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Viewing cable 10NDJAMENA30, THE REAL DEAL?: CHAD-SUDAN PEACE AGREEMENT
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10NDJAMENA30 | 2010-01-17 10:25 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Ndjamena |
VZCZCXRO8064
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0030/01 0171025
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171025Z JAN 10 ZDK ZUI RUEHAE 6802 SVC. VOL ALL OTHERS
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7586
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000030
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF SU LY CD
SUBJECT: THE REAL DEAL?: CHAD-SUDAN PEACE AGREEMENT
TIMETABLE AND DETAILS
REF: A. NDJAMENA 029
¶B. NDJAMENA 028
¶C. NDJAMENA 021
NDJAMENA 00000030 001.4 OF 002
Classified By: AMB LOUIS J. NIGRO, JR. FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.
-----------
SUMMARY
AND COMMENT
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¶1. (C) The January 15 Chad-Sudan agreements set a deadline
of February 21 for both the GOC and the GOS to accomplish the
key element in their rapprochement, "elimination of armed
rebel presence on their respective territories," Chad Amb to
the U.S. told Ambassador January 16, but both governments
have a month's "wiggle room" in case of difficulties. After
March 21, Bechir underlined, the GOC and the GOS committed to
removing rebels from their soil, either by voluntary
repatriation ("going home"); or by remaining and claiming
"refugee status;" or by going to a third country "of their
choosing." The two sides also agreed to set up border
monitoring posts in Abeche and El Geneina NLT February 21.
¶2. (C) Bechir said the agreements could and should work, but
that everything depended on the willingness and ability of
the two governments to keep their commitments. Bechir said
that the GOC was acting in good faith, and that the Chadians
generally trusted Dr. Ghazi, but that neither the GOC nor the
GOS had overcome all suspicion of the others' motives and
future plans.
¶3. (C) The "difficult cases" piece of this is interesting.
We do not know if there are any JEM rebel figures who would
be personae non gratae in Sudan, but we think that the
Chadians would not be able to accept either Timan Erdimi or
Mahamat Nouri back in Chad, not only because they have put
themselves personally beyond the pale as far as Deby is
concerned, but also because the GOC could not guarantee their
safety here. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
¶4. (C) CHAD AMB TO U.S. BECHIR: Chad Amb to the U.S. Bechir
briefed Ambassador Nigro late January 16 on the Chad-Sudan
peace agreements signed here January 15. Bechir has been a
member of FORMIN Faki's negotiating teams, both with the GOS
and with JEM, over the past three weeks.
¶5. (C) REBELS OUT BY 21 FEBRUARY: Bechir said that the GOC
had committed to eliminating armed Sudanese JEM rebels from
Chadian soil NLT February 21 and the GOS had committed to
similar elimination of armed Chadian rebel groups from
Sudanese soil NLT than February 21.
¶6. (C) BORDER MONITORING POSTS: Bechir said that the GOC
and GOS had agreed to set up the first stage of the border
monitoring mechanism with posts in Abeche, Chad and El
Geneina Sudan, also by February 21.
¶7. (C) WIGGLE ROOM: Bechir said that there was some
flexibility built into these timetables. If one side or the
other encountered technical or other difficulties in
completing the elimination of rebels, they could ask for a
delay until March 21.
¶8. (C) REBELS INTO REFUGEES?: Bechir said that after March
21, rebels would either have returned to their own country,
or elected to remain "as refugees only."
¶9. (C) DIFFICULT CASES: If either the GOS or GOC
encountered a few "difficult cases" of recalcitrant rebel
chiefs who refused of those alternatives (repatriation or
refugee status), that government would have to notify the
other of the situation and take steps to see that the
reluctant rebels ("one or two," Bechir said) made plans to go
to a third country of their choosing.
NDJAMENA 00000030 002.3 OF 002
¶10. (C) TRUST BUT VERIFY?: Bechir said the agreements
could and should work, but everything depended on the
willingness and ability of the two governments to keep their
commitments. Bechir said that the GOC was acting in good
faith, and that the Chadians generally trusted Dr. Ghazi, but
that neither the GOC nor the GOS had overcome all suspicion
of the others' motives and future plans.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶11. (C) The "difficult cases" piece of this is interesting.
We do not know if there are any JEM rebel figures who would
be personae non gratae back in Sudan, but we think that the
Chadians would not be able to accept either Timan Erdimi or
Mahamat Nouri back in Chad, not only because they have put
themselves personally beyond the pale as far as Deby is
concerned, but also because the GOC could not guarantee their
safety here.
¶12. (U) Minimize considered.
NIGRO