VZCZCXRO6827
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHRH #0105/01 0251124
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251124Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2363
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY 0452
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 0562

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000105 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SA LE SY IR WB GZ
SUBJECT: SAUDI-SYRIAN RELATIONS: A "GOOD SMELL IN THE AIR" 
 
REF: A. DAMASCUS 00052 
     ¶B. RIYADH 00034 
     ¶C. RIYADH 00037 
 
RIYADH 00000105  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES B. SMITH FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Syrian President Bashar Al-Asad's three-day visit to 
Saudi Arabia from January 13-15 (ref A) marked the third time 
in four months that the once-estranged Asad and King Abdullah 
have met face to face.  While the Syrian Embassy in Riyadh 
has downplayed the political dimensions of the visit--and 
brushed off the suggestion that Egyptian President Hosni 
Mubarak had been invited to attend--they are clearly 
enthusiastic about the improving personal relationship 
between the King and Asad and its potential implications for 
Syria's--and the region's--future.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
ASAD'S VISIT: THE BASICS 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) According to official SPA reporting, Asad was 
received at the airport on January 13 by King Abdullah bin 
Abdulaziz, Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz, Riyadh Governor 
Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz, and the King's son and advisor 
Prince Abdulaziz bin Abdullah.  The group went to the King's 
Janadriyah farm outside of Riyadh, where they were joined by 
FM Prince Saud Al-Faisal for official meetings and a dinner. 
 
¶3.  (U) On January 14, Asad traveled to Jeddah, accompanied 
by Prince Abdulaziz bin Abdullah for the duration of the 
trip.  In Jeddah he paid official visits to the King Abdullah 
University for Science and Technology (KAUST), where he met 
with Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ali 
Al-Naimi, and to the King Abdullah Economic City (KAEC), 
where he met with SAGIA Governor Amr Al-Dabbagh.  Other press 
outlets reported that Asad's wife and children met him in 
Jeddah, and that the family performed Umrah together. 
 
 
"PRIVATE VISIT" WITH LIMITED OFFICIAL CONTENT 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Syrian Embassy contacts described the visit as a 
"tremendous success," stressing the personal, rather than the 
official dimensions of the trip.  According to Syrian First 
Secretary Qusay Mustafa, their Embassy in Riyadh was aware of 
Asad's visit in advance; however, they were told it was 
"purely personal" and had limited involvement in its 
arrangement or substance.  Asad had initially just asked to 
visit the Kingdom to perform Umrah with his family; however, 
the King insisted upon hosting him and the pair held 
approximately two hours of official meetings.  No Syrian 
officials accompanied Asad on the visit, and the Syrian 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia was present at "some, but not all" 
of the official talks between the two leaders. 
 
¶5.  (C) Mustafa said that discussion of Lebanon, the 
Egyptian-led Palestinian reconciliation efforts, and the 
upcoming Arab League summit in March dominated the official 
conversation.  On Lebanon, both sides were "pleased" with 
current progress.  On Palestinian reconciliation, Syria hoped 
that an agreement could be reached, but did not believe 
Palestinian unity was a necessary prerequisite before 
continuing their own talks with Israel vis-a-vis the Golan 
Heights.  On the Arab League summit, Mustafa said the Syrians 
we0QiQQb;TS*U,7wportant" to happen, such as an 
agreement on a possible "deadline" for Israel to acknowledge 
the Arab Peace Initiative.  He was tight-lipped as to what 
extent Saudi and Syrian goals for the summit were in 
alignment, but maintained the Syrians were "optimistic" that 
developing personal bonds between Abdullah and Asad would 
eventually pay dividends.  While the official news reports 
suggested Iran, Iraq, and Yemen were also on the agenda, 
Mustafa made no comments about these topics. 
 
 
WHAT ABOUT MUBARAK? 
------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Asked about media speculation that King Abdullah had 
been trying to bring about a three-way meeting that included 
Egyptian president Mubarak, Mustafa insisted it was 
unfounded.  "I was standing next to our Ambassador when he 
asked our President if this was the case, and he said no, 
absolutely not." 
 
 
 
RIYADH 00000105  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
COMMENT: 
-------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Asked to describe the current state of Saudi-Syrian 
relations and their prospects for the immediate future, 
Mustafa noted a "good smell in the air."  However, his 
insistence that Asad's visit was "purely personal" may be an 
attempt to camouflage Syrian disappointment that the rumored 
three-way summit didn't materialize.  In separate meetings, 
Egyptian Embassy contacts have maintained that Mubarak was 
invited, but that he refused because he did not want to 
"reward" the Syrians for what he views as insufficient steps 
to distance themselves from Iran, Hezbollah, and especially 
Hamas.  Further, they suggested that some Saudi officials 
were "growing frustrated" with Asad, but that the King felt 
strongly that engagement with Syria was essential.  While the 
truth probably lies somewhere in between, it is clear that 
both the Egyptians and Syrians are interested in shaping the 
U.S. view of the changing Saudi-Syrian relationship. 
 
¶8.  (C) COMMENT CONTINUED:  Asad's visit came during a 
particularly active time for Saudi diplomacy--on the heels of 
visits by Mahmoud Abbas (ref B) and Khaled Mish'al (ref C), 
following trips by FM Saud to Egypt and Damascus, on the same 
day as a visit by Chinese FM Yang (septel), and just prior to 
a visit by Turkish PM Erdogan.  Given this context, the 
suggestion the Saudis may have been trying to broker a 
three-way summit is believable.  Regardless of what else may 
have been intended, the Syrians are clearly enthusiastic 
about the improving personal relationship between Abdullah 
and Asad and its potential implications for Syria's--and the 
region's--future.  END COMMENT. 
SMITH