VZCZCXRO9543
RR RUEHLN RUEHSK
DE RUEHRA #0051/01 0271548
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271548Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RIGA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6265
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1258
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 0026
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0016
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0001
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 0031
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 4083
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 2674
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHFJUSC/HQS US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIGA 000051 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/VO BILL BEARDSLEE, LAURA STEIN, AND BRENDA GREWE 
DEPT ALSO FOR CA/FPP SETH BILLINGS 
FRANKFURT FOR RCO KERRY BROUGHAM AND CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 
DHS HEADQUARTERS FOR EMILY HYMOWITZ 
MOSCOW FOR FPM ERIN EUSSEN AND NIV CHIEF PHIL SKOTTE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CIS PGOV PREL ASEC KFRD KCOR KCRM LG
 
SUBJECT: LATVIA: MORE CHARGES LIKELY AS POLICE CONTINUE PASSPORT 
FRAUD INVESTIGATION 
 
REF: 08 RIGA 23 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On January 21 we met with the Latvian Security 
Police to discuss a two-year passport fraud investigation. 
Officials confirmed that 10 suspects have been charged, and more 
indictments are expected.  The Government of Latvia (GOL) confirmed 
that 144 false identities were created and shared the actual 
biographical information of foreign nationals who fraudulently 
obtained the Latvian passports.  Previously, it appeared that 
Latvian authorities were only targeting corrupt officials for 
prosecution and planned to merely recover and cancel the fraudulent 
documents, but it is now clear that all who obtained these passports 
could face prosecution in Latvia that would also meet the threshold 
for U.S. visa ineligibilities.  Latvian officials understand the 
importance of document security with regard to LatviaQs 
participation in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP).  This far-reaching 
investigation and willingness to share data underscores that the GOL 
continues to take this matter seriously.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On January 12, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the 
consular section with information about four new criminal cases 
filed between September and November 2009 pertaining to a 
high-profile passport fraud scheme that was uncovered in late 2007, 
shortly before Latvia was admitted into the VWP (reftel).  The 
Regional Security Office separately received an updated list of the 
fraudulent passports which authorities have identified.  On January 
21 we met with senior Latvian Security Police officials, including 
the lead investigator, to discuss the status of the case.  Police 
officials confirmed that, in addition to the four recently filed 
criminal cases, six other individuals have been charged in separate 
cases in connection with fraudulently obtaining genuine Latvian 
passports.  The police officials confirmed that the investigation is 
continuing and that evidence is being analyzed on a case-by-case 
basis, often involving the assistance of handwriting experts or 
other forensic specialists.  Thus, while it is difficult to 
determine how many individuals will ultimately face criminal 
charges, the police indicated that anyone who was involved in the 
selling or the purchase of the fraudulent identities is fair game. 
 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Security Police confirmed that a total of 144 false 
identities were created in the Population Register of Latvia between 
2002 and 2006 before the fraud scheme was uncovered, and passports 
were issued in all of these identities.  The number of identities 
does not exactly line up with the number of passports issued because 
some travelers were issued multiple passports (for example, if they 
subsequently registered a marriage and obtained a new passport in 
the married name or if they filled the pages from travel).  Latvian 
authorities shared the most updated list showing the names of the 
false identities and, for 66 of the passports, the corresponding 
real biographic information for those who purchased the passports 
and may face criminal charges.  (Note:  There were some 
discrepancies in separate lists received from the GOL over the past 
two years, and the Security Police pledged to provide post with a 
further updated list for use in consolidating information and 
creating substantive visa lookout entries.  End note.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) The police officials also provided assurances that, 
although a total of 108 passport books have not been physically 
recovered, all fraudulent passports have been invalidated via the 
Interpol and Schengen reporting systems.  The corresponding real 
names have not yet been identified for 78 fraudulently issued 
passports, but authorities have determined the real identities for 
the remainder.  According to the law enforcement officials, the 
majority of the passports were obtained by affluent Russian citizens 
who wanted an EU passport for travel purposes, although the police 
reported that citizens of Belarus, Ukraine, Israel, and Lithuania 
were also involved in the fraud scheme.  The police confirmed that 
large bribes were paid to secure the fraudulent passports, and 
emboffs heard anecdotal reports of payments of up to USD 100,000 for 
 
RIGA 00000051  002 OF 003 
 
 
the passports.  The high price these genuine documents commanded 
underscores the affluence of the suspects in this investigation. 
The Security Police noted that charges thus far have focused on 
fraud and forgery, but suggested that additional charges could be 
filed against the passport recipients for the bribery associated 
with obtaining the travel documents. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Up until now, it was postQs understanding that Latvian 
authorities were only targeting the Latvian bureaucrats and 
ringleaders who issued the fraudulent passports for prosecution and 
that police were content to merely recover and cancel the 
ill-begotten passports.  It is now clear that criminal charges are 
possible for many or all of the people who paid large sums for these 
fraudulent travel documents, and the recently filed charges over the 
past few months demonstrate that the two-year long investigation 
indeed continues and is yielding results.  The participation of the 
Chief and Deputy Chief of the responsible Latvian Security Police 
unit in this meeting with emboffs and their willingness to share 
data with post also demonstrates that Latvia is taking document 
security issues seriously, and officials are mindful that it is an 
important element of the countryQs participation in the Visa Waiver 
Program.  Most of the passport holders reside abroad, but even if 
suspects agree to pay a fine as part of a guilty plea if they are 
charged, there could be a substantial number of affluent and 
possibly influential persons facing future criminal eligibilities 
for U.S. visas. 
 
Visa Lookout Entries: 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) When post obtained the first lists of fraudulent identities 
from the GOL in early 2008, consular staff promptly entered P6C 
misrepresentation lookouts into the CLASS system.  However, when 
some of the holders of the fraudulent passports subsequently applied 
for U.S. visas, it was noted that there was no basis for a hard 6C 
ineligibility as the passports were never used to obtain a U.S. 
immigration benefit.  The P6C lookouts were also based on the 
fraudulent identities and were not linked to the real identities of 
those who obtained the passports, which in many instances still 
remains unknown.  Since Latvian authorities have invalidated the 
passports electronically and the criteria for 6C misrepresentation 
as established in the Immigration and Nationality Act is not met, 
post will seek to remove the P6C lookouts via CLOK in coordination 
with the Visa Office.  However, QLQ lookouts will be entered for all 
fake identities involving passports which have not been physically 
recovered, which will ensure that adjudicating consular officers are 
alerted in the event one of these passports is presented in 
conjunction with a visa application. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Post will follow up with the Department of Homeland 
Security Customs and Border Protection to ensure that the Latvian 
efforts to invalidate the documents were sufficient to alert U.S. 
port of entry inspectors should any of the unrecovered fraudulent 
passports be presented for admission to the U.S. via the Visa Waiver 
Program.  On January 26 the consular section searched the Consular 
Consolidated Database (CCD) and confirmed that no visas have been 
issued for any of the known fraudulent identities.  There were 
several new fraudulent names on the most recent list which had not 
previously been provided by Latvian law enforcement and therefore 
had no CLASS lookouts, so conoff checked the DHS Arrival Departure 
Information System (ADIS) to confirm that none of these fraudulent 
identities had been used to enter the United States.  New QL 
lookouts will be added for these identities as well.  We are also 
expecting Latvian authorities to provide information on 
approximately 20 additional fraudulent identities (of the 144 
reported) that we have not received thus far. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Since there is a reasonable basis to believe that criminal 
charges may eventually be filed against all known subjects who 
 
RIGA 00000051  003 OF 003 
 
 
obtained fraudulent Latvian passports, post will enter possible P2A1 
ineligibilities for moral turpitude in the CLASS system for the 66 
real identities that have been revealed to date.  These entries 
would alert consular officers to possible pending criminal cases in 
Latvia should the same subjects apply for U.S. visas at any embassy 
or consulate.  Those charged in the four criminal cases shared by 
the MFA have already been entered, but the Security Police agreed to 
provide information about the other six confirmed indictments filed 
thus far.  Post will upgrade these lookouts to hard category one 
hits for moral turpitude as information about convictions becomes 
available since all applicable statutes in the Latvian criminal code 
carry possible prison sentences of one year or more in prison and 
meet the criteria for a visa ineligibility. 
 
GARBER