VZCZCXRO0838
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0031/01 0181118
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181118Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7588
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000031 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF MARR CA SU CD
SUBJECT: CHADIAN POLITICAL THEATER:  SOUTHERN REBEL CHIEF 
CAPTURED AS DEBY IS FETED IN SOUTHERN CAPITAL 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 004 
     ¶B. 09 NDJAMENA 602 
     ¶C. 09 NDJAMENA 503 
 
---------- 
SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  The GOC's capture of rebel commander Djibrine 
Dassert and his top staff in Southern Chad January 4 was a 
big plus for President Deby's government, and provided an 
occasion for a bit of Chadian-style political theater.  The 
Chad military's successful ambush of Dassert, who took part 
in Deby's military triumph over Habre's regime in 1990 and 
was later Deby's Defense Minister before attempting a 
military of overthrow Deby in 2005, serves many of Deby's 
purposes in this election year.  Dassert's capture: 
 
-- burnishes the Chadian armed forces' (and Deby's own) 
credentials as protector of national security; 
-- decapitates the only major non-Sudan-based armed 
opposition group; 
-- eliminates the only politically-motivated armed rebellion 
based on Chadian soil; 
-- demonstrates the unwisdom of rejecting the GOC's efforts 
toward peaceful "national reconciliation"; 
-- shows Southern Chadians that the GOC is actively involved 
in their security; and, 
-- improves prospects for stability along the Chad-CAR border 
by eliminating a rogue armed group. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Dassert was part of a web of southern 
oppositionists, some armed, some not, some in Chad, some in 
exile.  An unarmed associate of Dassert, Dr. Nahor Mahamout 
Ngawara, long in exile in Paris, was wooed by Deby last fall 
and returned to Chad in December.  The political symbolism of 
Dassert's capture was unmistakable:  on January 2, Nahor sat 
on the dais with the President in the southern city of Sarh 
when Deby celebrated the 20th anniversary of his rule; two 
days later, Dassert was ambushed and captured by ANT troops 
near Sahr.  Coincidence?  Hardly. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The GOC's decision to go very public regarding the 
status of Dassert and his cronies is smart politically and 
also provides some protection for Dassert and his men, 
because there is transparency on their physical and political 
conditions.  How the GOC handles this case from now on will 
test the government's commitment to human rights and the rule 
of law, as well as give us an idea of just how politically 
sophisticated the GOC will be in managing a "national 
reconciliation" problem of a different sort from the 
negotiated and peaceful reentry to Chad of, say, Soubiane and 
Goukouni -- or Nahor himself.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Following the failure of his coup attempt in 2005, 
Dassert retreated to his power base in the Guera, Moyen Chari 
and Chari Baguirmi regions of southwestern and southern Chad, 
where Deby's support has traditionally been weak.  He was 
captured in Korbol, located very near Sahr, immediately 
following Deby's January 2 visit to Sahr.  Deby chose that 
southern city to deliver his New Year's address as part of an 
effort to cultivate southern voters long suspicious of him 
and of the ability of his northern Zaghawa ethnic group to 
govern all of Chad impartially. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Deby was accompanied on his early-January visit to 
Sahr by returned-exile Nahor, who decided to come back to 
Chad after having met with Deby in Paris in October.  Some 
here have asserted that Nahor provided information that led 
to Dassert's capture -- Nahor has said that soldiers directly 
loyal to his movement are still being encouraged to surrender 
from inaccessible locations along the CAR border, where 
Dassert's troops have also been operating. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Nahor has been quite visible since his return from 
France, engaging in interviews in which he describes his 
 
NDJAMENA 00000031  002 OF 002 
 
 
rational for abandoning an opposition stance.  Nahor has said 
that he does not see President Deby, with whom he continues 
to have political differences, as the root of Chad's many 
problems.  He has made clear that he believes Deby's 
overtures to rebels and opposition figures, and willingness 
to have opposition party members play prominent roles in his 
government, are sincere.  He has said that he appreciates the 
efforts of the National Mediator to guarantee the rights of 
returning rebels.  Like former rebel leader Ahmat Soubiane, 
Nahor insists that he does not intend to take an active part 
in political life in the near term, other than to serve as a 
link between the GoC and disaffected groups in Chad, France 
and elsewhere. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  As for Dassert, the GoC is treating his capture as 
a major victory, having paraded both him and a stockpile of 
weapons captured with him before foreign military observers 
in recent days.  Dassert's removal will lead to increased 
stability along the CAR border, as his troops stand accused 
of having staged raiding parties into CAR this past fall. 
Dassert's treatment in custody will be a test for the GoC's 
ability to adhere to human rights standards and rule of law, 
and also for Deby's skill at finessing relations with the 
Chadian South. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  The Chad military's capture of Dassert was a big 
plus for the government, serving many useful political 
purposes for Deby and company in this election year, 
including: burnishing the armed forces' (and Deby's own) 
credentials as protector of the national security; 
decapitating the only major non-Sudan-based armed opposition 
group; practically eliminated the only politically-motivated 
armed rebellion from Chad soil; demonstrating the unwisdom of 
rejecting the GOC's efforts toward peaceful "national 
reconciliation; showing Southern Chadians that the GOC is 
actively involved in their security; and improving the 
chances for stability along the Chad-CAR border by 
eliminating one more rogue armed group. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Dassert's fall also provided the occasion for a 
bit of political theater, Chadian-style.  Dassert was part of 
a loose web of southern oppositionists, some armed, some not, 
some in Chad, some abroad.  Unarmed associate Nahor Mahamout 
Ngawara, long in exile in Paris, was wooed by Deby last fall 
and returned to Chad in December.  The symbolism in this was 
unmistakable:  Nahor was on the dais in Sarh when Deby 
celebrated the 20th anniversary of his rule on January 2; two 
days later Dassert was ambushed and captured by ANT troops 
near Sahr. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  The GOC's decision to go very public regarding 
the status of Dassert and his cronies was politically astute 
and also provides some protection for Dassert and his men, 
because there is transparency on their physical and political 
conditions.  How the GOC handles this case from now on will 
test the government's commitment to human rights and rule of 
law, as well as give us an idea of just how politically 
sophisticated and supple the GOC will be in managing a 
"national reconciliation" problem of a different sort from 
the negotiated and peaceful reentry to Chad of, say, Soubiane 
or Goukouni -- or Nahor   END COMMENT. 
 
¶X.  (SBU)  Minimize considered. 
NIGRO