VZCZCXRO8612
RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHHO RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS
DE RUEHMU #0049/01 0262231
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 262231Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0574
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000049 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/26 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS EAID OAS HA NU
SUBJECT: TFHA01: AMBASSADOR PROTESTS ORTEGA HAITI STATEMENT 
 
REF: A) MANAGUA 158 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Robert J. Callahan, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C )  Summary:  At a January 25 meeting with Foreign Minister 
Samuel Santos the Ambassador protested President Daniel Ortega's 
willful mischaracterization of U.S. humanitarian efforts in Haiti 
as a military occupation.  He said that such statements have been 
noticed in Washington and are damaging to bilateral relations. 
For his part Santos questioned the need for "so many  troops" in 
Haiti and suggested that the main obstacle to good relations is USG 
"interference" in Nicaragua (i.e. criticism of electoral fraud). 
The Ambassador has explained our role in Haiti to the media and 
criticized those who seek to  politicize a humanitarian crisis. 
Ortega surrogates (including First Lady Rosario Murillo) have 
repeated his line; we expect they will continue to do so.   End 
Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C )  On January 25, the Ambassador met with Foreign Minister 
Samuel Santos to discuss President Daniel Ortega's assertion 
(reftel) that  U.S. operations in Haiti are aimed at "occupying" 
that country.  The Ambassador was accompanied by the DCM, Santos by 
MFA Director General for the Americas Orlando Gomez.  The 
Ambassador stated that Ortega's comment had no basis in fact, and 
that U.S. military had unique capabilities which were needed given 
the massive scale of the disaster.  He noted the U.S. military's 
role in reopening Port-au-Prince's Airport, the use of helicopters 
to bring in supplies, and the work of U.S. soldiers in distributing 
food to key points.  He also mentioned the presence of the USNS 
Comfort, the massive hospital ship which twice before has provided 
medical attention in Nicaragua, and should be well known to the 
GON. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C )  The Ambassador described the assertions of a U.S. desire 
to take over Haiti as "absurd," saying that there was no strategic 
interest which would warrant such a step and that our motivations 
were purely humanitarian.  Ortega's comment had been found 
offensive by the most senior members of the USG, and, in fact, the 
Secretary of State had raised it with the ambassadors during the 
recently concluded Western Hemisphere Chiefs of Mission Conference. 
He asked that Santos convey USG concerns directly to Ortega.  Such 
statements, he added, further complicate bilateral relations, which 
are not good. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C)  Santos promised to report our concerns, but then made an 
effort to defend Ortega's statement.  "Why are there so many 
troops?  Why aren't they under the control of the 'Blue Helmets' 
(MINUSTAH)?"  He added that he had returned from the Latin 
America-Asia Economic Cooperation Forum (FOCALAE) in Tokyo and that 
other (unnamed) nations shared Nicaragua's concerns.   He agreed 
that bilateral relations were not good, but said that he always 
tries to suggest publicly that they are, and urged the USG to do 
the same. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C)  The principal bilateral problem, he claimed, was USG 
interference in Nicaragua's internal affairs (i.e. our complaints 
about electoral fraud in the November 2008 municipal elections), 
and sought, as he had in previous occasions, to argue that 
statistics proved increasing support for the FSLN in successive 
electoral events.   While declining the opportunity to revisit GON 
arguments regarding the elections, which had been criticized not 
only by the USG, but by the EU and member states, the Catholic 
Church and international and domestic NGOs, the Ambassador said 
that we were still waiting for the National Electoral Council to 
actually publish detailed electoral results as Nicaraguan law 
requires.  Gomez at that point jumped in, suggesting that it had 
become a matter of sovereignty and that Nicaraguan electoral 
authorities would never publish results simply because the USG was 
demanding them. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Ambassador reiterated that Ortega's comments were 
offensive and damaging to the bilateral relationship.  He said that 
a senior USG delegation was planning to attend the Nicaraguan 
Army's change of command ceremony on February 21, and warned that 
if President Ortega repeated false accusations regarding Haiti it 
would have no choice but to walk out.   When Santos and Gomez 
suggested that this was a threat, the Ambassador said that in the 
interests of maintaining decent relations, he had felt obligated to 
give them advance warning.   Santos agreed to pass this message on 
to Ortega. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C)  At a press encounter earlier that day, the Ambassador took 
the opportunity to praise the Nicaraguan military presence in Haiti 
(search and rescue and medical) and to describe the U.S.-led 
international humanitarian effort there effort there.  He said that 
was "sad that some persons take advantage of this to play politics 
regarding U.S. actions."   The Ambassador's comments were 
extensively reported in print and electronic media. 
 
 
 
¶8. (C)  Comment:  The effort in Haiti simply does not fit with the 
GON's preferred portrait of the U.S. as a heartless, interfering, 
capitalist monster.   We can expect that GON spokesmen will stick 
to their talking points no matter how far they vary from reality. 
They have already been re-used by First Lady Rosario Murillo, FSLN 
international affairs chief Jacinto Suarez, and Nicaraguan 
Ambassador to the United Nations Maria Rubiales 
CALLAHAN