VZCZCXRO0047
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0003/01 0041026
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 041026Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7556
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000003 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PRELGOV PGOV MARR PHUM PREF SU CD
SUBJECT: FORMIN ON CHAD-SUDAN XMAS DIPLOMACY:  KHARTOUM 
TALKS PRODUCTIVE, BUT MORE TOUGH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 003 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 621 
 
---------- 
SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) FORMIN Faki told Ambassador Dec 31 that he 
considered his "Xmas Visit" to Khartoum last week a success; 
that he was encouraged by the frankness and seriousness of 
conversations he had with President Bashir, Dr Ghazi, and 
others; and that he was satisfied that the GOS had indeed 
moved most but not all Chad rebels far from the border. Faki 
said that "we have broken a psychological barrier by speaking 
so frankly to one another."  But the GOC was still not fully 
convinced that the GOS was committed to matching the GOC 
commitment to a definitive end to the proxy war and that the 
GOS must make clear to the Chad rebels still in Sudan that 
they must soon renounce armed action against the GOC and 
prepare for a different, peaceful future.  For its part, Faki 
affirmed, JEM was getting a clear GOC message at all levels: 
"Make peace in Darfur -- or get out of Chad." Faki made two 
other points with more much more emphasis than usual:  Deep 
GOC appreciation for USG diplomatic and political support 
throughout the bilateral detente process; and linked to this 
strong USG support, what he described as his own personal 
commitment to do everything he could to make the bilateral 
detente process succeed and result in a peaceful, "normal," 
and durable Chad-Sudan relationship, reflecting the GOC's 
awareness of the necessity of peace between Chad and Sudan 
and a definitive end to the "proxy war" as preconditions to 
achieving peace in Darfur. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Faki's take on the latest Khartoum talks tracks 
closely with Chad Ambassador Bechir's (Ref B) view, as well 
apparently with Dr Ghazi's (Ref A).  But Faki was much more 
explicit regarding the GOC's readiness to break definitively 
with JEM than he has been previously, although he still 
conditions it with something like absolute surety that the 
Sudanese will have broken equally definitively with the Chad 
rebels.  Faki's meeting with President Bashir, on which the 
Chadians insisted as a condition of the visit, seems to have 
been in itself a confidence building measure of major 
significance.  We support Faki's idea that the GOS should 
send Dr Ghazi to NDjamena this month along with its technical 
delegation, to continue the "political conversation" even as 
the technical implementation of the protocol is discussed. 
We should urge the GOS to do so, and we should tell the GOC 
that we have done so. President Deby's highlighting of the 
GOC's peace efforts both with the GOS and Chad rebels in his 
Dec 30 "Liberation Day" speech (Septel) are welcome 
confirmation that the GOC is at least as serious as the GOS 
in reaching a peaceful solution to their differences. END 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
------------------- 
FAKI'S "XMAS VISIT" 
TO KHARTOUM 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU)  FORMIN Moussa Faki Mahamat told Ambassador Dec 31 
that he considered his "Xmas Visit" to Khartoum Dec 24-25 a 
success and that he was encouraged by the frankness and 
seriousness of conversations he had with President Bashir, Dr 
Ghazi, the DEFMIN, and INTEL Chief Atta.  Faki said that "we 
have broken a psychological barrier by speaking so frankly to 
one another."  Faki said that Ghazi had asked for the 
agreed-on sequence on CBMs to be changed:  Instead of a 
Sudanese delegation to Chad next, would Faki come to 
Khartoum?  Faki said the GOC was quite willing to accommodate 
Ghazi in this.  Faki said that the visit has definitely moved 
the bilateral process forward and that the Chadians were 
satisfied that the GOS had fulfilled its pledge to move Chad 
rebels far (c. 400KMs) from the border, but that there were 
still issues to be worked out.  Principal among these was the 
willingness of the GOS to match GOC commitment to a 
 
NDJAMENA 00000003  002 OF 003 
 
 
definitive end to the proxy war.  This meant, according to 
Faki, that the GOS must make clear to the Chad rebels still 
in Sudan that they must eventually renounce the goal of armed 
overthrow of the GOC and prepare for a different, peaceful 
future, either back in Chad or elsewhere. 
 
---------------- 
PRESIDENT BASHIR 
---------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU Faki said that his dialogue with Pres Bashir was 
completely frank and open:  Bashir reviewed the history of 
the Chad-Sudan relationship, with its ups and downs, blamed 
Darfur for the downs, said that Sudan was ready for a change 
of course; and reaffirmed his approval of the Faki-Ghazi 
bilateral track and its agreements.  But all actions must be 
reciprocal, Bashir emphasized.  Faki said he rejected the 
"absolute parallelism" of the Chad-Sudan proxy war.  Chad was 
suffering unfairly for what Khartoum had done in Darfur: 
refugees, war, rebellion, instability.  All Chad rebels were 
in Sudan and all were Sudan's clients and "creatures," having 
been "created" by the GOS .  Faki argued that JEM was 
"tolerated" by the GOC, not created and maintained by 
NDjamena.  The GOC permitted only a few JEM leaders to stay 
for long in Chad; the rest of JEM could only come for short 
visits.  Faki said that the Sudanese contested all his 
arguments, but still showed what he interpreted as a serious 
interest in resolving bilateral problems in a bilateral way. 
Faki said that this might be because the GOS was playing for 
time, or because it wanted an authentic and durable peaceful 
settlement, or perhaps both, as the GOS had internal 
divisions with different agendas.  Faki said he believed that 
Ghazi was sincere, but that the DEFMIN and Atta were perhaps 
less so. 
 
--------------- 
THE GOC AND JEM 
--------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Faki claimed that the GOC had been distancing 
itself from JEM for some time and had told JEM that they had 
"no future" as an armed group in Chad and that they should be 
pursuing peaceful paths to peace in Darfur.  The JEM, Faki 
intimated, understood that GOC tolerance of them as an armed 
group in Chad was not eternal and that the GOC was itself 
prepared to break definitively with JEM as soon as it could 
be sure of reciprocal action by Sudan.  Faki said that JEM 
was getting a clear GOC message at all levels:  "Make peace 
in Darfur or get out of Chad." Faki said that Chadian 
intelligence was aware of what the GOS was telling its Chad 
rebel clients, and that the GOS had not yet been so clear 
with them.  This would be the "sticking point" for the GOC, 
Faki suggested. 
 
----------------- 
GHAZI SHOULD COME 
TO NDJAMENA JAN 7 
----------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The next step, Faki said, was a Sudanese technical 
delegation of military and intelligence officers to Chad to 
discuss concrete implementation of the 2006 bilateral 
protocol, which called for border monitoring posts and "mixed 
border surveillance units," composed of Chad and Sudan 
military personnel. Faki said that he had suggested to Dr 
Ghazi that Ghazi accompany the technical delegation so that 
the Faki-Ghazi "political conversation" could be continued. 
"We must keep talking," Faki said.  Ambassador said that the 
USG supported this idea, to maintain the momentum generated 
by the Khartoum talks. 
 
----------------- 
STAYING BILATERAL 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Faki said that he had always believed that a 
bilateral track would be more realistic and more successful 
 
NDJAMENA 00000003  003 OF 003 
 
 
than any multilateral track, given the deep history  and 
close relation between Chad and Sudan.  As such, the GOC was 
not interested in seeking multilateral assistance or support 
from "international organizations" for the implementation of 
the 2006 bilateral protocol, although the GOC was always 
appreciative of diplomatic and political support for its 
peace efforts.  The GOC and the GOS could at some point 
consider asking bilateral partners to play a role in 
"witnessing" future agreements, but this was not certain. 
 
---------------- 
FAKI AND THE USG 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Faki made two points with more much emphasis than 
usual.  First, he emphasized that the GOC was deeply 
appreciative of USG diplomatic and political support 
throughout the bilateral detente process, begun last summer 
between himself and Dr Ghazi.  Faki said the GOC was grateful 
for public, visible USG support, such as the Dec 29 USG press 
statement, as well as for more private USG actions in support 
of the process, such as SE Gration's efforts and others to 
make clear USG goals and expectations for the sub-region. 
Second, he linked this USG support to what he described as 
his own personal commitment to do everything he could to make 
the bilateral detente process succeed and result in a 
peaceful, "normal," and durable Chad-Sudan relationship.  The 
GOC, he said, was fully aware of the necessity of peace 
between Chad and Sudan and a definitive end to the "proxy 
war" as preconditions to achieving peace in Darfur. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Faki's take on the latest Khartoum talks tracks 
closely with Chad Ambassador Bechir's (Ref B) view, as well 
apparently with Dr Ghazi's (Ref A).  But Faki was much more 
explicit regarding the GOC's readiness to break definitively 
with JEM than he has been previously, although he still 
conditions it with something like absolute surety that the 
Sudanese will have broken equally definitively with the Chad 
rebels. Faki's meeting with President Bashir, on which the 
Chadians insisted as a condition of the visit, seems to have 
been in itself a confidence building measure of major 
significance.  We support Faki's idea that he GOS should send 
Dr Ghazi to NDjamena this month along with its technical 
delegation, to continue the "political conversation" even as 
the technical implementation of the protocol is discussed. 
We should urge the GOS to do so, and we should tell the GOC 
that we have done so. President Deby's highlighting of the 
GOC's peace efforts both with the GOS and Chad rebels in his 
Dec 30 "Liberation Day" (Septel) are welcome confirmation 
that the GOC is at least as serious as the GOS in reaching a 
peaceful solution to their differences. 
 
¶10.  (U) Minimize considered. 
NIGRO