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FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0640
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP 0209

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUSAKA 000053 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/S LAYLWARD AND JNAMDE 
NSC FOR MGAVIN AND EHUIE 
ADDIS PLEASE PASS NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR GAVIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2020 
TAGS: PREL ECON EAID KCOR ZA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN 
AFFAIRS MICHELLE GAVIN'S VISIT 
 
LUSAKA 00000053  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael Koplovsky for reasons 1.4(d) 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary and Introduction:  The U.S. Mission to 
Zambia welcomes the visit of Michelle Gavin, Senior Director 
for African Affairs at the National Security Council and 
Senior Adviser to the President.  Your visit comes at a time 
when President Rupiah Banda's administration has changed 
course on a number of issues important to the United States. 
Your interventions can help set Zambia on a corrected course, 
bolstering progress on democracy and promoting transparency 
and accountability.  You should also press for enhanced 
cooperation in multilateral fora and a larger peacekeeping 
role.  In 2009, the GRZ pivoted away from anti-corruption, 
good governance, and regional stability, issues that had been 
a focus of the Mwanawasa government.  Banda is struggling to 
consolidate control within the ruling Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy party while maintaining national support in the 
lead up to 2011 general elections -- an election that could 
see a significant percentage of young voters disenfranchised 
if voter registration efforts do not begin in earnest soon. 
Banda has also changed course on Zimbabwe, deferring to 
President Mugabe as an elder liberation struggle hero. 
Despite significant financial U.S. assistance to Zambia, the 
GRZ is an inconsistent partner on regional and multilateral 
issues and has generally toed the African Union/Non-Aligned 
Movement line in international fora.  Zambia weathered the 
economic downturn relatively well but still struggles to 
reduce poverty through economic growth or to attract 
significant foreign investment.  End Summary and 
Introduction. 
 
Relationship Stressed But Improving 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) After the late President Mwanawasa's death in 2008, 
Banda was a consensus choice to replace him -- an older, 
not-so-ambitious candidate to serve out Mwanawasa's term and 
make way for new leadership in 2011.  His campaign was based 
on a "Mwanawasa legacy" platform, but Banda quickly tacked 
away from the previous government's agenda.  Mwanawasa's 
death left a weakened and fractured MMD.  Banda has pursued a 
more ambitious personal political agenda, exacerbating the 
rifts.  He now must work to consolidate control over the MMD 
while maintaining his support nationally.  Banda has removed 
or reshuffled competent cabinet members and national party 
executive committee officials considered Mwanawasa's people 
and replaced them with his own loyalists in a bid to 
consolidate control over the party (and government resources) 
in the lead up to an MMD party congress in 2010. 
 
¶3. (C) Since the 2008 by-election, Banda and his 
administration have demonstrated increasing intolerance of 
public criticism.  The GRZ has attempted to restrain the 
independent media through intimidation, such as the 
unsuccessful criminal case against "Post" editor Chansa 
Kabwela on charges of distributing pornography, and through 
restrictive media regulation legislation.  In August 2009, 
the government passed an NGO bill that could be used to 
silence organizations that are deemed not be operating in the 
"national interest."  These and other actions demonstrate the 
GRZ's lack of commitment to freedom of speech and expression 
when it does not serve the GRZ's purposes.  On many 
occasions, GRZ representatives have told the Ambassador and 
Emboffs that Zambia's young, fragile democracy cannot be 
exposed to unfettered freedoms that countries like the United 
States enjoy. 
 
¶4. (C) The Banda administration has lacked Mwanawasa's 
commitment to fight corruption.  In August 2009, former 
President Frederick Chiluba was acquitted of corruption 
charges by a Zambian court.  In the lead up to the acquittal, 
Banda treated Chiluba as an honored former head of state, 
speaking positively about him in the press and seating 
Chiluba and his wife at the head table at government events. 
After the acquittal, the GRZ removed Max Nkole, lead 
prosecutor of the Task Force on Corruption, which prosecuted 
all Chiluba-era corruption cases, for attempting to submit a 
request to appeal the decision.  The GRZ announced that the 
government would not appeal the decision and disbanded the 
Task Force, moving its remaining cases to the Anti-Corruption 
Commission (ACC), which is headed by a Banda loyalist.  The 
GRZ has yet to register the approximately USD 45 million UK 
civil court decision against Chiluba in a Zambian court.  In 
October 2009, at the nadir of its relationship with the 
international community, the GRZ publicly accused "foreign 
 
LUSAKA 00000053  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
diplomats" of interfering in its sovereignty and "inciting 
people" against the government after a memo describing a 
conversation between Banda and donor representatives, 
including the Ambassador, about the Chiluba case was leaked 
to the press.  The GRZ backed off after a number of European 
Ambassadors and Charge registered their concern with the 
Foreign Minister. 
 
¶5. (C) In December 2009, the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC) board re-selected Zambia for Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) Compact eligibility.  In making its decision, 
the board expressed concerns about the GRZ's commitment to 
good governance, anti-corruption efforts, and freedom of 
speech and expression, essential to Zambia's continued 
qualification for a compact.  While the GRZ touts Zambia's 
FY10 MCA indicator scores as proof that its commitment to 
transparency and good governance remains strong, the lagging 
indicators are based on information from 2008 or earlier. 
¶6. (C) In a series of recent meetings, GRZ officials have 
touted the government's new anti-corruption policy as proof 
that Banda is serious about fighting corruption.  The policy, 
announced in August 2009, would strengthen the ACC, pass and 
implement new anti-corruption legislation, and create a 
financial intelligence unit that meets international 
standards.  The GRZ has also committed to engage with NGOs on 
an implementation framework for the NGO law and has, for now, 
shelved its restrictive media regulation bill in favor of 
re-engagement with media organizations to develop a less 
restrictive self-regulatory mechanism.  While the GRZ's words 
are encouraging, Post has yet to see concrete action. 
 
The "Youth Bulge" and the 2011 Elections 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C)  Zambia is a young country, with an estimated 55 
percent of its 12.8 million people under the age of 19.  The 
Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) has done no voter 
registration since December 2005, which means that any 
Zambian citizen who has turned 18 since then is unable to 
vote.  The GRZ has promised to initiate a significant voter 
registration drive in the lead up to the 2011 elections, but 
has yet to commit the necessary resources.  It is estimated 
that unless issuance of voter and national registration cards 
(both required to vote) begins immediately, up to 2.8 million 
voters could be disenfranchised in the 2011 elections.  The 
GRZ has been dragging its feet on mobilizing voter 
registration drives, likely because a majority of Zambia's 
youth is expected to support the opposition in 2011.  Initial 
efforts by the Ministry of Home Affairs to issue national 
registration cards have been somewhat anemic, especially in 
opposition strongholds. 
 
Retreating from Leadership on Regional Issues 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Banda has refrained from speaking critically on the 
situation in Zimbabwe.  Banda has said that he prefers to 
pursue quiet, deferential regional diplomacy that emphasizes 
patience.  Soon after becoming president, Banda privately 
claimed to support his predecessor's public positions on 
Zimbabwe but said that, as the most junior head of state in 
the region, he must defer to his elders and let SADC take the 
lead on creating consensus on Zimbabwe.  In public he has 
been supportive of Mugabe as an elder of Africa's liberation 
struggle and described him as "a brave leader" and a 
"selfless nationalist who has withstood pressure from his 
enemies." 
 
¶9. (C) Zambia's military, totaling just over 20 thousand 
personnel, deploy with paramilitary elements of the Zambia 
Police Service for peacekeeping missions and are generally 
considered competent peacekeepers.  Zambia currently has 700 
peacekeepers deployed, including on UN missions in southern 
Sudan, Darfur, and Congo.  Zambia has not responded to the 
African Union (AU) call for peacekeepers in Somalia and is 
unlikely to do so unless the AU increases pay scales and 
provides equipment. 
 
¶10. (C) The United States provided battalion-level military 
training in 2007 under the African Contingency Operations 
Training Assistance (ACOTA) program.  Offers of a second 
round of training have been politely rebuffed for various and 
changing reasons.  A major hurdle to bilateral military 
cooperation is the GRZ's rejection of AFRICOM -- the GRZ 
views AFRICOM as a threat to Zambia's sovereignty and 
 
LUSAKA 00000053  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
suspects militarization of foreign policy. 
 
An Inconsistent Partner on Multilateral Issues 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶11. (C) Although Zambia ranks 28th in the world in U.S. 
assistance per capita and enjoys one of the largest Peace 
Corps programs, our cooperation on many multilateral issues 
is minimal.  Zambia's 2008 voting coincidence on 
non-consensus resolutions during the 2008 UNGA was 16 percent 
(and zero percent on votes deemed important by the USG).  In 
the months leading up to the 2009 UNGA, Post engaged the MFA 
at multiple levels to encourage the GRZ to vote its 
principles rather than in lockstep with the AU/Non-Aligned 
Movement positions.  MFA officials expressed an interest in 
changing the way it approaches votes at UNGA, saying that 
they felt their voice was lost by bloc voting even on 
resolutions about which they have different views.  While 
final tallies for 2009 UNGA voting have not been completed, 
Post does not expect a significant improvement in voting 
coincidence and expects a similar result on important votes. 
 
¶12. (C) In other fora, while Zambia has not recognized 
Kosovo's independence, the GRZ did support Kosovo's bid to 
join the World Bank and IMF.  Zambia supported the U.S. 
candidacy for the Human Rights Council and the renewal of the 
Sudan Special Rapporteur's mandate within the Council. 
 
Zambian Economy and GRZ Focus on Investment 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) A sharp rise in global copper prices and a bumper 
maize harvest helped Zambia to rebound quickly from the 2008 
economic downturn to an estimated five to six percent real 
GDP growth in 2009.  During the short-lived economic crisis, 
the GRZ renewed its focus on diversifying the economy to 
insulate it against volatile global copper prices. 
Unfortunately, Zambia's strong economic performance could 
cause the GRZ's focus on economic diversification to flounder 
as it has during past periods of robust copper-fueled 
economic growth. 
 
¶14. (C) In your possible meeting in Addis Ababa, Banda and/or 
Foreign Minister Pande will likely raise the issue of 
American investment in Zambia.  The USG has responded to GRZ 
interest in increasing bilateral trade and investment by 
working toward an Open Skies civil aviation agreement and 
proposing the creation of an informal working group on 
bilateral trade and investment lead by USTR on our side. 
Both efforts have been delayed repeatedly by GRZ inaction. 
Foreign Direct Investment is further constrained by a high 
cost of doing business.  Zambia has made strides to 
streamline business licensing and provide incentives to 
foreign investors, but high fuel costs, poor infrastructure, 
restrictive labor laws and a dearth of skilled labor continue 
to limit foreign investment. 
 
Engaging the GRZ 
---------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Your possible meeting with President Banda and/or 
Foreign Minister Pande on the margins ofthe AU summit and 
your subsequent visit to Lusaka will provide an opportunity 
to reinforce Washington's interest in governance and 
anti-corruption issues in Zambia.  You may wish to stress 
that commitment to good governance and fighting corruption is 
essential not just for Zambia's continued qualification for 
an MCA compact, but for the country's standing in the region 
and the world.  You can remind your Zambian interlocutors 
that it is crucial that 2011 general elections are free and 
fair so that the next Zambian administration be seen as 
credible both domestically and abroad.  You can also explain 
that the United States looks to Zambia to be a partner in the 
region and on the world stage.  As such, we will expect 
Zambia to cooperate in multilateral fora, to help solve 
regional problems, and to provide peacekeeping forces, for 
which we stand ready to assist with training and equipment. 
 
KOPLOVSKY