VZCZCXRO7135
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHLJ #0019/01 0251508
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251508Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7630
INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0013
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 0194
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0060
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 LJUBLJANA 000019 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/FO FOR DAS QUANRUD AND DAS JONES 
PM FOR PDAS COUNTRYMAN 
EUR/CE FOR KONDITI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EUN MARR BK KV SI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER ON SLOVENIA'S ENGAGEMENT IN THE 
WESTERN BALKANS 
 
REF: A. 09 LJUBLJANA 385 
     ¶B. LJUBLJANA 006 
 
Classified By: Pol-Econ Chief Yuriy Fedkiw, reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 
1.(C) Slovenia sees eye-to-eye with the United States on 
nearly all issues relating to the Western Balkans and offers 
us a good partner in promoting transatlantic priorities.  The 
one exception -- Slovenia's refusal to allow Croatia's EU 
accession talks to move forward without an agreement on 
resolving the bilateral border dispute -- now appears to be 
on a path toward resolution, though several procedural and 
political hurdles remain on the Slovenian side.  One sign of 
this improved relationship is the proposal by Prime Ministers 
Pahor and Kosor to jointly-sponsor with the EU a conference 
on the Western Balkans in the second half of March.  The 
Western Balkans are and will remain a primary focus for 
Slovenian foreign policy and development/aid assistance. 
Ljubljana shares our goal of EU and NATO expansion in the 
Balkans, believing it will further regional stabilization and 
development goals.  The Slovenians would like to see 
membership extended to all the former Yugoslav republics and 
Albania, and is fighting in Brussels to keep the EU from 
losing its focus on the region, particularly now that Sweden 
has passed the baton of the EU Presidency to the Spanish. 
 
2.(C) Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) forms a major focal point 
for Slovenia's overall foreign policy, and Ljubljana has 
indicated to us on several occasions that Slovenia is seeking 
closer coordination with the United States on all issues 
affecting that country and the region as a whole.  We should 
take advantage of Slovenia's unique position as we continue 
to actively engage in BiH to address constitutional reform 
issues.  Slovenia is actively seeking a more prominent 
leadership role in the Western Balkans -- Volk's visit to 
Washington offers us an opportunity to recognize Slovenia's 
contributions to date and encourage Ljubljana to keep using 
its influence in BiH to help resolve the impasse surrounding 
the Butmir process.  More broadly, Volk's visit offers an 
opportunity to encourage Slovenia to aim high in the region. 
Slovenia's goal should be leadership -- not "of" the region, 
but "on behalf of" the region.  End summary. 
 
A GOOD ALLY WITH A UNIQUE PERSPECTIVE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS 
 
3.(SBU) This message is intended to update policy makers on 
Slovenia's engagement in the Western Balkans in advance of 
MFA Western Balkans Coordinator Vojko Volk's January 26 visit 
to Washington to introduce Slovenia's "new" Western Balkans 
Policy. 
 
4.(SBU) In a speech delivered on January 7, Foreign Minister 
Zbogar outlined the role of Slovenian diplomacy in the 
Western Balkans.  Zbogar assessed that Slovenia enjoys 
excellent relations with countries in the region based on 
mutual trust and equal partnership.  The FM noted Ljubljana's 
policy is to apply a consistent and impartial approach to all 
countries in the Western Balkans, and in particular, to 
places where there may be fundamental disagreements such as 
Serbia and Kosovo.  According to Zbogar, Slovenia seeks to 
create an environment conducive to supporting its own 
national interests while allowing for in-depth cooperation in 
areas of mutual interest for all the former Yugoslav states. 
To accomplish this, Slovenia sees the prospect of EU and NATO 
membership not only as a stabilizing factor, but also as a 
key engine for reform, particularly in Sarajevo.  The FM 
noted in his speech that Slovenia will continue to play a 
role in contributing to security sector reform and ensuring 
that the rule of law takes hold in the Western Balkans. 
Slovenia plans to participate in a reconstructed EU mission 
in BiH whose main task will be to train the BiH armed forces. 
 Slovenia will also maintain its relatively large presence in 
KFOR, as well as the EU civilian missions in BiH and Kosovo 
and the OSCE missions in BiH, Serbia and Kosovo. 
 
5.(SBU) To underscore its long-term commitment to the region, 
the Government of Slovenia (GOS) plans to shortly present to 
Parliament a Western Balkans Strategy that is to codify a 
more coherent and coordinated approach to engagement of both 
the countries and citizens of the region.  It is our 
 
LJUBLJANA 00000019  002 OF 004 
 
 
understanding that Volk's main purpose in traveling to the 
United States is to outline this new strategy.  The head of 
the MFA's Division for Southeastern Europe and Regional 
Cooperation, Alenka Kosir, said that Slovenia's new strategy 
will accomplish two major tasks.  First, it will lay out 
Slovenia's promise to assist the Western Balkan states in 
Euro-Atlantic integration.  The strategy will review past 
accomplishments and broadly set future goals, laying out in 
general terms what Slovenia wants to accomplish in the region 
on both bilateral and multilateral levels.  Second, the 
strategy will provide the MFA with the legal structure it 
needs to ease the interagency coordination process.  For 
example, the new structure would allow for better 
coordination of educational and other types of exchanges with 
the region, as well as the free movement of people, goods, 
and capital services.  This change is expected to permit the 
MFA to coordinate its policies more easily and encourage 
other ministries to "come on board" with Slovenia's overall 
foreign policy goals as they relate to the Western Balkans. 
 
6.(SBU) As part of the integration process, Slovenia has 
called on EU member states to step up the process of visa 
liberalization for BiH and Albania.  Slovenia sees the 
scrapping of visas for the entire Balkan region as a top 
priority and important step for reducing barriers between the 
EU and the region.  A Slovenian MEP, Tanja Fajon, is the 
European Parliament's Special Rapporteur for Visa 
Liberalization for the Western Balkans.  Another MEP, Jelko 
Kacin, is the EP Rapporteur for Serbia.  Slovenia's strong 
political, economic, commercial, historical and 
people-to-people ties with the region give Ljubljana a unique 
perspective into the problems the Western Balkan nations are 
facing.  Slovenian experts and government officials provide 
training in the areas of legislation, education, democracy 
building and the organization of key state institutions. 
Slovenian ministries have also cooperated closely with their 
counterparts on a more technical level to assist Western 
Balkan countries in meeting the EU accession standards.  In 
addition to official government and NGO links, Slovenia has a 
fairly complex web of connections with the countries of the 
Western Balkans through business and trade.  Recent figures 
indicate that 67% of Slovenian direct investment is in the 
Western Balkans. 
 
SLOVENIA ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
 
7.(C) Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) forms a key focal point 
for Ljubljana's foreign policy.  Slovenia actively supports 
the joint U.S./EU effort to break the current logjam in BiH. 
FM Zbogar made several trips to BiH at the end of 2009 to 
talk with Bosniak leaders, and the MFA seconded one of its 
top lawyers to Sarajevo to work on the constitutional 
question.  FM Zbogar noted in his January 7 speech that the 
Butmir process has failed to deliver success. The FM urged 
all parties to continue their dialogue and not turn their 
backs on those most at risk.  While Zbogar did not elaborate 
on who he was specifically referring to during his public 
speech, Zbogar told CDA during a late December meeting that 
the Bosniaks would radicalize if they were left believing 
that the international community (IC) was turning its back on 
them (reftel A).  Our working-level interlocutors at the MFA 
have noted that they were concerned this process of 
radicalization was beginning.  According to the MFA's Kosir, 
the Bosniaks felt Butmir was too Republika Srpska focused. 
Kosir told Pol-Econ Chief in early January that the Bosniaks 
had high expectations for the Butmir Process and were ready 
to negotiate, but once the process began to falter, not 
enough external pressure was put on all parties to come to a 
final agreement.  As a result, the MFA believes time is 
limited and that the process should continue even as the 
elections approach. 
 
8.(C) Slovenia also believes Russia and Turkey both need to 
take on a more active role in the Butmir process.  According 
to Kosir, the IC's future strategy should focus primarily on 
well-coordinated private discussions with the Bosniaks and 
other partners, as public gatherings of the three BiH parties 
have brought limited results.  As the process moves forward, 
Kosir advocated that the three parties come to a private 
agreement before going public to avoid further 
politicization, and that the IC's main message to the 
Bosniaks should be that the IC is standing by to help.  Kosir 
 
LJUBLJANA 00000019  003 OF 004 
 
 
noted that the Bosniaks trust the United States and that 
Washington should use this leverage as the IC considers its 
next steps. 
 
9.(C) Ljubljana is concerned that the IC may send the wrong 
signal to the region if BiH's process of Euro-Atlantic 
integration is put on indefinite hold because BiH's EU 
accession application will not be considered until the Office 
of the High Representative (OHR) closes.  Although Slovenia 
believes the OHR should be closed down and that all 
conditions must be met before the transition can take place, 
Ljubljana is convinced the IC needs to present BiH with 
sufficient and credible incentives to keep the reform process 
moving and to underscore the importance of BiH's territorial 
integrity.  In one of the few areas where Slovenia disagrees 
with the United States, Ljubljana would like to see MAP 
offered to BiH as soon as possible, preferably this April. 
The MFA believes that MAP would offer the Bosniaks the 
psychological and security guarantees they need to stay 
engaged in the reform process.  Slovenia sees MAP as a 
starting point and as a means to achieve reform -- according 
to Kosir, the Bosniaks are mired in a vicious cycle and a 
strong incentive is required to pull them out.  However, CDA 
conveyed to both Foreign Minister Zbogar and the Prime 
Minister's foreign policy advisor the U.S. position that 
progress on reform is necessary before the U.S. will consider 
MAP.  Zbogar's question -- "what would constitute progress?" 
-- will likely be on Volk's lips when he visits Washington. 
 
10.(C) Visa liberalization, while high on Slovenia's agenda, 
does not offer the same type of incentive to the Bosniaks as 
MAP would.  Kosir explained that the Bosniaks saw the EU move 
to grant visa liberalization to Croatia and Serbia and not to 
BiH as an injustice committed against the Bosniak people -- 
visa liberalization for BiH would only "right a previous 
wrong" and level the playing field.  She noted that both the 
politicians and the general public in BiH agree on MAP. 
Because it is so difficult to get all the parties in BiH to 
agree on anything, Slovenia reasons that offering MAP in 
April presents the best incentive. 
 
SLOVENIA AND KOSOVO, MACEDONIA 
 
11.(SBU) Slovenia was the first Yugoslav successor state to 
recognize Kosovo's independence in March 2008, during its EU 
Presidency.  Volk was Slovenia's first Ambassador to 
Pristina.  The first Kosovo Ambassador to Slovenia, Anton 
Berisha, presented his credentials to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs on December 17, 2009.  At that time, MFA State 
Secretary Dragoljuba Bencina assessed the relations between 
the two countries as very positive and called for enhanced 
bilateral economic cooperation. 
 
12.(C) Ljubljana is cautiously optimistic that the ICJ's 
ruling will favor Kosovo and is actively engaged in Belgrade 
to ensure Serbia fully cooperates with the international 
community on Kosovo's legal status.  However, the PM's 
foreign policy advisor asked CDA on January 21 whether 
Washington had a contingency plan for dealing with Serbia if 
the ICJ ruling goes against Kosovo.  Volk may probe 
Washington's thinking in this regard. 
 
13.(C) Slovenia currently has 395 troops participating in 
KFOR, and plans to keep around 300 there after the NATO 
drawdown in late January or early February 2010.  Even as 
other KFOR contributors are looking for ways to reduce their 
numbers, Slovenia plans to maintain its role and the size of 
its contribution to KFOR as conditions progress toward 
further drawdown.  Slovenia's soldiers are well-liked by both 
Kosovars and Serbs, who appreciate the Slovenes' 
understanding of local history, customs, and language.  Since 
its EU Presidency in 2008, Slovenia has worked to increase 
access for Kosovo in regional fora and to continue the 
gradual process of Kosovo's regional integration. 
 
14.(C) Slovenia fully supports Macedonia's aspirations to 
join the EU and NATO.  Prime Minister Pahor is interested in 
helping to resolve the Greece-Macedonia standoff, but he has 
little to show so far for his private discussions with Greek 
PM Yeoryios Papandreou and Macedonian PM Nikola Gruevski.  FM 
Zbogar told CDA that Pahor delivered a "firm" message to 
Gruevski when the two men recently met, regarding the need to 
 
LJUBLJANA 00000019  004 OF 004 
 
 
see the current financial crisis in Greece as an opportunity 
to resolve political issues and revive trade links. 
 
SLOVENIA'S DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR THE REGION 
 
15.(SBU) Slovenia focuses its development assistance on 
several geographic regions, with the primary one being the 
Western Balkans.  FM Zbogar recently noted that 70% of 
Slovenia's bilateral development assistance is devoted to the 
region.  Slovenia has already signed bilateral development 
cooperation agreements with Albania, BiH, Macedonia, Moldova 
and Serbia.  An agreement with Kosovo is in the pipeline. 
Slovenia channels its bilateral development cooperation 
primarily through non-governmental organizations.  For 
example, Slovenia is active in the area of demining through 
the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims 
Assistance and through the Center for European Perspective to 
build technical capacities for Euro-Atlantic structures. 
 
16.(SBU) Slovenian development assistance also targets 
specific sectors such as children and social services, good 
governance, and environmental protection.  These projects tie 
in well with President Turk's overall focus on human security 
issues.  Because Slovenia's development assistance in real 
terms is limited, Slovenia proposes to move forward with 
"tripartite" projects that combine the efforts of Slovenia, 
an additional donor country and host country development aid. 
 According to FM Zbogar, this approach will promote local 
ownership and responsibility for the projects.  As a result 
of this "tripartite" approach, Slovenia is looking to further 
cooperation with USAID on funding aid and assistance projects 
in the region. 
 
COMMENT 
 
17.(C) Slovenia has a unique window into the Western Balkans 
based upon a shared history and web of government, business 
and personal relationships.  Slovenia recognizes that it has 
both a responsibility and a national interest in aiding 
Western Balkan nations move towards greater European and 
trans-Atlantic integration and has undertaken several 
initiatives (some of which are outlined in this cable) to 
achieve this goal.  As Slovenia continues to seek a foreign 
policy niche for itself in an expanding European Union, we 
should encourage the Slovenes to use their influence to help 
the Western Balkan states maintain their course of deeper 
integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
 
18.(C) Slovenia has a powerful success story to tell, and can 
take a leadership role in bringing further democratization 
and reform to the region.  Slovenia also has an important 
role to play in Brussels to overcome EU expansion fatigue. 
We should take advantage of Volk's trip to Washington to ask 
the Slovenes to help us maintain momentum in the Butmir 
reform process in BiH and to convince all parties involved to 
take ownership of the process and move it forward.  More 
broadly, we should encourage Slovenia to set its sights on 
leadership -- not leadership "of" the region, but leadership 
"on behalf of" the region, both in Brussels and by supporting 
the reforms necessary for these countries to enter the EU and 
NATO. 
 
FREDEN