 
 
- GPO'S ISLAMIC/NATIONALIST ROOTS: Mousavi denied foreign control 
or influence on the GPO: 'I stress the Islamic and nationalistic 
identity of the GPO, our fealty to the Constitution, and our 
opposition to the dominance of foreigners [aka the West].... We are 
not American or British [i.e. pro-American, pro-British]. We have 
not send cards of congratulations to the leaders of the great 
powers [NOTE: a dig at Ahmadinejad and his congratulatory letter to 
President Obama], nor do we have hopes of their help.' 
 
 
 
MODERATE OSULIS: MAYBE 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶4. (U) Reaction to Mousavi's statement among Iran's ruling 
"Principlist" ('Osulgarayan') faction seemed split largely among 
the fault line between the Ahmadinejad wing and the so-called 
moderate wing (aligned with Ali Larijani, Mohsen Rezai and Tehran 
Mayor Mohammad Qalibaf). Initial signs indicated that the 'moderate 
Osulgarayan wing' seemed either quiet or somewhat supportive of the 
Mousavi initiative. One of the main websites associated with this 
faction, Ayandeh news, posted Mousavi's letter without any negative 
editorializing.  Anti-Ahmadinejad former Majlis conservative Emad 
Afruq wrote that it was a 'positive sign' in that Mousavi 
explicitly expressed his abhorrence for foreign powers such as the 
US or the UK and for 'sinister currents' such as the MEK; stressed 
the nationalist-Islamic nature of his efforts; and made explicit 
his commitment to work within the Constitution.  Other public 
comments by both conservatives and others  similarly noted 
Mousavi's 'compromises' in this statement. 
 
 
 
REZAI BACKS MOUSAVI STATEMENT 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
 
¶5. (U) More significantly, that same day (June 1) Expediency 
Council Secretary Mohsen Rezai made public his letter to the 
Supreme Leader  in which he supported Mousavi's statement.  Rezai 
wrote that 'Mousavi's retreat from denying [the legitimacy of] 
Ahmadinejad's administration and his constructive suggestion that 
the Majlis and Judiciary act according to their legal duties in 
terms of making the Administration accountable, although late, can 
serve as a movement unifying the protestors with others.'  As such, 
he suggested Khamenei send a message or guidance [presumably in 
reaction to Mousavi's statement], which 'could be a new movement 
for unity, brotherhood, forgiveness and common sacrifice in 
society.' Rezai letter  to the Supreme Leader Khamenei also made 
much of the December 30 pro-government demonstrations, which he 
 
DUBAI 00000001  003 OF 004 
 
 
wrote 'nullified the enemy's plans' and could 'serve as the start 
of a new initiative to move the country forward and end the 
confusions and ambiguities of the last few months.' 
 
 
 
AHMADINEJAD OSULIS: NO 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (U) Pro-Ahmadinejad conservatives were having none of it, 
expressing disapproval both for Mousavi's letter and more so for 
Rezai's endorsement of it. Kayhan's January 3 main headline read 
'Mousavi's New Statement Copied from CIA, Mossad.'   Prominent 
pro-Ahmadinejad Majlis representative Hamid Rasai lashed out at 
Rezai for asking Supreme Leader Khamenei to implement the wishes of 
'the seditionist leaders,'  while representative Hojjatoleslam 
Musavi Qorbani called Rezai's letter 'simplistic' and showing his 
'lack of understanding of the current situation.'  Tthe website of 
the IRGC's political office 'Basirat' wrote a piece on the 'wave of 
criticism' by Iranian political activists in relation to Rezai's 
letter, and another one showing the similarities between Mousavi's 
statement and comments by President Obama.  Pro-Ahmadinejad Majlis 
Representative Ruhollah Hosseinian also criticized Rezai's letter, 
saying that seeking unity with seditionists is treason.' 
 
 
 
MOUSAVI'S GOAL: DIVIDE OSULIS? 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) A prominent US-based Iranian analyst made the following 
points to IRPO about Mousavi's letter [paraphrase follows]: 
 
 
 
- Unlike many of Mousavi's pronouncements, this one was 'carefully 
worded' and didn't seek Ahmadinejad's removal over the election. 
It placed the responsibility of removing Ahmadinejad on Majles and 
the Judiciary 'if and when... the incompetence of the government 
becomes evident.' 
 
 
 
- Mousavi sought to 'keep Khamenei out of the equation' by 
accepting his role constitutionally and yet giving him a way out of 
the crisis, which allowed Rezai to issue his statement; 
 
 
 
- Obviously Mousavi knows that the hardliners and probably Khamenei 
will not accept his proposals but this statement was not written 
for them. It was intended to give Rafsanjani more room to maneuver 
from within (again Rezai's statement is significant here) and to 
find more allies within the regime. It was also intended to unarm 
the hardliners or at least give them less ammunition for attack, by 
affirming his commitment to Iran's constitution and by showing that 
Mousavi isn't seeking to bring down Khamenei and the system.  In 
this manner the statement sought to increase the rift within the 
conservative faction.  It is of course not clear it is going to 
work but it is an attempt to start a process of negotiation based 
on the argument that what has been done so far has proven 
disastrous to the Islamic Republic. 
 
 
 
THROWING AHMADINEJAD 
 
UNDER THE BUS? 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT:  The paragraph seven analysis immediately above 
seems on the money, in that this latest Mousavi statement seems 
 
DUBAI 00000001  004 OF 004 
 
 
primarily a stratagem to divide the ruling Osulgarayan faction, 
provide more ammunition to Rafsanjani in his attempts to woo the as 
yet uncommitted elite, and to encourage the Supreme Leader if not 
to 'throw Ahmadinejad under the bus,' to allow the Majlis and other 
political players to continue to weaken his position.  However, 
Mousavi's attack on IRGC economic interests in this latest 
statement seems to ensure that at least one large and important 
segment of those seeking to neutralize the GPO will remain 
unconvinced of the need for compromise.   END COMMENT. 
EYRE