VZCZCXRO3317
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0008/01 0081117
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081117Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1026
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0018
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 0657
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0595
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0989
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0001
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0103
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0200
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0139
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL PRIORITY 0107
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0061
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0520
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0040
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0568
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1183
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0459
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0057

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 000008 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR AF, AF/W, NEA, NEA/MAG AND INR/AA 
KINSHASA PLS PASS BRAZZAVILLE 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2020 
TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL PINR GV MO
SUBJECT: GUINEA: THE WAY FORWARD 

REF: A. 09 RABAT 1018 
¶B. 09 RABAT 1009 

RABAT 00000008 001.2 OF 004 


Classified By: Ambassador Samuel L. Kaplan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

¶1. (S) Summary: Following a series of discussions in Rabat 
on January 5, Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs Johnnie Carson signaled explicit USG support to 
Guinean Defense Minister Sekouba Konate in his bid to lead 
the country's transition to civilian rule. A/S Carson, along 
with French Presidential Advisor for African Affairs Andre 
Parant and Moroccan Foreign Minster Taieb Fassi Fihri, signed 
a declaration indicating their commitment to the transition 
process based on the plan proposed by ECOWAS facilitator 
Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso. Under the 
declaration, wounded junta leader Captain Moussa Dadis 
Camara, who remains hospitalized in Rabat, would be 
prohibited from returning to Conakry as the signatories 
pursue his resettlement to a third country. Konate departed 
Rabat after meeting with A/S Carson and was expected to make 
a public pronouncement in the near future in Guinea 
announcing his intention to lead the transition to civilian 
rule (Ref A). 

¶2. (S) On January 7, King Mohammed VI called Gabonese 
President Ali Bongo to request that Gabon host Dadis Camara; 
according to the Moroccan MFA, Bongo declined. French 
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner planned to ask Congolese 
President Denis Sassou-Nguesso if the Republic of the Congo 
would host Dadis, and the GOM requested that we reinforce 
that message. Finally, the GOM indicated that it would be 
willing to participate in an international contact group 
meeting on Guinea in Addis Ababa on January 26 and would 
mobilize Arab support -- if an organization other than the 
African Union (AU) convened the meeting. End Summary. 

----------------------- 
Moroccans Set the Stage 
----------------------- 

¶3. (C) Prior to meeting with Konate, A/S Carson met on 
January 5 with Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri and 
Moroccan Director General for Studies and Documentation 
(external intelligence service chief) Mohamed Yassine 
Mansouri, the de facto national security advisor. Also in 
attendance were Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director 
General for Multilateral Affairs and Chief of Staff 
Ambassador Nasser Bourita, Ambassador, DCM, and D/PolCouns. 
French Presidential Advisor for African Affairs Andre Parant 
had met with the Moroccans and with Konate on January 4, and 
A/S Carson subsequently briefed French Ambassador Bruno 
Joubert. 

¶4. (S) Emphasizing Morocco,s goal of finding a way to 
stabilize the situation in Conakry, Fassi Fihri reported that 
in the past few days Konate had asserted his readiness to 
begin the political transition in Guinea. Konate had told 
the Moroccans that he would not name a Prime Minister but 
would ask Guinean civil society, including the political 
parties and the labor unions, to identify a leader until 
elections could be held. Fassi Fihri added that Konate 
recognized the inseparability of military and political 
affairs and the need to disarm the militias and restructure 
Guinean armed forces. Konate needed, however, the commitment 
of support from Washington, Paris, and Rabat, evidenced by 
signature of the declaration, to move forward, Fassi Fihri 
said. 

¶5. (S) Fassi Fihri went on to explain that Konate saw the 
restructuring of the military as a three-to-five year process 

RABAT 00000008 002.2 OF 004 

before the country could claim to have a professional army. 
Konate wished that violence and bloodshed such as seen in 
Guinea and elsewhere on the continent would "never happen 
again," and he recognized the need for those responsible, 
from Dadis to the lowest ranking accomplice, to be brought to 
justice either through Guinean courts or, if not credible,  through an international tribunal, Fassi Fihri reported. As  for the document expressing French, U.S. and Moroccan support  for Konate, French Presidential Advisor for African Affairs  Andre Parant had already signed it. Fassi Fihri said Konate  would "keep it in his pocket" but needed the written  assurance of support. 

------------- 
The U.S. Role 
------------- 

¶6. (S) A/S Carson and the Ambassador expressed appreciation 
for the GOM's leadership on the issue and in the region, 
noting the urgent need to set Guinea on the path to stability 
and civilian rule. While recognizing the importance of 
military restructuring, A/S Carson stressed the need to 
address Guinea's economic situation as well by working to 
develop a strategy for the country's economic revitalization. 
Specifically, A/S Carson suggested that the United States 
could seek the establishment of an international contact 
group that would encourage economic assistance to Guinea, 
engaging the World Bank and the IMF as well. He noted too 
that U.S. Africa Command could visit Guinea to assess the 
security sector and make recommendations on security sector 
reform. 

------------ 
Enter Konate 
------------ 

¶7. (S) After more than one hour, Guinean Minister of 
National Defense Sekouba Konate, who had been waiting nearby, 
joined the meeting. A/S Carson thanked him for sharing 
concerns about the future of Guinea and applauded his efforts 
to resolve the situation in the country. He stated that 
Guinea is at a crossroads and that Konate's leadership was of 
crucial importance and could help ensure the country moved 
along the road to stability and progress. A/S Carson 
stressed that it was important for the transition to begin 
and to lead in the shortest possible time to new elections, 
adding that it was similarly important that Dadis not return 
and participate in elections. Likewise, it would be 
beneficial for Konate to facilitate the presence in Guinea of 
a small ECOWAS monitoring group consisting of 30 to 40 
diplomats and unarmed military personnel, which would lend 
credibility to the transition process. A/S Carson noted 
there was much international goodwill toward Guinea, and if 
the country chose the path toward stability, economic 
development, and civilian government, there would be help 
along the way. 

¶8. (S) Konate expressed his appreciation for A/S Carson's 
message and repeated the importance of having the signed 
document verifying support for his efforts. He repeatedly 
expressed concern for his own security and for the security 
of his country, but stated his readiness to return to Conakry 
and put the Ouagadougou Accords in place. It was important 
to begin, he said, adding that the violent events of 
September 28 could be repeated if efforts were not made to 
prevent violence. Konate stated explicitly that he would 
engage the Forces Vives and others in support of the 
transition and that he would not be a candidate in any future 
elections. 


RABAT 00000008 003.2 OF 004 


¶9. (S) Konate also stated that he supported a civilian 
government of national unity and suggested that opposition 
leader Jean Marie Dore serve as Prime Minister until 
elections were held but asserted in this regard that he would 
accept the decision of the opposition. Konate said the 
military would agree to his role in leading the transition, 
and he agreed it would be important to show that the army was 
not engaged in politics. Claude Pivi (Dadis's half-brother) 
and others closely affiliated with Dadis Camara and the junta 
would similarly be excluded from participating in the 
transition. Pivi was involved in the September 28 massacre, 
Konate said, and should go to court (Ref A). 

-------------- 
Whither Dadis? 
-------------- 

¶10. (S) Carson did not meet with Dadis Camara, but discussed 
his health with the Moroccans outside of Konate,s presence. 
Fassi Fihri told A/S Carson that he has visited Dadis four 
times since he was allowed into the country for medical care 
(Ref B). According to the FM, Dadis has regained "80 
percent" of his faculties, but has difficulty putting more 
than five words together without 30-second pauses before the 
next phrase or sentence. Fassi Fihri,s conversations with 
Dadis had focused mainly on health issues, the FM said, with 
Fassi Fihri urging him to fully recover before thinking about 
politics and his future. Dadis has, however, expressed the 
desire to leave, Fassi Fihri said, and has begun to wonder 
why he has not been discharged from the hospital. 

¶11. (S) Fassi Fihri and Mansouri suggested that once Konate 
made his public pronouncement, Dadis would know he was 
finished politically and it would be difficult for him to 
return to Guinea. Concerted engagement by Konate with 
political forces inside Guinea, and by the U.S. and France 
with external forces such as ECOWAS and President Blaise 
Compaore, to enlist support for Konate and his leadership 
though a transitional period and their positive reaction to a 
pronouncement would convince Dadis to go to a third country, 
Fassi Fihri said. Konate was explicit that Dadis not be 
allowed to return to Guinea and participate in the transition. 

¶12. (S) A/S Carson outlined U.S. efforts to identify a 
country to house Dadis Camara for the long term, noting that 
Gabon, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Libya have been considered. 
Fassi Fihri suggested that The Gambia or the Republic of the 
Congo (Brazzaville) might be other options. 

-------------- 
The Road Ahead 
-------------- 

¶13. (S) After A/S Carson relayed to ECOWAS facilitator 
Blaise Compaore the contents of the meetings, Compaore 
expressed his gratitude for the efforts and noted that this 
could help break the impasse in Guinea. However, he noted 
that Pivi seemed to be running the show in Guinea and asked 
rhetorically if Konate would be able to bring the factions 
together or whether a Konate pronouncement would bring 
greater instability. The real issue for Compaore was whether 
Konate would be able to command the support of the military. 
Konate's stated intention was to move the country along the 
path to economic progress and civilian rule. Konate departed 
Rabat for Conakry on January 5. 

¶14. (S) On January 7, King Mohammed VI called Gabonese 
President Ali Bongo to request that Gabon host Dadis Camara; 
according to Bourita, Bongo declined. French Foreign 
Minister Bernard Kouchner planned to ask Congolese President 

RABAT 00000008 004.2 OF 004 


Denis Sassou-Nguesso if the Republic of the Congo would host 
Dadis, and the GOM requested that we reinforce that message. 
Bourita told DCM that Morocco it would be willing to 
participate in an international contact group meeting on 
Guinea in Addis Ababa on January 26 and would mobilize Arab 
support -- if an organization other than the African Union 
(AU) convened the meeting. Having the AU convene is 
unacceptable to Morocco because Morocco is not a member. 

------- 
Comment 
------- 

¶15. (C) Ambassador Carson,s trip was very productive and 
clearly led to forward movement. Konate, who spoke very 
softly, repeated several times that he was concerned about 
his personal security. For its part, the GOM is anxious to 
1) get Dadis Camara out of Morocco and 2) continue to support 
the transition and reconstruction processes in Guinea. End 
Comment. 

¶16. (U) A/S Carson cleared paragraphs 1 and 3 through 13. 

¶17. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered. 


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