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O 261350Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000049 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SU LY CD
SUBJECT: CHAD, MINURCAT EXTENSION, AND THE LOGIC OF 
GEO-POLITICS 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 43 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 35 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 30 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 29 
     ¶E. NDJAMENA 28 
 
Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
----------- 
SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶1. (C) As the GOC nd the UN continue to negotiate seriously 
over te issue of the extension of MINURCAT's mandate (se 
Ref A), our analysis of the GOC's motivations leds us to 
cnclude that the GOC is attempting to chieve interlocking 
geo-political and domestic-plitical goals, as well as 
wringing concrete concssions from MINURCAT on 
bred-and-butter PKO-presence issues.  President Deby and the 
GOC address five main goals in calling the future of MINURCAT 
in Chad into question, but the GOC's and Deby's overriding 
geo-political goal of ensuring a durable peace with Sudan 
predominates.  It is impossible to overestimate the 
importance to Deby and his regime of the possibility that 
this peace deal will hold, at least into the middle-term, say 
24 months or so. (Which is not the same as saying that Deby 
is completely convinced that it will hold.)  The promise of a 
reasonably durable peace with Sudan via the Jan 15 accords, 
and the end of the proxy war that posed a constant and 
existential threat to the GOC, must be the highest of Deby's 
political and personal priorities, and worth making 
concessions such as we believe he did to Khartoum on 
MINURCAT.  Zaghawa solidarity, especially among his military 
chiefs, must be assured absolutely in case he has to face 
down JEM or Chadian Zaghawa JEM-lovers, as a result of the 
Chad-Sudan peace deal, so concessions to them at MINURCAT's 
expense are tightly linked to the larger geopolitical 
imperative. 
 
¶2.  (C) According to our analysis, none of the GOC's and 
Deby's key geopolitical and domestic goals requires that Chad 
"break with" the UN by demanding an early withdrawal of 
MINURCAT from Chad, although that could conceivably be one of 
the possible results of the current negotiations.  We think 
that all of Chad's and Deby's goals could be satisfied by a 
negotiated compromise with the UN that permits MINURCAT to 
continue to operate on the ground in pursuit of its mandated 
objectives until March 2011.  Despite the GOC's professed 
grievances and the importance of its geo-political and 
intra-Zaghawa goals, MINURCAT's presence confers valuable 
benefits on Chad's overall security and in terms of the 
stability of its troubled eastern regions.  Much will depend 
on the UN's ability approach to these negotiations skillfully 
so as to convince the Chadians that their balance sheet with 
MINURCAT has more pluses than minuses.  END SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT. 
 
---------- 
CHAD-SUDAN 
---------- 
 
¶3. (C) The GOC position on MINURCAT extension is in part a 
GOC concession to Sudan:  The GOC took a hard line against 
MINURCAT partly as quid pro quo to Sudan as (an undeclared) 
element in the recently concluded bilateral peace deal 
through agreements signed Jan 15 to normalize fully 
Chad-Sudan relations by ending their internecine proxy war 
(See Ref B-E).  We do not know if the Jan 15 accords will 
hold and we doubt that Pres Deby and his closest advisors are 
100 percent convinced that they will do so.  But it is 
impossible to overestimate the importance to Deby and his 
regime of the possibility that this peace deal will hold, at 
least into the middle-term, say 24 months or so.  In many 
ways the past five years of Deby's rule have been a 
geo-political nightmare, with active and well-resourced 
Sudanese clients persistently and violently  seeking to 
overthrow him and (if possible) kill him.  These clients got 
 
NDJAMENA 00000049  002 OF 003 
 
 
within 500 yards or so of doing just in February 2008.  A 
durable peace with Sudan, and the end of the proxy war that 
posed a constant and existential threat to the GOC, must be 
the highest of Deby's political and personal priorities, and 
worth making concessions such as we believe he did to 
Khartoum on MINURCAT. 
 
------------------ 
THE ZAGHAWA NATION 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) The GOC position on MINURCAT extension is in part a 
Deby concession to the Zaghawa notables of his own ruling 
circle, especially his military chiefs, as a reward for their 
defense of the country in 2008-2009 and to assure their 
loyalty in the ethnically messy business of breaking and 
expelling the Zaghawa JEM from Chad (as part of the 
Chad-Sudan peace deal).  (Remember that, when Deby when tried 
to use his military against JEM in 2005, his Zaghawa war 
chiefs balked at taking effective action against their 
Zaghawa "ethnic brothers."  Remember, too, that Chad's proud 
Zaghawa-dominated military is jealous of its ability to 
protect Chad's sovereign territory, which MINURCAT's presence 
calls into question.)  Zaghawa solidarity, especially among 
his military chiefs, must be assured absolutely in case he 
has to face down JEM or Chadian Zaghawa JEM-lovers, as a 
result of the Chad-Sudan peace deal, so concessions to them 
at MINURCAT's expense are tightly linked to the larger 
geopolitical imperative. 
 
------------------ 
A NOD TO THE GUIDE 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) The GOC position on MINURCAT extension is in part a 
Deby nod to the Guide, by addressing Libyan sensibilities 
regarding non-African forces in the sub-regional 
neighborhood. (This is not to say that the Libyans made this 
a major issue, but that Deby found this a useful way to 
reassure the Guide regarding Chad's "African" bona fides.) 
 
----------------- 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 
----------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The GOC position on MINURCAT extension is in part a 
Deby/GOC appeal to domestic political constituencies in an 
election year, by demonstrating Chad's sovereign vigilance 
and ability to defend Chadian national interests and 
integrity effectively, and by reassuring Chadians that the 
current situation in eastern Chad -- the presence of refugees 
from Sudan and Chad's own IDPs which requires UN "tutelage" 
of Chadian territory -- is not "eternal." It reminds Chadians 
that the end-state is the return of refugees and IDPs to 
their homes and the restoration of "normality" in eastern 
Chad. 
-------------- 
NUTS AND BOLTS 
-------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) The GOC position on MINURCAT extension is in part an 
attempt to take advantage of MINURCAT's manifest operational 
and organizational deficiencies to wring concrete concessions 
from the PKO -- including getting troop strength to mandated 
levels; more attention and resources to the Chadian police 
component of MINURCAT (the DIS); more attention to GOC 
demands for infrastructure transfers (airports, police 
stations, etc.), and more demonstrable respective for Chadian 
sovereignty. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) According to our analysis, none of the GOC's and 
Deby's goals we discern requires that Chad "break with" the 
UN by demanding an early withdrawal of MINURCAT from Chad, 
although that could conceivably be one of the possible 
 
NDJAMENA 00000049  003 OF 003 
 
 
results of the current negotiations.  We think that all of 
Chad's and Deby's goals could be satisfied by a negotiated 
compromise with the UN that permits MINURCAT to continue to 
operate on the ground in pursuit of its mandated objectives 
until March 2011.  Despite the GOC's professed grievances and 
the importance of its geo-political and intra-Zaghawa goals, 
MINURCAT's presence confers valuable benefits on Chad's 
overall security and in terms of the stability of its 
troubled eastern regions.  Much will depend on the UN's 
ability approach to these negotiations skillfully so as to 
convince the Chadians that their balance sheet with MINURCAT 
has more pluses than minuses.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶9.  (U) Minimize considered. 
NIGRO