VZCZCXRO6941
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHRO #0049/01 0131442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131442Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3120
INFO RUCNMEU/EU INTEREST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 000049 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IT
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER FRATTINI'S VISIT 
TO WASHINGTON 
 
Classified By: DCM Elizabeth L. Dibble, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  Foreign Minister Frattini's visit to Washington is an 
opportunity to reinforce Italy's commitment to Afghanistan, 
and stress the need for close coordination on Iran: you will 
want to thank Italy for its early announcement of additional 
troop contributions for Afghanistan, and deliver a firm 
message regarding Italian cooperation on Iran sanctions.  The 
Berlusconi government aims to use this visit to highlight 
close US-Italian consultation on key issues, and to 
demonstrate that it is one of the allies that "matter." This 
is crucial to a government still somewhat uncertain of its 
stature with the Obama administration. 
 
¶2. (C)  Frattini's tenure as Foreign Minister has been 
characterized by a desire for closeness with the US and 
support for the priorities of PM Berlusconi, with a focus on 
human rights at time conflicting and competing with a policy 
of "commercial diplomacy" and a hard line on immigration 
issues.  Frattini hews closely to Berlusconi's support for 
Israel in the context of the Middle East Peace Process, and 
the GOI has stood with the US in opposing referral of the 
Goldstone Report to the UNSC or the ICC, and in advocating 
for more helpful EU statements more broadly.  Frattini has 
also pushed Turkish accession to the European Union. 
 
 
¶3. (C)  Frattini last visited Washington in May, 2009. 
 
 
Domestic Context 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  Frattini visits Washington at a time of flux in 
Italian politics.  Although Prime Minister Berlusconi remains 
personally popular, and his government enjoys a wide margin 
in Parliament, some of Berlusconi,s erstwhile allies have 
begun to criticize him openly or look beyond him as they 
maneuver to secure their own political futures.  Berlusconi 
faces no credible opponent within the center right or in the 
opposition, but his allies and confidantes tell us that he is 
increasingly irritated by ongoing 
personal and legal issues, as well as by political attacks by 
former allies, first and foremost President of the Chamber of 
Deputies Gianfranco Fini.  (See Ref Rome 01381) 
 
¶5. (C)  A former judge and a technocrat by nature, Frattini 
is a strong Berlusconi loyalist--consistently espousing and 
defending the PM's positions, unlike other cabinet ministers, 
even on issues wholly unrelated to foreign policy.  He enjoys 
a strong international reputation, as well as a good measure 
of respect from the opposition left. Although he does not 
command a political base, Frattini's political 
survival is probably no longer dependent on Berlusconi, given 
the the good opinion in which the Italian public and 
political class hold him. Amidst the at-times vicious 
maneuvering and political backstabbing in Rome this fall, 
Frattini has managed to remain above the fray. 
 
Key Advocate for Robust Italian Participation in ISAF and 
UNIFIL 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Frattini has consistently pushed within GOI circles to 
respond positively to U.S. requests for more support in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Lebanon, and has played a critical 
role within the GOI in pushing for robust continued Italian 
participation in military missions abroad, particularly ISAF 
and UNIFIL.  He was key to the GOI decision to announce 
Italy,s 1,000 troop contribution to ISAF well ahead of the 
NATO Foreign Ministerial and President Obama's December 1 
speech, a risky political move designed to demonstrate 
Italy's credentials as a staunch U.S. ally, and  to ensure 
domestic political support for the measure.  Italian troop 
levels will increase to an average of 3,700 in summer 2010, 
with an overall ceiling of  4,000.  Italy previously pledged 
200 Carabinieri police trainers to Afghanistan, 60 of which 
are on the ground now; the remainder should deploy in the 
coming months. 
 
¶7. (C)  Despite substantial domestic budgetary and political 
pressure to halve the 2,300-strong Italian troop contingent 
in Lebanon when Italy hands the UNIFIL command to Spain in 
February 2010, Frattini actively supported our request to 
keep Italian troop levels high, so that Italy will likely 
retain around 2,000 troops there.  Frattini has also 
protected Italy,s modest development aid contributions to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan from budget cuts that have gutted 
other Italian aid programs: Italy contributes about Euro 50 
million to Afghanistan per year and has approved over Euro 60 
million in aid to Pakistan in 2009.  Some of that aid is 
 
ROME 00000049  002 OF 004 
 
 
being held up by the Zardari government,s failure to sign an 
MOU with Italy governing disbursement. 
 
 
Iran: Italy needs to be fully on board 
--------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C)  On sanctions, throughout all levels of the 
policy-making apparatus, GOI officials have professed strong 
allegiance to President Obama's two-track approach; since PM 
Berlusconi's meeting with President Obama in June, GOI 
officials have insisted that the word has been passed clearly 
to Italian companies that no new projects should be initiated 
in Iran.  As recently as December 30, Undersecretary Gianni 
Letta, PM Berlusconi's right-hand man, assured Amb. Thorne he 
would personally press Eni CEO Scaroni to halt any ongoing 
activities.  On January 12, FM Frattini published an 
editorial in which he wrote that if UNSC sanction don't work 
"we must be ready to consider sanctions adopted by a more 
restricted group of countries, the so-called 'like-minded' 
group. . ."  Though Italy is among Iran's main economic 
partners, he continued, "we believe that physical security 
and responsibility to our allies and to the entire world come 
before other considerations," and "our firms with interests 
in Iran have shown a great sense of responsibility." 
 
¶9. (C)  Yet while the GOI claims that it has been successful 
in applying "moral suasion" to Italian companies, these 
efforts have at times appeared to be half-hearted, and the 
results are certainly uneven.  Major Italian energy firms Eni 
and Edison have only offered to hold off 
new expansion plans in Iran temporarily.  Eni has repeatedly 
told U.S. officials  that it will not undertake "new" 
projects while in fact it is expanding oil production 
operations in Iran under existing (i.e., "not new") 
contracts. It would be helpful to reiterate to Minister 
Frattini our strong concerns about the continuation of 
business as usual in Iran by Italian companies, and in 
particular the expansion of any activity by Italian energy 
companies, notably Eni. 
 
¶10. (C/NF) The GOI often claims that Italy has a major 
economic relationship with Iran which makes the economic pain 
of sanctions difficult to bear for Italian companies. In 
reality, Iran ranks 24th among Italy's trading partners, 
representing a mere 0.5 percent of its total exports; even 
Italian energy imports from Iran are relatively low and 
fungible (about 5 percent of total oil imports).  While we 
see Iran as not particularly significant in economic terms 
for Italy, the reverse is not true, however.  In 2007, Italy 
was Iran,s fifth largest export destination, and Iran,s 
sixth largest import source -- Italy supplied Iran with about 
4 percent of its imports, and purchased approximately 5.7 
percent of Iranian exports.  Thus any vulnerability on the 
restriction of trade appears to be more on the Iranian 
side; the fear of undertaking measures that really bite in 
Iran likely stems more from Italian fear of political 
retaliation by Iran against future commercial opportunities, 
than of a substantial economic price to be borne by Italian 
companies now. 
 
¶11. (C)  The Italians are neuralgic on the issue of the P5 1, 
a grouping they feel cuts them out of the 
decision-making process on issues of direct import to their 
commercial opportunities, and they have  advocated for a 
"like-minded" states mechanism in order to have a seat of 
some kind at the 
table.  Italian officials reacted with alarm to word of 
possible inclusion of Eni and Irasco on the Iran Sanctions 
Act list, with MFA Secretary General Massolo telling A/S 
Gordon in November that Eni would "do anything" to avoid 
inclusion. Frattini has been an outspoken advocate for human 
rights in Iran in the aftermath of the June elections, and 
has repeatedly criticized the regime for its harsh measures 
against demonstrators and opposition activists. 
 
 
Russia 
------ 
 
¶12. (C)  PM Berlusconi's close personal ties with Vladimir 
Putin and the very strong corporate ties between Italian 
energy parastatal Eni and Russia's Gazprom often put Italy at 
odds with U.S. and EU energy security efforts.  Italy's 
energy policy too often reflects Russian, rather than 
European, priorities. For example, the GOI is ambivalent 
about supporting the EU's Nabucco Caspian pipeline, while 
Eni is poised to help Gazprom construct Black Sea and Baltic 
Sea pipelines that will only deepen EU dependence on Russia. 
Eni often appears to dictate GOI energy policy and uses its 
influence to hinder EU energy market liberalization plans. 
 
ROME 00000049  003 OF 004 
 
 
However, Italy is taking some steps in the right direction by 
supporting energy projects that will diversify its own energy 
sources. 
 
¶13. (C/NF) It would be helpful to remind Minister Frattini of 
long-standing USG concerns about European dependence on 
Russia or any other single energy supplier, emphasizing that 
Italian help in increasing the flow of Russian gas around 
Ukraine is not the same as a policy of seeking diversity of 
energy sources, routes and technologies. 
 
¶14. (C)  Ever loyal, FM Frattini has been a vocal supporter 
of strengthening political and security ties with Russia and 
has also publicly defended PM Berlusconi,s friendship with 
PM Putin from media criticism, such as when Berlusconi 
abruptly left Rome during Jordan,s King Abdullah recent 
state visit for a "private visit" to Russia to celebrate 
Putin's birthday at the latter's dacha. 
 
¶15. (C)  We understand that the GOI has not yet begun to 
assess the draft Russia EU security treaty in detail.  FM 
Frattini has been careful in his public remarks, however, to 
underline that any new treaty cannot supplant existing NATO 
and OSCE structures.  Frattini and Russian FM Lavrov recently 
published a joint editorial in centrist influential daily La 
Stampa calling for "a new world order" based on 
interdependence and cooperation between the EU and Russia, as 
well as reinforced and expanded U.S.-EU-Russia relations 
within the framework of existing organizations and 
agreements.  In the context of the December 3 Italy-Russia 
Summit in Rome, Frattini noted it was a mistake to say 
Russian-Italian or 
Russian-EU relations were based chiefly on energy interests, 
and stressed that Russia is an indispensable partner for 
European stability and security.  Frattini also lauded 
President Obama,s 'reset" of U.S.-Russian relations as a 
window of opportunity which Italy strongly supports. 
 
 
Belarus 
------- 
 
¶16. (C)  Amid questioning over the appropriateness of 
Berlusconi,s November visit to Belarus, Frattini 
characterized it as a "visit by a head of government that 
blazed the trail for the others."  Frattini,s consistently 
positive statements on Belarus contrast with his EU 
colleagues, (and the U.S.,) deep concerns about President 
Lukashenko,s suppression of political opposition and other 
human rights abuses.  In September 2009, Frattini was the 
first European government minister to visit Belarus since 
¶1994. His advisors noted to us at the time that he was 
undertaking the trip in the context of and in line with the 
EU's evolving policy toward Belarus.  During the trip, 
Frattini underscored Italy,s great interest in strong 
economic relations with Belarus and hinted at deals major 
Italian concerns would be closing 
with Belarus.  Frattini also advocated that Belarus move 
closer to European institutions and came out in favor of 
lifting the  EU visa freeze (suspended, although not 
terminated, since 2008) for senior Belarusian officials, 
including Lukashenko.   (In November, the EU recommended to 
extend the sanctions and their suspension.) 
 
Italian Nuclear Energy Project 
------------------------------ 
 
¶17. (C/NF) The GOI is pursuing plans to build up to ten 
nuclear power plants in Italy. Heavy French lobbying led to a 
political deal for an Italian electricity parastatal ENEL 
joint venture with France,s EdF to build four nuclear plants 
with French technology. The lack of a fair and open bidding 
process for this deal and continuing French lobbying has 
placed U.S.-based companies at a disadvantage in entering the 
Italian nuclear energy market. A word to Minister Frattini 
that we expect U.S. companies to be given 
a level-playing field to compete is critical if they are to 
have a fair chance to bid for Italian nuclear energy 
projects. 
 
 
Yemen 
----- 
 
¶18. (C)  Following the foiled Christmas attack in Detroit and 
the closure of the U.S. and UK Embassies in Sana'a, Frattini 
forcefully called for EU coordination (based on the 
anti-terrorism strategy adopted by the EU in 2005) in 
combating terrorism and encouraged the EU High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton to 
move Yemen to the front of the EU foreign policy agenda for 
 
ROME 00000049  004 OF 004 
 
 
its January meeting. 
 
¶19. (C)  Frattini strongly supports tight collaboration with 
the U.S. and all democratic countries in combating terrorism 
and its causes.  Frattini also believes stronger coordination 
with Arab countries is absolutely necessary and that while 
Europe has a role, Arab leaders must be in the forefront in 
fighting terrorism.  Frattini recently commented in the press 
that Saudi FM al-Faisal and Arab League SecGen Amre Moussa 
share his view that in combatting terrorism, a strong focus 
must be placed on preventing terrorist groups from forming in 
the first place.  In the case of Yemen, he said, this means 
advancing national 
reconciliation, involving the ROYG in anti-terrorism efforts 
and providing increased anti-terrorism support. 
 
DIBBLE