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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000043 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
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LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF MARR UN SU LY CD
SUBJECT: CHAD AND THE UN CONTEND OVER MINURCAT EXTENSION: 
THE STATE OF PLAY, JAN 25. 
 
REF: NDJAMENA EMAILS TO AF AND AF/C JAN 5-25 
 
NDJAMENA 00000043  001.8 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
---------- 
SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  The GOC and the UN have been sparring over the issue 
of the extension of MINURCAT's mandate since Jan 5.  The GOC 
delivered Jan 15 a note verbale to the UN Secretariat 
informing it of Chad's "request for the withdrawal from Chad 
of the PKO" and requesting further "to discuss as soon as 
possible the modalities of such a withdrawal in conformity 
with UNSCR 861."  The SRSG and Perm Five COMs here have 
demarched the GOC in the aim of permitting MINURCAT to 
continue its work under 1861 until the "natural" end of its 
mandate in 2011.  A UN delegation arrives here Jan 26 to 
discuss the issue with GOC interlocutors, a heavily military 
and relatively hard-line group.  SRSG Angelo told Ambassador 
Jan 25 that he remained "optimistic" that the GOC and the UN 
would find a way for MINURCAT to remain on the job through 
March 2011, including by making concessions based on Chad's 
"legitimate grievances" regarding MINURCAT's performance on 
the ground up to now. SRSG has arranged for UN delegation to 
brief Perm Five COMs here Jan 28. 
 
¶2. (C)  We believe that the GOC's motivations for raising the 
question of MINURCAT withdrawal Qpond to both domestic and 
geo-political considerations, including the recently signed 
peace accords with Sudan, which we will analyze in Septel. 
We share SRSG's optimism to the extent that the GOC has good 
reason to reach a compromise solution to this issue that will 
permit Chad to enjoy the benefits of MINURCAT's presence and 
activities here, even as it exacts further concessions from 
the UN in return.  But the UN delegation will have be very 
skillful in its approach to the GOC in order to succeed. The 
controverQ over what has become known as "MINURCAT 
withdrawal" has had an impact on humanitarian IOs and NGOs, 
which we dQuss in aQher septel.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
------------- 
THE BACKSTORY 
------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  The question of the GOC's stance on extension of 
MINURCAT's mandate past 15 March 2010 emerged when FORMIN 
Faki convoked SRSG Angelo January 5 to inform him that the 
GOC did not intend to agree to an extension of the PKO's 
mandate under UNSCR 1861, adducing various reasons -- 
including MINURCAT's lack of troop strength, its 
ineffectiveness in providing security in Eastern Chad, its 
relative neglect of the Chad police and gendarme component 
(the DIS), its supposed lack of respect for Chadian 
sovereignty, and lack of follow-through regarding promised 
infrastructure, etc.  At the SRG's request, the UNSC Perm 
Five missions here (icluding us) demarched the GOC at the 
COM level i support of a continuation of MINURCAT's presence 
under its current mandate until 15 March 2011,Qhe 
earliest. 
 
¶4. (C) The GOC delivered a note erbale Jan 15 to the UNSYG 
informing the Secretariat of Chad's "request for the 
withdrawal from Chad of the PKO" and of its willingness "to 
discuss as soon as possible the modalities of such a 
withdrawal in conformity with UNSCR 861."  This whole issue 
is complicated by the fact that SRSG Angelo is scheduled to 
retire on 26 Feb, although he has held out the prospect of 
staying on for a time past that date.  Since the very 
beginning, SRSG Angelo has been extremely activQtalking 
literally to everyone who counts on this issue. 
------------------ 
UN DELEGATION HERE 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) A UN delegation uQr GEN Cammart, who we understand 
 
NDJAMENA 00000043  002.8 OF 003 
 
 
is the UNSYG's Military Counselor and trouble-shooter on PKO 
matters, arrives here Jan 26.  The GOC's ad hoc commission to 
deal with the delegation includes the MFA SYG, CONAFIT chief 
GEN Degache, the President's and FORMIN's military advisors, 
National Intelligence Service chief GEN Chaibo, and Air Force 
chief GEN Orozi, with relative hard-liners well-represented. 
 
--------------- 
SRSG'S OPTIMISM 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  Angelo told Ambassador Nigro Jan 25 that he was 
"optimistic" about the mission's chances of reaching a 
"mutually acceptable solution" to the extension issue. 
Angelo said that the framework for discussions would be the 
GOC note:  they would discuss modalities of MINURCAT's 
withdrawal in conformity with UNSC 1861," with short-, 
medium-, and long-term options for such withdrawal, and with 
long-term option keeping MINURCAT on the ground until the 
"natural" end of the mandate on 15 March 2011. 
 
¶7. (C)  Angelo said that he believed the GOC was concerned to 
"save face" but not at the expense of earning a completely 
"negative image" among its international friends and 
partners.  Angelo said he thought that at least some among 
the GOC were concerned about the impact on conditions on the 
ground in Eastern Chad, including security, if MINURCAT were 
to withdraw precipitously.  Angelo said he had tried to 
impress on his GOC interlocutors that withdrawal of MINURCAT 
troops would necessitate withdrawal of MINURCAT civilian 
elements as well, including those supporting the DIS:  "They 
cannot have one without the other."  Angelo said that he had 
noticed an increased awareness among GOC officials involved 
in the issue that there were "political benefit of MINURCAT's 
presence" conferred on Chad, including diminishing but still 
real "dissuasive" effect on Chad rebels in Sudan, and a kind 
of "persuasive effect" on the Chad rebels that the GOC 
continued to try to attract peacefully back into Chad. 
 
¶8. (C)  Angelo said that the GOC had indicated that it was 
open to discussing all three options in terms of UN 
"guarantees" on issues of importance to the GOC regarding 
MINURCAT.  Angelo said that he had already made the point 
that MINURCAT's force strength was growing -- it was up to 65 
percent now -- and that he had been making concessions to GOC 
criticisms regarding infrastructure -- he had turned parts of 
the Abeche airport over to the GOC in return for assurances 
of shared use. 
 
--------------- 
MINURCAT IN CAR 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Angelo said that he would be in CAR Jan 25-26 for 
talks with Pres Bozize, who he considered "on board" with 
MINURCAT extension, because CAR could not control its NE 
corner without MINURCAT and because he wanted to keep the UN 
favorable to CAR on the DDR issue there. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C) We believe that the GOC's motivations for raising 
the question of MINURCAT withdrawal respond to both domestic 
and geo-political considerations, including the recently 
signed peace accords with Sudan, which we will analyze 
septel. We share SRSG's optimism to the extent that the GOC 
has good reason to reach a compromise solution to this issue 
that will permit Chad to enjoy the benefits of MINURCAT 
presence and activities here, even as it exacts further 
concessions from the UN in return.  But the UN delegation 
will have be very skillful in its approach to the GOC in 
order to succeed.  The controversy over what has become known 
as "MINURCAT withdrawal" has had an impact on humanitarian 
IOs and NGOs, which we discuss in another septel.  END OF 
COMMENT. 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000043  003.7 OF 003 
 
 
¶11.  (U) Minimize considered. 
NIGRO