VZCZCXRO3824
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHPG #0030/01 0210923
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 210923Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2072
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0130
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0836
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PRAGUE 000030 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2020 
TAGS: PREL MARR ENRG AF RS EZ
SUBJECT: JANUARY 13 U.S.-CZECH STRATEGIC DIALOGUE 
 
Classified By: EUR A/S Phil Gordon, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  A/S Phil Gordon led the U.S. side in the 
second U.S.-Czech Strategic Dialogue on January 13.  DFM 
Tomas Pojar, who led the Czech side, was friendly, open and 
constructive.  Before the Dialogue, A/S Gordon met with FM 
Jan Kohout.  Kohout, Pojar, other leaders and even Czech 
media with whom Gordon met uniformly asked first about when 
the U.S. would name an ambassador to the Czech Republic.  The 
Czechs asked about U.S. Russia policy in several contexts, 
but did not contest A/S Gordon's assertion that the U.S had 
not sacrificed either principles or allies to its Russia 
policy. 
 
¶2.  (C) The two sides had a full discussion of the agreed 
agenda:  Afghanistan, energy security, Eastern Partnership, 
relations with Russia, Western Balkans and the Middle East. 
FM Kohout and DFM Pojar expressed concern about a supposed 
lack of U.S. attention to Central Europe; Gordon cited strong 
administration commitment to and expertise in the region.  On 
Afghanistan, Pojar predicted that the Czechs would keep 
present troop levels but would not increase them.  Kohout 
suggested a possible modest increase after the elections, 
which A/S Gordon encouraged.  Pojar urged continued U.S. 
involvement in energy security.  Pojar was critical of the 
adequacy Westinghouse's lobbying efforts to win a $27 billion 
contract to build additional nuclear power plants at Temelin. 
 Pojar was glad to hear the U.S. would not negotiate a START 
agreement at all costs.   At the conclusion, The Czechs asked 
that the Strategic Dialogue process continue.  End Summary. 
 
Kohout-Gordon Meeting 
--------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Foreign Minister Jan Kohout opened the meeting by 
saying that he had told former Secretary Albright that naming 
a new ambassador as soon as possible was important. (Note: 
Albright attended a seminar on the NATO Strategic Concept in 
Prague January 12.  End Note.) 
 
¶4.  (C) FM Kohout called the Dialogue an important 
opportunity.  Kohout thought the two sides had managed well 
the results of the missile defense policy review and noted 
that Russia was not happy with the new phased adaptive 
approach (PAA).  Kohout highlighted the importance of energy 
diversity, including at the Temelin nuclear plant (a 
reference to the Westinghouse bid) and concern about cyber 
threats.  He asked about what to expect on Iran and Yemen. 
 
¶5.  (C) Kohout told Gordon some Czechs are worried about 
being "totally forgotten" (again, caveating that this was not 
his personal feeling) and urged Gordon not to underestimate 
this concern.  But, he added, the Czech Republic does not 
expect the U.S. to "be its mother" and it was important for 
the Czech Republic to work out problems on its own.  He noted 
that he was associated with a political party "closer to 
Obama" (a reference to the Social Democrats - CSSD), but that 
some Czech "experts" were concerned about what they perceived 
as the President's weakness and lack of leadership.  He urged 
the U.S. to "show its teeth somehow." 
 
¶6.  (C) A/S Gordon said the lack of a U.S. ambassador was no 
reflection on bilateral relations and thanked Kohout for 
Czech patience on the issue.  However, anyone who thought 
President Obama had no "teeth" seriously misunderstood him: 
he had sent additional troops to Afghanistan and had not 
compromised principles or allies for better relations with 
Russia.  Gordon identified Iran as an important challenge 
over the next six months and emphasized the importance of 
U.S.-EU cooperation on sanctions.  On Yemen, Gordon advised 
that the less said publicly about counter-terrorism 
cooperation, the better:  the U.S. was getting good 
cooperation from the Yemeni government but did not want to 
advertise it. 
 
¶7.  (C) Kohout noted the A/S's upcoming meeting with Deputy 
Speaker of Parliament and CSSD shadow Foreign Minister 
Lubomir Zaoralek and said A/S could send an important message 
on an increase of troops.  He said unlike the Defense 
Minister, who wants an increase of 100-plus, Kohout's 
ambition is somewhere in the middle, 20-30 people as trainers 
would be more politically feasible. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) He ended by noting that he would like the 
opportunity to meet SecState and would gladly rearrange his 
schedule should that be possible. 
 
Strategic Dialogue - Afghanistan 
-------------------------------- 
 
PRAGUE 00000030  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) At the beginning of the formal Strategic Dialogue, 
A/S Gordon thanked Pojar for the Czech contributions in 
Afghanistan and said the U.S. was pleased with the 
international response to the President's December speech. 
Gordon explained the way forward, noting that the U.S. would 
review the situation late this year with the aim that the 
U.S. begin transferring more responsibility for security to 
the Afghans in summer 2011. 
 
¶10.  (C) Pojar expressed appreciation for U.S. troop 
cooperation in Logar, where the Czechs maintain a PRT.  Pojar 
indicated that the Czechs plan to maintain their current 
level of involvement, and noted it was unlikely the Czech 
government would increase troop strength in Afghanistan, as 
the Czechs have "no ambition to play a more significant 
role." 
 
Czech Queries on Afghanistan 
---------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Pojar posed several questions to Gordon -whether the 
U.S. had seen a change in President Karzai over the past six 
months, the U.S. view of Pakistan, and about Russian 
cooperation on Afghanistan.  Gordon noted Karzai had said 
some of the right things, and committed to addressing 
governance and corruption, but that the U.S. needed to see 
action.  Gordon also stated that we had told Karzai that 
support for his government would wilt if corruption continued 
and that we would not be able to support him if he did not 
demonstrate a commitment to these issues. 
 
¶12.  (C) On Pakistan, Gordon noted that some in the Pakistani 
military continued to perceive India as the main threat and 
to sympathize with the Taliban, and thus Pakistan has not 
been able to put its full attention and assets to address the 
situation in Afghanistan.  Responding to Pojar,s query on 
whether Russia has been helpful on Afghanistan, A/S Gordon 
noted that the Russians had granted lethal transit, and that 
Russia seemed to want the U.S. to succeed in Afghanistan. 
Pojar noted in response that it was his view that "Russia is 
not interested in seeing the U.S. succeed in Afghanistan." 
 
Energy Security 
--------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) A/S Gordon emphasized that the U.S. was very 
committed to Eurasian energy security and Special Envoy 
Morningstar was very active in the region.  Experience has 
shown that countries that are largely dependent on energy 
from one country are also dependent politically on that 
country.  At the end of the day, however, the U.S. cannot be 
more concerned about Europe's security than the Europeans. 
It is the Europeans that must lead and the U.S. can help. 
Pojar agreed that Europe needs to do more.  While the Czech 
gas industry is fully privatized, the GOCR is trying to 
encourage greater interconnectivity with neighbors.  A gas 
interconnector is being built between the Czech Republic and 
Poland.  There are inchoate plans to build an interconnector 
with Austria.  Nevertheless there are still significant holes 
in the EU energy grids.  More liberalization of the energy 
market is also needed, although the semi-state Czech 
electricity company CEZ does not always support this. 
 
¶14.  (C) Pojar added, however, that U.S. involvement is often 
crucial to making progress.  The Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi pipeline 
would not have been built without U.S. leadership, and he 
urged the U.S. to continue to push Turkey and Azerbaijan to 
reach a gas transit agreement that would allow Nabucco to go 
forward.  A/S Gordon emphasized that the U.S. strongly 
supports development of a gas pipeline through the southern 
corridor and was very active in the region.  He noted that 
the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement protocol was being blocked 
by the Turkish parliament which wants progress on 
Nagarno-Karabakh, without which it will be difficult to get 
the gas flowing and U.S.-Turkish relations could suffer. 
Pojar said he believed Russia felt it had an interest in 
maintaining the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh, which "lets 
them pull the strings."  As he had with U/S Tauscher in 
November, Pojar raised the subject of intelligence sharing on 
energy issues. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Pojar also raised concerns that Westinghouse was 
not being nearly as active as its competitors (the Russian 
AtomStroyExport and French Areva) in support of its bid to 
supply the Czech Republic with new nuclear reactors and urged 
Westinghouse to do more on the ground to demonstrate its 
interest.  A/S Gordon and Charge Thompson-Jones stressed that 
Westinghouse was very serious about its bid, and 
 
PRAGUE 00000030  003 OF 004 
 
 
Thompson-Jones promised to share Pojar's concerns with the 
U.S. company. 
 
START 
---- 
 
¶16.  (C) Pojar asked about the status of START.  A/S Gordon 
said there were many unresolved issues, including numbers and 
telemetry.  The Russians had miscalculated, believing the 
U.S. wanted an agreement at all costs, and were surprised 
when the U.S. did not agree (Pojar said he was glad to hear 
this).  Pojar asked about Russian attempts to link defensive 
weapons to START.  Gordon replied that the Russians knew that 
there was no chance the U.S. would agree to this.  When Pojar 
asked about timing, Gordon said the U.S. has no deadline and 
would not be forced into an unacceptable deal. 
 
Russia and Central Europe 
--------------------- 
 
¶17.  (C) Pojar kicked off the discussion of &Relations with 
Russia8 by stating it is not clear what the U.S. is trying 
to achieve via U.S. policy toward Russia.  Pojar also 
inquired about U.S. policy toward Central Europe.  He said he 
understood President Obama did not have experience in this 
part of the world and recognized that Central Europe was not 
a top priority, but pressed to know "how much you will be 
involved."  He claimed the U.S. had not shown leadership on 
some issues, acknowledging that neither had the EU.  He also 
stated that he sees diminished U.S. interest and growing 
Russian interest in the region.  Rounding out his comments, 
Pojar highlighted that the Czechs were carefully watching the 
NATO Strategic Concept debate and that the "real questions" 
were the meaning of NATO and Article 5. 
 
¶18.  (C) Gordon granted that Afghanistan and Iran were top 
priorities, but challenged the idea that the U.S. was not 
paying attention to the region.  He pointed to the depth of 
high-level administration foreign-policy decisionmakers with 
experience in the region and cited a number of examples of 
NATO and U.S. involvement in the region.  Moreover, in no 
instance had the U.S. sacrificed principles or allies to its 
Russia policy.  The results so far had been modest, Gordon 
said, but not bad. 
 
¶19.  (C) Pojar said the U.S. needed to do more things like 
NATO contingency planning in the Baltics (an example Gordon 
had cited).  He also said he was satisfied with the Phased 
Adaptive Approach to missile defense, but expressed concern 
about its planning, development and funding.  He did not 
think the U.S. approach was wrong, "but we need to see 
results."  He agreed the START process thus far showed the 
U.S. did not simply want to please Russia. 
 
Eastern Partnership 
------------------- 
 
¶20.  (C) Pojar said the EU's more open policy toward Belarus 
via the Eastern Partnership had perhaps surprised Russia. 
Gordon said there was a "real opportunity" on Belarus and 
thanked the Czechs for helping to initiate the Eastern 
Partnership within the EU.  Gordon noted there were signs 
Minsk wanted a different relationship with the U.S., and he 
had recently traveled to the region and that there would be 
follow-on meetings at his level next month.  He did not want 
to overstate progress, but said the U.S. has taken note of 
some small steps (such as non-recognition of South Ossetia 
and release of a U.S. citizen from detention).  In addition, 
he believed Belarus was perhaps starting to chafe under 
Russian influence. 
 
¶21.  (C) Pojar agreed that Belarus was nationalistic and that 
"it's good to battle Russia in their neighborhood" and not 
nearer to the Czech Republic.  The Czech Republic welcomed 
U.S. cooperation on Belarus and the Eastern Partnership in 
general  with the U.S. on this. 
 
¶22.  (C) Pojar noted that several EU countries had pushed for 
Russian attendance at Eastern Partnership meetings.  The 
Czechs had no objection to Russian participation as long as 
other third countries, including the U.S. and Turkey, were 
included as well, a stumbling block for some EU colleagues.. 
 
¶23.  (C) On Ukraine, A/S Gordon and Pojar agreed there was no 
easy formula for the way forward.  Gordon noted that it was 
important that the upcoming elections be legitimate; the U.S. 
was sending election monitors to try to make sure it was free 
and fair.  Pojar urged the U.S. to make sure no IMF funds to 
Ukraine were diverted to pay Ukraine's gas debts to Russia. 
 
PRAGUE 00000030  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
Middle East 
----------- 
 
¶24.  (C) Pojar asked "what can I expect" in the Middle East 
(Note: Pojar will become the next Czech ambassador to Israel 
later this month. End Note).  A/S Gordon gave a realistic 
assessment of the peace process; Pojar had nothing to add. 
He expressed hope EU Middle East policy would become more 
realistic and less reflexively pro-Palestinian. 
 
¶25.  (C) Pojar asked about U.S. timing on Iran.  Gordon 
predicted that Iran's internal political turmoil would 
probably not soon produce changes in its government, or its 
nuclear policy.  Gordon said the U.S. was now examining 
sanctions. He stated that while the first recourse is to work 
through the UN Security Council, Gordon indicated he did not 
expect it to produce strong sanctions, and therefore the U.S. 
and EU would need to work together on sanctions. 
 
¶26.  (C) Pojar asked about the status of Russian SA-300 
missile sales to Iran.  Gordon said Russia knew the U.S. 
would view any move here as an aggressive step.  He also 
indicated the U.S. would not "compensate" Russia for not 
selling the missiles to Iran. 
 
Western Balkans 
--------------- 
 
¶27.  (C) The Czechs focused the Balkan discussion on Bosnia, 
particularly the Butmir process and the closure of the Office 
of the High Representative in (OHR).  A/S Gordon highlighted 
that Deputy Secretary Steinberg had gone three times to 
advance the Butmir process, and noted that the impetus for 
advancing the process and implementing reforms must come from 
the parties themselves. 
 
¶28.  (C) Commenting on the OHR, Gordon noted that the 5 2 
"conditions" required for OHR closure have yet to be met and 
that we should not simply drop these requirements.  DFM Pojar 
pressed on this issue, and noted the European view that the 
EUSR may be more effective.  Gordon pointed out that 
Republica Srpska PM Dodik has repeatedly challenged OHR and 
there is no indication that he will treat the EUSR any 
differently. 
 
¶29.  (C) The Czechs also posed the question of whether the 
USG believes we will need to wait for a change of leaders in 
order to see progress advancing reforms.  Gordon noted that 
for now we should stick to the OHR and press for the 
conditions to be met. 
 
Czechs Wish to Continue Dialogue 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶30.  (C) Pojar urged continuation of the Strategic Dialogue 
including lower-level meetings on specific topics, and 
between officials of different agencies.  He believed the MFA 
would want to continue the Strategic Dialogue even after a 
change of government following upcoming May elections. 
 
¶31.  (U) A/S Gordon and DFM Pojar conducted a media 
availability in which both sides praised the useful Dialogue, 
and A/S Gordon took questions on the content of the Dialogue, 
missile defense, and the status of a new U.S. ambassador to 
the Czech Republic. 
 
¶32.  (U) A/S Gordon has cleared this message. 
Thompson-Jones