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Viewing cable 10ROME83, SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SECRETARY GATES TO ROME

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10ROME83 2010-01-22 12:28 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rome
VZCZCXRO5182
PP RUEHFL RUEHNP
DE RUEHRO #0083/01 0221228
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221228Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3164
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0571
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0429
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 3985
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 4212
RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RUENAAA/SECNAV WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3071
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 000083 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS NATO IT AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SECRETARY GATES TO ROME 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David H. Thorne for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Mr. Secretary, Mission Italy and I look forward to 
hosting you in February, as does Minister La Russa and the 
Government of Italy.  In anticipation, I met with La Russa on 
January 19.  He is delighted that you have accepted his 
invitation and is working hard to ensure that your meetings 
in Rome showcase the U.S.-Italian bilateral defense 
relationship that he was worked so hard to strengthen and 
expand.  Whether on Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Abu Omar Case, 
and now assistance in Haiti, La Russa, with the active 
support of FM Frattini, has been our champion in the Italian 
interagency, pushing our case with a high measure of success. 
 Your visit comes at a high point in our recent political 
military relations and will demonstrate publicly that Italy 
is within the closest circle of our European partners, 
facilitate parliamentary approval of Italy's commitment of 
1,000-1,200 new troops for Afghanistan and empower La Russa 
to deliver on some other key U.S. objectives.  The value of 
our relationship with Italy lies not only in what we do 
together overseas but also the reach and freedom of action 
that the seven U.S. bases on Italian soil afford U.S. forces. 
 Your visit provides La Russa with the momentum to break the 
impasse over two of our most important basing issues: the 
GOI's refusal to recognize Navy Support Site Gricignano (near 
Naples) as a military installation; and local political 
opposition to the Navy's proposed satellite communications 
site in Niscemi, Sicily.  Hearing that you view these as 
important U.S. priorities will give him the clout to deliver 
on these vital operational issues.  Finally, La Russa will 
want to demonstrate to you that he has done everything 
possible to convince the courts to recognize the U.S. 
assertion of primary jurisdiction in the case against USAF 
COL Romano. 
 
La Russa: A Friend of the U.S. Who Delivers 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2. (C) I met with La Russa on January 19, shortly before he 
sent the Aircraft Carrier Cavour to Haiti with a cargo of aid 
supplies and helicopters to deliver them (thereby avoiding 
the backlog at the Port-au-Prince Airport).  His approach to 
the Haiti crisis is typical of his style: he is an 
action-oriented leader who gets things done with little fuss 
or fanfare.  He has been the strongest voice in the cabinet 
in favor of our shared security interests, particularly in 
Afghanistan.  He responded immediately to your telephone call 
on November 25 with a concerted effort to generate a troop 
commitment.  He and FM Frattini convinced PM Berlusconi to 
approve and announce a 1,000 troop increase before consulting 
with Parliament, thereby ensuring that Italy would be among 
the first in NATO to announce, and that skeptics in 
Parliament would fall into line with what the GOI portrayed 
as much as a gesture of solidarity with President Obama as a 
step for Italian national interests.  La Russa continues to 
do the difficult behind-the-scenes work with the Minister of 
Finance to find funds for the mission, with the result that 
MOD planners tell us that the 1,000 troop increase is likely 
to become a de facto 1,200 increase by November 2010 (an 
increase from the 2,790 mandated average of 2009 to 3,970). 
Although Berlusconi enjoys a comfortable majority in 
Parliament, La Russa and Frattini may face hard questions 
about the size and expense of the commitment.  Your visit 
will do much to bolster their case and ensure that 
Afghanistan remains Italy's top foreign policy priority. 
 
Getting to Yes on the MUOS Satellite Antenna Array 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
3. (C) La Russa's help will also be crucial in securing 
approval for the U.S. Navy's planned construction of a MUOS 
(Mobile User Objective System) antenna site in Niscemi, 
Sicily.  A campaign of local political opposition in Sicily 
has prevented the U.S. Navy from obtaining final approval to 
begin construction of this fourth and final ground station 
for the MUOS system.  When it comes on line in 2012, MUOS 
will allow U.S. (and NATO) troops anywhere in the world to 
communicate instantly with headquarters in CONUS or 
elsewhere.  Given that the project is seriously behind 
schedule (the Navy must begin construction by March 2010 or 
contemplate moving the site elsewhere in the Mediterranean), 
I have asked La Russa to help us make headway with Sicilian 
 
ROME 00000083  002 OF 003 
 
 
Regional President Lombardo, whose office has withheld the 
necessary approvals.  La Russa has agreed to do so, but 
hearing from you that MUOS is a U.S. priority will spur him 
to expend the substantial political capital in his home 
region to ensure that the project moves forward. 
 
Breaking the Logjam on NSS-Gricignano 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4. (C) Your visit will also help to move the ball forward on 
COMNAVEUR-NAVAF ADM Fitzgerald's single most difficult basing 
issue at Naples: securing Italian recognition of Navy Support 
Site Gricignano (NSS-Gricignano) as a military installation 
under the 1951 NATO SOFA and 1954 U.S.-Italy Bilateral 
Infrastructure Agreement (BIA).  The U.S. has invested over 
USD 500 million to build Gricignano, which is the logistics 
support hub for all U.S. Navy Commands in the Mediterranean, 
the site of the chief Naval hospital for the European Region, 
two DOD schools, and residential housing for approximately 
3,000 U.S. Navy Servicemembers and their families.  In 2008, 
during negotiations to update the Naples-area basing 
agreement, the Italian Defense General Staff informed us that 
we could no longer protect the site with armed U.S. Navy 
security forces because the site is on leased property 
(rather than MOD-ceded land) and the Navy had not obtained 
the specific authorization that would confer military 
installation status under the NATO SOFA and BIA. 
 
5 (C) U.S. Navy lawyers have refuted the Italian argument, 
showing the series of approvals the U.S. obtained in 
transferring the base from its old leased site at Agnano 
(which the Navy has occupied since the 1950s, with all the 
privileges guaranteed under the SOFA), but Italian military 
lawyers have held firm.  Their position threatens not only 
the viability of the base from a security standpoint, but 
also the tax-exempt status of the commissary, exchange, 
hospital and other operations on the base.  I have asked La 
Russa to break the deadlock with a political declaration that 
Gricignano is a military installation, and he has promised to 
find a solution, but a signal from you that the security of 
our servicemembers is not negotiable will help make the 
matter a top priority for La Russa and empower him to impose 
and defend a political solution overcoming the consensus 
legal opinions of his own staff. 
 
U.S. Assertion of Jurisdiction in Abu Omar Case 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
6. (C) La Russa and his staff were helpful in persuading the 
Italian Ministry of Justice to weigh in to support the U.S. 
assertion of jurisdiction under the NATO SOFA in the case of 
USAF COL Romano, which was part of the larger "Abu Omar" 
trial.  La Russa, while a successful and experienced lawyer, 
as MOD is not a key player in judicial matters and, like the 
rest of the cabinet, has very little influence over the 
highly independent Italian judiciary.  We have raised our 
position repeatedly with all key Italian leaders, and La 
Russa understands that this continues to be an important 
issue for the U.S. military.  La Russa will want to offer 
what help he can, but may plead powerlessness before a 
headstrong judiciary that remains locked in a bitter 
long-running conflict with PM Berlusconi over past corruption 
cases. 
 
JSF: La Russa May Ask for More Industrial Participation 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7. (C) The Joint Strike Fighter is Italy's top modernization 
goal and serves to guarantee continued U.S.-Italian 
interoperability, cooperation, and joint operations for 
decades into the future. MOD Undersecretary Crosetto visited 
Washington and Fort Worth in November to push for greater 
Italian industrial participation in the JSF project. 
Crosetto met with USD (ATL) Carter on the matter -- without 
much success -- and may push La Russa to raise it with you. 
Italy has a USD 1.9 billion commitment in JSF, making it our 
largest bilateral Defense Cooperation in Armaments (DCA) 
program with the Italians.  Hearing from you that the U.S. 
values Italy's special role in the program and that our joint 
future with the JSF bolsters our strong relationship will be 
helpful in keeping the focus on the strategic gains that 
cooperation brings to both sides. 
 
ROME 00000083  003 OF 003 
 
 
 
An Important Partnership 
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8. (C) Mr. Secretary, the La Russa-Frattini team has come 
through for us on a number of key issues: they have supported 
us on Kosovo, agreed to retain high troop levels in UNIFIL 
during the transition to Spanish command, and came up with a 
courageous commitment to the next phase of operations in 
Afghanistan.  They are a team that works, is instinctively 
pro-American, and is highly sensitive to how Italy is 
perceived by the U.S. Government.  Your visit will pay 
substantial dividends for the U.S.-Italy relationship for the 
foreseeable future. 
THORNE