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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MANILA 000093 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM PHUM PTER MOPS EAID ASEC KJUS
KCRM, KDEM, KISL, KTIP, KNNP, RP 
SUBJECT: PHILIPPINES 2009 POLITICAL WRAP-UP AND LOOK-AHEAD 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Kristie A. Kenney, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) While several tumultuous events -- a political 
massacre in Mindanao, massive flooding in Luzon -- created an 
end-of-year sense of crisis in the Philippines, overall 
political and security stability improved perceptibly over 
the course of 2009.  The year witnessed no significant 
military or political efforts to unseat the president, and 
insurgent Muslims in Mindanao returned to peace talks with 
the government. President Arroyo also moved forcefully when 
she imposed martial law for a brief period in areas of 
Maguindanao province to respond to the worst act of clan 
violence in recent years.  Nonetheless, the Philippines faces 
numerous challenges in 2010 that could divert attention from 
issues of concern to the U.S., like counterterrorism and 
regional leadership on democratization and human rights.  The 
country is intensely focused on May national elections, which 
have already been marked by violence and fears that new 
automated voting could lead to disarray.  The elections could 
also distract the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from 
counterterrorism efforts in the South.  While the government 
has made meaningful progress in talks with the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF), the calendar may not permit this 
administration to conclude a comprehensive peace compact. 
U.S.-Philippine relations are likely to remain strong no 
matter who wins the presidential election.  Although some 
Filipinos publicly criticized our Visiting Forces Agreement 
(VFA) in 2009, our troops here won widespread acclaim for the 
assistance they (and other USG agencies) provided in the 
aftermath of natural disasters.  We also have provided the 
government recommendations for continued progress against 
trafficking in persons.  End Summary. 
 
DEMOCRACY 
--------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Philippines' election season is now in full swing. 
 Although the authoritarian rule of Ferdinand Marcos ended in 
1986, the Philippines has only had three presidential 
elections since then, all marred by irregularities and 
violence.  The current election process has already been 
badly scarred by conflict. Filipinos were stunned by the 
heinous November 23 massacre of 57 unarmed people, many women 
and journalists, by members of the powerful Ampatuan clan in 
Maguindanao province.  The Arroyo administration proved wrong 
the widespread suspicion that the Ampatuans -- political 
allies of the President -- would escape accountability for 
this crime.  Despite intense criticism from democracy 
activists, the President imposed martial law in portions of 
Maguindanao for eight days, during which the authorities 
arrested leading clan members and disarmed the Ampatuans' 
private army.  The Ampatuans' fate remains unclear; they are 
widely presumed guilty, but the legal processes are only 
beginning.  The audacity of the crime exposed a provincial 
political and justice system that was deeply dysfunctional 
and susceptible to political influence. 
 
¶3. (C) Despite widespread concerns throughout 2009 that 
President Arroyo might seek to remain as chief executive 
beyond the time the constitution allowed, we believe she 
intends to step down as president in June when her term ends. 
 However, she has also taken the unprecedented step of 
registering to run for a congressional seat.  Many political 
observers see this as continuation of Arroyo's effort to 
achieve a constitutional amendment to create a parliamentary 
system of government, and perhaps allow her to return to 
political preeminence in the near term.  Some Filipinos are 
also anxious about the use of automated ballot tabulation in 
the May 2010 elections, fearing that computer systems will 
facilitate distortion of election results, or that equipment 
failures might render the entire election illegitimate and 
create a constitutional crisis. The Mission is taking a 
leading role with international and domestic NGOs and other 
Embassies to craft an election monitoring effort to help 
ensure a more fair and transparent voting process. 
 
¶4. (C) Although it is too early to call the presidential 
race, recent polls have given Senator Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino 
III front-runner status, but we do not rule out Senator 
Manuel "Manny" Villar, a wealthy self-made businessman and 
more experienced politician.  Aquino, Villar, and the other 
contenders are all well-disposed toward the United States, 
and we are confident we can work well with whoever wins the 
 
MANILA 00000093  002 OF 004 
 
 
presidential election.  The greatest challenge for us is to 
avoid becoming entangled in partisan politics, as many 
Filipinos lack faith in U.S. neutrality. 
 
ROBUST MILITARY TIES 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Military relations between the U.S and the Philippines 
are robust and vibrant.  A Philippine court of appeal's 
spring 2009 ruling that overturned the conviction of Lance 
Corporal Daniel Smith, who spent years in detention on 
Embassy grounds, removed an extraordinarily serious irritant 
to military ties.  Opponents of the close U.S.-Philippine 
military relationship continued to focus attention on our 
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which became the subject of 
legislative hearings late in the year.  Public attention has 
now shifted away from the VFA, but we remain watchful that 
politically motivated critics may again focus on the 
agreement, and we recognize it may become necessary for us to 
clarify with the GRP the modalities for the incarceration of 
certain persons covered by the VFA. 
 
¶6. (C) The Philippines, named a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2003, 
remains a committed bilateral and regional partner in 
fighting terrorism.  In 2009, the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) conducted numerous successful raids against 
high-value targets associated with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist organizations, as well as 
against the communist New People's Army (NPA -- also a 
terrorist organization) and rogue elements of the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).  Incurring inevitable 
casualties, the AFP nevertheless continued to aggressively 
engage and pursue terrorist elements in Basilan and Jolo. 
Thanks to close cooperation with the Joint Special Operations 
Task Force - Philippines (JSOTF-P), which is working to 
enhance the AFP's capabilities to engage terrorists, the AFP 
recorded 10 ASG members it killed in 2009, leaving the ASG 
approximately 390 strong.  (Separately, the police claimed it 
killed seven ASG members.)  The AFP also claimed 165 NPA 
members killed in action during 2009, with the police adding 
13 to that number. 
 
DISASTER ASSISTANCE, CIVIL AFFAIRS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) While kinetic operations are essential to the 
Philippine military's strategy against terrorism, recent use 
of humanitarian assistance programs involving medical, 
dental, engineering, and veterinary clinics have done much to 
alleviate the local populace's unease toward the AFP and 
mitigate support given to terrorists in isolated areas.  The 
AFP continued to emphasize the role of civil-military 
operations (CMOs), in part through the growing role of the 
National Development Support Command and establishment of a 
civil military operations school. Tragically, U.S. servicemen 
Sergeant First Class Christopher D. Shaw and Staff Sergeant 
Jack Mayfield Martin III -- and one AFP counterpart -- died 
on Jolo island on September 29, 2009, when their vehicle 
detonated an improvised explosive device.  Shaw and Martin 
were engaged in a CMO that entailed construction of a school. 
 The Embassy is working with Philippine authorities as they 
conduct a criminal investigation. 
 
¶8. (C) The AFP may be increasingly distracted from its CT 
mission, however, as elections approach.  Not only did the 
Department of National Defense undergo a leadership 
transition as Secretary Gilberto Teodoro resigned in order to 
begin his presidential campaign, but the AFP is also turning 
to focus on its traditional mission of providing a secure 
environment for elections.  Teodoro's resignation may weaken 
support for the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) program, 
intended to introduce comprehensive systemic reforms in the 
defense establishment.  The PDR's initial phase is scheduled 
to conclude in 2010, as the program transitions from a focus 
on internal defense to territorial defense. 
 
¶9. (U) The AFP in 2009 demonstrated its ability to respond to 
multiple natural disasters in a prompt and professional 
manner.  Responding to the extensive damage from a 
devastating series of typhoons and floods, the Philippine 
military was instrumental in rescuing stranded civilians, 
providing medical services, and using their engineering 
assets to rebuild roads and homes destroyed by these natural 
disasters.  U.S. forces worked closely with the AFP and 
civilian authorities in these efforts, receiving substantial 
positive publicity, and the superb coordination between U.S. 
 
MANILA 00000093  003 OF 004 
 
 
and Philippine forces demonstrated the growing 
interoperability of our two militaries, due in large measure 
to intensive bilateral training efforts.  The Philippines 
also established itself as a regional leader in disaster 
response by hosting the first ASEAN Regional Forum disaster 
relief exercise -- the Voluntary Demonstration of Response 
(VDR) -- in May 2009. 
 
¶10. (U) Coupled with its recent success at home, overseas the 
Philippine military continues to excel as a much sought after 
partner in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions (UNPK).  The 
late-2009 dispatch of an AFP battalion to replace a Polish 
unit in the Golan Heights boosted the total Philippine 
deployment in peacekeeping operations to approximately 1,000 
Philippine soldiers, police officers or other experts in nine 
UNPK missions worldwide. 
 
¶11. (C) The AFP, due in no small part to numerous regular 
bilateral training exercises with the U.S. military, 
continues to improve slowly, but challenges remain.  While 
the Philippine military's senior promotions have become less 
politicized, chronic budgetary shortfalls have left the AFP 
woefully under-equipped and understaffed.  Severe budgetary 
constraints have made it difficult for the AFP to purchase 
badly needed equipment ranging from aircraft to ammunition. 
Budget constraints also reduce reliable maintenance for the 
Philippines' rapidly aging C-130s and Huey helicopters. 
 
PEACE PROCESS 
------------- 
 
¶12. (C) It seemed like a distant hope in early 2009 that the 
government could revive peace talks between the government 
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).  The two 
parties reached a ceasefire agreement just days before 
President Arroyo's July visit to Washington, however, ending 
a year of intense fighting in central Mindanao, and laying 
the groundwork for a full resuscitation of peace talks. 
Still intact, the ceasefire has enabled thousands of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their homes. 
 We continue to provide emergency assistance to IDPs across 
central Mindanao, including food aid, shelter, and health and 
sanitation services. 
 
¶13. (C) Arroyo has made additional meaningful progress toward 
a peace settlement with the MILF in the second half of the 
year.  The government and MILF concluded a September 
agreement creating an international contact group to support 
the peace process, and then agreed in October to form a 
civilian protection component within the International 
Monitoring Team.  Formal peace talks resumed December 8 in 
Kuala Lumpur.  Both sides continue to work toward a 
comprehensive compact, although a Philippine government 
official recently acknowledged privately to us that there is 
insufficient time before the elections to sign one.  Arroyo 
ultimately seeks to secure the legacy of having moved the 
Philippines closer to ending one of its most intractable 
conflicts, while the MILF leadership hopes to reduce the 
uncertainties associated with the upcoming change of 
administrations. 
 
¶14. (C) Throughout 2009, we used our extensive development 
assistance and consistent high-level engagement to encourage 
the parties to advance the peace process.  USAID development 
assistance supports education, health, economic growth, and 
governance programs across Mindanao, while Joint Special 
Operations Task Force - Philippines (JSOTF-P) humanitarian 
projects, executed jointly with the Philippine military, 
assisted communities susceptible to violence and terrorist 
influence.  The USG programs not only tangibly improved the 
lives of Mindanao's people, but they also helped focus the 
Philippine government on the needs of its people.  These 
initiatives are bolstered by regular high-level engagement 
between senior Mission officials and Philippine government 
cabinet members, in addition to our contact with the MILF. 
The Charge d'Affaires met on October 16 with the MILF's top 
leadership at MILF headquarters to affirm our support for the 
peace process, and visiting DAS Marciel on November 6 
delivered a letter from EAP A/S Campbell to MILF Chairman 
Murad Ebrahim, reiterating our unchanged policy of support 
for peaceful solution to the longstanding conflict. 
 
FOREIGN POLICY 
-------------- 
 
¶15. (C) A member of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Philippines 
 
MANILA 00000093  004 OF 004 
 
 
does not always agree with us in foreign affairs and 
frequently does not vote the same way that we do in 
international fora.  The Philippines in 2009 continued to 
pursue observer status with the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, hopeful that this would facilitate its peace 
process with the MILF and provide the government more 
influence for the protection of the millions of overseas 
Filipino workers in OIC countries.  Nevertheless, the 
Philippines has been a valuable partner on high-priority 
regional issues.  The Philippines remained a vocal supporter 
of Aung San Suu Kyi and others working for democracy and 
human rights in Burma.  The Philippines also has been a 
strong ally in condemning provocative and destabilizing acts 
by North Korea.  (Usefully, the Philippines has pressed ASEAN 
to take a stronger line on both Burma and North Korea.) 
 
¶16. (C) The Philippines has also welcomed close coordination 
with us in advance of its May 2010 chairing of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (Revcon).  While 
the Revcon's coinciding with national elections implies that 
it will be difficult for policymakers to remain focused on 
nonproliferation, we believe we can use our engagement with 
the Philippines in the coming months to lay the foundation 
for a productive event. 
 
TIP AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
-------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) Following the Philippines Tier Two Watch List 
placement in the 2009 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, 
the Philippine government inventoried cases and pressed 
judges for decisions on cases that could be solved quickly. 
Progress is slow, but there have been clear, noticeable 
improvements.  The Philippines has engaged more closely with 
Singapore and Malaysia on transnational TIP cases that could 
help Philippine law enforcement crack down on powerful 
trafficking rings.  The government obtained four convictions 
in the current TIP report cycle, including the conviction of 
a police officer -- the first conviction ever of a public 
official for human trafficking.   Although resource shortages 
continue to hamper government training efforts, some law 
enforcement agencies are becoming more aggressive in 
preventing and investigating human trafficking.  We have 
urged the government at senior levels to do more against 
trafficking and have approached officials at the working 
level with boththe G/TIP Action Plan and Post's own specific 
reommendations. 
 
¶18. (C) More generally, judicial eform programs are helping 
Philippine prosecutor and courts become more effective 
partners of lawenforcement and more responsive to citizens' 
nees.  The introduction of small claims courts and ou 
ongoing support for improed case and courtroom management 
training, judicial investigations, and broadening citizens' 
access to justice are strengthening the judicial system. 
Small claims courts, to be rolled out nationwide in 2010, 
have the potential over time to unburden the judicial system 
of its sizable case backlog. 
 
¶19. (C) Post began preparations to invite two federal 
prosecutors through the U.S. Department of Justice Office of 
Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT) to 
train Philippine prosecutors and law enforcement personnel on 
professional best practices and police-prosecutor 
cooperation, among other areas.  One of the prosecutors will 
focus exclusively on human trafficking prosecutions and be 
augmented by a victim witness coordinator.  Our hope is to 
help prosecutors, judges, and law enforcement personnel 
improve cooperation and break through inefficiencies that 
stymie success in criminal trials. 
KENNEY