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Viewing cable 10NDJAMENA30, THE REAL DEAL?: CHAD-SUDAN PEACE AGREEMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10NDJAMENA30 2010-01-17 10:25 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXRO8064
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0030/01 0171025
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171025Z JAN 10 ZDK ZUI RUEHAE 6802 SVC. VOL ALL OTHERS
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7586
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000030 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SU LY CD
SUBJECT: THE REAL DEAL?:  CHAD-SUDAN PEACE AGREEMENT 
TIMETABLE AND DETAILS 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 029 
     B. NDJAMENA 028 
     C. NDJAMENA 021 
 
NDJAMENA 00000030  001.4 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D. 
 
----------- 
SUMMARY 
AND COMMENT 
----------- 
 
1.  (C) The January 15 Chad-Sudan agreements set a deadline 
of February 21 for both the GOC and the GOS to accomplish the 
key element in their rapprochement, "elimination of armed 
rebel presence on their respective territories," Chad Amb to 
the U.S. told Ambassador January 16, but both governments 
have a month's "wiggle room" in case of difficulties.  After 
March 21, Bechir underlined, the GOC and the GOS committed to 
removing rebels from their soil, either by voluntary 
repatriation ("going home"); or by remaining and claiming 
"refugee status;" or by going to a third country "of their 
choosing."  The two sides also agreed to set up border 
monitoring posts in Abeche and El Geneina NLT February 21. 
 
2.  (C) Bechir said the agreements could and should work, but 
that everything depended on the willingness and ability of 
the two governments to keep their commitments.  Bechir said 
that the GOC was acting in good faith, and that the Chadians 
generally trusted Dr. Ghazi, but that neither the GOC nor the 
GOS had overcome all suspicion of the others' motives and 
future plans. 
 
3.  (C) The "difficult cases" piece of this is interesting. 
We do not know if there are any JEM rebel figures who would 
be personae non gratae in Sudan, but we think that the 
Chadians would not be able to accept either Timan Erdimi or 
Mahamat Nouri back in Chad, not only because they have put 
themselves personally beyond the pale as far as Deby is 
concerned, but also because the GOC could not guarantee their 
safety here.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
 
4.  (C) CHAD AMB TO U.S. BECHIR:  Chad Amb to the U.S. Bechir 
briefed Ambassador Nigro late January 16 on the Chad-Sudan 
peace agreements signed here January 15.  Bechir has been a 
member of FORMIN Faki's negotiating teams, both with the GOS 
and with JEM, over the past three weeks. 
 
5.  (C) REBELS OUT BY 21 FEBRUARY:  Bechir said that the GOC 
had committed to eliminating armed Sudanese JEM rebels from 
Chadian soil NLT February 21 and the GOS had committed to 
similar elimination of armed Chadian rebel groups from 
Sudanese soil NLT than February 21. 
 
6.  (C)  BORDER MONITORING POSTS: Bechir said that the GOC 
and GOS had agreed to set up the first stage of the border 
monitoring mechanism with posts in Abeche, Chad and El 
Geneina Sudan, also by February 21. 
 
7.  (C)  WIGGLE ROOM: Bechir said that there was some 
flexibility built into these timetables.  If one side or the 
other encountered technical or other difficulties in 
completing the elimination of rebels, they could ask for a 
delay until March 21. 
 
8.  (C)  REBELS INTO REFUGEES?:  Bechir said that after March 
21, rebels would either have returned to their own country, 
or elected to remain "as refugees only." 
 
9.  (C)  DIFFICULT CASES:  If either the GOS or GOC 
encountered a few "difficult cases" of recalcitrant rebel 
chiefs who refused of those alternatives (repatriation or 
refugee status), that government would have to notify the 
other of the situation and take steps to see that the 
reluctant rebels ("one or two," Bechir said) made plans to go 
to a third country of their choosing. 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000030  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
10.  (C)  TRUST BUT VERIFY?:  Bechir said the agreements 
could and should work, but everything depended on the 
willingness and ability of the two governments to keep their 
commitments.  Bechir said that the GOC was acting in good 
faith, and that the Chadians generally trusted Dr. Ghazi, but 
that neither the GOC nor the GOS had overcome all suspicion 
of the others' motives and future plans. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11. (C) The "difficult cases" piece of this is interesting. 
We do not know if there are any JEM rebel figures who would 
be personae non gratae back in Sudan, but we think that the 
Chadians would not be able to accept either Timan Erdimi or 
Mahamat Nouri back in Chad, not only because they have put 
themselves personally beyond the pale as far as Deby is 
concerned, but also because the GOC could not guarantee their 
safety here. 
 
 
12.  (U) Minimize considered. 
NIGRO