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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 000109 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER BG IN
SUBJECT: HASINA'S DELHI VISIT: PROGRESS TOWARD REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION 
 
REF: DHAKA 00027 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Uzra Zeya for reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Bangladeshi PM Sheikh Hasina's January 10-13 
visit to India boosted prospects for regional integration. 
Following recent Bangladeshi action against Indian 
insurgents, Hasina again pledged Bangladeshi territory would 
not be used for anti-Indian activities.  Bangladesh granted 
India use of Bangladeshi ports to transit goods to India's 
Northeast, and India offered Bangladesh a USD 1 billon credit 
line and direct access to Nepal.  The 50 point Joint 
Communiqu read like a wish list for progress on security, 
counter terrorism (CT), regional connectivity, and trade. 
Contacts tell us that "track two" discussions contributed 
substantially to the CT and security agreements. Meanwhile, 
MEA contacts described the Hasina visit as an important 
milestone towards an "irreversible" rapprochement with 
Bangladesh.  END SUMMARY. 
 
A Very Warm Reception 
--------------------- 
¶2. (U) President Patil welcomed Hasina at her residence and 
Hasina received visits from Finance Minister Mukherjee, EAM 
Krishna, Railway Minister Mamata Bannerjee, and Leader of the 
Opposition Sushma Swaraj.  Hasina called on Sonia Gandhi and 
former PM Gujral.  She accepted the 2009 Indira Gandhi Prize 
for Peace, Disarmament, and Development and earned a standing 
ovation for her acceptance speech in which she promised a 
relationship based on cooperation and understanding.  "The 
Hindu," an Indian daily, ran the front page headline, "Indira 
was truly like our mother: Hasina" (Note: Indira Gandhi 
sheltered Hasina after the massacre of her family in 1975). 
Senior New Delhi press people effusively characterized the 
visit as the beginning of the economic and strategic 
integration of South Asia under India's leadership.  Some, 
however, cautioned that this noteworthy progress may only 
have been possible because of Hasina's close ties with the 
Congress-led UPA government. 
 
Hope for Regional Integration 
----------------------------- 
¶3. (C) MEA Joint Secretary (Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
Maldives) Tirumurthi indicated that India was ready for this 
type of engagement as early as three years ago but Bangladesh 
did not have the mandate to pursue it until Hasina's 
election.  The GOI was optimistic that if progress on the 
agreements moved quickly, within five years its engagement 
with Bangladesh would be "irreversible."  The many high-level 
exchanges in the months before Hasina's visit ironed out most 
differences, and India and Bangladesh chose to put tough 
issues like Teesta River water sharing into timeframes for 
resolution rather than pressing for immediate solutions and 
risking disagreement.  He noted that India had granted its 
single largest line of credit ever extended to another 
country - USD 1 billion - to fund priorities as determined by 
the GOB.  The agreements with Bangladesh promote India's 
regional integration goals: topics such as energy and 
connectivity (as well as security and CT) are already under 
discussion within SAARC.  India's bilateral agreements with 
Bangladesh could help press the SAARC agenda forward. 
 
The Joint Communiqu and Agreements:  Counterterrorism... 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
¶4. (C) The leaders issued a fifty-point Joint Communiqu 
underscoring cooperation on security issues and pledging 
Indian and Bangladeshi territories would not be used for 
terrorist purposes.  They agreed to form and implement a 
comprehensive framework for development.  Three of the five 
agreements inked concerned security and counter terrorism: an 
Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters, an 
Agreement on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, and an 
Agreement on Combating International Terrorism, Organized 
Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking.  They also discussed an 
 
NEW DELHI 00000109  002 OF 003 
 
 
extradition treaty.  Tirumurthi told us the security 
agreements were largely symbolic, with content of the CT 
agreement drawn from existing SAARC CT agreements.  India 
would like to pursue a similar agreement on the transfer of 
sentenced persons with Sri Lanka and the Maldives. 
 
¶5. (C) Tirumurthi said Sheikh Hasina deserved recognition for 
earlier realizing that the forces that brought to power the 
caretaker government and caused the February 2009 mutiny in 
Bangladesh could ultimately destabilize her government.  Her 
recent action against United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 
fugitives in Bangladesh laid a foundation of trust, but 
differences on CT remained.  Even after the visit, India 
wanted to know how Bangladesh would resolve differences 
internally among their five security agencies, and how it 
would go about dismantling the insurgent infrastructure in 
Bangladesh.  In this context, Tirumurthi said, capacity was 
no problem - but political will might be.  Many Bangladeshi 
army personnel were entrenched from BNP (Khalida Zia's 
political party) days.  India would not pressure Bangladesh, 
but would support Bangladesh's progress as it moved ahead at 
its own pace. 
 
¶6. (C) Sreeradha Datta of New Delhi's Institute for Defense 
Studies and Analyses (IDSA) is a regular participant in 
"track two" dialogues between India and Bangladesh, including 
the December 6-7 USG sponsored dialogue between Dhaka's 
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI) and Delhi's Observer 
Research Foundation (ORF).  She believes that "track two" 
dialogues contributed substantially to the security and CT 
agreements inked between India and Bangladesh.  Tirumurthi 
told us that any regional engagement is valuable and that the 
GOI appreciated U.S. support of the BEI-ORF dialogue. 
However he found that India looked at regional security from 
a different perspective then the U.S..  India viewed it from 
three angles: terrorism, insurgency, and Pakistani 
involvement.  Tirumurthi cited the flow of counterfeit 
currency, drugs, and arms across the Nepal and Bangladesh 
borders as examples of Indian priorities that did not always 
register on the U.S. radar.  "Insurgents are more 
destabilizing than terrorism," he commented. 
 
...and Connectivity... 
------------------------------ 
¶7. (U) The remaining accords included an MoU on Cooperation 
in the Power Sector and a Cultural Exchange Program.  India 
agreed to supply 250 Mega Watts (MW) of power to Bangladesh 
through new power line link-ups to be constructed by 2012. 
India and Bangladesh would fund and implement the 
construction.  The cultural agreements included joint 
celebration of the 150th birthday of Nobel Prize winner and 
poet Rabindranath Tagore and a new scholarship program for 
Bangladeshi students studying in India.  Tirumurthi described 
the joint Tagore celebration as an important gesture to 
rekindle historic cultural links. 
 
¶8. (U) In progress on development, connectivity, and trade, 
India designated a railway link for transit from Bangladesh 
to Nepal and agreed to grant duty-free export to India for 
more Bangladeshi goods.  Ashuganj in Bangladesh and Silghat 
in India were slated as ports of call.  Bangladesh agreed to 
allow Indian use of Mongla and Chittagong sea ports for 
movement of goods to India via road and rail, and indicated 
Nepal and Bhutan would be granted similar access (Note: this 
is significant in that it will allow India easier access to 
its land locked, underdeveloped Northeast). 
 
... but Not Water. 
------------------ 
¶9. (C) Some tough issues remained: according to Tirumurthi, 
the Teesta River water sharing issue was nowhere near 
resolution despite intensive rounds of talks.  The two sides 
agreed to convene the Joint Rivers Commission by March. 
Indian Ambassador Deb Mukharji (a former Ambassador to 
 
NEW DELHI 00000109  003 OF 003 
 
 
Bangladesh) was pessimistic about prospects of river-by-river 
and bilateral solutions.  Mukharji predicted that an 
effective water sharing solution would have to be regional 
(Note: PM Singh has indicated in the past that India might be 
willing to discuss water issues at the regional level with 
Nepal and Bangladesh). 
 
¶10. (C) The land boundary issue, Tirumurthi told us, was "not 
intractable."  Tirumurthi shared that none of the Indian 
leaders were interested in discussing the amount of territory 
to be ceded, as it was a matter of principle to implement an 
existing 1974 agreement covering the border, enclaves, and 
adverse possessions.  The first two categories had been 
listed and agreed upon; however, the list of adverse 
possessions was still under discussion. 
 
Areas of Concern 
---------------- 
¶11. (C) There is concern among local Bangladesh experts about 
Hasina's management of anti-Indian feelings in Bangladesh. 
Mukharji emphasized that India can not change such attitudes 
in Bangladesh on its own, and needs Hasina's help.  Datta 
worried that Hasina was not adequately cultivating other 
Bangladeshi leaders' relationships with their Indian 
counterparts, observing Hasina brought no new, young leaders 
on this visit.  Datta complained too that, as a recognized 
expert on Indo-Bangladeshi relations, she frequently advises 
Indian and Bangladeshi civil society leaders and retired 
officials who transmit her inputs up to political 
heavyweights. However, she has frustratingly poor access at 
the Indian MEA. 
 
¶12. (U) COMMENT: Hasina showed herself willing to "go the 
extra mile" in addressing India's concerns, and India 
reciprocated in kind.  Singh's willingness to extend himself 
personally - and to extend a huge credit line - is a clear 
sign of India's commitment to strengthen relations with 
Bangladesh.  The neighbors are on track to resolve tough 
issues like maritime border demarcation, water sharing, and 
operationalizing an Extradition Treaty - as India will no 
doubt work to do quickly.  This visit, if it bears fruit, may 
be a template for a new Indian approach to regional 
engagement.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
ROEMER