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INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
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C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 000069 
 
SIPDIS 
DRL FOR GREG MAGGIO AND WHA/AND FOR KAREN SANJINES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/25 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI PHUM PE
SUBJECT: Bagua Report - No Consensus but a Good Start 
 
REF: 10 LIMA 0033; 09 LIMA 1010; 09 LIMA 1124 
09 LIMA 1380 AND PREVIOUS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: James D. Nealon, Charge D'Affaires; REASON: 1.4B, D 
 
¶1.   (C)  Summary:  After three months of work, the "Special 
Commission to Investigate and Analyze the Events of Bagua" in late 
December issued its report describing the causes and events leading 
up to the June 5, 2009 violence.  The document assigns blame 
broadly - including to the government and indigenous communities - 
and provides non-binding recommendations aimed at avoiding a repeat 
episode in the future.  Two members of the Commission did not sign 
the report and, along with a third member who did sign, issued 
"dissenting" documents.  Those opinions are included as part of the 
report, and assert that the investigation lacked sufficient 
resources and was slanted in favor of the government.  Rather than 
setting the record straight, the report has revived debate about 
what happened and who was responsible.  In our view, the report 
accurately reflects a complicated and confusing series of events, 
and helps dispel widely disseminated misinformation about an 
alleged police massacre of "hundreds" of indigenous people.   End 
Summary. 
 
Background 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The violence in and around the Amazon town of Bagua last 
June 5 represents the single greatest crisis faced by the Garcia 
administration to date.  24 police and 10 civilians (five of whom 
were indigenous) were killed and more than two hundred persons 
injured, including 82 with bullet wounds.  Roughly one month after 
the events took place, four working groups ("Mesas de Dialogo") 
were established under the aegis of the National Coordinating Group 
for the Development of Amazon Populations ("Grupo Nacional") to 
address the various issues surrounding the deadly Amazon clashes. 
The first working group (Mesa 1) was charged with appointing 
members of and establishing an investigative commission to conduct 
research into the causes and events leading up to the June 5 
violence. 
 
¶3.  (C) Following consultations with various participants and 
stakeholders (including indigenous organizations, the Church, the 
Ombudsman's office, GOP officials and NGOs), Mesa 1 concluded its 
work and on September 7 established the "Special Commission to 
Investigate and Analyze the Events of Bagua."  Three of the 
Commission's seven members were nominated by indigenous 
representatives and four by the GOP and regional governments. 
(Note: One of the GOP-nominated members left the Commission early 
on in the process, apparently for personal reasons, and has not 
commented on the report.  End note.)  The Commission worked for 
three months to complete its mandate, interviewing numerous 
community members, indigenous representatives and others, and 
visiting rural indigenous communities in the Amazon twice for a 
total of 11 days.  Completed in late December, the Commission's 
main report was placed on the Prime Minister's website on December 
¶21.   Several days later, two dissenting opinions, one written by 
Father Ricardo Alvarez Lobo (a Dominican Catholic Priest), and 
another jointly produced by Jesus Manaces Valverde (an indigenous 
leader and President of the Commission) and Sister Carmen Gomez 
Calleja (a Jesuit nun and reportedly a member of the radical SUTEP 
teachers' union), were added to the report.  (Note: Manaces and 
Gomez did not sign the main report, but Alvarez did.  End note.) 
The final report did not receive wide attention in the media until 
an incendiary photo of a missing and presumed murdered policeman 
(ref A) was released to the press on January 7, reigniting the 
passions and reviving the debate over what really happened at Bagua 
and who was responsible. 
 
Highlights of the Main Report 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The main document entitled "The Final Report by the 
Special Commission to Investigate the Events of Bagua - So it Never 
Happens Again" consists of 87 pages, with an additional thirteen 
pages of dissenting opinion included as part of the package.  The 
main report's outline, including brief Embassy remarks (in 
brackets), follows below: 
 
 
Introduction   (Useful in listing the actors involved in the 
process.) 
 
I-        Commission's Methodology (Includes a description of the 
scope of work, agenda, visits to the field and interviews. We have 
heard anecdotally that some witnesses, both from indigenous 
communities and the police , were reluctant to disclose full 
details for fear of retribution.) 
 
II-      Situation of the Amazonian Peoples (Useful in 
understanding the challenges faced by native peoples both in the 
national context and in the District of Bagua, including 
socio-cultural, economic, political and religious factors.  The 
indigenous communities have long been overlooked by the GOP, suffer 
from high rates of poverty and unemployment, and generally have not 
benefitted from the presence of extractive industries in the 
region.) 
 
III-    World Views of the Awajun Wampis (An anthropological 
explanation of the "Cosmovision" of the main ethnic group involved 
in the Bagua incidents, including its myths, social values, 
organization and gender roles.) 
 
IV-   Narrative and Chronology of June 5 Events (Mostly focused on 
events at locations where the worst violence occurred, including 
the Devil's Curve, Pumping Station No. 6, Bagua and Utcubamba, 
based on interviews with eyewitnesses, including local residents, 
indigenous people, policemen and regional and national authorities, 
as well as secondary reference documents.  Indigenous and police 
accounts of certain critical details, such as who fired the first 
shot, are directly contradictory, but all versions are included. 
The report does not resolve all such discrepancies.  Includes some 
historical and political factors influencing the atmosphere, 
including the notorious "Rubber Boom" of the early 20th century, 
when many indigenous Peruvians died after being enslaved as rubber 
tappers.) 
 
V-     Analysis and Conclusions (Examines the participation of 
various actors, "applying the principles of truth, justice and 
independence."  Tends to blame situations rather than individuals 
for the violence, including poverty, social exclusion, the 
executive branch's clumsy handling of the legislative decrees, fear 
of foreign investment, distrust and ignorance on the part of the 
indigenous communities, as well as  mis- and dis-information.  It 
also spotlights the role of outside actors - including members of 
the Peruvian Nationalist Party, Ronderos, SUTEP (the radical 
teachers union), and resentful indigenous veterans of the 1995 
Cenepa War - in stirring up the indigenous communities.) 
 
VI-   Recommendations (Non-binding advice is provided to Congress, 
the Executive, the Judicial branch, Regional and Local governments, 
Amazonian indigenous organizations, Christian churches, NGOs, 
political parties, extractive enterprises , investors and the media 
to, inter alia, improve the consultation process, continue formal 
dialogue between the GOP and indigenous communities, create and 
implement a major poverty reduction and development plan for the 
Amazon, include indigenous personnel in the national police and 
military, return weaponry taken by indigenous protesters from 
police, redirect NGOs' focus to citizen responsibilities in 
addition to rights, improve transparency and dialogue between 
indigenous communities and extractive enterprises, and promote more 
accurate and less confrontational reporting through the media.) 
 
Highlights of Dissenting Opinions 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The two members of the commission who did not sign the 
final report, Manaces and Gomez, describe their joint letter to 
Agriculture Minister de Cordova as "an alternative report": the 
document contains 43 points that highlight the shortcomings of an 
earlier, leaked, draft of the Commission's report.  (They 
acknowledge that the Commission's subsequent final draft corrects 
deficiencies, but argue, somewhat incoherently, that the spirit of 
the final report remains faulty.)  Manaces and Gomez echo 
criticisms made by other commission members that the investigation 
 
lacked sufficient resources, while emphasizing their view that the 
final product is slanted in favor of the government.  Their 
document also argues that the report's criticism of the role of the 
Church, NGOs, political parties, and other organizations in 
supporting the protesters is condescending, and wrongly implies 
that the actions of indigenous people are always "the product of 
[outside organizations'] deceit and manipulation."  It also 
maintains that the Commission's report neglects to examine the root 
causes of the unrest, including the deterioration of indigenous 
land rights beginning under the administration of Alberto Fujimori, 
and calls for more international oversight into the process. 
 
¶6.  (C) Note: The Commission's technical secretary (protect) told 
the Embassy that Gomez herself had leaked the earlier draft of the 
report, which garnered significant media attention for several days 
in mid-December, as an apparent attempt to undermine the 
Commission's work.  The draft had included text specifically 
accusing Jesuit religious workers of supporting the indigenous 
protesters' "legal and illegal methods, which resulted in the 
deaths of police and natives," but praised Dominican-led churches 
for being peacemakers elsewhere in the Amazon.  The draft also said 
a "racist, romantic anthropology" proposed by many NGOs created a 
radicalized indigenous world view that was incompatible with change 
and progress.  These and other controversial phrases, the technical 
secretary said, were only one Commission member's words, and had 
not been discussed by the group before they were leaked.  They were 
not intended for public consumption, and were not included in the 
final report.  Nonetheless, in leaking this draft, Gomez planted a 
lasting impression of a biased and insensitive report, which 
continues to be the subject of local and international NGO 
criticism.  End Note. 
 
¶7.   (SBU) Father Alvarez, who did sign the report, issued a 
separate two-page commentary that distributes responsibility to a 
wide range of actors.  He criticizes President Garcia for his 
series of 2007-8 articles entitled "The Dog in the Manger" ("El 
Perro del Hortelano" - taken from Aesop's fable) arguing that 
progress and development of the Amazon is being held up by a tiny 
minority.  He blames the Executive for mishandling the PTPA-related 
decrees, two of which were later rescinded, and for failing to 
coordinate among ministries before and during the security 
operation.  He faults Congress for failing to assume its 
responsibilities and misunderstanding the motivations of indigenous 
communities.  He charges indigenous leaders with fomenting 
insurrection and ignoring the President, legal institutions and the 
rule of law, and he accuses the national and local media, social 
activists and political party leaders for exacerbating and 
inflaming an already tense situation. 
 
Other Reactions 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Commission's report did not receive extensive public 
attention, until a widely distributed incendiary photo of a missing 
and presumed murdered policeman surrounded by his indigenous 
captors reignited passions and revived the debate over the Bagua 
violence and who was responsible.  Immediately after the National 
Coordinating Group for the Development of Amazon Populations 
officially launched the report January 12, the Interethnic 
Association for the Development of Amazonian Peoples (AIDESEP) and 
the Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP) 
rejected it - arguing that it was incomplete, skewed against the 
indigenous communities, and unlikely to lead to reconciliation. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The Institute for Legal Defense (IDL), a Lima-based NGO 
focusing on legal and human rights issues, published an 18-page 
paper entitled "The Bagua Report: Neither Independence, nor Truth, 
nor Towards Reconciliation" in response to the report's release. 
IDL's paper asserts that the report cannot be considered a credible 
version of events because it was not signed by all members of the 
Commission.  Moreover, it contends that the main report is slanted 
and politicized in order to protect high GOP officials from blame 
(by using the police and military as "scapegoats") and to tarnish 
the image of groups who oppose development plans for the jungle 
areas. The IDL paper concludes that the report sends "a very bad 
signal on how the administration interprets the Amazonian conflict, 
 
and what it really intends to do in the Amazon, far from all 
national debate and the rights of the indigenous peoples."  The 
Bishop of Chimbote, Luis Bambaren, also challenged the report's 
characterization of the role of Catholic religious workers during 
the Bagua conflict.  In particular, he disputed the claim that 
priests had helped to incite violence and defended their provision 
of food and shelter to the indigenous protesters as a positive and 
peaceful gesture. 
 
Comment:  No Consensus but a Good Start 
 
¶10.  (C) The Special Commission's official report is, in our view, 
a necessary point of departure for the historical record.  It 
describes a complicated structural problem relating to the 
historical marginalization of indigenous communities in areas where 
the state is largely absent, and seeks accurately to capture a 
deeply confusing series of events - seen in different ways by 
different groups with different perspectives and interests - that 
led to the June 5 violence.  The report probably goes as far as it 
can go, given the freshness of the violence, the understandable 
reluctance of participants and witnesses to tell all, and the fact 
that separate congressional and judicial investigations were (are) 
happening in parallel.  If it fails to resolve definitively the 
controversy surrounding what really happened and who was 
responsible, it helps to correct wildly exaggerated initial claims 
that the GOP had perpetrated "genocide" against innocent indigenous 
people - a mistaken but widespread interpretation that could 
generate a vicious cycle of mistaken reactions. 
 
¶11. (U) The full, final report and dissenting opinions can be 
accessed at: 
http://www.pcm.gob.pe/Prensa/ActividadesPCM/2 009/Diciembre/bagua/In 
forme Final de la Comision Especial para Investigar y Analizar los 
sucesos de Bagua.pdf 
NEALON