VZCZCXRO2461
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0011/01 0071304
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071304Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7563
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000011 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PREF SU CD
SUBJECT: CHAD-SUDAN RAPPROCHEMENT GAINS MOMENTUM AS GOC 
GIVES JEM ULTIMATUM:  "DOHA IS YOUR LAST CHANCE." 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 004 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 003 
     ¶C. 09 NDJAMENA 621 
 
---------- 
SUMMARY AND 
COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Chad-Sudan rapprochement has gained significant 
momentum, with the GoC last week having given the JEM an 
ultimatum on the need to travel to Doha and negotiate in good 
faith, or "go it alone from here on."  A Sudanese technical 
team arrived in N'Djamena January 7, and a heavy-weight 
Sudanese political/military delegation headed by Dr. Ghazi is 
scheduled to come here January 8.  The Sudanese have two 
goals:  first, they want to advance Chad-Sudan rapprochement 
politically, in parallel to the work of the technical team on 
implementation of the planned border monitoring program. 
Second, the Sudanese delegation plans to speak with the JEM's 
Khalil Ibrahim here in N'Djamena, in a meeting arranged by 
the GoC. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  This getting really interesting.  The new momentum 
in Chad-Sudan rapprochement lies in the convergence of the 
paths of the two governments.  The GOC and GOS are advancing 
their national goals and relations at the expense of JEM and 
Chad rebels in Sudan.  The Chadians will be looking for Sudan 
to give an "ultimatum" to Chad rebels there, just as the GoC 
did to the JEM. The idea of the GOC and the GOS talking to 
JEM with the same message is indeed intriguing.  END SUMMARY 
AND COMMENT. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  In a conversation with Ambassador Nigro and DCM 
January 7, Chadian Ambassador to the U.S. Adoum Bechir 
reported that Sudan's technical delegation charged with 
working out a bilateral border-monitoring plan had arrived 
earlier in the day, and that a political/military delegation 
headed by Ghazi Sallahuddin and including Intel Chief Atta, 
FMA SYG Muttriq, and Doha Negotiator Amin Hassan Ouman, would 
arrive January 8.  In addition to giving political blessing 
to the work of the technical team, the political delegation 
would meet in N'Djamena with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim in the 
aim of trying to make progress on a JEM settlement with the 
GoS. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The GoC had set the table for the Sudan-JEM 
meeting, said Bechir, by sending its own high-level 
delegation to Am Djarras last week to give Khalil an 
ultimatum from President Deby:  "Either go to Doha and 
negotiate seriously in a logic of peace, or go it alone." 
The Chadian delegation to Am Djarras, consisting of FORMIN 
Faki, Interior Minister Bachir, Infrastructure Minister 
Younousmi, Ambassador to Libya (and brother of the President) 
Daoussa Deby, Intel Chief Chaibo, National Assembly First 
Vice President and Ambassador to the U.S. Bechir, had made 
clear that the GoC at the highest level had decided to make 
peace with Sudan.  The GoC viewed Doha as the JEM's "last 
chance to move forward peacefully."  The delegation had 
specified that "if the JEM chose to take up arms after Doha 
and go to war, it would go alone."  Furthermore, it would no 
longer be welcome in Chad.  "Our support for the JEM, except 
as a peaceful political movement in Sudan, has ended; this is 
the President's decision," the delegation told Khalil.  "We 
want to turn the page definitively on our relations with 
Sudan and the JEM." 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  In response to the GoC demarche, Khalil had 
repeated familiar themes, said Ambassador Bechir:  "We'll go 
to Doha, but we are not hopeful.  Sudan has stacked the cards 
against us."  "Sudan wants us to be a tooth on the wheel" 
along with other ephemeral, GoS-fabricated civil-society 
players.  "We aren't a tooth, we are the wheel." 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  The JEM did accept the GoC delegation's invitation 
to arrange a direct, high-level GoS-JEM meeting in N'Djamena, 
which would take place with Ghazi representing the GoS 
 
NDJAMENA 00000011  002 OF 002 
 
 
January 8.  The Sudanese were already aware of what had 
happened at the Am Djarras talks.  In fact, the GoC had told 
Atta, "You know you can trust us.  You have already heard 
through your own sources what happened at Am Djarras.  Now 
you must give your Chadian rebel clients a similar message." 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Bechir noted that the GoC still had doubts about 
GoS sincerity overall, and especially about its intention to 
break definitively with Chadian rebels.  He added that the 
discovery in Tisse, southeastern Chad, of new rebel land 
mines was proof that anti-Chadian rebels were still capable 
of causing problems for the GoC. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  This getting really interesting.  The new momentum 
in Chad-Sudan rapprochement lies in the convergence of the 
paths of the two governments.  The GOC and GOS are advancing 
their national goals and relations at the expense of JEM and 
Chad rebels in Sudan.  The Chadians will be looking for Sudan 
to give an "ultimatum" to Chad rebels there, just as the GoC 
did to the JEM. The idea of the GOC and the GOS talking to 
JEM with the same message is indeed intriguing. 
 
¶9.  (U) Minimize considered. 
NIGRO