VZCZCXRO9068
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DE RUEHGO #0051/01 0270943
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FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9775
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2384
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5881
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 9444
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7071
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4735
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2815
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000051 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP, IO AND DRL 
PACOM FOR FPA 
US MISSION GENEVA FOR LABOR ATTACHE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2019 
TAGS: ELAB PGOV PREL PHUM BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: SUPPLEMENTARY UNDERSTANDING ON FORCED LABOR 
EXTENDED 
 
REF: A. 2009 RANGOON 45 
     ¶B. 2009 RANGOON 37 
     ¶C. 2009 RANGOON 746 
     ¶D. 2009 RANGOON 875 
 
Classified By: Economic Officer Marc Porter for reasons 1.4 (b and d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  The International Labor Organization (ILO) and 
Government of Burma (GOB) have signed a one year extension to 
the Supplementary Understanding (SU) on Forced Labor - the 
basis upon which ILO's representative in Burma is permitted 
to receive forced labor complaints and advocate for 
resolutions.  While noting some progress, such as newly 
granted permission to distribute an informational brochure, 
ILO remains at loggerheads with the GOB over a group of 
linked forced labor cases in Magwe division, which may 
jeopardize the ILO's presence in Burma. That conflict 
contributed to a curtailment of ILO participation in the 7th 
annual Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative Against 
Trafficking (COMMIT), and gave ILO officials a vivid picture 
in Magwe of how far some portions of the GOB will go to 
attempt to paint a false picture.  End summary. 
 
Extension of Supplementary Understanding 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  ILO Executive Director Kari Tapiola and Steve 
Marshall, the ILO Liaison Officer in Rangoon, told diplomats 
at a January 22 briefing that the ILO and GOB signed a one 
year extension to their SU on forced labor to February 2011. 
The SU was initially signed in 2007 (REFTEL) and has been 
renewed annually.  The scope of the SU remains unchanged. 
Labor Minister Aung Kyi, with whom ILO officials have a good 
relationship, indicated that the extension, which presumably 
will allow the ILO to continue its activities throughout the 
coming 2010 election period and into the term of the 
succeeding government, was a significant concession.  The GOB 
initially had attempted to negotiate an extension only until 
the election, proposing that the current regime could not 
bind the succeeding government. 
 
Tense Times in ILO-GOB Relationship 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Tapiola and Marshall did not divulge to the group of 
diplomats details of their negotiations with the GOB other 
than a cryptic remark about 'difficult discussions.' 
However, Marshall met with Pol-Econoff and G/TIP TDYer in 
Bagan January 19 and revealed a strained relationship.  The 
embassy officers were in Bagan to attend the 7th annual 
COMMIT meeting.  Marshall and a Geneva-based ILO team headed 
by Tapiola had travelled to Bagan to attend the meeting, as 
previously planned, but upon arrival were informed the GOB 
had arranged a full day of sightseeing.  ILO responded that 
Tapiola was there to attend the conference.  GOB officials 
succeeded in preventing ILO representatives from attending 
the meeting, although the ILO team managed to meet with a few 
delegates and observers at their off-site hotel.  Tapiola 
later told CDA at a Rangoon dinner that it appeared two 
portions of the GOB (the Labor Ministry and the Home Affairs 
Ministry) had not coordinated on plans.  Home Affairs, which 
organized the COMMIT meeting, won the day. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Marshall noted to Emboffs that another explanation 
for the Bagan fiasco could be ILO's vigorous pursuit of a 
group of linked forced labor cases in Magwe Division that led 
to the imprisonment of thirteen farmers, their lawyer, and 
their facilitator. (REFTELS)  The ILO has privately taken a 
hard line on the Magwe forced labor cases, going so far as 
telling the GOB that the ILO "will pull out" of the country 
if the issue is not resolved.  Marshall reported the 
authorities offered to release the "five least dangerous 
 
RANGOON 00000051  002 OF 003 
 
 
farmers."  The Tapiola team drove to Magwe Division after 
Bagan to speak directly with the farmers and local 
authorities.  At the diplomatic briefing in Rangoon, Marshall 
described the Magwe case as an example of local authorities 
going their own way, sometimes contravening directions from 
Nay Pyi Taw, on forced labor cases. 
 
¶5. (C) At the Rangoon dinner, Marshall and Tapiola revealed 
that when the team reached Magwe Division the minders stopped 
the convoy at a village, saying it was the place of the 
controversy.  The ILO local reps realized it was not the 
right place and insisted on proceeding to the right village, 
a few miles onward.  The authorities had bussed in 
"villagers" to the first place, and those "villagers" then 
were bussed on to provide a tense background at the right 
village.  None the less, the aggrieved population of the 
right village spoke freely with the ILO about their case and 
the suffering they have endured because of making their 
complaint.  The attempted GOB subterfuge, however, left an 
indelible impression on the visitors. 
 
Reports to the ILO on Forced Labor 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) In the private meeting with Emboffs in Bagan, Marshall 
noted that the ILO has received more complaints from Magwe 
than any other region, speculating that the populace in Magwe 
has seemed in the past to be more aware and more willing to 
lodge protests than in other regions, though he admitted to 
not know why this was the case.  Marshall also noted that 
most forced labor complaints submitted to the ILO have come 
from "white areas" where there are minimal security concerns. 
 While the ILO receives information on forced labor from 
"black" areas (where there are operational military 
activities against armed insurgent groups and where forced 
labor problems may well be at their worst), Marshall 
commented that it is difficult for people in those areas to 
submit complaints, and the ILO does not have access to these 
areas due to security reasons.  Marshall noted that, since 
the unfortunate example of criminal convictions in Magwe, the 
number of complaints flowing into the ILO office in Rangoon 
has "dried up." 
 
New Brochure to Highlight Forced Labor 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) ILO has received permission to produce and distribute 
a pamphlet in Burmese that will describe forced labor and 
provide information on seeking redress, ILO officials told 
the diplomatic briefing. This has been on the ILO's agenda 
with no past success.  It is good news.  Marshall separately 
told Econoff that he has submitted a proposed text for the 
brochure to the GOB and is awaiting their suggested 
"improvements."  Marshall expected that the final wording of 
the brochure would be the result of back-and-forth 
negotiation.  Funding for the brochure will likely come from 
existing ILO resources, but they may also ask Germany for 
financial assistance.  Marshall inquired whether the USG 
would be interested in helping finance the effort.  Marshall 
hopes to distribute the brochure through NGOs, religious 
organizations, the UN, and GOB-linked organizations. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) We are encouraged that the ILO has received GOB 
permission to continue operations into 2011.  The ILO Rangoon 
office may be the most energetic UN entity here in pushing on 
important human rights issues in ways that actually achieve 
results.  It will be interesting to observe how much scope 
for action the regime actually allows the ILO reps in the 
lead-up to elections.  Rumors abound that all international 
entities and NGOs will have their activities severely 
restricted during the election season, with the regime not 
wanting outsiders to influence voters or to observe election 
 
RANGOON 00000051  003 OF 003 
 
 
preparations.  The ILO is certainly correct in considering a 
solution to the Magwe case, at the least freeing those 
wrongly convicted, as truly important.  Absent the ability to 
complain without retribution, many people will be too fearful 
to exercise their "rights," leaving the ILO role minimal. 
 
¶9. (C) Marshall's belief that the trouble in Magwe stems from 
regional, rather than central, GOB actors is interesting.  We 
are aware that regional military commanders do have 
considerable power to run their own turfs.  We doubt regional 
labor officials have the same abilities, unless they also 
have regional military backing.  With the Magwe case having 
become a major ILO issue, one would think central GOB actors 
will become engaged, if they were not already. 
 
¶9. (C) During the ILO dinner, Tapiola noted how much better 
relations with the Ministry of Labor are since Aung Kyi 
received the role.  That prompted the Charge to ask what 
relations were like with the previous minister, U Thaung, the 
regime's designated point of contact for engagement with the 
USG.  Tapiola rolled his eyes and wished us luck.  He clearly 
found U Thaung a very rigid interlocutor.  Tapiola said he 
had been forced to let the GOB know that, if U Thaung 
remained Labor Minister, the ILO would have to rethink its 
engagement.  Then came Aung Kyi. 
DINGER