VZCZCXRO7896
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI
DE RUEHNE #0060/01 0141241
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141241Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9131
INFO RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 5480
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA 4698
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 4500
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 7517
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 2619
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 3059

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CA/FPP FOR JILL NYSTROM, PLEASE PASS TO DHS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS ASEC IN BT
SUBJECT: BHUTANESE CULTURE GROUP IN SMUGGLING PERFORMANCE 
 
REF: (A) 08 NEW DELHI 3190, (B) 09 NEW DELHI 000007 
 
¶1. SUMMARY:  New Delhi's recent confirmation that a P3 group of 
Bhutanese cultural performers was a front for alien smuggling 
demonstrates continuing and serious fraud issues with groups from 
Bhutan initially reported a year ago (reftel A).  Six of the twelve 
associated applicants interviewed individually by the Fraud 
Prevention Unit confessed to conspiring to work together along with 
their fixer, a Bhutanese national, to allow them to work and/or 
immigrate to the illegally.  Given our relatively small Bhutanese 
visa applicant pool (we adjudicated 599 cases in CY09), such a large 
group gives us greater cause for reflection when interviewing these 
applicants, especially in light of the findings of our Bhutanese 
traveler validation study (reftel B).  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. Post recently interviewed a group of 12 Bhutanese nationals who 
stated that their purpose of travel was to perform as members of a 
Buddhist folk music and dance troupe, petitioned by Bhutan 
Performing Arts Corp., at several US venues.  As part of Post's 
normal P3 adjudication procedure, FPU conducts a pre-appointment 
review of the information provided by the group's members. In this 
case, the review exposed several concerns including the fact that 
the individual arranging the group's travel, Sonam Phuntsho (DOB 
14MAR1949, PPT G006991), appeared to still be in the US although 
ADIS records indicated his departure.  As part of the review, we 
called the contact number in the U.S., and spoke with a man 
identifying himself as Phuntsho.  During this conversation the 
information he provided about his spouse did not agree with visa 
application records. COMMENT:  Post speculates that Phuntsho 
provided his and his companion's passports to another traveler for 
the purpose of establishing an ADIS record.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶3. With Post already alerted to the possible mala fide intent of the 
applicants, the NIV interviewing officer noted that the applicants 
did not possess any specific knowledge about their trip, such as the 
performance venues.  Moreover, five of the group, including the 
leader, had no prior travel while the others had substantially 
identical travel histories. Indian applicants often attempt to 
enhance their travel history by taking brief visits to Southeast 
Asian countries, in the hopes of improving their chances at 
receiving a visa to a Western nation.  As a result, the officer 
referred the cases to the Fraud Prevention Unit (FPU) where six of 
the twelve applicants were given individual follow-up interviews. 
 
¶4. FPU first interviewed the putative group leader Gyembo Dorji (PPT 
G0118258).  He initially stated that he had been associated with 
Kuenphen Performers Arts Thimpu for the past three years as a 
coordinator and a mask dancer. However, when asked about his 
performances with the other group members, he was unable to provide 
any information about their background or his previous performing 
experience with them. Despite being the team leader he was not aware 
of even a basic travel itinerary for the group. After further 
questioning, and faced with several inconsistencies between the 
stories of the other group members, he admitted the fraud.  He 
informed the FPU team that travel arranger Sonam Phuntsho was 
actually his father, and admitted that none of the members was a 
performer, but all had relatives in the US, and their intention was 
to travel to the US to work or settle illegally. 
 
¶5. Dorji also informed FPU that his mother, Dema Phuntsho, was 
currently in their village in Bhutan and the lady, alleged to be 
Dema Phuntsho (DOB 01JAN1969, PPT G017113), who had travelled with 
his father to the U.S. and posed as his wife during the visa 
interview, was unknown to him.  In fact, Dorji was unable to 
identify her picture when shown it in a matrix of other Bhutanese 
females.  While Dorji initially stated that there was no money 
exchanged between the group members and his father for the visa 
scheme, two members (Kuezang Lhaden, and Kingley Zangmo) later 
confirmed that they had been told to pay Phuntsho USD 3,000-4,000 
after receiving the visa and arriving in the United States. 
 
¶6. The other five group members interviewed by FPU admitted their 
participation in the scheme after being confronted with the 
information provided by Dorji, and all prepared written and affirmed 
statements that they were actually intending to travel to the US to 
meet family and work illegally.  All stated that the entire group 
had met previously to discuss the interview, that they had been 
coached by Dorji and the arranger to maintain silence as to their 
motives as well as the Dorji-Phuntsho family relationship, and all 
admitted they knew that none of the other members of the group were 
performers and that all were acting in concert to get to the United 
States. While all six acknowledged that they knew that Sonam 
Phuntsho's true wife was in their home village in Bhutan, none were 
able to identify the lady who had posed as his wife. 
 
¶7.  COMMENT:  Given the nature of the smuggling plan and the 
concerted action of all members of the group, they were found 
ineligible under Sections 212(a)(6)(E) and 212 (a)(6)(C)(i) of the 
INA.  There continues to be uncertainty about the true location of 
Sonam Phuntsho and the woman posing as his wife; as ADIS indicates 
they have departed from the U.S., Post speculates that perhaps other 
Bhutanese nationals used their passports.  As their visas have now 
expired, there was no need to ask the Department for prudential 
revocation.  However, provisional 6C1 and 6E entries have been 
placed against both records.  This case illustrates the benefit of 
the New Delhi's P3 pre-interview review process and highlights the 
need for continuing careful scrutiny of Bhutanese group travelers. 
END COMMENT 
 
 
ROEMER