VZCZCXRO2253
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHRH #0131/01 0301151
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301151Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2404
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY 0461
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 0571

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000131 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SA
SUBJECT: A/S FELTMAN'S JANUARY 26 MEETING WITH CULTURE 
MINISTER ABDULAZIZ KHOJA 
 
RIYADH 00000131  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) During a January 26 meeting with Assistant Secretary 
Feltman, Culture Minister Abdulaziz Khoja urged us to share 
our thoughts on Iraq with FM Prince Saud Al-Faisal; said the 
Saudis remained convinced of Iranian support for the Houthis 
in Yemen; expressed concern about the possibility of Israel 
striking Hezbollah or Iran; and assured us that the improved 
Saudi-Syrian relationship would not come at the expense of 
Lebanon.  He also praised Saudi-U.S. cooperation and its 
positive impact on Lebanon, and described his plans for 
transforming the Saudi Ministry of Information and Culture. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
WORKING HARD ON IPR 
------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) A/S Feltman began by thanking Khoja and his Ministry 
for the work they had done on IPR and copyright issues. 
"This is very important and we have been working very hard," 
Khoja said, adding that they were hopeful their efforts would 
result in Saudi Arabia's removal from the 301 Watch List. 
 
 
SHARE VIEWS WITH FM SAUD RE: IRAQ 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Turning to politics, Khoja asked A/S Feltman for his 
views on recent events in the region, mentioning Iran, Iraq, 
and Lebanon, in particular.  We saw several trends in Iraq, 
explained Feltman, many positive, and some negative. 
Increased evidence of cross-sectarian coalition building in 
the lead-up to the March elections was a positive sign, as 
was evidence that Iraqi Shia leaders appeared to be 
benefiting politically when they were seen as demonstrating 
their independence vis-a-vis Iran.  "Even the Shia?," Khoja 
remarked, agreeing that this was an encouraging development. 
Taking notes throughout the conversation, Khoja urged Feltman 
to raise this issue with FM Saud.  Those close to the King 
were aware that engaging Iraq was important, he continued, 
but the fact was the King did not like or trust Iraqi PM Nuri 
Al-Maliki.  "I hope you can talk to Saud about this," he 
urged again, adding that he would try to relay the message to 
both FM Saud and the King later that day. 
 
 
IRAN AND YEMEN 
-------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Feltman then discussed current U.S. thinking on both 
Iran and Yemen.  On Iran, he detailed the steps taken by the 
Obama administration, noting that the Iranian response had 
been "disappointing" at all levels.  On Yemen, we were very 
pleased with productive U.S.-Saudi cooperation, although we 
still differed in our assessment of Iran's role in the Houthi 
conflict.  The Saudis remained convinced of Iran's 
involvement, Khoja acknowledged, adding that they suspected 
Eritrea and possibly Somalia were acting as conduits for 
Iranian assistance.  Asked about Houthi leader Abdel Malik 
Al-Houthi's announcement of a unilateral ceasefire and 
withdrawal from Saudi Arabia, Khoja replied that it might be 
serious; however, the Houthis were also looking for an 
opportunity to talk to the Saudis directly.  In any case, if 
the Houthis did indeed withdraw, the Saudis would have no 
reason to follow them into Yemeni territory. 
 
 
SAUDI-SYRIAN RELATIONS 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Moving on to Syria, Feltman highlighted U.S. efforts 
to reach out to Syria, concluding that in our view, the ball 
was now in Syria's court.  He cited specific instances of 
unhelpful Syrian behavior, and raised concerns regarding both 
continued Syrian assistance to Hezbollah and the possibility 
of Syria trying to leverage its improved relations with Saudi 
Arabia to put pressure on Lebanon.  Khoja responded that the 
Saudis did not want to see this happen.  Reacting to 
Feltman's comments about Damascus-based satellite channel 
Al-Rai, Khoja described steps taken by a group of Arab 
Information Ministers in Cairo to limit the broadcast of 
political incitement on satellites under their control.  He 
expressed concern that Israel would strike Hezbollah, then 
move on to Iran, and wondered whether or not U.S. efforts to 
avoid a military conflict in the region would succeed. 
 
 
RIYADH 00000131  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
HARIRI, LEBANON "DOING WELL" 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The discussion then turned to Lebanon.  Khoja said 
that he saw Lebanese PM Saad Hariri often, and that he was 
"doing well."  Smiling broadly, he noted that Hariri and Asad 
now talk from time to time.  Asked about Asad's January 13-15 
visit to Saudi Arabia he said it was "very good," and that 
Asad had visited Jeddah, the King Abdullah University of 
Science and Technology (KAUST) and King Abdulllah Economic 
City (KAEC).  Quickly turning the conversation back to 
Lebanon, Khoja praised the Saudi-U.S. partnership, observing 
that together "we saved Lebanon many times."  He said that he 
no longer maintained significant contacts with Hezbollah, but 
spoke occasionally with Fadlallah.  Nasrallah, he was sure, 
"didn't like him anymore." 
 
 
KHOJA'S PLANS FOR MEDIA REFORM 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C) Discussing his current role as Minister of Culture 
and Information, Khoja said he questioned the whole Ministry 
of Information concept and hoped to spin-off television, 
radio, and news agency operations in the near future.  He 
highlighted his recent efforts to liberalize the Saudi press, 
and promote a more professional journalistic culture.  "You 
can criticize anyone now," he said proudly. 
 
¶8.  (U) A/S Feltman has cleared on this cable. 
 
SMITH