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O R 251400Z JAN 10
FM AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8342
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMCONSUL KARACHI 
AMCONSUL LAHORE 
AMEMBASSY KABUL 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
NSC WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000010 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/25/2020 
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS PK AF
SUBJECT: FATA SECURITY UPDATE; PAKISTANI/RC-EAST COORDINATION ON 
BAJAUR 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Candace Putnam, Consul General, Peshawar, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary.  During a January 23 briefing for RC-East MG 
Scapparotti, 11th Corps Chief of Staff BG Aamer provided an 
overview of the security situation in FATA and Malakand 
Division, Northwest Frontier Province.   It would take at least 
a year, predicted Aamer, to finish military operations and 
create the conditions for civilian development that is required 
to stabilize the area.  The imminent operation in Bajaur (for 
which MG Scaparrotti met the same day with Frontier Corps MG 
Tariq Khan to plan coordinated operations) was designed to: (a) 
prevent militants who had re-infiltrated into Bajaur from again 
threatening the neighboring settled areas of Malakand Division; 
and (b) finish operations in northern FATA so that they could 
redeploy and increase forces in the south (i.e., North 
Waziristan) by May-June.  11th Corps Commander LTG Masood made 
it clear that the Army had decided to change tactics and would 
no longer displace local populations ahead of combat because the 
post-conflict consequences of this in Bajaur and Malakand had 
been too disruptive.  The Army and the Frontier Corps again 
complained about militant support from the Governor of Kunar 
Province and noted the importance of reconstruction and 
restoring civilian governance to their ability to reverse 
militancy.  This is a joint CG Peshawar SOC-FWD Pakistan 
message.  End Summary. 
 
 
South/North Waziristan (SWA/NWA) 
 
¶2.  (C)  According to Aamer, the Army is continuing 
"synchronized, calibrated" operations around Ladha in central 
SWA where militants are trying to regroup because they 
increasingly are being denied support in NWA.  The Wazir tribe 
is "completely on board," and discussions with the dominant 
Mehsud tribe (reftel) continue.  Many within the Mehsud tribe 
are now openly advocating support to the Government of Pakistan 
which is considered to be against their cultural norms.  The 
Army is expanding its "social space" of areas in which the local 
population supports anti-militant operations with both 
intelligence and the denial of sanctuary. 
 
¶3.  (C) IEDs remain the weapon of choice within SWA and all 
indications are the TTP leadership has fled the Agency to NWA 
and left behind mid-level leadership and foot soldiers behind to 
continue harassment operations.  Gul Bhadar continues to support 
these resistance activities. Both Aamer and Masood highlighted 
the $55 million USAID has provided for SWA. 
 
¶4.  (C)   In North Waziristan (NWA), "the environment is being 
shaped (through roadblocks and snap operations) to deal 
effectively with the situation by the middle of the year."  The 
Army will be rotating forces in May/June, with the "quiet" 
result of an added infantry battalion and additional Special 
Service Group (Special Forces) troops.  The relief in place of 
these infantry formations is designed to bring fresh troops into 
the environment as the current formations have been engaged in 
combat operations for nearly two continuous years. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The January 21-22 operations in NWA included an attack 
that killed ten militants along the border near Machi Khel and 
an airstrike on a militant compound outside Miram Shah where 
known Arab, Uzbek, and Afghan fighters were living.  Aamer said 
that the areas around Mir Ali, Miram Shah, Datta Khel and the 
Tochi Valley remained problematic.  Extremists were being 
supported by Gul Bahadar, foreign fighters and Punjabi militants 
(Note: no mention of the Haqqani network but an interesting 
admission on the presence of Punjabi militants).  The problem 
was that these areas were heavily populated (Aamer claimed the 
population of NWA was now about 800,000); LTG Masood said 
several times that the Army had abandoned its previous strategy 
of depopulating areas before military operations.  "There will 
be no new displacements," as this punishes the tribes and 
creates too many post-conflict challenges.  Aamer and Masood 
voiced the hope that the NWA population has taken a lesson from 
what happened in SWA and will cooperate with the government to 
preclude a similar fate for themselves. 
 
 
Orakzai/Mohmand/Kurram/Khyber 
 
¶6.  (C)   Most of the access points to Orakzai Agency have been 
blocked but further action is planned after the Bajaur operation 
is completed.  The plan is to encircle Mangal Bagh's  militants 
in the Tirah Valley (a central point in the Kurram, Khyber and 
Orakzai Agencies).  This is the area that al-Qaida wants to keep 
in reserve as a sanctuary if they lose the Waziristans, 
according to Aamer.  The Thall-Parachinar road in Kurram, which 
was blocked by militants for over a year, is now open; the major 
concern in Kurram now is habitual Sunni-Shi'a conflict.  Pockets 
of resistance along the border remain in Mohmand Agency, which 
serves as a conduit between Bajaur and Khyber/Orakzai. The 
Frontier Corps will continue sporadic operations in Khyber 
Agency, which controls Af-Pak trade and Coalition Forces' supply 
routes and protects Peshawar. 
 
 
Bajaur 
 
¶7.  (C)  Aamer noted that militants from Swat and Dir (Malakand 
Division, NWFP) as well as from the Khyber and Orakzai Agencies 
in FATA and Afghanistan had been steadily moving into the Bajaur 
area in recent months.  These included Maulana Fazlullah, Qari 
Hussain, Jan Wali, Qazi Zia ur Rehman, and Salih Mohammad.  The 
focus of militant activity remains the Mahmond tehsil along the 
border with Kunar Province in Afghanistan, but Aamer admitted 
they do not yet have full control of the restive Charmang 
Valley.  The Frontier Corps has established concentric rings, an 
inner one around Mahmond tehsil and another around Khar to block 
militant exits.  Since the militants are aware of planned 
operations, however, Aamer said the leaders already were 
slipping away to Afghanistan.  The focus on the upcoming 
operation will be against mid-level forces; the plan is to 
regain control of Mohmand and station troops there for at least 
six months to stabilize the agency. 
 
¶8.  (S/REL PAK)  Aamer and Masood were adamant the Governor of 
Kunar was providing logistical and refuge support to TNSM 
Commander Faqir Mohmand and remained concerned the upcoming 
Bajaur operation would merely displace him and his key leaders 
to Afghanistan. 
 
¶9.  (S/REL PAK)  Masood noted the importance of securing Bajaur 
that he identified as key to securing the northern portion of 
Pakistan.   Preventing movement through Bajaur into Lower Dir, 
combined with efforts in Afghanistan in preventing movement 
through Nuristan, would secure the Malakand Division.  Security 
within the settled areas will allow the Pakistan military to 
shift some of the nearly three divisions' worth of troops 
currently acting as a hold force there to support the efforts in 
SWA and NWA.  Aamer inserted into this discussion the importance 
of developmental and reconstructive aid into this region, and 
specifically asked for donor representation in Khar, Bajaur. 
 
 
U.S. Operations in Afghanistan 
 
¶10.  (C)  Noting that RC-East covered the major population 
centers important to improving governance and controlling Kabul, 
LTG Masood asked why the U.S. was concentrating the troop surge 
in RC-South.  Scaparrotti replied that we needed to control a 
Taliban resurgence but noted that his major focus was governance 
and the number of civilian experts in RC-East had increased from 
30-174 during his command. 
 
 
Bio Note 
 
¶11.  (C)  LTG Masood's only son was killed in the December 4 
attack on a mosque in Rawalpindi.  Since then, he has been 
reporting to the 11th Corps headquarters in Peshawar only 
infrequently.  Before his son's death, he was due to retire but 
was extended for the SWA operation.  Mission sources report that 
COAS General Kayani has agreed that Masood will be given the 
option of remaining in Peshawar but for how long remains 
unclear.  In the meetings today, he was particularly unfocused 
and BG Aamer, who has effectively been running 11th Corps, 
interrupted and corrected his commander on several occasions. 
 
 
Operational Planning With the Frontier Corps 
 
¶12.  (C)  In a follow-on meeting, FC MG Tariq provided a 
detailed historical overview of the FATA/NWFP covering the last 
several years.  He particularly explained how the GoP agreed to 
a series of deals with various militant factors and tribes 
because of political necessity.  As the deals were broken by the 
various factions, the GoP used this as justification to conduct 
operations against them. 
 
¶13.  (C)  Bajaur was the first major operation conducted but was 
unable to conclude due to unrest within Malakand and eventually 
SWA.  Currently the militants were attempting to reconsolidate 
their position in the northern portions of Bajaur believing the 
difficult terrain and Faqir Muhammad's grip on the region 
prevented effective FC interdiction.  Tariq claimed the local 
tribes want them removed from the area. 
 
¶14.  (S/REL PAK) The current plan is to conduct a three phased 
operation against the remaining contested regions with Bajaur. 
The first two are directed at pushing the militants up through 
Mohmand tehsil towards Afghanistan with an expectation RC-E 
would conduct disrupting operations as a blocking force.  The 
third phase is directed towards Hashim Valley, along the 
southern portion of Bajaur.  Shaping operations were due to 
begin January 24 with the initiation of air strikes against 
pre-planned targets followed by a ground assault beginning on 
January 26. The actual start will be dependent on the weather. 
An Agency-wide curfew will be issued 24hrs prior to the ground 
assault in order to isolate the militant and safeguard the 
population.  Tariq did not expect any major population 
disruptions. 
 
¶15.  (S/REL PAK) The Frontier Corps operations will target the 
following militant groups: 
 
-          Faqir Muhammad (Strength: 180-200) 
 
-          Ibn-e-Amin/Fateh (Strength: 150-200) 
 
-          Jan Wali Alisa Sheena Gp (Strength: 70-80) 
 
-          Maulv I Umar Group (Strength: 25-30) 
 
-          Qari Zia Ur Rheman Group (Strength: 40-50) 
 
Each of the elements are known supporters of Faqir Muhammad, who 
is the dominant threat personality in Bajaur.  Faqir Muhammad is 
currently broadcasting through FM thaQe is ready to support 
the GoP, but Tariq believes he is using these statements to buy 
time prior to the launch of the offensive.  This is not the 
first time Faqir Muhammad has used this tactic. 
 
¶16.  (S/REL PAK)  Like 11th Corps, the Frontier Corps iterated 
to RC-East their belief, based on intelligence analysis, that 
the Governor of Kunar is providing logistical and refuge support 
to the militants.  The preferred tactic was to cross into 
Afghanistan for about a kilometer, cache their equipment, and 
blend into the local population to evade capture. 
 
¶16.  (S/REL PAK)  RC-East, Frontier Corps, 11th Corps, and 
SOC(FWD)-PAK will use the Intel Fusion Cells as the 
deconfliction point and the conduit to pass intelligence back 
and forth. 
 
 
PUTNAM