VZCZCXRO0085
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHLJ #0001/01 0041053
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041053Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7610
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1197
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0073
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LJUBLJANA 000001 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2020 
TAGS: PREL NATO MARR AF SI
SUBJECT: SLOVENIA: OMLT ON ORDER FOR OCT 2010, LOGISTICS 
NEXT ON THE MENU 
 
Classified By: CDA Brad Freden, reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Slovenia announced on December 24 that it 
would lead an Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT) in 
Afghanistan beginning no later than October 2010, with 
functional caveats lifted to allow Slovene troops to 
accompany Afghan security forces on operations.  USG support 
will be required if the Slovenians are to meet the October 30 
deadline.  Defense Minister Jelusic told CDA on December 30 
that the compressed timeframe prior to deployment will 
challenge the Slovene Armed Forces (SAF) to have all 
logistics and training completed by October, with the most 
pressing concern being the immediate procurement of 
up-armored HMMWVs or similar armored vehicles.  The current 
wait for up-armored HMMWVs purchased through FMS is more than 
a year, and the Minister of Defense told CDA that she will 
not deploy Slovenian forces without adequate armor.  The 
Colorado National Guard plans to contribute up to 25 troops 
with specialized skills to the Slovenian OMLT during its 
first year of deployment, but will also be hard-pressed to 
meet the October deployment deadline if preliminary steps are 
not completed and a formal agreement is not reached before 
the end of January.  Minister Jelusic stressed that the 
government needed to ramp up efforts on the "homefront" to 
engage both key political players and the general public in 
the run-up to deployment.  End Summary. 
 
One OMLT, No Functional Caveats 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The coalition government made its official decision 
on December 24 to lift functional caveats and lead an OMLT in 
Herat, where Slovene soldiers currently provide force 
protection on an Italian base.  The Slovene troops will train 
an Afghan battalion, and are expected to begin in late 
October 2010.  The government's decision allows Slovenia to 
deploy the OMLT for two years, with 4 six-month rotations of 
approximately 90 troops (30-45 in the OMLT and the rest 
providing force protection).  A new mandate would be required 
to extend the deployment beyond the initial two years.  The 
Slovene troops, augmented by up to 25 Colorado Army National 
Guard (CONG) soldiers, will take over the OMLT from a U.S. 
Embedded Training Team (ETT) currently operating out of Camp 
Stone in Herat. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Slovenia notified Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE) at the December 7 ISAF force generation 
conference of its plan to field an OMLT.  With the final 
decision on December 24, Slovenia can now receive a formal 
tasking from SHAPE to take over the OMLT from the U.S. ETT in 
Herat.  Slovene Armed Forces (SAF) will then perform a 
mission analysis to determine the number and composition of 
its contingent, name a commander for the OMLT, and then 
submit a Request for Forces (RFF) letter to Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), who will evaluate the proposal and 
send an RFF letter to the CONG.  The normal range for 
National Guard contributions to state partnership OMLTs runs 
from 12-30 troops, and Colorado has informally notified 
Slovenia that the CONG can contribute up to 25 troops. 
 
Logistics and Assistance: HMMWVs and Training 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) State Secretary Krek told CDA on December 30 that 
the Slovene troops will need up-armored HMMWVs for the OMLT. 
Krek noted that Slovenia would procure the HMMWVs any way 
possible, though Foreign Military Sales (FMS) would be 
preferable due to cost.  ODC has already begun to fast-track 
a request through the FMS process, but the normal lead time 
for production and delivery exceeds 12 months.  Other 
procurement requests, for night-vision goggles, laser-range 
finders, and communications equipment, could follow as 
Slovenia discusses lessons learned with its neighbors, 
Croatia and Hungary, who have fielded OMLTs. 
 
¶5. (SBU) CONG has also notified Slovenia that it needs a 
270-day lead time to have its troops ready to complete 
training and preparations for deployment, meaning that a 
late-October deployment would require Slovenia to complete 
the RFF process and have formal agreement with Colorado by 
late January.  After formal agreement, it is likely that SAF 
 
LJUBLJANA 00000001  002 OF 002 
 
 
and CONG would coordinate on a fact-finding trip to Herat in 
early spring as well as on joint pre-deployment training in 
Germany in spring and summer. 
 
Homefront Opinions and Emotions 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Minister Jelusic told CDA on December 30 that 
convincing the homefront of the value and need for an OMLT 
would be a tough task, in addition to managing the logistics 
for deployment.  She highlighted the close nature of Slovene 
society and how it is not just soldiers' families who are 
affected, but extended families, friends and communities.  On 
the political front, Jelusic and FM Zbogar briefed the 
parliamentary Defense Committee on the government's proposal 
on December 17.  Zbogar later noted to CDA that the briefing 
had succeeded in getting some of the more skeptical MPs to 
understand the urgency of ISAF's mission and how Slovenia 
could raise the quality of its ISAF contribution without 
increasing substantially the number of troops deployed. 
Zbogar reported that the committee wanted a detailed status 
report in one year to reevaluate their support for the 
deployment, and that the government would appreciate the 
Embassy's support on a proactive public diplomacy strategy in 
the meantime.  CDA reaffirmed our commitment to support the 
OMLT deployment, both with help from the Colorado Army 
National Guard on the military side, and with public 
diplomacy assistance in Slovenia. 
 
Comment:  Decision taken, Now Comes the Hard Work 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7. (C) After a long process overshadowed by the emotional 
border dispute with Croatia and the economic crisis, the GoS 
finally made a tough and much-appreciated decision to 
qualitatively improve its ISAF contribution.  This deployment 
will not happen without USG support.  The Minister of Defense 
told us flat-out that it would be political suicide for this 
government to deploy Slovenian troops in a new, more 
dangerous mission without adequate armored vehicles.  The MOD 
has the money, but they will need our help to acquire the 
vehicles -- by purchase or lease, from the U.S. or a third 
country -- in time to deploy by October.  SHAPE, the 
Slovenian Armed Forces, and the Colorado Guard will have to 
work together seamlessly for at least the next 30 days in 
order to get the CONG contribution rolling. 
 
¶8. (C) Though the government announced both increased 
civilian assistance for Afghanistan and the possibility of 
fielding an OMLT in mid-December, the public, media, and the 
political class seemed to pay more attention to the civilian 
assistance.  This highlights the challenge facing the 
government as it ramps up for deployment in October 2010: how 
to sell the idea to a skeptical public and handle the 
inevitable questions about Slovene troops in harm's way.  As 
Krek told CDA in November, the policy sounds good now, but if 
there is a casualty, "you know what will hit the fan."  We 
are urging the government to prepare for such situations, 
especially on the public relations front.  With the political 
decision now made, the reality of the challenge must spur the 
government to more serious public diplomacy efforts.  END 
COMMENT. 
SHULTZ